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tv   U.S.- North Korea Talks  CSPAN  May 8, 2018 4:22pm-6:53pm EDT

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education and the funding to do that so i believe that's one of the top issues that we have here. >> voices from the state. part of c-span's 50 capitals tour. >> president trump said this afternoon that secretary of state mike pompeo is headed to north korea today to continue preparations for the president's summit with north korean leader kim jong-un. last week the atlantic council hosted a discussion on the prospects for a successful dialogue between the u.s. and north korea. this is two and a half hours. >> good morning and welcome. i'm fred kempe. i'm president and ceo of the atlantic council. and thank you all for joining us
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for the 2018 atlantic council east asia foundation strategic dialogue. they say timing is everything, and we certainly are gathering together here at a historic movement i want to especially welcome our speakers, dr. moon, mr. kim, congressman kim, congressman park, dr. park, for traveling all the way from the republic of korea. we are deeply honored to be the first venue in washington, d.c. chosen for public engagement by high-level korean officials since the inter-korean summit. the atlantic council is proud to host the event through our center for strategy and security in partnership for the first time with the east asia foundation at such a historic moment. if just the opening conversation we had as we were just preparing to come into this room is any
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indication of the kind of rich conversation that we'll have now. hold on to your seats. as i watch the summit on the korean peninsula unfold, and i watched the amazing theatrics of the long conversation on the bridge, on going across the line back and forth, i was remind of my own experience conversation the transformation of germany around the fall of the berlin watch. you had a sense of history throughout that period of time, but you were never quite sure where it would all land, and i think that's where we are now. history moves at its own speed, and too often it overtakes the analysis of those living in the thick of it. but here at the atlantic council, particularly the scowcroft center hosting this event today, we at least try to keep up with history's face,
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honoring general brent scowcroft's legacy and non-partisan work to make the world safer. it's in that spirit that the women and men of the scowcroft center work to develop sustainable non-partisan strategies to address the most important security challenges face the united states and the world, so with that i salute the leader of this center and others who have done such amazing work on the set of issues around korea and beyond. it's safe to say that north korea ranks near the top of the challenges we're all facing in the world right now, so fostering peace on the korean peninsula is very much a priority for us with ramifications far beyond korean borders, and it keeps with general scowcroft's legacy of continued u.s. leadership in cooperation and coordination with allies such as the republic of korea. the enduring strength and resilience of the u.s. rok
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alliance is clear from the way the two allies are currently navigating their relationships with north korea, and it was crucial at the time that west germany worked as closely as it did with the united states during that period of time. it's worth remembering when kim jong-un gave his new year's speech earlier this year extending an olive branch to president moon and not to president trump, many analysts feared it would cause a rift of the united states and the republic of korea but it hasn't turned out that way. the united states and the republic of korea share so much. a responsibility for regional security, an unwavering commitment to democratic governance, a conviction in the belief of rule of law. the fates of the nations of the atlantic and those of the pacific are increasingly tightly bound. hence the atlantic council's increasing body of work on the pacific. no longer can we or anyone else be a bystander in it the other's
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affairs. across both oceans countries that once had little to do with one another now face common challenges and renewed transatlantic pacific partnerships are crucial to resolving these issues. building these global coalitions is the core mission of the council's growing asia-pacific efforts, and over the past year we've cultivated partnerships with the republic of korea, not just on security and denuclearization issues, but also on otherishous like tech, energy and trade. last september we recognized president moon jae-in at our global citizen awards dinner with his brave open-minded engagement with kim jong-un in panmunjom just last friday and over the past few months. he has done even more to shepherd peace and stability on the korean peninsula. last december here in this room
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former secretary of state, then secretary of state rex tillerson and secretary of commerce wilbur ross spoke on the diplomatic and economic importance of the u.s. rok partnership, and even more recently we released a report on u.s./rok collaboration to harness the opportunities of the fourth industrial revolution. i mention all this because our asia programs demonstrate so clearly how the u.s./rok alliance exemplifies cooperation at its best. let's not forget the peace -- that if peace does indeed come to the peninsula, it will not be because of a mere confluence of military interests. it will be because of the strength of this longstanding partnership deeply rooted in every aspect of personal and political life and then one has to think hard about what that partnership looks like going forward. with that i would like to thank the east asia foundation for their collaboration on the strategic dialogue which serves as a reminder of what we can do
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when we as americans, koreans and the international community work together to secure the future. most of all, i want to thank our two keynote speakers, senator edward markey who i have admired for many years and dr. chung-in moon for being a part of this important and timely discussion. senator markey, it's been a pleasure over the year to have long conversations with you in various places including the white house correspondents dinner last weekend. i'm sorry we don't have a comedian to accompany you here. senator markey is the u.s. senator from massachusetts. he's a ranking member of the east asia subcommittey and senate foreign relations committee, and for many years already has been one of the most important international policy voices in congress. he served in the u.s. house of representatives for 37 years working on issues related to climate change, clean energy, nuclear proliferation, among
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many others. he is former dean of the massachusetts delegation in the house, and he was elected to the senate in a special election in june 2013. dr. chung-in moon, and if you want to see what he's most recently said, he has a very interesting article that was published this week in "foreign affairs," special adviser to the republic of korea rp president for foreign and national security affairs, former ambassador for international security affairs for the korea minister of foreign affairs and trade, and he served as chairman of the presidential committee on the northeast asian cooperation initiative. dr. moon is an accomplished professor at institute in both the republic of korea and the united states, and he is the editor-in-chief of the quarterly journal "global asia. "senator markey, dr. moon, it's a pleasure to have you involved in this collaborative effort. we're grateful for your work. before we turn to our keynote speakers i would like to invite
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mr. kim, board member of the east asia foundation and partner in organizing today's event to say a few years. mr. kim is a board member of the east asia foundation, distinguished visiting professor and the chairman of the art and culture foundation. he's an experienced diplomat with a career spanning 36 years and was minister of foreign affairs and trade of the republic of korea from 2010 and 2013. sir, the floor is yours. [ applause ] one thing. we're engaged in social media. we're live streaming and don't forget to tweet @acscowcroft and @acasia. sorry to interrupt and minister kim, over to you. >> good morning.
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this morning i'm greatly honored to greet all the participants in the first strategic dialogue between atlantic council and east asia foundation. on behalf of east asia foundation, i sincerely welcome all of you. taking this opportunity i wish to express my gratitude to president fred kempe and his council for the tiring efforts to make this dialogue possible. i also expressed much thanks to today's keynote speakers, the honorable senator edward markey and prove chung-in moon who is a friend of mine for a long time and i want to mention two members, mr. park beom-kye of the ruling democratic part and mr. kim, a members of the defense community and member of defense affairs.
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korean delegation is specially reinforced by their participation. as we have with the korean peninsula, it's been in the vortex of unprecedented changes which were unthinkable even three months ago. president moon jae-in and chairman kim jeunghun had an historic meeting last friday and made an important first step towards sustaining peace on the korean peninsula. i think all of you may know that as a result of the meeting, two leaders agreed that they will cease all hostile acts towards each other and take various measures to improve inter-korean relations. they also agreed to establish permanent peace regime on the korean peninsula by declaring an end of the war and entering into a peace treat this year and they also atreat to include tri-party
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talks between the two koreas and the u.s. and four-party talks involving the two koreas, the u.s. and china. now in korea we have a high hope that confrontation between south and north korea, which has prevailed on the korean peninsula for the last seven decades, will be transformed to reconciliation and rapprochement. regarding the denuclearization of north korea, two leaders laid the groundwork for the upcoming summit between president trump and the chairman kim jong-un. by realizing the common goal of a nuclear-free peninsula to a complete denuclearization, i personally believe that it is meaningful that the current leader kim jong-un, he made a commitment to complete denuclearization. i hope that the two summits will be mutually enforcing in achieving denuclearization of a north korea and permanent peace regime on the korean peninsula.
