tv North Korean Nuclear Issue CSPAN January 13, 2018 11:07pm-12:49am EST
8:00a, sunday night at eastern on c-span. >> next, a look at the results survey onc opinion how americans and the japanese view north korea. policy experts also discuss the diplomatic and military options for dealing with north korea's nuclear program. and future relations between north korea, its regional the u.s. and from the brookings institution, and as just over an hour half. -- >> good morning, everyone. welcome to brookings.
with theel hanlon, foreign policy program. and on behalf of my colleagues of us here, welcome. happy new year. very glad for the chance to discuss an issue that we all know will likely be quite important in the new year and we hope, with positive we're all a, but little on edge about the state of the north korea crisis. and we're fortunate that in today's discussion, which, by the way, as you request see, is as you can see is being telecast on c-span, also has a translation dimension. but in today's discussion, we're going to begin with polling that done by yasushi kudo and shibley telhami, in the united and japan, respectively, with various other organizations support. and this is looking at united states and japanese attitudes the north korea crisis, across a range of issues. we'll begin with that. from theill present podium in just a moment, after i've introduced everyone.
will convene a panel discussion, at which time we'll begin with mr. kudo being able offer any quick thoughts he has to further understand and thellish especially japanese dimensions of the poll. but then richard bush, the head east asia policy center, and my longstanding colleague here, richard will broaden the discussion to also think about anth korea, obviously interested actor in this equation and a very important factor, and we'll try to abouttand a little bit south korean views. thethen finally, playing role of panelist, i will try to talk a little bit about military or in my opinion, the lack of good military options. this is something that will follow naturally from some of the questions in the polling. so let me just add a couple more our panelists, then without further ado, we'll get presentation. shibley is the anwar sadat chair
at the university of maryland, where he's had a distinguished career and been associated with the middle east u.s.-islamice world. one of the most eloquent voices broadest islamic world. but he's also started a critical issues polling effort. we get today's material from, in large part. the first time that he's extended in a major way to asia. much of that polling began with ands on the middle east united states. i look forward very much to the results. reaffirmations of what you might expect. there are also some potential surprises that will have time to discuss and then have your questions on later. head ofkudo is the toa tokyo, where he's done a lot of polling but also
proponent and practitioner of track two dialogues with a number of countries, including china and a korea in the region, trying to improve japanese relations with those two other northeast asian powers. more generally, an international think tank across different countries and been involved in number of initiatives on that front. bush, i can't say enough about. i had a colleague -- we had a colleague in the old days, as who i used to call the ripken jr. i think richard is the tom brady. and i'm not a patriots fan, so i some trepidation. but he just keeps reinventing himself. we really benefit from having him on the panel as well. without further ado, i'm going the floor to shibley. we'll hear from him, see the results of the polling and then discussion.el please join me in welcoming shibley to brookings.
[applause] >> thanks so much. good morning to you. so much more braving the cold to be here this morning. really appreciate that. really a pleasure for me. not only because we're talking about an important issue of course, that concerns all of us, but also because we're ye genron npo withen jen november,ement, early two polls. one in japan and one in the of the same some questions, trying to see how the japanese and the americans issue of north korea's nuclear program and a little bit beyond that in terms asia security. what i'll do, i'm going to present both results together so see them side by side. for that reason, of course i'm breakdownto show the in the u.s. democrat-republican, because we -- otherwise it would hard to compare with japan. those -- i will mention some of
through. go but everything is posted online. the university of maryland, critical issues poll, website. to be on the brookings website. certainly the methodology is posted there. but all the results are posted, including the breakdowns. so you feel free to pursue this the presentation, if you have questions. there's a lot more data and breakdown of the data as well. with the polling methodology. i have -- as i said, in japan, ofwas a samp of 1 -- sample 1,000. it with usually we do neilson. this is all done that way. in their --ne panel it's a sample of 2,000, among
the probablistic panel. of youngave a sample people, just to have more confidence about what the young people are thinking in the u.s. the methodology is posted. you're welcome to look at it. let's start with one of the had. questions that we which of the following do you believe is the most effective to stop north korea's nuclear program? you look, obviously the blue is japan. red is the u.s. the most striking thing here is two middle options. the one that says stricter sanctions against north korea themilitary action by united states and its allies. withee how very few agree those options. 11%he case of japan, only think stricter sanctions will work. in the case of the u.s., only
7%. same thing with the military option. then 11% only think those would work. by the way, even in the u.s., if down,eak it republican-democrat, slightly republicans think that's possible. 17%, so it's still not huge on this issue. you see the u.s. japan in the case of the u.s., 35%. option is negotiations. japanese, the first option is sort of a little bit stronger than the others, 21%. direct talks between north korea and the united states. clearly, you also see, at the very bottom, that a lot of think it won't be the result, particularly the
realistic, ifmore you can call it realistic about that. theou support or oppose united states initiating military action against north to stop itsattempt nuclear program? here,s interesting because despite the fact that you saw how very few people say solved by military option, when you put the military option on the table, you end up getting more people supporting it. 21% it's a minority, only in japan. 33% in the u.s. high whenat's quite you consider what mike will tell us about really, what are the options?what are good i'd love to hear mike's opinion on that. you alsook at that, bit --mething a little probably more difficult to understand, which is that if you 33%, the majority 53%, support a
military option. interesting, because obviously that is the president's principle constituency. got 53% who say they would support that. the next question, do you think the problem relating to north nuclear program will be resolved, and if so, when? now, again, this is, of course, about optimism or pessimism. it's not that people really know the details. way of measuring, are people generally optimistic or pessimistic? let's be clear about that. but look at how pass mystic pessimistic people are. obviously a lot of people don't know. that's not surprising. givemong those people who an answer, you know, two-thirds beanese think it won't resolved and one third of the u.s. say ity few people above will be resolved anytime within the next five years.
pessimism. north korea has already acquired nuclear weapons. is, do youquestion support or oppose recognizing north korea as a nuclear weapons state? now, of course, people may interpret this in different ways. this is actually worth a conversation, because even with all the realism that you see, may not work,n won't work, the issue wouldn't a resolved, in a way, recognition of north korea's and yet at the, same time, you find, you know, of japanese accept recognizing north korea as a nuclear state. u.s.8% of the americans are more divided. you see 38%, 37%. still, there is more acceptance, not surprisingly, i think, in the u.s. than in japan. that's worth a conversation.
