tv This Week in Defense CBS October 18, 2009 11:00am-11:30am EDT
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now this week in defense news with vago muradian. >> good morning and welcome to this week in defense news. i'm vago muradian. it is said that winning hearts to minds is critical to a successful counter-insurgency campaign. history shows that might not be true. first a very special guest, tony zinney, was chief of the u.s. central command and later with george w. bush's envoy to the middle east. way back in the late 1980s the
general prophesized america's enemies would be asymmetric threats. that is exactly what happened in somalia, iraq and afghanistan. so general stanley mcchrystal and other leaders talk about putting more troops in afghanistan. the president said he needs more time to make up his mind. secretary gates told everybody to quiet the public debate. how much of this debate should be had in public? >> i don't think it should be in public. i think obviously the leaking of mcchrystal's report of request was a bit unfortunately a big mistake and how it was done, who did it, what was the motivation i don't know. but it forced it into the public domain and i think it got too open now and it doesn't give the president, i think, and the generals and the secretary of defense and others, an opportunity to really have a debate in private to sort of sort out the strategy, what the
resources that are required. because decisions start to get made outside or opinions get formed or political pressure begins to exert itself. so it is unfortunate it got on the outside, i think. >> as the mutual friends, you said there were certain stories where there were certain pressures about getting word and dialog directly to the president. how big of a challenge is that when you're a military commander to get the president's attention sometimes as opposed to working through the chain of command. >> i think the key is, the secretary of defense and chairman, i was blessed in my time at cencomm, i had shelton as a chairman and secretary of defense bill cohen. both made it clear to us that if we had strong objection or strong views, that they would guarantee we had a hearing right up to the president. and i have to say secretary cohen twice took me to see the president, when i disagreed with
policy or disagreed with a decision, and i felt i had a full hearing each time. and a couple of times it changed the decision in some ways or what was about to be the decision. and i think commanders want that opportunity to be heard, to be sure their views are put forward, whether it is directly by them, which i think is preferable or through the chain of command. >> do you get the sense it is happening in this administration? >> i think so. judging the president, i only met him one time, but judging his approach, i think he likes that direct contact. it doesn't mean the views in between shouldn't be heard. we have general petraeus and the chairman, joint chiefs and certainly the secretary of defense and i think their views are critical. he striked me, the president, that he likes to hear all views and likes to work and sort it out. what would concern me is that you don't want a decision by committee. a decision needs to be made by the commander in chief given the best information and going with his best instincts and how he
processed that information. >> some say that afghanistan is in a military problem , that it is more of a diplomatic problem. others disagree and say, look, it is a real military campaign. you were a warrior and diplomat. what is the right balance and the solution? >> obviously it is both a diplomatic and military problem. i used to teach counter-surge sey during the vietnam conflict. and we used to say there was three parts to that. one is conjoel and security of the population of the resources. without that, you can't move forward and that is the military security piece. the second was environmental improvement programs, what will you do to make life better to convince them to reject the insurgents and their ideology. that can't go on without security and security alone won't solve the problem. the third piece is fighting the insurgent, the combat operation. it has to be a blend of those.