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looking back, new developments on the korean peninsula started during the pyeongchang winter olympics. it was the outcome of close coordination and cooperation between the governments of korea and the united states, particularly based on strong bond of trust and friendship between president trump and the president moon jae-in. i strongly believe that this close working relationship between our two presidents will continue to play a key role and achieving complete verifiable and civil dismembership of the korean nuclear programs. however, denuclearization of north korea is a long and difficult road, and we should make very well coordinated joint efforts to make comprehensive and the world to commit to the denuclearization of north korea. in that regard, i just want to stress that we should closely consult and coordination,
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particularly with other countries concerned, particularly china so that the sanctions front will not be ended until the final result of the nuclear issue. this disassembly which has scheduled leaders of both countries, such as congressmen, government officers and the policy adviselers make a contribution to moving forward current progress forward, and before i conclude my remarks, let me take a few moments and introduce our east asia foundation. east asia foundation was organized in 2005 with a generous funding from the hyundai motor company and we have maintained exchanges with a number of institutions and universities in the united states, japan and china. we also publish a quarterly english journal "global asia" which is available outside desk. once again, thank you to all for your participating in the first
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strategic dialogue with the atlantic council and east asia foundation and particularly those who ultimately prepared this meeting. thank you. [ applause ] so, thank you so much. thank you all for being here today, and thank you, fred, for the kind interdufnlgts fred and i have known each other for many years, and i do so admire your leadership. fred, i congratulate your outstanding work and those of your colleagues for making the atlantic council an extraordinary epicenter for engagement on international affairs. i cannot think of a better host for this important and timely
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discussion today, and i also want to take a moment to applaud our south korean colleagues who are here and back in south korea for the great strides which they have made in the historic third ever meeting between the leaders of north and south korea. i met fred almost 35 years ago. and i had just published a book entitled "nuclear peril, the politics of proliferation." the theory of my book, a 1982 book, was that president carter had made a mistake in agreeing to sell 38 tons of uranium to india without full scope
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safeguards after the russians -- the soviet union invaded afghanistan. i was concerned, obviously, that pakistan would respond in kind. the book also dealt with the israeli raid on the osirok reactor in iraq which obviously was being used as a nuclear bomb factory. these facilities can generate electricity or nuclear bomb-making material, and the israelis moved in to destroy that facility. and it was in the context of the u.s., ussr nuclear arms race, the vertical arms race between those two countries that was
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obscuring the horizontal nuclear race as country after country would seek to gain their own nuclear weapons capacity, so it was a book about iran, about iraq, about korea, about other countries beginning in the early 1980s that would have ambitions to have their own nuclear weapons program. and so i came to be friends with fred around that time, and the summit between mikhail gorbachev and president reagan in 1986, another historic moment where finally the two superpowers were going to come to the table, and so ultimately that is what we are trying to encourage.
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we're trying to encourage negotiation. we're trying to negotiate a way to resolve these issues. each country is given that choice, but ultimately we're either going to know each other or we're going to exterminate each other. we're either going to live together, or we're going to die together. those are the choices which we have to make on an ongoing basis in each and every one of these situations. and the inter-korean summit at the peace house was by all accounts a very welcome turn towards engagement and diplomacy. the panmunjom declaration includes important commitments to improve north-south relations, reduce tension,
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informally end the korean war. if we are to succeed in reaching a durable solution, we must view these leader level engagements as the beginning of what will be a long diplomatic process and not aron end unto themselves. as i think my south korean colleagues would agree, much work lies before us. even with the positive developments, north korea remains a serious and ever worsening threat to the united states, to our allies and partners in the region and to its own people. its engineers and scientists at present continue to work unabated and unmonitored on nuclear-tipped intercontinental
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missiles. this threat is real. but it kittanning solved with force. i've long called for a diplomatic approach to the crisis in north korea. this past august as the lead democrat on the east asia subcommittey i l subcommittee i led a delegation to korea and china and to japan. i asked senator chris van hollen of maryland, senator jeff merkley of oregon and congresswoman ann wagner from missouri to accompany me on my trip. and we went and met with president moon. we traveled to the border of china in north korea as the first ever u.s. delegation to visit dandong, the major point
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of commerce between north korea and china so that we could discuss and witness oil tanks going across the bridge from china into north korea. that's just last august. we met with our generals. we met with our admirals working in the region and with our diplomats. and then last october i met with president trump in the white house before his trip to south korea to underscore the importance of strengthening economic sanctions and engaging in dialogue. i told him that there is only a diplomatic resolution to this issue. there is no military resolution of this issue which would not
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turn catastrophic very quickly, and i also told him that talks in and of themselves are not a concession. i made the case to the president that direct and unconditional talks and tough economic sanctions were the only way he could start making deals that first freeze and then roll back kim's nuclear program. this is the only way for us to ultimately owe eliminate north korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. since then the president thankfully has embraced the diplomatic approach. now i will admit his embrace has been a bit unorthodox, but i applaud him for taking my advice to heart, and i hope that he will also heed my advice that success will take time and
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requires looking back at the arc of history. after all, kim jong-un is as we will looking back at history. like his father before him, he seeks to emulate countries that successfully gained acceptance as nuclear weapons states, countries like china, india and pakistan who raced towards nuclear weapons, endured the international community's ensuing consternation and sanctions, but eventually they emerge on to the world stage as more powerful players with an acceptance of their nuclear weapons program. by the rest of the world, defekt facto. at the same time he's keenly aware of the fate suffered by other strong men that either did not complete nuclear weapons programs or negotiated them away
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like iraq where saddam hussein agreed to host united nations weapons inspectors and still faced an invasion that deposed him. on moammar gadhafi in gadhafi in libya who agreed to dismantle his nuclear weapons program only to face a popular uprights and a nato intervention that ultimately led to his brutal death. in 2011 events in libya confirmed north korea's deep-seeded fears. its reaction was telling when it stated that the libya deal was nothing but, quote, an invasion tactic to disarm the country. and indeed numerous deals with north korea from the agreed framework to the commitments laid out in the 2005 joint statement, to the leap day deal all fell apart likely driven both by long-standing emknknity
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the one hand and also by these lingering securities. many point to these examples as cause for pessimism. maybe so, but history also shows that there's still reason to be hopeful. that perspective in events do change, and the unexpected can happen. on october 12, 1986 an adversary to america walked into a leader-level summit prepared to do what everyone assumed and expected he would not and could not possibly do. at the reykjavik summit soviet leader mikhail gorbachev was in fact serious about eliminating nuclear weapons, and that conversation helped end what long had been an intractable arms race between two nuclear powers. it seems reasonable to us now, but at the time most were incredulous, so while the
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challenge to a lasting agreement with north korea are great, we should not abandon optimism. nevertheless, a fundamental question is whether this time will be different from our previous efforts with the kim regime. is kim jong-un different from his father, different from his grandfather, or is he using the same playbook? have our sanctions compelled a weakened north korea to the table, or with a completed icbm is kim jong-un negotiating from a position of strength? the more fundamental question is more within our control to address. what have we learned from the past, and what must we do differently this time to ensure success? so if you'll permit me, i would like to share my thoughts about the road map that lies ahead, and it's essential that we view
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this as the beginning of what will and must necessarily be a very long process. despite all the recent good news, a phased approach that will that will play out over time is the only way all sides will overcome the trust deficits forged by war and harden bid decades of hostility. a long process does not mean we think we can wait to address the north korea threat, but because denuclearization, however define ed, simply cannot be solved overnight or in one meeting. so while we all look forward to an upcoming summit between president trump and kim jong-un that will bee history making, w must ensure meaningful talks continue follow iing the summit
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and the tangible process kobts to be made. to do that, there are specific sticking points that must be addressed. after all, the devil is in the details and we have seen similar promises from north korea before. first, we don't yet have agreement on what denuclearization of the korean peninsula means. it seems exceedingly unlike ly that north korea will unilaterally disarm. highly unlikely. will they expect an end to our extended nuclear deterrent? to our alliance with south korea itself? what weapons and programs will be b incluincluded? just north korea's nuclear weapons or fissli weapon producti and programs as well.