do you believe support or oppose weapons?uiring nuclear if north korea doesn't give up its own? question of, you know, as you know, this has been a taboo in japan. you see far more support in the support% of americans that. only 12% of japanese support it. but one of the things that -- mr. kudo makes in his presentation about the is that this 12% is actually an increase, because it was only 5% last year. so yes, in comparison to the u.s., it looks like a small number but it seems to be an increasing number of people who may prefer to accept that. question about orther -- do you support oppose south korea acquiring nuclear weapons?
we have roughly the same. u.s., the same acceptance level. in japan, slightly fewer people but it's really roughly the same result. if north korea doesn't give up weapons, do you support the placement of american nuclear warheads in korea and/or japan? here you have a lot of americans that.ting a slight majority of americans supporting that. you have obviously still an in japan, not surprisingly, but still you have 21% who support that. there is a difference between democrats and republicans on that issue. as with the other issue. i'll talk about that on the panel. the likelyforesee outcome of the situation in the north korean peninsula in the years? obviously we don't follow it as much here in the u.s. in japan, they follow this a bit more. and the question is whether -- the publicf outcome
perceives for the korean peninsula. see that, you know, ranging fromeople, almost a third of americans and japanese, say the instability will remain the same roughly. and then very few people say north korea and south korea will reduced tension and improve their relations or even fewer say they will be unified. don'tain, very -- people think that relationship is going to profoundly change. ofy differ on the level instability really, whether it's going to remain the same, to increase going on the american side. i think people think it's gonna get a lot worse and that is something obviously striking in comparison to the japanese, of japan,n the case there are a lot of people who say they don't know. a large number of people who say
they don't know. how do you think the north korea affected japan's relations with the united states? here, again, it's interesting, because both have, in a way, similar perceptions. 40% of each public been they have strengthened. people who sayhe 4%. been weakened, only it is actually a bit high in some ways for the american side, even if it's 20%. the question, why would it even be 20%, given that unifyingea should be issue with japan? when you look at the breakdown find thatyou democrats are more likely to republicans, that they have been weakened. and i think part of it is the trump, that anything -- it's not just about, is the
improving?p but is trump dealing with it well? and so i believe that's what means. we'll see that actually in a minute, because we have a specific question about that. what level of military power statesthe united maintain in asia? obviously a relevant question, we all are grappling with. and here it's interesting, wayuse you have in a both -- almost half of the 42% of theblic, japanese public, maintaining the same level. in the u.s., it's a little bit more. increasehink we should the level. 12% in japan. 13%ease, some support that, in japan, 9% in the u.s., but not much more than that. the wayou view president trump has handled the
north korean nuclear issue? now, i needn't tell you this, because you know this about issue.ther there's a huge partisan divide on this, among republicans and democrats. but the independents fall the democrats' way on this one. so that's kind of where that data is. that a can see here majority of both the japanese u.s. public think that -- they view the handling unfavorably. the difference here is, you unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable, more intense in the u.s. than it is japan. but obviously still a majority, japanese, view the handling of north korea as do a majority of the american public. which of the following is closer to your view? nuclear arms
buildup is mostly driven by insecurity. just one hypothesis that people talk about. that it's mostly driven by and aggression. mostly driven by a desire to be recognized. or it is mostly driven by the the currenttain regime. and so you see that a plurality publics really think it's mostly about the regime trying to maintain power. divided.re a lot of others, in the middle, quarteru know, a believe it's mostly driven by ambition and aggression. the japanese of think that it's mostly a desire recognized. that was onlytion in the japanese market, and it
really had to do with china. so currently, there's discord between china and the u.s.-japan when it comes to northeast asian security. future, do you think a multilateral security mechanism, which includes china, is order to bring a stable peaceful environment in the region? our partners,at in japano, feel that we didn't ask that question obviously, and 58% say it's necessary. only 5% say it's not. hard to interpret that. obviously that's worth a discussion. multilateral security framework for northeast asian security, which of the following would be most effective? now, this is interesting, kind of askried to the question in the same way, understanding the japanese think about it in a particular way, we think about it in a particular way. we put the options there.
china, japan, south korea. china, u.s., japan. russia.ina, but what's interesting is it though the publics in both places like broader, multilateral coalitions. if you look at the one that has most embrace, at the u.s., china, japan, south korea, russia, that is the one that has support.st so clearly i think it is more embracing multilateralism in dealing with north korea. to be the case in both. please name two countries that you believe pose the greatest threat to world peace and security. now, i want to tell you that question is an open-ended question. we did not give names. we did not give anything at all. people can name whatever country they want. very interesting to look at that, because this, again, is worth a real
conversation, especially in of the other results. the u.s.,singly, both in the u.s., and japan, the publics name north korea as number one. in this environment, they see thatas the country threatens world peace more than any other. look at whereu the u.s. is, it's striking. theuse it is number two for japanese. 43% of the japanese name it as two countries that are most threatening to world peace and security. now, remember, these are not going to add up to 100, because we're asking people to name two countries, not one. a list of two, not a list of one. that's why you get those kind of inspection. those kind of numbers. u.s., it is striking, because when you look at 13% of the american public says the united states is the biggest threat to world peace and security. and oddly enough, it edges china
on that here. in terms of people writing it. they don't think china is a threat, by the way. that's a different think. it's just what comes to the because if you had to rate each one of these countries separately, they may rate china higher. that's a different story. but it tells you something about divided onlics are this. obviously you can see the same thing in japan. now, one reason why this might japan, in spite of all of the other things that we've seen, is the following i will end up with. is,... two national or world leaders you think pose the world peaceeat to and security. again, it's an again, it's an open-ended question.
in anyt try to lead them shape or form. what we have in japan, donald bymp is number one followed kim jong un with 44%. actually,n the u.s., donald trump is roughly tied, error, of margin of putin, at number two, following is rated number one. and i think if you look at -- obviously, the complexity of attitudes will be discussed. we have two superb experts on the panel who will tell us more. but i will say something general, not so much about from, that we do know other polls, particularly pew, pew had done global attitudes, perceptions on the u.s. and perception of the president. and they have shown clearly, particularly in a poll they did
months after the election, that the perception of the u.s. with they correlated perception of the president of the u.s. highly. it's so graphic, it's very interesting. i urge you to look at it if you haven't seen that. but certainly this could be one of the reasons why it's so high threat of the perception that the u.s. is one of the two most threatening states to security, as the view of the japanese. that, i will end. i will invite my colleagues to join me on the panel and we will have a discussion. thank you very much. [applause]
>> thank you, shibley, fascinating. what i would like to do now is begin this panel discussion by turning first to kudosahn, our cleelg who was shibley's partner in the polling and ask for any further clarifications, embellishments have.ck thoughts he may before then, i turn to richard bush. this is where your translation devices will come in handy and just in case there is any kind of malfunction, i will try very briefly to summarize what we have heard from kudosahn. our understanding is that this should work also with c-span audiences, that you should hear directly the translation into english as that proceeds. i think we want to be on channel 2, if i'm correct, with those of you here, with your devices. so really, kudosahn, thank you for coming so far. thank you for your excellent work on this poll. is there anything that you want to draw our attention to or additional points beyond the
excellent presentation? translator: well, let's see, we did the poll and we released to japanese media in december. it was shocking data for japanese media. a lot of huge coverage was done society.se japanese society took it as hot news. why is that? i think that is an interesting point. that is because america -- a lot of americans support north korea and recognizing that north korea as a nuclear power. quite a few number. and similar results can be found amongst japanese experts. a lot of japanese experts support the idea of recognizing north korea as a nuclear power. but this is a public poll. public opinion.