without security you can't get on to the other business that is diplomatic or in any way the development of the nation, its governing systems or economic systems or whatever. >> you were president bush's mid-east envoy and to many people a persistent arab-israeli problem is one of the things worsening relations between the west and generally islam. what do you think -- you still have lots of sources in that area. what is next in this process, do you think? >> well, the thing that bothers me about the process is that we keep repeating processes that failed. having been aspecial envoy i don't think the special envoy is the method that is the best approach. the americans putting the peace plan on the table isn't the best approach. i think that you need to have a permanent address. it needs to be a robust organization that deals with political, economic, security issues, potential monitoring issues, and you need to work the
issues from the bottom-up. you need borders, right of return, the settlements, the status of jerusalem. those things are not going to be solved by summits and envoys and quick signatures on a piece of paper. secretary of state then, colin powell said if you go over there, i don't need another plan in principle. take one. the tenant plan, get it in play. the difficulty wasn't there was a agreement in principle; it was actually getting down, rolling up your sleeves with the security people because it was basically a document that dealt with security and ensuring you could implement it on the ground. >> do you think that fear of iran, which is pretty universal across the region, is something that could actually bring certainly some parts of the arab world and israel closer together? >> i think through the united states that is possible. i don't think directly you're going to see some sort of
coalition formed around that. obviously the arab world, and islam see iran as a threat. i think with us involved, too, because we obviously see it as a threat to our natural interests, europeans and others, i think in that total mix you will see a sense of cooperation in dealing with the threat. the approaches may be different but it puts them on more common ground. >> do you think that the iranian situation, there are those who say the nations that want nuclear weapons are undeterred in trying to get them. is iran deter rabble or should folks think about what life is like with the nuclear iran. >> i think they're terrible, but i think there are several approaches that have to be made. the specter of international sanctions, serious ones, have to hang over it to provide the incentive and motivation for the dialog to be effective. here i think the russians and
chinese play a big part. we have now cancelled the missile defense program, that might be a motivator for the russians. i don't think it was a quid quo pro, but it might be a motivator to be more cooperative. what it might mean in terms of proliferation. if we're serious about international sanctions that would put pressure to resolve this in a diplomatic fashion. the second is from within iran. we should have done more to be supportive of those young people and reformers that were in the streets. the change is going to come inside. we saw a crack in the regime. saw arguments with mahmoud ahmadinejad. i think that is where the pressure has to come. >> let me take to you a much broader question. you prophesized and talked about asymmetric warfare two decades, you showed an uncanny knack for
being ahead of your time. where do you see warfare going in the next 20 years? >> i wouldn't even call it warfare. i think we'll see conflicts generated for reasons that are not the normal causes of conflict. damage to the environment, copulations in societies that can't sustain themselves for whatever reason. problem that destabilize societies that are man-made water war s obviously war lordism, the collapse of the social structure, government systems. we'll find ourselves more and more because of the problems these present globally they become sanctuaries for bad things. they produce cocoa leaves and poppies, damage the environment. and i think you'll see us more and more involved in rebuilding societies, rebuilding institutions that allow them to sustain themselves. there will be a security peace of that. and that will be the nature of conflict we deal with.
>> stay tuned for more. you're watching this week in defense news. (voice 1) we've detected an anomaly... (voice 2) how bad is it? (voice 1) traffic's off the chart... (voice 2) they're pinging more targets... (voice 3) isolate... prevent damage... (voice 2) got 'em. (voice 3) great exercise guys. let's run it again.
the company. british authorities are investigating allegations that the company bribed other governments in europe and in africa and mid-east in order to win business. the justice department launched its own investigation looking into whether the parent company in london used the u.s. bank to send bribes to saudi officials. how are these investigations affecting your business and how will they be resolved? >> in terms of the u.s. subsidiary it hasn't had any effect on us. obviously as a company we want this resolved. and it has been ongoing for a number of years, precedes the current leadership and i can attest to high ethical standards the kinds of leaders we want in this business now. we're working with those investigate gating this. we want to thing this to a resolution. i don't want to speculate on what the outcomes might be. we have certainly been supportive of the requirement of the investigators to see what they can find and we wish we would bring this to a head. >> and it is something we are
going to be following up on and when it comes to a head we'll have you come back. >> sure. >> the company is invested heavily in expanding into the united states the last decade or so, one is armored vehicles and you're one of the premier suppliers to the pentagon. recently you guys had two major orders you missed for the mine resisted vehicle and trucks. there are some who look at the outlook with the draw-down in iraq, saying is this asset now a liability. how do you answer that? >> the heyday with the mraps and everything that went on, and the need for armored vehicles we'll see that level off and decline in the u.s. market but there is a very viable and strong international market now. i think that is a good business. i think it will continue to be a good business, and certainly we'll be a -- it will be a part of our business. obviously i don't think you will see the kind of growth you saw before, but that doesn't mean it
is solid going forward. we pride ourselves on not just providing the vehicles but the innovative technology to go along with the vehicle. that is our strength and we'll continue to focus there. >> are you guys going to grow in the united states through mergers and acquisitions? >> i think we certainly have a growth strategy. the question is, where do you grow? we always consider potential acquisitions as a means of growing the company. we will look at areas where we see the defense dollar or the government funding is shifting. interest in smartpower, technological solutions to the non-military efforts. we have a lot of smart people, we have a lot of support and understanding of technology that we can provide. >> where do you think the defense business will be in five years given the spending pressures on the pentagon. >> it will decline in about that time period a bit. but i do think there are focus points like in terms of cyber
and support of the intelligence community. information management. i.t. support and data analysis. there are ways you can apply that kind of technology superiority and thing that will stabilize society. >> you were a former customer and now chairman of the business. what do you want us to remember. >> we need to stay balanced. if we go too much to the counter-insurgency, we forget president risk of tempting a peer that wants to engage us in the future. >> thank you for joining us. lessons from afghanistan to the civil war, that's next. we'll be right back.