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delivery systems. icbms only or sharp range blast bic missiles as well and how do we deal with north korea's world renowned space program. second, what timelines will be acceptable to all parties? the declaration suggests there are differing exp peckations regarding the timeline sanctions relief. what milestones could north korea first reach? we have not been applying pressure for the sake of pressure. our sanctions are meant to both degrade north korea's ability to threaten the united states and the region with its weapons and to denuclearize north korea through negotiations. as we have not yet achieved either of these goals, it is too
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early to tell whether our efforts have been b successful. so it is also too early to remove the pressure. we will need to keep the pressure focused, but nimble. so that when, not if, north korea backside, we will be able to calibrate based on a demonstration of progress. third, assuming we can reach agreement on the definition of denuclearization and we can agree how to sequence tangible steps towards denuclearization with sanctions relief, how will we conduct the verification process? verifying that north korea has truly rewrelinquishe eed its nc program, weapons grade nuclear materials and related components and not stashed extra warheads deep in scluded bunkers, hide
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aways safe from the prying eyes of weapons inspectors will be a major challenge. these obstacles are surmountable, however, and as the administration moves towards the trump kim summit, there are some guiding principles. it should follow to maximize chance acceptable to us and our allies. as we approach the stumt, i see crucial due u ls each of corresponding don'ts first, do on the threat at hand. north korea's nuclear warheads and the icbms that carry. north korea's growing ability to hold is the drive iing factor i the escalated crisis. many will be tempted ed to focu
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on any win in what has long been a losing situation. and i believe there is a real likelihood we will see some big quote wins at the upcoming summit. after all, the kim regime is masterful at using propaganda to avoid meaningfully rolling back its nuclear program. but we cannot afford to be sidetracked to lose sight of what really is america's ultimate security goal. so to the administration, don't fall for north korea's inevitable theatrics and false concessions. kim jong-un will try to distract. we need to be careful not to give kim too much credit, but we have seen this before. kim jong-un seeks to market
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north korea as a responsible nuclear weapons state by fore swearing nuclear and missile tests. yet this is not the first time that north korea has afwree ed o a moratorium on nuclear and long range missile tests. for example, in 2008, to much fanfare, north korea implode d the cooling. except that the cooling tower was not a necessary component. for north korea's production of the material. as you know was able to -- and in recent weeks, north korea has promised to close its nuclear test site and open it to inspectors. is this a welcome development? yes. would u.s. international experts learn something by visiting the pfacilit
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facility? of course, but while the imagery would be great, would we be achieving our objectives given that the test site may no longer be usable any way and north korea has already conducted six nuclear tests. we we would be wise to think of these examples when weighing what north korea is really willing to concede during negotiations. for every concession, we must ask ourselves whether it is truly an irreversible step towards denuclearization and reciprocate accordingly. this requires a thoughtful look at the diplomatic tools we possess and new creative ones we could quop. second, do stay in lock step with our allied south korea. and help build on the foundation laid by president moon and his
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advisers. north korea and china stand to benefit from drive iing a wedge between the united states and its allies. we must continue to work together. shoulder to shoulder, planning our next steps to maximize our leverage and ensure to avoid opening gaps that north korea can exploit. but there are things to avoid. strategic picture. american forces in the region are and have been b a stabilizing presence. we welcome the recent blue house statement that u.s. troops took a level on the peninsula are an alliance issue independent of any potential peace agreement that might be signed.
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the united states is committed to defend south korea from attack and we must ensure the capable the is on that promise are retained and we must -- must not lose its meaning. and third, do build american diplomatic capeability and infrastructure because diplomacy is team sport. no matter what commitments leaders back, it is only through a well staffed and resourced professional diplomatic core that it becomes a reality. the state department must have the resources it needs to conduct american foreign policy around the gloep and especially with regards to asia and north korea. but a president of the united states has no special envoy or representative on north korea policy. we still don't have a u.s.
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ambassador to south korea. more than a year into the trump administration. we still don't have a confirmed assistant secretary for east asia b b and pacific affairs. we still don't have a special envoy for north korean human rights issues. we no longer have a sanctions coordinator at the state department. the state departments is facing drastic cuts to its budget resources. going into presidential talks without a fully staffed state department mean there are fewer resources dedicated to building a diplomatic toolkit. fewer opportunities to build pressure and fewer people holding north korea accountable for progress moving forward. holding north korea accountable will require sustained garden tending. after this, there will be, how
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will our nation ever be able to ensure that anything kim jong-un promises becomes a reality? don't succomb to the illusion that is possible to strike a grand bargain to solve the problem overniflgt as condoleezza sa rice said, do not quote try to negotiate the details with kim jong-un. diplomacy and sustain. fashion is our only option for peace. we cannot squander this opportunity. by sideline iing the expertise those inside and outside of government who have spent their careers trying to understand the nuances of nuclear negotiations with the kim regime.
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should talks collapse, will not be justified in a failed summit cannot become a steppingstone war. preventive or otherwise initiated by the united states. victor cha recently said that if a trump kim summit does not go well, the only thing behind is a clip. to avoid that outcome. at all costs. we need to be ready with additional measures to further increase economic pressure on the kim regime. to tighten the pressure even
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more. on the kim regime. to cut off their access to the rest of the world's economy even more if they are unwilling to sit and to negotiate a resolution of this issue. china, the primary enabler of north korea, may decide to reduce cooperation with us in enforcing sanctions which would ease the pressure on north korea, but to do so would set back our efforts to revolve the crisis. this morning, i have presented a road map for deescalating the north korean threat. for decade, my work has focused on safeguarding our planet from catastrophic nuclear war. as albert einstein once said, peace cannot be kept by force.
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it can only be achieved by understanding. we have an obligation to american families to service members and the to our allies. to say unequivocally that we did everything in our power to address north korea's dangerous behavior without resorting to armed conflict. this is the pathway for promoting understand iing that must be followed to ensure a more peaceful, prosperous world now and in the years ahead. i thank the council for this very important gathering and all of the leaders who are here and working hard in order to find a peaceful resolution of this incredibly important issue that goes right to the heart of whether or not we are going to have a nuclear nonproliferation
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regime that is enforceable across the planet and i think that ultimately, what the president is talking about is in potentially pulling out of the iran nuclear agreement, would be a huge mistake. if he believes in any way that he would have credibility sitting at the table with kim. we must honor the agreements which we have already entered into as a nation if we expect to have credibility when we sit at the table with the next leader that we hope to persuade enter into negotiations with us on a verifiable basis with the international energy, with the iaea, able to enforce those measures. saudi arabia right now is
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seeking to negotiation a deal with the united states on a 1, 2, 3 agreement for nuclear reprocessing. plutonium reprocessing on their soil. united states wants to have credibility. we must have a consistent nuclear nonproliferation policy. that's what i called for in my 1982 book. nuclear pearl for politics of proliferation. this is ultimately the historic moment and president trump has an opportunity with kim to begin to reverse this whole trajectory of nuclear proliferation. our hopes and prayers go with him and my hopes are tha this agreement can be reached and that we can begin to see a world where the korean peninsula is denuclearized, that we have true peace, which is reached between the north and the south.
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thank you all so much for having me here. >> i'm so overwhelmed by your impressive and imaginative speech and being a speaker for such a wonderful speaker is a great disadvantage. i didn't prepare my written text and he said i'm not speaking for the, for our government. i'm speaking as a scholar. i'm speaking at a person who can be the summit. i was very lucky to attend the first summit in the year 2000. second summit in 2007 and the
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last summit in in 2017. i'll give you my own impressions. sense of market point out -- how to normalize korean relations. and i think they succeeded in coming up with a specific -- no south korean relations. article two is about reduce military tensionings and how to
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come up with tis armament in faced manner. and what is more noticeable in the declaration is that mostly have agreed to transform into peace and at the same time, those of have have agreed to transform the area into a maritime peace joint. because those two areas have been constant source of military attenti attention. article three touches on the issue of peace. and a denuclearized peninsula. article three stiplats that mostly this have agreed, too,
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and to the korean law and to transform this agreement into a peace accord. and then they agreed. they you know, they both conf m confirmed the common goal of achieving the rejection and nuclear weapons free career. senator markey pointed out, there's some different interpretation, made clear there was a clear understanding between under the concept of denuclearization. of nuclear weapons. president moon that there was no
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difference in the concept of the concept, but there could have been a difference. and another mentioning the free pension. but what it really amazing about the declaration, there are four or five points. in india, 2007 in the year 2007, north korean leader showed up to the declaration. two declarations came with a lot of emphasis on unification.
