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tv   Controversial Generals of the Civil War  CSPAN  October 21, 2017 9:00am-10:01am EDT

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opportunity to persuade them freedom of speech, especially for the thought we hate, is there most essential ally. >> for more of this weekend's schedule, go online. >> now, we take you live to pamplin historical park for a symposium just getting underway. they are calling it pamplin." -- they are calling it "generals we love to hate." our first speaker is david ingle, history professor at florida atlantic university . >> papers and great opportunities for what i thought would be good biographies. him 17 yearsckled
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ago -- i started the research as a dissertation. he's an interesting figure. i will give you a couple of brief biographical insights. born and raised in ohio, goes to west point, not a stellar student. he's won to merit away from being dismissed every year, actually. [laughter] >> his best friend at west point was winfield scott hancock. he's 32 out of a class of 52. he participates in the seminal wars and the new mexican wars. he sees himself being this career military person and making a life in the military. he finds himself as a lieutenant colonel in the war department. if you have read the book, you know i tried to sidestep the claim that he was responsible
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for starting the american civil war. was sent on a secret mission to talk to robert anderson about the prospect of what might happen if south carolina decided to secede. you have to understand, floyd, the war secretary, has given bewell no instructions and he spent three days in trust and harbor with robert anderson and after the first few hours, he was convinced that south carolina was probably going to secede and he had a long conversation with robert 9.erson on december before he left, he felt so conscientious about putting something in writing that he did put a memorandum of instructions to anderson should it look in a eminent that south
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carolina was going to secede and mobilize for war and he should position himself better in the harbor by moving to fort sumter. he gets this memorandum to anderson and he leaves and he carries a copy back to washington, d.c. and slips it in andsecretary's outgoing box nothing is to be done for the next couple of weeks until december 20 when south carolina secedes and anderson decides a few days later on the evening of christmas day that it's time to move to fort sumter under what he believes is authorization from the war department. isn't summoned the war department to discuss this new move and he greets the secretary of war and the preston on the way into the cabinet meeting and the secretary says something to the effect "i believe you've just started the american civil war." he says on the
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contrary, i think i've averted it. he is sent to california to never be heard from again. -- in his review of k, russellars' wor posed a rhetorical question. what are we to make of major general george b mcclellan? after all, he was one of the mysteries of the war. thehe 150 years since american civil war, contemporaries and historians alike have been prolific in speaking to uncover what made mcclellan the commander he was. while he was seemingly incapable of bringing about complete victory on the battlefield -- upon his death in 1985, the new concluded no soldier who gets a little fighting has ever had his qualities as a commander so minutely and so
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fiercely discussed. how are we to understand the collapse of so much promise? the fascination with the attempt to define the very man who gave shape to the civil war and the union army has produced several theories driven by questions serving to solve the mystery behind the man and the commander. did the war ruin his ability to command? did he ruin himself by his delusion? did the war claim his leadership and move on or was he simply unable to use the army he created? thatifficulty now was studying george b mcclellan was like studying several soldiers anin one. one of those mcclellan-like men he was carlos --
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regarded as one of the least understood generals o among the union high command. it was a thorough soldier, not even mcclellan surpassed him an intimate knowledge of the various duties of officers and men or in strength of conviction that prolonged and unremitting attention to their duties with the only means by which the volunteer regiments could ever acquire the solidarity of an army. he contended he was a strict, almost too strict disciplinary and. but he was a great deal more than this. he sought to imbue his troops with the same principles of military duty which he held himself. is ideal of the soldiers character was of the highest and the services which rendered in this regard to the troops of his department cannot be overestimated. vision,and unprejudiced he had fuel equals -- a few
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equals among the generals on either side. review for the literary era portrayal ofpes' him and described the commander as one of the least understood among the eminent generals of the war. it was one of the interesting questions of the civil war why this finds holder should not have exercised influence upon events which his character suggests. he seemed never to have commanded the full trust which his merits entitle them. of -- it is not a violent presumption that the history of events would now furnish much more satisfied reading. it is perhaps an unprofitable
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speculation, he observed, but it is not improbable that had bewell be given the opportunity, the war would have been brought to a close earlier. whether this would have been to the benefit of mankind is another question. this gave me the title of the book, "most promising of all." that's what i thought at the beginning. [laughter] modern scholars have been less charitable often comparing him to mcclellan. characterizing him as a general who is temperamentally unable to seek complete victory. they knowledge that similarly between his operation in the west and mcclellan's operation in the east in 1862. they drew upon the same military philosophy to justify their actions. both commanded armies during a changing political environment
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and both were better at creating armies and using them successfully -- than using them successfully. both evaded combat because they feared defeat. he maintained his object was not to buy great battles and storm byfortifications but demonstrations and maneuvering to prevent the enemy from concentrating his forces. war had a higher object than pure bloodshed, he believed. sometimes missed the accidental success which folly or recklessness might have gained -- it is nevertheless true in the end that usually triumph. he asserted that carefully concentrating a well-organized force against an outnumbered enemy constituted solid tactics and he strove to develop within his voluntary army or volunteer army and efficient and effective fighting force -- an efficient
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and effective fighting force. his superiors grew tired of his maddeningly slow campaign. when president abraham lincoln refers to mcclellan as a general who's got the slows, he may have been speaking of bewell. you grew frustrated in the summer of 1862 with a march on chattanooga -- and mcclellan in the army was minimal, but a combination between him and bewell was deplorable. not uncommon for military commanders, especially in the civil war, he fought three wars. won against confederates on frontline, one with politicians and soldiers in the rear and one to enforce occupation of the soil.