counter-insurgency is enjoying a renaissance and it is the centerpiece of u.s. strategy in afghanistan. u.s. troops have been fighting insurgency for generations in the 19th and 20th centuries. winning the hearts and minds of locals is the key to success. our next guest says history shows that might not be true. mike moyer, is the author of a book. mark, welcome to the show. >> thanks for having me.
>> why isn't it about winning hearts and minds. >> there is two schools of thoughts, population-centered view and the other enemy centered view. we usually refer to the hearts and minds school. after studying this and spending years talking to practitioners, what many of them, not all, many will tell you that that is sort of a false dichotomy, and it is neither just the enemy or just the people and i actually like to think of it as leader-centric warfare. when you look at successful or unsuccessful insurgencies, it comes down to leadership. you have to do certain things to win the population over and you have to go to the enmeechl there is this myth in the counter-insurgency manual that says you have to minimize the use of force. force is almost always a critical component. >> what would have been a successful campaign and why and which have been unsuccessful and
why? and would have been the sore key leadership attributes that you discussed that are the discriminators to success? >> one of the most successful ones in the last century was the british conduct in malay. insurgents were gaining ground and brought in gerald templer in 1952 and he didn't change the tactics at all, but he cleaned out a lot of bad apples from the leadership and convinced the british to bring in their hot-shot leaders from all over the world. and within a matter of months that turned things around quickly. iraq is another excellent example particularly in anbar province, where everybody thinks the situation has been lost. and we had to go in and use force there. we needed great leaders and we had some really terrific battalion commanders.
they went in where others had failed. they had the skills to do the non-military side but they also had the aggressiveness and the risk-taking to do the military part and there was a lot of blood shed involved in that. the biggest challenge we face on the leadership side on the american spied is creativity and flexibility, especially the army historically has not done as much to reward those behaviors and it has been more focussed on standard procedures. now we're moving in the direction that situation changes fast and we need people who can adapt quickly and don't need to pull out standard operating procedures to figure out what has to be done. >> why have campaigns failed. >> the years in iraq are an vent example of failed campaign. one of the big mistakes we made was in removing the entire ruling class in iraq, through
disbaning the army and this gets back to the leadership. we thought we could bring in new people out of the blue. turns out you need people with experience. so the new leaders just didn't have experience and getting overrun left and right. catastrophic losses. other big mistake we made is that we tried to push people through training very quickly, and you can train sort of rank and file folks in a few months, but to train the leaders you can take five to 10 years and we didn't factor that in unless we sent out all these units that were not doing the job and that is what required the surges, because we realized there are not the iraqis there with the leadership traits there. >> we certainly have grown a far, far larger cadre of guys who have the experience and nuance challenge that goes with that. what constitutes winning a counter-insurgency? in a conventional war you take the territory, you seize the
capitol, you subjugate its people. what constitutes winning? >> that is a great question. people are grappling with that now. in the military there is lots of talk about what are the measures of effectiveness that we need to use or what indicators will tell us when we have won. i think we should avoid those single indicators because there are a number of factors you have to consider. if you look at the great leaders, they didn't spend a lot of time agonizing over what these measures are, and what they did was go out into the field and talk to all sorts of people to get the firsthand view and to get more holistic view. i think in most cases certainly in afghanistan, what we're looking for, not necessarily to defeat everybody but to get to the point where the afghans can handle this on their own. >> coming up in my notebook, why
sense of that when the tory party met for its annual meeting. leaders who hope to return to power in may, hope they cut civil service without cutting troop level. they have 85,000 civil servants, not clear how many would have to be cut but eliminating would only save $4.3 billion. britain shrunk the military but improved deploy ability. civil servants constitute the force for policy operations and procurement. cuts can be made but have to be done carefully. the purge of civil servants the tories crave are likely to spare weapons accounts. for britain that will force an impossible choice. engage with troops ill-equipped for the job. or work hard tore find more money for defense. thanks for joining us in this