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but under the declaration came more emphasis of peace. would be a difference previous to declarations. audacious goal because they declared that there will be no more under korean peninsula and the era of peace has begun. that is a quite bold statement. therefore unification is important, but without peace, you cannot go to to destination of unification. i think that's a very, very important stam. another interesting point in the
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third korean summit is that both leaders could reach an agreem t agreement. if you look at the test, south korea had always advocated to function in this approach. agency first, difficulty later. led us to economic issues first and military politics issue litter. issues should reach first then social economics and can be known very easily. it's why they talked about disarmament, denuclearization.
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peace, kind of things. there's quite an amazing difference between the summit and two other summits. third important issue is that it's about den gri. north korea has refused to have a talk with the south korea on the issue of nuclear. because north korea has been only say thag the nuclear issues solely between north korea and the united states. south korea doesn't have any right to interview in this nuclear negotiation. therefore, during the first summit, there was an issue of nuclear. during the second summit, president pushed very hard to
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put the newauclear issue, but t north korean, kim jong-un, refused it. they come up with a rather vague close under denuclearization of north korea. there was a knowledge. but during this summit, when we held the first summit and raised the issue because president moon placed the utmost emphasis on creation, north korea accepted it. at the working level, we talked about it. at the summit level, there was a very candid and concrete discussion. come first, too, but the very
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effective north korean leader agreed with the consultation would represent with the public senator markey raised the question of some doubt. the nuclear test sites are still usable and we're going to close them in transparency. experts from the united states and south korea and let them watch the entire process of dismantling nuclear site. i would say these are are quite progress from north korea. we've got to get
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denuclearization. if i wanted to highlight that aspect, too. >> i discovered the extreme realistic and pragmatic. for example, during the summit negotiation, he never mentioned a reduction of american forces in south korea. he didn't mention about the status of combined in military exercises training. always came with those kind of preconditions for their effort toward the denuclearization. western media reported about,
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told president moon if we talk more with the united states trust them, hasome kind of declaration on end iing the korn war why should we have a nuclear weapon and suffer i think for the first time, the north korean leader. the fifth one i'd say -- in the test.
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they afwreeed that deck la races but never kept those agreements. that we find north korea. but this time, it was kim jong-un who raised the issue in the past we have adopted the so many agreements and declarations, but they would never implement. this time so that we'll have the face. that's a very interesting document on the part of north korea. in the past, they adopt deck la la rations. the scheduling of events.
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this one in may. download many talks an cross talks and those three talks will be continued. and he'll be visiting pyongyang. very specific in terms of scheduled. and wii will say that the interesting aspect that really differentiates coming from the other two summits. if you get this b kind of differences, you can come up with in a conclusion that the some are different from the past one.
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going back the senator markey's point. devil is in details. most promise to improvise. harm in what way. what verification process. in early declaration. would north korea inspect from the united states? how about verification? different tests. so many technical issues. once you get up to the case of moving. i wouldn't say that given these
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kinds of things and others, what is the head. but then remember, it's a process. okay? we're well accustomed to culture while hosted. the paradigm of why confrontation, the paradigm of peace. it will be extremely difficult. i hope or president would approach these kinds of challenges. finally as senator markey said,
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this agreement declaration is very much dependent on the summit talk. the successful. his now u tradition again. we hope that we can avoid that path and i hope the president will make the summit successful so we can pull together towards the peace and b stability and common prosperity under korean peninsula. thank you very much.
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>> we're behind a little bit. we provide translation is provided for us. so channel one is english and channel two is is korean. i'm the dean of the school of international studies university and i'm serving as board member of the foundation. that's why i'm here.
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i'm pleased and honored to moderate the public session. the dialogue between the counsel and foundation. this is extremely important and the time, it's timely. battle between the united states and korea. i'd like to thank counsel for forcing us and the keynote speaker said, we welcomed a new possibility and a new window of opportunity to make korean peninsula much more peaceful than before and trying, we are trying our best to make the korean peninsula free.
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but prior to perspectives about the progress in the future. some people are very much cynical. trz sochl people are much more optimistic. some are cautiously optimistic. of course there are some people in korea, they have elevated expectation for a peaceful and nuclear peninsula. at least everybody understands that reduce the tensions. and open a new chapter of going to a duh neenuclearized korean peninsula. it's just the end of it. we are going to have debates and discussion this morning.
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and you have four excellent panels to diss cuscuss this top. i was thought that about ten minutes for additional remark, but in the initial marks for about seven minutes if possible. seven to ten minutes initial marks by each presenter, then the counsel the chance to speak from the guest side rather than even. so the chance, i will give it to
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the assemblyman from korea. even though they have busy schedules, they joined this friendly thought between us u. walk it closely to president moon even during the administration and he works as a ruling party. roughly represent to the government tradition. i give the chance to representative park for about seven minutes to maximum of ten minutes. please.
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>> thank you. retest. i am from democratic party of korea. we were facing north korea summit and very honored to be b here. i work for the summit, expeck tases for the upcoming u.s. north korea summit. i believe president moon's vision was a major factor
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entering the summit meeting. kim to complete denuclearization of the korean peninsula. former first lady told the president moon that he should receive nobel peace prize. president moon responded the peace prize should go to president trump and we will take the peace instead. that response highlights the good intentions of president moon. last year, president moon gave a speech and since, he has followed through. during the olympic, he made room for participation of the north korea by delaying a korea u.s. joint military exercise in consultation with the u.s.
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after the olympics, president moon followed through by sending a special envoy and a special meeting and the message was relaed to president trump. that laid the foundation for the upcomi upcomi upcoming u.s. north korea summit. president moon arranged the meeting. what distinguished this that they are connected with u.s. north korea summit. the previous summits are limited in their effectiveness because they are a lie dog between the two koreas only and did not lead two dialogues with other major powers. such limitations were overcome in the third intercory korea summit.
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principle moon president moon i just the driver, he's also the sherpa. we learned he's able to react appropriately to events surrounding him. i don't intend to overestimate kim's abilities, however, we we can't realize he's not a madman and that it would be wrong to simply assume that he would never give up nukes. kim's been through a difficult period where pressures and were coming in from all directions. he also faced serious threats to his regime where military options such as limited strikes were talked about.
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changes were not limit today nonprovocation. it is apparent he wants to secure the safety of his regime. through a structure of peace. even if there was a guarantee of nonaggression and quality of life, it would be difficult for kim to maintain his regime. the economy was scrapped and now, north korea has adopted full pursuit of economy only. >> peace through the coalition goes hand in hand. with quality of life.
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to p p pursue quality of life only and not that the denuclearization that would lead to heightened pressure and greater sanctions. as a kim has stated, that would be like poking one's own eyes. kim chose the path and probably red trump's art of the deal that dennis rodman gave him. moon also gave kim a new economic map of the peninsula. there are an intersection of interest amongst cory rkorea, ud north korea. at the upcoming summit between trump and kim, if the
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denuclearization issues are agreed to, there might be a need for a large scale economic assistance and such assistance could be a win win opportunity for all sides involved. economic relations with north korea should not be a one sided handout rather, it should be a series of investment which will have positive returns for south korea and the u.s. we have the author of the art of the deal and the scheherpa to n economic myth map for dead. a return for all parties involved. thank you. >> you use the device in a different way from others.
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i think the ruling party is trying to change the way of thinking. try to change the korean peninsula. you showed it could be done. >> kim is a very well-known specialist in korea. it is a member of the justice party and he has long been working in a defense community in the korean national assembly. and before we gip this discussion, asked me make the discussion. so please start. >> hello. i am from the justice party of
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korea. yeah, so well last two, the north korea dialogue we were in line with the ruling party here. so justice party is in steps with the party. i am with the opposition party. don't want you to forget that, so i don't espouse the position taken. by not all the position taken by the main party.
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let's go back to 1865 when there was a civil war between the americas. and during civil war, lincoln did not think of the civil war in terms of south and north only when lincoln was coming to power. he steadied that it's important for him and everybody, all american, not to think of good and evil only. or one side against the other. and he's in this speech, an inspiration for many people. it's important we have an open mind when it comes to looking at the other side.