general public in america supposing north korea is a nuclear power was a big surprise for the japanese. north korea, who is the neighbor to us, nobody knows what the leaders might do. our allies, the american people, recognizing north korea as a nuclear power -- that could possibly dramatically change the security strategy under alliance. but in any case, it was shocking news for japanese society. a lot of media talked about that. but at the same time, there was a lot of americans also supporting japan acquiring nuclear power. that was another big surprise. although predominant supporters come from republican. but that was a very big surprise. that caused a lot of uncertainty
and concerns amongst japanese society. and now, there were new opinions in japan. we could potentially have a serious discussion about whether japan should be acquiring a nuclear power. now, we have done three polling over the last one, two years. about one year ago, it was only 5.1% of the people who said we should be having a nuclear power. that came up to 12.3%, only in a matter of a year plus a few months. so anti-nuclear power attitude in japan has shrunk quite a bit. we asked same question of japanese experts. 20% of japanese experts support the idea of japan acquiring nuclear weapons. this is not going to be easy process in japan because this is really acceptable by
culture.popular but now because of the situation happening, there are a lot of worries, amongst japanese public. so not recognizing north korea as a nuclear power and being completely aligned across allies as well as neighbors, i think a lot of japanese think that has to be the strategy. that, i think, is a small insight that we have acquired. that probably is the most plausible scenario as we move forward. >> from the important points that our friend, kudosahn, wanted to make -- japanese surprise that the united states would have such a high percent of americans supporting a japanese nuclear option. there is japanese expert opinion that is perhaps moving in this direction gradually, not overwhelmingly, by any means.
is one important point. a second important point, assuming your translation worked well, is that japanese were a little taken aback that the united states and americans would consider recognizing north korea as a nuclear weapon state. which, as you all know, we do not at present. that is going to be a good question for me to start with richard. i'm going to ask him more generally to speak about south korea and south korean attitudes but i hope he can also offer his thoughts as to why or a substantial majority of americans, seem to recognize north korea state.clear weapon is that just a bow to reality? americans saying there's no way to eliminate these things? or is it somehow favoring a formal change in america's positions? before i give the floor to richard, let me add one more clarifying point which is important for richard and me and
colleague who holds the korea chair here and others -- who are wondering why we are focusing on a japan and america perspective, to some extent, it's our good fortune and shibley doing the poll in those two countries. it was not designed to be a comprehensive way to think about the korea crisis of public opinion across the region. we did not have a big, long project that would have looked at five or six different countries. please do not interpret this as somehow signaling that these are the only two countries that matter. but clearly they are two of the half dozen or so with among the greatest equities in this issue. now, richard, if i could turn to the one country that has the all, and askty of you to talk about the republic you view the north their eyesue through and interpreting their public politics.
and then if you could, why do americans increasingly tolerate the idea of north korea as a nuclear weapon state or at least acknowledge that seems to be the reality? richard: mike, thank you for your kind introduction. you may think i am ageless, but i certainly don't feel it. because i'm not ageless, i'm going to answer your last question first so i remember it. second, i am pleased that you've given me this opportunity to talk about south korean opinion. for reasons that i'll talk about. on the question of recognizing north korea as a nuclear weapon state, i actually think that ambiguous, orite assumes knowledge by the respondents that they don't have. the word "recognize" has a certain legal power when it comes to this issue. as i interpret it, it means that you are recognized as a nuclear weapons state for the purposes of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. only five nuclear weapon states are so recognized.
there are other states that possess nuclear weapons that are not recognized as nuclear weapon states. i think that, de facto, they are a state with nuclear weapons. we all know that. but we are not going to give china and russia and anybody else are going to give north korea the special privileges conferred by the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. that the current recognized states do. so on south korean attitudes -- first of all, you're absolutely right. south korea does have the greatest equities involved here. as our colleague jonathan pollack likes to say, this is the korean peninsula. but mostly importantly there is a widespread assumption in policy making circles in various
countries that if the united states or south korea were to take overly aggressive action against north korea, then it would lead to unacceptable retaliation by north korea against the republic of south korea. and the capital city, seoul, is just about on the front lines. so south korean views have a presumptive value. second, political trends in south korea are important here as well. we had conservative presidents for nine years up until last year. now we have a progressive president. and his ideas towards north korea, relatively speaking, are more conciliatory and more in favor of engagement than those of his predecessors. so that raises the question whether public attitudes have moved as well. i'm going to draw on two recent polls. one is by gallup korea in
september of last year and the other is by genron npo. thank you, kudosahn, for doing july.oll last the two polls didn't ask the same questions. but that's ok. first question, how much does north korea pose a threat to peace and security particularly after the last nuclear test? people in south korea, 76% say it is a threat of some degree. only 20% said it is not much of a threat. there are no illusions in south korea about the danger that their country faces from their northern cousins. second question, how likely do you think that north korea will actually start a war? 37% of south koreans said it was a possibility to some degree.
only 13% said it was a high possibility. still, about one third of the public thought it was. and then 58% thought it was low possibility. that was a pretty simplistic question by gallup, but this set of responses strikes me as a good reflection of what i understand south korean opinions to be. genron npo poses this issue in open-ended and more way. it's not whether north korea start a war, but whether military action will occur in korea's to north nuclear weapons development. so it includes the possibility that the united states might take the military action. so 38.6% of koreans say yes, that military action will occur.
