probably aren't worried as much about a denial of service which is what the banks are experiencing or the exfiltration of data thatpl might u steal corporate espionage or th nature. or the criminal attacks that people want to, you know, attack the banks to try and get some money. we are more worried about, again, the physical damage that would be done to the electric system that would disable the economy and every other part of the economy that depends on electricity. >> host: are there deficiencies in the information sharing abilities? >> guest: well, we are definitely working to improve the information sharing abilities. there is information sharing that is going on right now through, again, through from the government to the industry to the federal regulators and our federal regulator is greatly expanding under the chairman's leadership. its own capabilities. but it needs to be improved, and it needs to focus on exactly what kind of intelligence we need, actionable intelligence. and this is why we have a very, very high level group working with ceos and cios and others working with the secretaries

oftentimes when we speak about china and chinese entities, infiltrating targets in the united and exfiltrating information. there are a couple of things that come to mind here. first, they cannot lose it entirely. they adopt have to send somebody in to do that. that's an interesting historic issue. also, i think it's a fair assumption in china we have both scenarios at the same time hire -- [inaudible] engaged in operation intelligence. and companies where individuals take a initiative, essentially a market for stolen ip, intellectual property. we have at the same time entrepreneurial and -- [inaudible] this is a very confusing situation, because, for instance, a lot of discussion in washington, d.c., right now about hacking back. not sitting back and being, you know, robbed of valuable property, intent yule property. but try fog go after the attackers. now it makes a difference who you are going after. whether you're going after a small individual or after an organized state entity. it's difficult to go in to more detail in the debate because so much is -- is not in the public domain, and i s

really have as much data as we would like, particularly day that that shows us property that's been exfiltrated back to china who then is successfully able to reverse engineer it who can then productize it, markettize it and show a demonstrable, quantifiable loss of u.s. company market share in china and then when they compete with them globally. there are few cases where we have enough data to make that chain, and it's primarily because there are not really the guidelines for many of those companies to self-report those problems. the sec has tightened up some of their guidelines about reporting loss of shareholder value. but many of the companies i deal with feel that they're not properly indemnified from reporting that. so in many ways, many of them are looking to congress for legislation that will provide them with the indemnification that they need to share information with the government without antitrust problems or even collude with one another and share intrusion data with one another so they can engage in collective defense without legal jeopardy. now, we have begun the talk to the chi

three years ago where somebody apparently from russia hacked the georgia ministry and try to exfiltrate the document. and the computer emergency response team in georgia found out something was fishy and they actually put a pdf fire rigged had malware embedded and something fancy like nato agreement. so the russian hacker apparently stepped to the trap and hacked him and took a video of the guy and picture with his web cam. it's a guy sitting there and his wife in -- >> if anybody hasn't seen the photograph. go home tonight and dig it up. it's exactly what you think it would be. [laughter] but it's an interesting point. it didn't solve the attribution problem. they didn't know who it was. they had no idea who of it. >> okay. chad, back in your days in dhs let's say company x got attacked. they call you up and say, i know my government. they are not going attack back on my behalf. because they don't want to escalate to a general cyber war. do you have any problem if we think we know who attacked us if we blow up their servers? >> well, it's a fair question and we -- when we got asked tha

become increasingly adept at exploiting weaknesses in our computer networks, and once inside they can exfiltrate the state secrets and trade secrets. and we also faced persistent threats from hackers for profit, organized criminal cyber syndicates, and activist groups. as i said in the past, i believe that the cyberthreat may well eclipse the terrorist threat in years to come. and in response we're strengthening our cyber capabilities in the same way we enhanced our intelligence and national security capabilities in the wake of september 11 attacks. the cyber division is focused on computer intrusions and network attacks. fbi special agents work side-by-side with federal, state and local counterparts on cyber task forces in each of our 56 field offices, working to detect and disrupt computer intrusions. we have increased the size and scope of the national cyber investigator joint task force, which brings together 19 law enforcement, military and intelligence agencies to stop current attacks and prevent future attacks. and together with dhs and nsa, we have clarified the lanes and roads for our c