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civil war provided the nation, eventually, u.s. was united. the same could be said of kor s koreas. we have been divided for about 70 years and for the 70 years, we have been adversaries and we have been fighting one another. and edition of people have been very brutal for cokoreans and i think it's important we don't look at the relationship as good and evil. or evil versus good. we heard before that north korea was part of the axis of evil. i think it's important we don't look at north korea as evil. actually, we have to have a more open mind when it comes to thinking or framing the issues on the korean peninsula.
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meeting was taking place. not to say that moon was trying to imlate lincoln. but moon was definitely open minded when talking kim and the open mindedness of kim was something that enabled the declaration to be b, to come about. i came to the u.s. and then many people asked me whether trump kim meating would be a success, but no one can be sure how the outcome would be. but the question should be if the meeting were to be a failure, then what would happen? i think i would have an easier time responding if if the trump
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kim meeting becomes a failure, perhaps our 1971 lessons from cuban crisis could be replayed on the peninsula because because if we were to approach the meeting with, if the meeting fails, we don't have any other options. then we don't have other options. we have to be mindful there should be other options. that's why it's important to have an open mind when it comes to the meetings. if u.s. found north korea to be not awe thent nick their approach to the meeting, there is a real possibility of a
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surgical sprtrike that could ta place against north korea and this is not something anybody wants on the korean peninsula. i think it's important that as we approach the north korea u.s. meeting, that we also have other options available. but not just one and these options need to be considered. of course we want to summit to become a success and we strive for success. i think it's also important for us to have a frame of mind that we know that the meeting could be a failure. the meeting would become a success. i've met americans who asked me
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following whether kim is a trustworthy human and can he be trusted. i get these questions. the answer to the questions, i don't know, actually. i don't think anybody knows. maybe kim himself dooichbt know if he could trust himself. but that we do not trust kim, we know for a fact that he does fear the pressure from the u.s. that he fears the military might, that much we know for a fact. for kim to continue to hold on to the nuclear weapons, i think he came to realize that he can have the nukes on one hand and economic prosperity on the other. so he need to give up one or the other.
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and kim also wants to, he likes k pops and wants to be able to watch the k pop performance and he wants to enjoy those like other human beings. it is often said that north korea developed their nuclear weapons, nuclear program to counter the american pressure, but north korea also fears china and the sense of isolation that north korea is feeling has felt of late. is real so kim needs to make a choice. because u we know his statement and because we also are aware of some of the options that he has,
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i think it's easier for us to assess the path that he would have to take. well, what options does he have? we need to consider wh wr he is to make sure he is going to be heading. i think it's important we continue to put pressure on him. so that he would make the right choice. as we look towards the u.s. north korea meeting, we need to be mindful that kim needs to make certain choices very fast because dmesically, he has om mobs probs with his economic situation. with the continues sanctions have had effects. have been effective.
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and we don't want to the, doing something that would making kim to lose his face or to embarrass him. and bring about submission. but rather we need to approach p meeting so he makes the right choice under the situation given the options that he has and as stated, i think it's important that we have a good details when it comes to the execution and implementation of whatever argumentments are to come out of and ls i think that we have to provide some sort of a guarantee for his regime. because foremost on his mind is survivablility and by providing
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some sort of guarantee. and with this approach, would be able to sea a right option chosen. right path chosen by kim. so these are the road maps, initial road maps toward it is big picture twoept achieve. and of course the ultimate goal is permanent peace on the korean peninsula. i realize i'm running out of time. we really don't have a whole lot of time also on the korean peninsula. we don't want to be replaying the cuban missile crisis on the cory rkorean peninsula. what we want is a permanent and sustainable peace on the korean peninsula. on this regard, we certainly look forward to mr. trump making a good choice when it comes to dealing with kim. thank you.
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>> thank you. you said that you belonged to an opposition party and made it clear. when you said you wanted to make president moon the lincoln of cokorea, it sounded as if you we belonging to a ruling party. you said a very interesting concept of a glorious way to denuclearize north korea. and i think we can discuss the issue further at the initial presentation. next, we are going to invite mr. hish man. she's working as the director of the project on new places. and senior adviser of international security program at the csis. and she has a lot of experience of dealing with the issue. she works as computer systems
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defense for conquering weapons of mass destruction. so she at the department of defense. she dealt with a nuclear issue, nonproliferation and arms control. so i think she's the perfect one to comment on the current stats. so please next we will invite her. >> thank you. very much. for having me. thank you to the atlantic counsel for this terrific event. i was asked in the time available to focus on denuclearization. what does it mean and is it achievable? short version is it depends on who you ask and no. and yet i think this does remain a moment for optimism and we should seize it to seek to reduce nuclear risks. so let me explain my answer. in my opinion, sort of the bad news is i don't believe, i believe neither kim jong-un's
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delair clared willingness nor t united states assistance on irreversible denuclearization is really feez indeed compatible. why? because when a country makes a strategic choice or even if it makes a fundamental strategic choice to give up its strategic capabiliti capabilities. most cases, nuclear but a few examples of chemical weapons have been similar. these objectives are unachievable. you cannot find and inspect every potential hiding place. you cannot assure the actions and decisions of future leaders. you cannot be absolutist in these efforts. indeed a strategic rejection of these weapons complete ve
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verifiable and irreversible nuclearization is the maxization of that point is -- it is even more important than the details in this specific of how far you roll back capabilities. now, if such an expansive definition on the one hand is impossible and on the other hand is unnecessary, why does it persist? >> it needs the rhetorical needs on both sides to sound conciliatory and deliberately out of reach for both sides. this in its simple form is not setting conditions to come together and achieve meaningful progress. it is setting conditions to assure that one can walk away. now, let's keep in mind a few examples of where we sought to and achieve roll back of wmk
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capabilities. it was not fully complete and retains large stocks of weapons of usable materials that the united states would consider impossible in the case of north korea. they did not have the type of procedures that we expect to have with north korea. it could have been reversed at fw any time. it never did because it had no will to do so and because it was a fundamental strategic choice that nuclear weapons were not in south africa's fundamental interests at that point. in the case of libya, internally and externally imposed burdens of its nuclear program simply became too costly. these weapons were not burden, they imposed on the state. in that context, the discovery
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of undeclared chemical weapons of 2011 did little to shake the national security -- so the incomple incompleteness was not catastrophic. syria under cohearse of pressure, the joint of chemical weapons, the community came together to remove and destroy syria's chemical weapons and reduce chemical weapons risks. no such effort can eliminate the expertise and capabilities to reconstitute small scales or eliminate the incentives to use niese weap these weapons when they prove their value and utility to the regime. the international community aired not in the effort to eliminate what it could buy in its naive embraced of syria's
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rhetoric and gross calculation of syria. the syria example along with north korea's own history should be our cautionary tale today. unless and until north korea comes to the conclusion for itself, that possessing nuclear weapons is more dangerous to its security. this will be the fundamental reassessment of strategic value of their program. the best we can hope to achieve is nuclear risk production. perhaps when we are talking about the threat of nuclear tips of long range missiles that threatens the united states of our homeland and of our allies.