43.1% of koreans say no. 18.3% are not sure. for 39% to say yes is not that different from gallup. you will remember that 37% said that there was a possibility that north korea would start a war. gallup asked whether respondents agreed that the u.s. should take military action if north korea continues to test and nuclear weapons technology. this is only a continuation of testing, it is not use in some way. 33% of the public agreed that the u.s. should take military action. 59% disagreed, 7% did not know. for 33% to agree is higher than i expected, but that number is
suspiciously close to the working estimate of the strength of conservative voters in south korea. our working model of south korean politics is that 33% are conservative, 33% are progressive, and 33% are swing voters and move in the middle. so on this question, conservatives stand out. now, gallup asks whether south korea should have its own nuclear weapons. 60% agreed. 35% disagreed. this seems high but my recollection is that previous polls have gotten similar results. this does not mean they do not like the u.s.-korean alliance. they like it a lot. but this is the typical response. on the question on how to address the current situation, according to genron npo, koreans
tend to emphasize dialogue and negotiations. 35.8% favor diplomatic efforts talks.e six-party 12.1% favor direct talks between the united states and north korea. that's 47.9% in favor of some kind of diplomacy. 26.1% are in favor of strengthening sanctions. 14.4 say china should play a greater role. on the long-term future, genron npo asked what the korean peninsula would look like 10 years from now. quo would the status persist. 31.2% said north-south conflict would intensify. 19% said there'd the and moved to unification. 20.1% said it is unpredictable. that strikes me as a pretty realistic distribution of predictions among the public at
large. to sum up, these are my takeaways. south koreans see north korea as a threat. they don't see that war is likely. and they do believe that south korea should go nuclear. south koreans believe the future will look about the same as today or worse. still, they believe that diplomacy is a good method for addressing the current impasse. in the current context, i think the final opinion gives president moon jae-in at least some running room to test north korea's intentions, most immediately regarding the olympic winter games. tomorrow will be the first meeting of north and south negotiators to talk at least about the north's participation in the winter olympics. thanks a lot. >> thank you so much, richard. this is fascinating and richard did a great job of summarizing at the end.
i won't try to encapsulate and points.e those main i want to get to your involvement in the discussion, but there are two or three other big issues that we want to put on the table briefly. i'm going to do one of those which is what might military options be. the polling that we saw from kudosahn recently showed us that there are some interesting divides. richard just reiterated that. in regard to rok public opinion. there is also a question about how well can sanctions that have been so intensified in recent months, starting with a trump administration, ambassador haley at the u.n., but also with the participation of many other countries -- how well can these bite in 2018 and what kind of policy prospects and options do have? i do not think we will touch the last question in our presentations. we'll leave that to you to bring up if you wish in our discussion. the same thing with the sanctions and economic options.
but let me briefly talk through just four military options that some people's minds. let me start at the beginning and say again at the end. i do not endorse any of them. i think they all wind up being bad ideas even on their own relatively narrow terms of what they could directly accomplish. as my colleagues at brookings have emphasized, we have the whole big question of how would kim jong-un respond? so let me be emphatic that i am not endorsing these options. none of them presume an all-out invasion by the united states presumably with south korea along, something i don't think south korea would want to do. none of them are beginning with the option of regime change or, you know, 2003 iraq-like overthrow of the existing government. i don't think anybody is contemplating that as even a remote possibility. in korea, it is too hard. korea hadth deployable nuclear forces, the estimates that we heard were war would cause at a
bare minimum many hundreds of fatalities on the korean peninsula. those were low estimates at the time and certainly low estimates for today. because one hiroshima size bomb -- over a city of the density of seoul has been estimated by various exports found 200,000 to 400,000 prompt fatalities. that is one nuclear weapon, and north korea may have several dozen. we don't have much means to a.m.d.pt nuclear weapons at seoul, or for that matter, tokyo. tokyo, a little better chance given the distances and some of theater systems we have deployed in the region that we could bring in. i just want underscore, all-out war, virtually everyone agrees looks very bad. i'm going to talk about four more specific, limited attempts at the use of military force. or at least efforts in our own
mind would be limited and would hope would stay that way. but there is the huge uncertainty as to whether they might. one option that was articulated a dozen years ago by two democratic secretaries of defense, is to shoot down any future icbm test launch by north korea on the grounds that doing so would deprive north korea of the ability to get data and perfection and technology of long-range missile strikes. so icbm, intercontinental ballistic missile, this is what they have been trying to develop. they launched three such missiles in 2017, the last in november. we think they're making a lot of progress. we're still not sure, neither is south korea, as to whether north korea has all the different pieces of this kind of complex perfected. specifically, we're not sure if they have re-entry vehicles that could protect the descending warhead from heat and kinetic disruption during its descent into the atmosphere before
detonation. that's a very hard thing to do well. thee not really clear -- north koreans could be sure they've perfected that. why not prevent them from having the option of having a missile descend by shooting at it while way up or in the mid course or before it's launched? it is an interesting option. at first blush, it's not crazy. i'm not sure it's crazy even at second blush. the problems i have with thinking it through, even if we could successfully prevent these kinds of launches or stop them early, you give north korea incentives to then develop other kinds of technology that could be more threatening -- specifically, solid fuel icbm's could be even more threatening. they're harder for us to see in preparation of launch and harder with in the very early going. we do not want to steer north korea to accelerating that kind of technology.