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it is an opportunity that's n e nonetheless. if the opportunity exists to reduce those risks and perception by the parties involved, if that exists, we should seize it. this opening is the good news and it leads to attempts to turn it into the good news it had the potential to be. shipping skep conceptually, the region complete verifiable or i irs virsable program. that involves steps of reciprocity. what are the key steps? >> the first immediate that sets the condition destabilize
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nuclear risks and enable negotiations in a way that does not provide to do damage to the party and the other. nuclear testing is fundamental. a robust strategy to counter and prevent north korea's proliferation activities and its ability to continue and fund its illicit program is vital. third, what's fundamentally essential is an aggressive plan for alliance maintenance that reduces the rescouplinecoupling. overtime we have additional steps that we can take. a fairly short amount of time, capability reductions to cap and reduce to the greatest extent possible of nuclear advance capabilities. considering whether such steps could be taken as well as to other areas which pose a tremendous threat to our allies
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and their neighbors to the south. inducing transparency and verification measures to enhance the nature of the program and felt confidence that these steps are legitimate. a series of steps designed to influence the perception as to the value risks and efficacies of nuclear use. also, reciprocity for real and genuine progress as these steps unfold. overtimes, these efforts cover with the broader political dialogue or fundamental changes to the political leadership may help establish conditions to the fundamental choices we are talking about at the beginning. the choice by the regime hopefully with the support of the korean people that are safer and secure and stable and more internationally integrated knee
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y internationally integrated knee y north korea is a north korea without nuclear weapons. we can find a concrete methodical path based on reciprocity to help reduce those risks. >> thank you. >> thank you miss hersman. >> you gave us details of this. and finally and last but not least, we invite the host of this strategic dialogue, our senior president and director of our strategy and security. as you know, he works a long time as a specialist in the
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defense and strategy under president obama and president bush. he's developing a strong education of the education of the peninsula issue. i want to hear your view on the current situation. >> thank you very much. it is really an honor to be here with mr. minister and your excellence and my long time colleague, rebecca hersman. we have been appreciating to the opportunity and i am one of those who cautiously is optimistic about the events that are unfolding. three, i think we need to tweak our policies a little bit. i think maximum pressure engagement might have been good for 2017 but i think we need to sort of rethink how we dial, how
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we turn those dials a little bit. first on the stakes, i give the noon administration a lot of credit and the trump administration a lot of credit. i wrote early last year that i thought policies of the last three presidents oconee ya han korea have utterly failed. that's because the threats have sell rat accelerated. i think people under estimate the threat if it is allowed to continue on its current path and it is still an outcome that we ca can't rule out. north korea if it ever gets an operational capability and it does not have it now but it is probably two or three years away. if it gets that capability, it would be the only third country since world war ii. to be able to pose a direct threat by the use of nuclear
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armed ballistic missiles. i also argued that the north korean's security challenges are less predictable than it used to be. that's for a couple of reasons. there is new leadership in a lot of the countries involved. this is where i think and there is the opportunity but also the danger. there is new dynamics with these leaders and there is a newly chinese leadership last october. this is uncharted territory for us where china's ambition is no longer hidden. i think any brief summary of the president xi jinping's speech last october would give a clear indication of china's new found confidence. i think there is increasing on unpredictability at least among all the countries involved of the u.s. roles. there is a lot of uncertainty and almost a day does not go by
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one of the countries and what do you think trump will do next? i don't have an answer to that. that's new and unpredictability. if we pass forward to 2020 and north korea has 50 techniqunort has 50 nuclear weapons and the threat deminuiminishes -- i wor a crisis instability. if something happens, do we have any confidence that north korean leadership is getting served up in a rational matter? do we have any confidence that they share our concepts of nuclear deterrence. do we think kim jong-un hears all the pros and cons of various decisions that he's being told the truth of all aspects of what's going on? >> i worry very much if this threat is allowed to continue and my biggest worry that our
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public will no longer support our alliances. if there is 50 north korean icbms by 2024. our public will say why do we have these alliances and the u.s./japanese alliance and why are we paying money if the threat is getting worse and if there is a danger of the crisis. i think by using those kinds of foresight, it helps to inform how urgent the situation is today. second, the opportunity, i think it is greater than many experts seem to appreciate from my reading of the literature here and washington in particular. a lot of analysts reacted negatively every time the trump administration took a different approa approach. there was a lot of increase rhetoric last year regarding the threat and possible military reactions and most analysts say
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this is not really helpful. this is not a good thing to do. when the trump administration agreed to have a face to face meeting, most analysts and a lot of analysts say boy, we just gave away the store and this is not a good idea. this has been tried before and we have been down this road and this is typical and north korean propaganda and this is the same, old, thing. i am not saying positive outcomes are guaranteed. i do think we need to have the imagination to look at the opportunity and to try to seize it. president moon and his team and we know them very well from a lot of our engagement. the high levels and they have repeatedly said they're not going to make the same mistakes as their predecessors. it is not all about their sunshine and it is about hard head approaches to engagement while we keep our pressure on and the next three months is
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very telling to make sure those policies are continuing to be pursued. president trump defide conventions by engineering a top down approach and it is high-risk and also potentially high reward. the status quo was not working at all after three deck kalds. and then we don't know about kim jong-un as previous speakers eloquently said. he may continue elements of his father and grandfather but he may have a different approach. he's much younger and he has a longer term perspective. he has grown up in the west, he knows better. he may see the opportunity that economic prosperity may bring to his people. >> it may enhances his longevity after a continued build up of his weapons. i am not saying it is guaranteed
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but we need to think about these opportunities and upside potential even as we are being careful and looking also at the downside risks. so i think we need a new policy approach, i don't think it needs to be completely new but we'll be entering a period of what's likely a long set of diplomatic negotiations at high levels and medium levels and low levels. this is going to go on. it is not going to be instant. i took a look of the current policy and i think i would dial things up and down a little bit as follow. in terms of maximum pressure, we really need to keep this on because it is a critical lever and in this regard, china is a critical actor. i don't agree with complete verifiable and irreversible disarm
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disarmorme disarmorment. i heard rebecca say, ir revireve is death. everything is reversible. new materials can be packaged in a war head. there is no such thing as irrevesible. anybody that tells you that, do not believe them. denuclearization steps need to be under taken. i also think what i call denuclearization needs to be taken. i think we should think of what does the concrete steps look like in the near term and how do we know this is happening and some of the images that i think a are important to think about. that's already been announced. i like the word as an action ve
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verb. i like images of crushing minister canister. we saw some of these in the programs towards the end of the cold war. i like those kiepnds of things. those are good positive signals that north korea would be very serious. taking their missiles and taking them outside and destroying them in full view and i also think of removal of war heads of some other fashion or maybe china takes them. that's another thing we need to think about very soon. i think this kind of concrete steps are very important to think about in the next few weeks. on-site inspections are very important, satellite imagery. i also have a hunch of some of our capabilities may be useful understanding where north korea
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capabilities may be. i think we should look into how we look these data heavy tools to help us with these important exercises and so i think that's sort of the pressure. i also think obviously, we need to increase the engagement and we are doing that and i thought professor moon did a very good job of talking about that. the key question is when do we consider lifting sanctions. once those sanctions are lifted, a tiny bit, it is really hardtoo put it back down. i would hope today in this discussion and others very soon, how do we get a handle on when do we lift sanctions and when do we think the process is such that we can consider such a monumental move because that's a mild stone either a good one, i hope but also could lead to an
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easing of pressure and a reduction of leverage by the coalition that's engaging. lastly, i think engagement is an important and pressure is important. i would add the word hedge. we do not know how all of this is going to turn out. it could go very positively which is what we hope and we are working hard towards. it can go very, very negatively in a very quick way. if it goes negatively, what's our hedge? what are your capabilities and what are our leverage? should we consider more military capability enhancement that's useful no matter what scenario plays out. capability enhancement will help modernize the u.s. and south korea/alliance for whatever challenges that may be come ng tingcoming. i agree with the blue house
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statement, the u.s. force is not tied to any peace treaty as senator markee said so well. it is a decision for the south korean people to decide whether or how much of u.s. forces should be hosted as part of our alliance and in pursuit of our interest. as we saw south korean forces operating in the middle east with the u.s. led coalition and other places. the purpose of the alliance is multi purpose. it is not only for the north korean challenge, there are a lot of things that we want to do in the world and helicoptcontin in the world. i would not tie u.s. force presence at all to a piece of agreement and so far that's the position of both the trump administration as well as the moon administration. i think i hit my time mark at this point and happy to answer
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questions. >> thank you. your last point gives a lot of questions to us. it tells us our uncertain future is still there. we have to be prepared for any kind of possibilities. i will raise a few questions from moderating this position that which i think is important. the first question, rebecca, you raised a fundamental strategy of choice whether kim jong-un made that kind of strategy to denuclearize the country is a serious question and nobody knows clearly. we have to think about it and whether kim jong-un made the strategy choice to change the course and try -- because it is kind of -- and many of us are curious to know why kim jong-un shifted his position from making
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a north korea nuclear strong country to -- developing the kind of nuclear weapons in a speedy way. i wanted to hear your opinion about whether north korea made a strategic choice and after that, i want to hear -- when you said that kim jong-un shifted his policy from a kind of a parallel economy and military together and shifted to the economy's concentration strategy, that sounded as if kim jong-un made a strategy choice to advocate the new nuclear program and going forward. i want to hear the answer to your response, rebecca. >> thank you. so, i can't know the mind of kim jong-un but i am deeply skeptical about the presence at
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least today of the strategic choice that nuclear weapons are in in fact and that the north korea regime fundamentally believes that their own weapon are a greater threat for them than the giving up of them would be. i am deeply skeptical that the choice has been made. i think we are right to be skeptical. and just because that choice has not been made does not mean we cannot make progress to make ourself safer. we just have to do it with our eyes wide open and take off the rose color glasses and be practical of what sort of options lie in front of us. why do i suspect it is possible that kim jong-un have done this? >> there is a few things. first of all, there is a lot of tractional things going on here and there is as large amount of pressure and if there is an ability to create an environment to transact and lift some of
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that pressure, i can see why and the regime wish to do that. to some extent, he's making lemonade out of lemons. the test site issue is a very good example as they complete the test depending on how destroyed the test site is and what a nice way to make concession. the broader sense of giving up some of their testings if indeed they give it up always a good tactic to give up what you don't really need anymore. they have that opportunity to kind of be transactional of something that's not deeply meaningful. but, i think the third reason is probably the most important and should be the most worrisome to us. i worry that kim jong-un believes that his best bet to decouple the united states and our ally and the republic of korea is today and particularly of the leaderships of the two
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countries today. that's a moment that perhaps kim jong-un can't let pass. both leaders may be prepared to walk one from the other if they believe their interests die ver ververged diverged. both of our countries are public koreas of the united states will be dramatically disadvantage and our options reduced substantially if we cannot count on each other when this does hit a major bump in the road. >> all right -- do you think kim jong-un made as strategic choice and shifted his decision from a nuclear development to -- >> well, let me respond to that.
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some scholars have stated before north korea were in pursuit of military first policy and now they have switched to economy first. that's what many scholars are saying. i know before north korea pur e pursued economy and military but during the state of the nation address at the beginning of the year, kim expressed his wish for putting economy first. and kim and moon one day were talking at and kim stated that
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kim likes the train to pyeongchang but the trains in north korea has a problem with the north korea's rails and he expressed his embarrassment over the frail state of the north korean economy and what that indicated was that kim jong-un is looking at his economy and he's willing to be honest about the despair that felt when it comes to the economy. when we look and analyze certain statements as such from kim, i think we come to realize that the economy is becoming more of a priority so i think there was a change to economy first. >> the second question that kim jong-un raised a possibility of
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a failure in the course of the future and we can't face an unpredictable dangerous future which is quite similar to the missile crisis. do you think it is plausible because investors -- mentioned that we have to pursue a diplomatic pass. the military option is easy to say how hard to implement. so, do you think it is plausible and i wanted to hear that you also said that we have to be prepared for the alternative future and we have to have any possibility of the future. what do you think about it for representative kim?
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>> for analysts, it is very hard to predict the future and although that's our job. but, as of last year many experts were predicting april of this year there will be a crisis on the peninsula. no, we did not have a crisis and no one predicted and no experts was able to predict the situation that we have now on the peninsula. most experts with thinking in terms of military crisis, possible conflict on the peninsula. so those analysts were wrong so what happens to all the experts that we have in the u.s. and
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korea and what they were looking at. that's why it is important for us to have an analysis that looks at diverse outcomes and possibilities. it is not like we should be looking at only one outcome. that's why it is important for us to the possibility of a failure. if there was a failure talks between trump and kim, i think we need to be ready to address all the possible scenarios. if i talk about the cuban crisis, the crisis on the peninsula did happen quite a few times already. it is still a an area of conflict and the truth is on the war and the war still goes on. we don't know for sure why kim changed his mind but what i do
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know is that because u.s. believed -- what i am saying is that when the missile was launched, latter part of last year, kim/trump at the time says kim's threats are real. once kim realizes that trump believes that north korea has the capabilities, then he has the bargain chip needed to sell himself to sell his capabilities if u.s. did not believe in north korea's capabilities. i don't see why kim has to come to the table and negotiate anything because if he -- if mr. trump does not belief kim is capable then what is he going to sell? so that's where we are.
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>> okay, barry. >> sure, the reason i suggested a new policy or an adjusted policy or engagement pressure and haeedge, the hedge part is because we need to do more preparations for both scenarios or both sets of scenarios. the positive scenarios are potentially as likely as the negative ones. we should prepare vigorously for the positive scenarios. if the answer to every requests is yes, what do we do next? but, if the answer to the request is no then i also think that we need to say what do we do next. let me paint one snare jcenarios negative. i am used to thinking dark thoughts. you be, imagine the negotiations go on, let's say six month
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months -months -- months -months -- months -- or nine months and i know on twitter which i am on a lot, that's a long time. if they go in on that long and let's say kim jong-un's military comes to him and says if we don't test soon, i no longer can give you assurances that our missile will work or i can no longer guarantee that our flu nuclear war heads will work. sir, what would you like to do? you can imagine that kind of pressure and that's just one of, you know, a dozen scenarios that we can think of in the next ten minutes. i think this is why it is absolute critical coordination between the south korean government and the united states needs to continue and that we the need to make sure as we said earlier that we are in locked steps. so i am not pessimistic. i do worry about a crisis as i
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said in my remarks. i am cautiously optimistic and we need to keep pressing to realize this historic opportunity. >> okay. we did not have time to discuss the role of china that much. i think barry raised a very critical question of the role of china. china cannot be excluded frd om the whole process. barry raised an interesting process of continuing to pressure north korea, the role of china is critically important. i want to ask the representative of park about -- what do you think about the role of china in realizing our goals, what kind of roles do you expect from
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china? i want to hear what is the kind of expected and positive role of china in the whole process, mr. park. >> their roles? when it comes to koreans as we wat watched the interkoreans summit, we were happy with the outcome of the outcome of the inn interkorean summit. 90% of koreans believe the summit was a success. for koreans, we feel that theres a real possibility of a war, a conflict occurring on the korean peninsula. ever since 1953, the truth stood on the korean peninsula and the
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parties to the truth for the north and south koreas and as well as china and the u.s. and as such as the signature to the truth. china's role is very important if we were end their truce. president xi -- did not take phone calls from moon for a long time since the interkorea summit. but thankfully -- i hear moon did talk on the phone, that's great. >> she made it clear that when it comes to peace accord, that china will coordinate it closely with south korea and that's a
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green light from china. but with china and in the east asia region, we have certain history context and we had many coming across of paths with china. we do have a sudden fear especially when it comes to the north in st eastern part of the peninsula. >> the role play by china was also important although the strongest pressure came from the
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u.s. to a certain extent, china was also to be accredited. >> sure, thanks for the easy question. i would start by saying that before 2018 -- in recent months, there was a sense of debate in north korea that it was involving and maybe there is an unstable regime and of increasing capabilities was not so great for them verses alternative scenarios and i think when the assassination of kim jong-un's brother happened, that was a marker in chinese thinking and so was the trump's administration rhetoric of military options and i think that this might accelerated that debate to a point where they engage and where they really put
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their foot on the brakes in terms of trades of north korea and unprecedented level. you know now we go to 2018 and i don't know what president xi and kim jong-un talked about. i don't know what they agreed to and i would love to hear anybody who says they do. i worry a lot about china taking their foot off the sanctions. the sanctions' pedal too quickly and if i am in china. i may worry about a north korea that's opening up, that's increasing its engagement with other countries because right now china is, you know, is everything in terms of north korea's external interactions and it gives them enormous leverage over the configuration of the geo politics of northeast
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as asia. i imagine they have a debate ongoing and that they may not be a unified view behind closed doors. my suggestion for dealing with that uncertainty would be with hedging the element. it may sound hard but if i were president trump or president moon, i would get together and here is a set of capabilities that'll be important for the region and other endeavors and it includes significantly enhanced military capabilities of a variety of sorts that should be brought into the region that should be developed, working with japan and others and then i would go to china and say if you did not like the fad battery, you are really not going to like these other capabilities which are legitimately needed. and so please continue to help
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us. please keep the sanctions on until this process has completed. i am not sure if i know of any levers that can help shape the decision making processes in beijing about this. i think that is one way that i recommended in the past that we helped to convince china that this is a real threat if it continues to develop and we need more capabilities that the pe people of liberation of army will not like if we bring them into the region. >> okay, we have not decided to finish this session at 11:45. about 10 minutes left. before i open up this floor, i want to give the final question to rebecca. both you and barry agreed that if the chances are there, twowe have to seize it. the best opportunity that we are
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expecting is this coming summit. what is the condition making it more successful -- you may have another kind of cautionary, tell us about -- if you want to make it successful, what are the kinds of things that you want to give advice to both? >> my biggest concern in not losing and what may be the opportunity is the trump administration not be so expansive in its requirements that it sets the opportunity up to fail before it has the chance to succeed. if it really is i insist on anything, complete and irreversible and setting up conditions that are by definition unachievable then that really is a feels like trying to set conditions for a
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military option. i think that some of us have that concern and there are advocates inside the administration who may think oh, just go through the emotions mo we can set up the conditions for the military operation. that's why i am so concerned of this. we need manager our expectations but also say can you get any steps towards meaningful risk reduction? if you can, you should take them because they'll help. they'll help stabilize in terms of the crisis situation that barry spoke about. they'll help in terms of those immediate threats and they may set conditions where we can achieve great results. >> we have limited time available for questions. i will collect all questions all together and ask the question collectively. please go ahead, the gentleman with the glasses. yeah, go ahead.