alos, these kind of test launch, shoot-down options could not do anything about the threat to seoul and probably not the threat to japan from shorter-range missiles of which there are already many in abundance. the nuclear arsenal of north korea is unaffected by this option, as well. so it's true it could have some narrow -- if successful. we're not even sure we could be successful in shooting down the icbm's in their ascent or mid course -- our these areas is much better than it has been. but the odds of any one shot succeeding are 25% to 50%. in that rough range. so we could miss. we could wind up embarrassing ourselves. we could wind up having our interceptor land in a place it wasn't supposed to. it's not clear it would be successful. smartis enough to give people like ash carter and bill perry reason to think this option through a dozen years ago. it not sure they endorsed
under current circumstances. i don't think they do. but it does not deal with the existing threat and it may not prevent the future icbm threat from taking on a different form. that is the first option. i'll try to speed up here a little bit. there are also nuclear facilities that north korea is expand further its nuclear arsenal. as you know, it has a working research reactor that makes plutonium, one of the key potential ingredients in a nuclear bomb. it also has the famous uranium enrichment facility that they were not supposed to have. they told secretary kelly in 2002 that they had been doing this surreptitiously. we now think they have enriched uranium and plutonium as a way to fuel their nuclear explosive devices. we could in theory try to deal with that or reduce that. the problem is, you cannot really attack the existing research reactor because you're going to create like a mini do.nobyl if you you would spew radioactivity swath of north korea. i don't think that's a viable
option on strategic or moral grounds. you could disagree. we could destroy that reactor. but it has been operational for so long that it will be a mini chernobyl or fukushima if it happens. we could try to destroy work on new additional reactors the way the israelis destroyed an iraqi reactor in 1981 and a syrian reactor in 2007. if that were the only potential capability the north koreans had to build a bomb material, the case would be stronger for doing that. the problem is if you do that today with the reactor there believed to be trying to complete, you are not going to affect the existing research reactor. and if you go after the uranium enrichment facilities, the way we were thinking about in much of the discussion of iran up until the iran nuclear deal three years ago, if you go after uranium enrichment, there's a little less concern about radio active spillage from existing sites, but we don't know about any additional sites the north koreans may have above and beyond the one at the established location. if we go after their nuclear
capability, the nuclear production capability, we are maybe getting at half the problem of a future buildup and doing nothing at all about what they own already. because we don't think we know where the nuclear weapons that are already built might be today. you are slowing the scale and pace at which their future reactor and centrifuge capabilities could expand their arsenal. again, that has some limited tactical appeal. but the risks are enormous and you're not eliminating the arsenal in any way or preventing its future growth. the third option you might consider, of a different type, not going after the weapons of mass destruction directly, necessarily, but blockading north korean trade as a supplement to the u.n. sanctions so they can't get around those sanctions by cheating, by working with any companies or countries that might be willing sanctions.e and you can use the u.s. and south korean navy to try to stop freight at north korean ports. it does have potential ability
to further heighten the effect of sanctions. i think there's no doubt about that if we were to do this. but it is also an act of war under international law. the north koreans already say the sanctions are an act of war. but this, everybody would agree in some sense, is an act of war. it is a tool that countries do not employ often. north korea might shoot back at our navy or at other assets, an immediate tactical sense. above and beyond, the main concern i have about this option, it doesn't prevent them doing trade across the border with china, the land preventand it doesn't them flying in high-technology equipment if they still need them for their missile programs. it runs a risk of escalation. the last option i will mention is direct assassination of kim jong-un. i probably wouldn't feel like i was being very polite bringing up that kind of an option here if it weren't already in the
public discussion. we know from reports last fall, there are elements of existing combined forces command war plans that would envision going after military command and of which kim jong un is the top rung in the ladder. therefore, one would ask, why do we not just tried to kill him? the way we tried on first day of operation iraqi freedom of 2003, to essentially assassinate or kill saddam hussein. as you'll recall, the opening day, we thought we knew where he was. we launched a big attack at a farm complex south of baghdad and turns out he wasn't there. he was on the run, shortly thereafter, he knew we were after him. we caught him a few months later, but the actual bombing attempt did no good. there is always a chance that we could figure out where kim jong un was on a given day and kill him. we could try to argue that this was justifiable under international law given his behavior and noncompliance with
various international obligations and hope there was no fallout or bounce-back against our own leaders. but above and beyond that, the more compelling counter argument is that we have no idea how his military command would react if that happened. and very little reason to think very little reason to think they are going to accept a peaceful reunification or whatever kind of terms we are offering and go into exile in whatever terms we've offered. offering and go into exile in terms we've offered. chances are, many are most would create an alternative leadership and fight. that would probably be seen as an opening act of war. in that particular option, the escalationrth korean are particularly high. sorry to go in to such detail on that but i want to get on the table and before we go to you -- i want to run down the panel. richard may want to comment on what i just said and i will go to our two other speakers for
any further comments they want to briefly make, then to your questions. richard: i think you stated it very well. i want to hear the questions of the audience. >> thank you. kudosahn, anything else at this point? translator: we have been doing opinion poll so many times in past. theid it together with chinese counterpart as well as many countries. greatn poll gives us insight. one of the message we can take from this opinion poll is that a americans and japanese believe status quo is not going give us a solution to the korea. in north japan, u.s., other neighboring countries -- maybe needing to come together to have strategy to objective together. there's an air of suspicion that maybe not really aligned
to each other. north korea -- recognizing north korea may not be possible under npt, but they do already have the nuclear weapons and they are trying to have their own missile so they can shoot in japan's location. -- in different locations in the world. what we need to have is to have as a solution is to have effective oversight, bringing out more effective control to korea.lear in the north otherwise, our neighbors will feel secured. but not too many people have started to think about the potential of having installed oversight. thatg, crossing finger nuclear program will be stopped. but that uncertainty is driving opinion poll.
there is a big if in the opinion poll result today, though. were feeling insecure because of the status quo. doesn't give quo comfort to our people, what are be new solutions we should discussing about? by the way, number two answer is chinesea involvement. now, china should not only step up for economic sanctions. i think there could be a potential military option by chinese, too. we've done opinion poll with china last year. china had just changed the internal law. almost all the overseas polling takings are banned from polls, but we are given access china.ing in in last year's poll results, we asked a question about, do you think north korea is a threat? only 13% of chinese thought north korea was a threat.
25% of chinese thought that south korea was a threat. but chinese experts are different. chinese experts think that north korea nuclear is a threat. chinese opinions are being controlled by central government, but experts exposed to the reality, and they are aware of how risky north korea nuclear is. now, i think this discussion needs to be discussed together us as well as with china. we should start discussing about specific scenarios once we are successful for freezing their nuclear program. maybe america should take leadership in that. is america willing to take leadership in that? i think that's a very important question. if america can take leadership in this multilateral discussion,
i think the sense of uncertainty that worries that people are feeling could dramatically change. so non-nuclear option in korean peninsula is something we should be discussing, inviting many different countries. thanks. from my point of view, to give my thoughts on your presentation, which i thought was extremely comprehensive in terms of putting out what people are thinking about in terms of options, a military option is unthinkable. it's not just risky, it's unthinkable. i think the public actually seems to think that, as well. when you ask them, what would it resolve? whether military action would resolve the korean issue, very few people agree that it would. like 11%. in japan is even fewer. there is agreement that it would not happen. in my opinion, the reason you slightly higher numbers
supporting military action when you ask in the u.s., 33 percent, it is basically because we are split on everything. you are either pro-trump or against trump. thatome of the options when people are saying this, they're just identity politics. trump, i'm going against trump. that is part of the problem in polling.ur i want to say something that is broader about the global options here. my colleague kudo said that the u.s. should take leadership in multilateral negotiations. you can see that the american public andjapanese south korean public prefer talks.teral they think that's the avenue to proceed. but here's the problem. in order to take leadership, people have to trust you.