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>> hello, my name is evans sanky, i am from schools of advance of national studies. what are the merits of pursuing a peace treaty first followed by disarmament followed by a peace treaty, thank you. >> gentleman from the left. >> thank you for your remarks, i have a question to national member mr. park. because you mentioned quality of life of north korean people, i was wondering whether you think it is necessary for our government to bring up human rights issues especially civil and political issues. why promoting the interkorean relationship? >> is there any other who - any
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other questions? i will go to the next round. i think rebecca can take the first question of sequencing and this treaty. >> right. well, this may be a controversial thought. i am not sure if it really matters necessarily. it matters what the terms are of both. it matters what the terms of disarmaments are. it matters what the terms and time line is for a peace treaty. i think there is an interesting option developing now where perhaps you establish a peace treaty frame first and embed the disarmament. just make sure you don't give everything up front before the benefit of the treaty. if the fundamental goals understanding that we are working not towards unification but towards the establishment of
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peace and condition on the peninsula, that may be an innovation that helps the opportunity to get some tractions. i am open to the idea. >> okay, there was a specific question to for mr. park. >> absolutely you know -- that was much debated topic. we do have a north korean rights law in south korea. we also applied it to the koreans of the north. we want to make sure that north koreans are adequately protected. however, we are facing the possibility of a crisis on the korean peninsula.
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that's why we are not dealing with it directly. >> i can accept a few questions more. >> the gentleman from the back. >> i will ask the question of national member of mr. park. >> i am from the yonsei university. as to the human rights of law in south korea, it talks about establishment of human riepghts foundations, i understand that the foundation needs to have a designation director for these foundations that's held up in your assembly. why? why are you guys holding it up? >> can you limit your question to one because we have others, sorry about that.
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>> okay. >> the lady here? >> thank you, i have al question for barry. barry mentioned that what is our hedge if the situation -- i wonder how barry thinks about u.s. part of hedge and also the hedge from south korean side. what would be the situation after if the summit goes bad. thanks. >> okay. gentlemen. >> hi, my name is daniel from the national -- the panel discussed of kim jong-un of economy's first policy and economic development, my question is, do you think it is possible that kim may be willing to work more fundamentally reforms of the economy in order to promote economic development
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that he may pursue chinese or vietnamese style economic reforms. >> all right, final. >> i am working at the cmi. my question is for all the panels about the thought of deployment. he said that the thought of deployment is decided after environment shows that -- after two summits whether he decides to deploy or not would be a pressure issue for him to decide. i wonder the two summit outcomes will influence his decision and how? >> okay, we have a little bit of time available. i will start from the very end and come to the right side and
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you can take the last question if you don't mind. >> so answer the one question to me. >> sure, what does the hedge looks like and if things go bad, i can imagine several elements, keeping the sanctions exactly as they are, that seems to have had an effect, although i cannot prove it statistically. a set of military enhancement that i suggested and i have written about this on the atlantic counsel website, some illustrations including special operation forces, deployments by the south korean or the united states military, more intelligence surveillance and capabilities and obviously more missile defense and i emphasize the d-word there. anybody that tells you fad is an offense system -- that's why it is called a missile defense
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system. potentially you know duo capable tactical aircraft, i mean this is a really serious and sort of discontinuous threat if they end up with an icbm and if they do in three years, they don't have it now. we need to start preparing it now and so it is not something that we can snap your fingers and redesign the military alliance of north korea. now is the time to be doing that. >> i read the obama and administration and cyber operations against the north korean programs, that seems like the right thing to me of test failures and etcetera, etc. i would keep it going. i would try to open up north korean society and somehow more information to them. internet access and i think that's good for them and for us and the more you can open up the society and the better off they'll be and maybe you know in
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that regard try to draw a wedge in the regime and have a lot of benefits and great meals and alcohol and most of the people are starting in dire straights. we need to dial that up if the summit goes bad. >> okay. >> in 2016, january 1st, i came to washington at the time. many americans and many organizations had expressed interests about the human rights in north korea and i know that it is an important topic for many people on their minds. so the declaration and peace
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regime on the korean peninsula, i believe these go hand in hand with the people of north korea and however i see that perhaps you feel that the human rights is neglected and we don't come out right and talk about it. the gdp per capita in south korea is about 20 times higher than that is in north korea. we heard about the exchange between kim and kim had expressed that his concerns that north korea was too slow in
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reforming their economy so if kim is lamenting that they are too late in economic reform, i think it is a good signal that he does indeed wants to reform his economy and by not reforming sooner or earlier, it appears that it has weaken his grip. >> i think i can respond to that deployment. last year they were deployed. moon administration, we had environmental assessment that were being carried out and moon stated that they temporarily deployed at the moment, eventually we'll make a decision
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after environmental assessment is completed. it is not perminantly stationed yet. >> it is no longer applicable as it is before. this is a strategic asset and so we need to look further and see how things will go. actually, we'll hold off on the assessment for about foive year. we don't have a permit deployment yet. it is going to be a temporary for some time to come. that's the way we are. we are in a limbo. also, if i may yesterday we arrived here in washington.
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it really happened to us at the hotel, there was an old lady, over 80 years old and she said that washington is at risk, you guys need to be careful and she said that we have trump and we are at risk and maybe she was joking but -- we have trump who's going to come to perhaps korea and talk to kim but if americans feel trump is a threat, and he is a risk then what koreans are to feel about mr. trump talking about peace on the korea peninsula? i am actually a little concerned of what may happen or what may come out of mr. trump's lips. but, i can only at this point
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trust the good judgment of mr. trump. >> any notes or optimism? >> so -- i will say what my test of optimism is and that's an example of this of the extent that we can sustain the strong coup couple ling of the alliance whether it is exercises and a strong economic relationship between the united states and south korea especially in the form of trade. can we sustain that over the next six months without either side making unilateral concessions that's not coordinated. if we can, we stand in a good position to attempt a strong negotiations. if we fail, the upper hand will go to north korea and that'll not end well. >> thank you.
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>> we are awfully behind the schedule but we enjoy the wonderful discussions of the variety of topics. please join me giving a big hand to all panelists. on wednesday, the confirmation hearing of gina
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haspel. if confirmed, she's the first woman to head to cia. you can watch her testimony before the senate intelligence committee live c-span's washington journal live each day. coming up wednesday morning, congressman tom rice will be with us to discuss president trump's decision on the iran deal and the administration trade policy. also, jared hoffman will talk about the newly formed congressional rethought caucus. and on tuesday night's primary
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results in four states and what could mean for the november election. be sure to watch washington journal live at seven eastern. joined the discussion. sunday on q&a we discussed the life and times of conjoined twins. >> if you can imagine, these are two married couples that cannot be in the same bed. when they set up two separate households about a mile from each other and they stick to this very rigid schedule and they will say live in one house
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for three days and during these three days chang is the master of the house and he can do whatever he wants to -- and three days later they moved to the other house and then chang will give up his home. and his own free will. >> did it work?>> apparently. they had 21 children. next, a look at current efforts to promote islam as -- this is held by washington institute for near east policy. this is a little more than one hour.


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