you have to have a moral position to lead. people have to think that you're threat. when they think you're a bigger president ofhe north korea, when they think that the president of the u.s. worldreater threat to peace than the leader of north hard tot's very persuade people to join you on whatever option you want to do, whether it's going to be additional sanctions, whether it's going to be a military -- is unthinkable but if somebody might go there because some of the republican openc seems to be somewhat to the idea, who's going to join you in the world when you're that. if you are going to lead in a multilateral way, for what agenda would they even trust you to lead if you don't have the agenda. clearly, we have the crisis in the way we are projecting ourselves in the world. that even is seen in places like
japan, which on this issue clear ally, and it is. but we see that and the attitudes. not to mention within our own country. we are in such a crisis internally, divided like we have never been, i think in our history. some of the polling we've done on the divide, it is extraordinary, the difference between republicans and 80%.rats is 80% or over it is like we are two different countries. not like one country. how is any leader going to morally mobilize us to do the right thing -- whatever that let aloneg is -- bring all these people around the world -- when we're isolated and seem not to be trusted, even worse, threat.be a that is the challenge we face in reality. >> let's go to you. i would like to take three questions at a time. please wait for a microphone and identify yourself. please limit yourself to one
question per person and you can direct the question to a specific individual or to the whole panel. start right here please. [indiscernible] >> i've done opinion polling all my life and it can be quite tricky. i am interested, if you could have one wildcard question at the end of the survey, what have biasedldn't all the other questions, what ?ight you have added for example, one asked the question if trillions of dollars is going to be spent focused around north korea, should it be on nuclear conflict or on developing people? something like that that will analyze all the other results cemented by that. it was quite difficult to know who was experts in terms of answering a lot of those questions. thanks.
will go over here to the woman in the third row. >> hi, i am a freelance journalist. i would like to ask the panelists, what do you think motivates kim jong-un in the talks that should start tomorrow? how optimistic are you that this could lead to multilateral talks? >> excellent. we will have one more in the second row. bill, retired foreign service usaid., your comment regarding control and oversight begs the question with regard to north korea selling off their nucleus to terrorist organizations, terrorist cells -- nukes. it seems like a hard question to answer, but has that been thought of and are their ideas on how to mitigate the problem?
>> great. i suggest, why don't that shibley and kudosahn, that on polling. and then richard will take what kim jong-un might be thinking, and we can all wait and on the final question about the broader risks. >> if you have something you want to add, feel free. i know it is a rhetorical question, but my own sense of where the public is -- the justc probably would say, in general, people don't want war. still anti-war. the post-iraq war sentiment still holds and they do not wars are solving the problems. the question is whether they want to spend american money to develop other countries. the public is really divided on
this and along partisan lines. ii think in theory, they're open to it. but i can see how they're opposed to foreign aid and they to getie it -- it's hard a grip on that. i want to get to the second question about what the public in principle says. one of the big things that we tried to get at in the poll is to see what people think is motivating the north korea. is it insecurity? is it aggression? protection? and is insecurity and regime samection one in the thing? you combine them together, a lot of people think that. think the regime is trying stay in power. i think that is a good interpretation because if that is one of the big motives, insecurity, given fleark's
people, then there are who say this is an opportunity because they are trying -- once the successful icbm tests, they now think they actually have, in effect, established deterrence against the u.s. and they've always said, when to start negotiations that. the question is is if the negotiation with south korea is an attempt to influence south korean public opinion away from the u.s. or whether it is a genuine conversation, i would love to hear both of our panelists on this. >> richard? richard: with respect to the talks that will begin tomorrow, hours.t 12 the defined scope of the talks is to talk about the winter games.
kim jong-un has an interest in his athletes participating in the games. for them to be excluded is a kind of humiliation. so i expect that some sort of formula will be found for north athletes to participate, perhaps under a single flag. the question that is raised -- extended talks then be to go into other issues? i think there will be an attempt, but my guess is it will not get very far. because each side has very different demands and because each side has very expectations of the other. we will find that north korea
sets out a very tough agenda concerning the future of inter-korean relations. it will be something the president cannot accept. response toed, in shibley's question, what we see in the polling of south korea is hand they're happy for these talks to occur. but the views as of now concerning north korea are quite negative and quite fearful. i think president moon does not have too much running room to make big concessions. finally, one might ask of the north koreans, do they really want to have talks on big issues including their nuclear program? they are moving closer and closer to their goal of being able to hit the continental united states with a nuclear
weapon. they probably do not want to be stopped in the middle of that. before they've gotten to what they really want. thanks. >> let me use the moment to pivot to your question but also to make an advertisement for colleagues at brookings who have thoughts these questions. to look at our website. we're blessed to have remarkable on korea, including our korea chair who spent many years communityelligence trying to understand what motivates kim jong un. the question we have had to debate internally, what are his ultimate goals, why does he want ability to hit the united states with a nuclear weapon? of us agree he does. the question is, is he an ambitious, assertive, leader who really envisions the
reunification of the peninsula some day and really wants to split the u.s.-south korean alliance so that south korea is coerced into submission. these kinds of theories are sometimes discussed -- other trying to avoid the mistakes that muammar qaddafi and the taliban all made hostile being in a relationship with the united states and not having your own nuclear weapons and it really is regime protection. i am not going to try to speak for any consensus among the brookings scholars, but we all agree that we do not really know. people may weigh one possibility more than another and if my weigh in, shes to can catch my eye and correct the record. but i would encourage people to look at that. einhorn and bob jonathan pollack, whose book is
sober us all to the fact that the north korean not be will probably easily eliminated any time soon if ever. that is a way of answering your question indirectly at least which is to say whether north korea would do something as potentially self destructive as to sell nuclear weapons abroad, say.hard to they have already sold some nuclear materials. would they threaten to sell a weapon if they feel u.s. sanctions have so squeezed their the resthat they want of us to believe they have no other choice to keep their afloat. i could see them making that threat. these are the kind of uncertainties we have about future north korean behavior and it is pretty hard to be precise that.re than >> see if mr. kudo has a comment to add on that. >> thank you.
>> no comment? ok. let's go to a second round of questions here. let's start with mack in the front row. gentleman go to the in the red scarf in the fourth next tothe woman in the the last row. >> i believe richard raised the question about the v.a. and the question of accepting north power.s a nuclear i wonder if the question had way that it in a might be confused with nonproliferation acceptance or reluctant acquiescence. i wonder if the answer would have more support if it was phrased as reluctant acquiescence because we lacked other options. >> thank you. >> my name is peter. given the options you described,
could say the long for action to diplomacy, negotiation. military action is been considered horrific but given our government's behavior with with t.p.p., the paris climate accord and even the iran nuclear have a lot of credibility is my assessment. where does that leave us? >> third question. >> diane perlman, george mason analysis andnflict resolution. in kim jong-un's famous sense about the button, i haven't heard anyone pay attention to the second half of the sentence which is that he has a button and he will not use threatened.'s i think it's pretty clear he ands the need to deter us people are more dangerous when afraid and threatened and backed corner. what about tension reduction and
freeze for and freeze, i think they have a much success.obability of >> how should we begin? richard? do you want to begin this round? >> mack, i wish they had asked the question that way. it would be more useful when thinking about policy responses. your. cook, i agree with that military option is horrific. i agree that we are hurting ourselves by these statements of the president. i think that underneath the rhetoric, there is a policy that is emerging. and that is containment and deterrence to include sanctions. sanctions do not have an impact right away. they have to be in effect for a longish period of time, they have to be applied in a comprehensive way.
reallyteresting that the tough sanction are only now beginning to take effect. china is only now beginning to add its weight to a comprehensive sanctions campaign -- whether this will change korea's policies, i don't know. this seems to be the most likely approach to achieving some sort of goal that has a broad international support. i did not quite hear the question in the back. i think the problem with any is not negotiations because the two sides don't or sort ofeach other don't have an opportunity to get to a compromise.
but at this point they have very goals.nt declared north korea says we are going to be a nuclear state, get over it. no country in the international community, particularly any are most affected and part of the six-party talks, goal.lling to accept that ours remains at denuclearization. until one side or the other backs down, it doesn't -- it's that there would be an opportunity to find some ground. kudosahn? >> now, in the united states, it is a very cold country. i find out. but i am feeling more comfortable because i am away from north korea now.
and i think i am speaking from one side and you are speaking from the other side because distance differences from north korea. north korea is having nuclear power already. if military option is not think the only thing is to raise the deterrence, containment. i agree with that. for japan to have better deterrence, maybe japan needs to american nuclear. maybe that needs to be discussed across japanese society. if they engaged the discussion, other neighbors will start the discussion of bringing nuclear in our state. somebody talked about the nuclear spillover to terrorists organizations, but that may add on top of that, there are a lot of layers of complexity associated with that. so if we recognize north korea
as a nuclear power, that could potentially damage the n.t.t. as well as the security framework on.ently we are relying now, again, we are having china androgram with south korea. we invited the american friends last year. in our dialogue, we wanted to objectives about security of our region. with south korea and japan, they can't quite a agree about nonnuclear in north korea, but the americans do not think that according to the poll. asked about 10 people, 60% said nuclear. but 40% is supportive about korea sayg north nuclear state. as an ally, that attitude for america was troublesome for many japanese perspectives.
because there is one state, korea, in asia, which owns weapons. if thise see them and continues, security strategy in changed. to be we do not want to change it. because we are victim of nuclear, we are very allergic to having nuclear weapons or allowing other countries nuclear weapons in our land, so is the only legitimate option for many japanese people. there are only two options to do that. one is to strengthen economic sanctions so we can have more diplomatic talks, or military option to some degree, degree might be. of course, peaceful solution is best.
we want to do it peacefully. how can we raise pressure and give the motivation to north orea by recognizing them extend economic development. but having them stop or freeze or completely abandon nuclear in north korea is the only viable for us. and i hope international community agrees. but this is the attitude of japan, if i may say. with mack'sart question. richard is right about this ambiguous.hat it is interesting that if you ask the same question to experts, you are probably going to get the same answer even if they know more. what you find in the results is exactly what you might expect the experts to say. which is that most expect that you will not change the reality, on the ground, there are nuclear weapons. but most do not want a formal
recognition. they may not know the meaning of that is, they may not know what entails for nonproliferation. but they have a sense that this question means you are asking as formal recognition and mr. kudo said, in japan, there is huge reluctance to accept formally. even if there is acquiescence. or acceptance. there is something interesting learn from it. on insecurity, richard is right on saying that there are different names. obviously that's the case. the question is what is the starting a negotiation even with different names? at some point you are going to have to start some negotiation. the reality is even if you do not think that the principal motivator for north korea is insecurity, no one would deny that part of it is insecurity given their history for the people or for the insecurity of the regime.
the question is whether if you give them some added sense of security, whether that will make them more open to negotiation. not to give up their nuclear weapons necessarily, but to some negotiations. when you go into elton frye's hegestion, in an article wrote a few weeks ago, saying let's place 50,000 troops on soil to assure them we'd never attack north korea, that's innovative thinking. we can agree or disagree with it. in principle, those are the kinds of things and ideas that we need to think about. with the question of our credibility and the possibility of war, despite all that we have said, despite what mike said, all the different options, there is no good military option here. moreof us feel even strongly than that for a variety mention reasons, not to
moral ones. not to mention consequences for the neighbors of south korea and japanese and everyone else. that, i don'tl of have the confidence to say that it.government wouldn't do and that is the scariest part of all. because with the fact that you have options, you can assess the risks. you start a conversation about the risks. and if you are in the white house and you want to do this, and maybe some of you have a theory about how our president makes his decisions. i don't. i'll leave that aside. the fact that you have 53% of the u.s.licans in supporting a military option, even without the president really putting it on the table, me that it's not unthinkable. so we all have to not be satisfied with the fact that we
are analytically -- we do not think it is possible or should not be possible. it should be unthinkable. that public opinion does not think that it is going to solve the problem, and it won't, all theseere are other things that we have to worry about and that's something that i do lose sleep at night over. richard wanted to add a point and i'm going to add one, too. round.'ll have a final >> on february 29, 2012, the united states and north korea came to an agreement. north korea would suspend nuclear missile tests and we would provide food aid. a kind of freeze for freeze. the hope on the united states side was that this could
progress to something else. three weeks, north korea reneged on the agreement. that, among other things, raises the questions about the credibility of their commitments. i was going to talk about something else, -- >> i agree with richard. bob and i have written about a freeze for freeze construct but i agree that they had to assume the north koreans are going to try to cheat. the idea that bob and i have been trying to develop is that how could we get the north koreans to freeze not just nuclear missile testing but nuclear production? there must be some way to get a sense of all of their nuclear production capabilities which will be hard.
we have to not give them too much for the deal. we should not formally recognize them as a nuclear weapon states and i believe most of the u.s. sanctions would have to stay in place even with that kind of deal. we could tolerate some more chinese and russian trade at that juncture and let up on some of the pressure to tighten the u.s. sanctions. the one thing the united states could give in addition to some food aid and other humanitarian gesture of that type would be some kind of cap on the size of future military exercises with a clear emphasis, however, that this is not meant to tolerate the reduction or readiness of the combined forces in korea. we have to substitute a big one with a few smaller ones. we have to talk with colonel tim
who was the head of our brigade and korea last year and many other military officers to figure out how we could do this. if they are not comfortable with the proposal, we would have to walk away from it. we could cap the size of exercises that is a relatively high number, 15000 or 20,000. that is the kind of freeze for freeze that we have been talking about. let's do one last round and i would like to favor people -- folks from the region. i have not seen too many japanese or korean hands, but i want to give first preference if there are any. then i will open it up more generally. we will start with the woman standing in the back and then the gentleman standing in the back and then we will come in the third row and we will wrap up.
>> thank you, this alecia. with in the last month, we have seen russia align its assessment of the icbm capabilities -- they have aspects of icbm. they have reached aspects of icbm capabilities. there is summit meeting in the middle here. one of the diplomatic alternatives that i did not see discussed here was a partial test ban treaty. i wanted your thoughts to u.s.-russia fixed party talks getting north korea to limit further testing to belowground -- that is not beyond the pale of thought considering the
future of north korea's nuclear testing. thank you. thank you. >> microphone over here please. >> thank you, nonproliferation bureau. one thing that did not come up was the u.s. public opinion and it seemed that 33% that did not have an opinion of did not seem to know -- or did not seem to know. i was curious that they did not seem to have a comfort level with the response. is that because you talk to them during dinner, is that because people despite it being in the news, do not have an opinion? what are your opinions on that on the high level of
nonresponse? >> on the nuclear testing idea, i was just thinking north korea participators, just an they areng thought, the only country with nuclear weapons who signed this recent whateveran treaty, for that is worth. my question is about russia. i wonder if any of the panelists could discuss that more. quickly, it is not the right impression on the u.s. side. very few do not know except on one or two questions that the rest of them were very low. the rest of those questions for detailed and they do not know. we do not usually get a lot of do not knows.
any last word of those three questions? you mentioned about a lot of japanese response i don't know. very many japanese people say i don't know. in this last opinion poll, the question is with those who , about 25% of americans say they do not know military options. i think this can sway in a big way depending on how new developments will take place.
once opinion gets swayed one way, that can have a huge impact to the political assets, and that can become uncontrollable. before a big crisis happens, i countries need to be more engaged with each other and communicating with each other. what can japan do? japan can only do a few things. we can maybe make a commitment for future assistance to the butlopments of north korea, another thing that japan can contribute his development exercise on this north korean issue. without north korean issues being resolved, there is no peaceful framework in that region. there, u.s. is there,
there is no peaceful communication channel. i'm giving us an opportunity. china, south korea, japan, the u.s., maybe the four of us should get together about a new peaceful institution that can possibly work in the region. japanese media is busy talking andt mr. trump's tweets, attitudes. that is the reason why a lot of japanese people are saying i don't know as my answer. seriously now have to face solution of discussions about this problem. i think the starting point has to be identifying a common objective across the two
countries, as well as our neighboring countries. this event has taught me a lot of things. there are a lot of different perspectives from americans that are different from japan. i am not criticizing that. i think more japanese people need to recognize american opinions so that we can have more productive discussions across japan and america about new order in our region. case, for the region to be peaceful, the north korean issue has to be resolved. that is the perspective of japan i wanted to emphasize. >> on the question of russia, russia's opinion on the outlook has always been good. i will say that there has been some concern in the last year
the russia may undercut tougher and tougher sanctions that are being imposed and maybe come in behind the chinese. there has been some expert analysis that suggests that the really remarkable progress that north korea has made in the last two years on rockets or missiles was a result of new help that they received from the russian enterprise that produces rockets. no information on who ordered the company to do that, but that is concerning because it has made a bad situation much worse. we spend a lot of time arguing with ourselves about what is the right formula for getting north korea to the table and what is the formula for getting to yes.
response withn secretary james baker said he was talkingen about negotiations with nicaragua when we had a similar sort of problem. it was simple. the white house telephone number. if north korea hassan ideas, they know who to call. >> i will add one brief concluding word. concerns.s the poll did a nice job of highlighting how much japanese share concerns. i am not here to try to suggest that i am completely at ease with the decision-making style of our commander in chief, but i am confident of one thing.
advicelity of the president trump will get will be excellent. mattises of the world, the sentiment have seen too much war in their lives to be in any way delusional. some of them are on record and -- saying that a war with north korea would be substantially worse than anything we are seeing in the middle east. i do not know what decisions that will produce, and i wish the public articulation of the discussion and of the options were of a somewhat different tone and character, especially from the man at the top. i have known a lot of his team for a long time, and it is a rocksolid team in questions of war and peace.
the level of options, i am confident will be very good. i hope that is something that we can finish with a feeling of reassurance about. i want to thank the panel for being here. them. join me in thanking [applause] >> there was a false alarm in hawaii today when residents received an alert on television and by cell phone just after 8:00 a.m. local time warning of
an incoming ballistic missile. nearly 40 minutes later another alert went out explaining the initial message was a mistake. that is after state emergency officials had already sent a tweet informing residents there was not an imminent threat. hawaii's governor told reporters human error was to blame for the mishap, but lawmakers are continuing to ask for additional information. the federal communications commission has already said it is launching a full investigation into the matter. communicators,e we are at bell labs, when they conduct fans communication research. >> probably the most exciting is 5g to medication. it is an interesting thing. marconi, itnce changed our species.
is have a newo do as of communication, and opposed to broadcasting the system everywhere, we want to target a theme -- a beam at individuals. our search for data is never-ending, we always want more, and we have saturated the spectrum at lower frequencies. we have to go to higher frequencies, and they have many other challenges, one of the challenges is signal loss is too much. we cannot do broadcast through traditional means. i have to send it directly to you. this is a completely change in the paradigm. also, huge set of challenges, but the wireless energy -- wireless industry is excited
about this. >> watch the communicators on c-span2. next, a look at issues facing african-americans in the u.s., followed by a look at what the city of saint lewis is doing to address race ofations after the shooting michael brown in ferguson. and later, a discussion on russian interference in u.s. elections and other parts of the world. ben carson was the keynote speaker at a recent symposium in new york that focused on education, discrimination and other disparities of a thing african-american communities in the u.s.. the event also included a discussion with journalists and academics colors. hosted by the manhattan institute, this