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his own soldiers criticize them in letters to home and governors. have come to appreciate just how -- even people were common citizens writing to the governors. heolitical conservative, would have been a better general had he been more tactful with politicians and accepted the changing nature of war, even while he disagreed with it. the civil war was as much a political contest as a military contest driven by political and public opinion that affected military strategy. successful commanders secured the favor of political leaders or cultivated a neutrality that insulated them from criticism. he had difficulty adjusting to the war's political demand because he'd attached himself -- detached himself from political leaders and the rank-and-file soldiers while striving to maintain a purely militaristic
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and professional demeanor with his command. he purposely separated himself from the sources of his army's strength to avoid political problems and failed to realize that cultivated cooperation among these constituents might prove helpful. consequently, he had little patience for the political posturing of northern governors who attempted to supervise the welfare of their soldiers. cadetparticularly stellar at west point, he failed to embrace that kind of warfare that demanded a blending of science and common sense. he lacked the command instincts that proved necessary in waging a political war with volunteer armies. his initial foray into command came in the autumn of 1861 when his good friend tapped him to become the commander of the department of ohio and strengthen its army. he was adept at creating a national army out of a state oriented volunteer culture in the midst of an already intensifying war with political
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leaders and critical public watching his every move, especially because he's in kentucky. seminolerved in the and new mexican worse, he had experience in commanding soldiers and that seen -- had seen considerable combat. he'd spent the last 13 years in the general's office, which made him overly systematic and stifled the imaginative flair for command. shanks responded to the new york years as ang bureaucrat had smothered the fire in his heart and taught him not to feel. danger and cool in there was no originality and his conceptions." he assumed an overwhelming responsibility. but cleland had sponsored bewell
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because he believed he would be one of the great men of the war. thedfact that he loa abolitionists and wanted to protect southern custody for rights made him all the more attractive as a commander in kentucky. his opportunity to be one of the great men of the war was magnified in this region because on his abilityed and his judgment to maintain the union's upper hand in this most critical region. generals robert anderson and theirm sherman viewed predecessor had buckled under the pressure. anderson was a gentleman of no mind, sherman was possessed of neither mind nor manner, we are thankful we have a man who combines both. when thomas scott arrived in louisville in 1862, he was
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greatly impressed. officer, very superior m, prudent and with great power to control, he said. the war beyond the appalachian mountains presented union and confederate leaders with significant military complications because of the divided population, geographical diversity and vast resources. the confederates defended a 500 mile line stretching from the appalachian mountains to the ozarks and occupied one third of kentucky. and the union line stretched from eastern kentucky to .outhwest missouri sherman left them with no strategic plan. 23,000 of the nearly 30,000 troops in his department had been organized into disco divisions to operate on a 300 mile run in the upper south.
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40 regiments were in recruiting districts scattered throughout kentucky, a state where loyalties were bitterly divided. could now appreciate sherman's troops, even though he said to mcclellan he would try with considerably less. buhl was equal to the task of organizing this fragmented collaboration into a coherent army. the first thing to be done was to organize, equip and mobilize in mass. he managed to do it in a short time and made an army. he possessed a strong professional and disciplinary pride with meticulous organizer -- although it revealed his greatest strength, his determination to detach the men
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from their state governors indicated the difficulty of reconciling his own view of the war with its undeniable political nature. state governors took an active and in raising, equipping training volunteers and they wanted to retain influence over them, especially when it came to procuring supplies. the commanders and soldiers alike came to lean on them for assistance. took a narrow view of this authority. with great assurance, he wrote to mcclellan, while he was annoyed by the governors, he was able to correct these problems entirely. he failed to realize the potential explosive nature of his decision and his actions with these state leaders. he displayed confidence in ohio, even as he lacks confidence in his volunteer soldiers. that extended to his attitude
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about the enemy, particularly in his command. invasion oflix's kentucky in 1861, he wrote to mcclellan, i don't need to be diverted -- the organization of my forces now b little better than a month, i could lincoln'saway -- desire for him to move into east tennessee tested the commander's twenty-year military philosophy. 'sven east tennesseean union proclivities, lincoln wanted him to move into the region to protect the citizens and resources. explained the rationale for undertaking such an operation, balked at the
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enterprise and suggested taking nashville. he argued the military risks outweighed the political gains involved, especially in winter. nashville could be reached by water and rail and occupying the tennessee capital gave the army certain advantages since it would enable his army to move south end remain close to a supply base in louisville. maintaining his supply line would allow him to rely on the union for resources. sendingsted two flotilla columns up the river -- this is the fort henry campaign. his nashville scenario impressed mcclellan and it did make better military sense, but it infuriated lincoln.
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political pressure was mounting in washington as congress had come into session and formed a joint committee on the conduct of the war and debated the merits of lincoln's limited war aims. acquiesced to these political considerations and earns his subordinate -- urged his subordinate to comply with moving into east tennessee. commanderlled on the of the department of missouri to move into tennessee to support buhl, halleck refused. when he asked his opinion of his plan -- his plan was madness. the fort henry campaign was madness. soldiers could not be removed from missouri, hallock argued, without losing the state. throughout january and making 62, the union high command made little progress in moving the war militarily while politicians
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written estimate politically. -- throughout january of 18 62. ulysses s. grant convinced him to send reconnaissance -- andrew foot took fort henry and opened the war in the west. emboldened by his success, grant informed how it that he would next take fort donaldson nearby. nashvillen focused on and refused. buhl by to persuade offering him command of the cumberland column, but he forfeited the opportunity ben hallock never forgot it. it afforded him the opportunity to proclaim himself the genius of grant's success.
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-- following day, he said give me command in the west. i ask this in return for fort henry and fort donaldson. you can imagine the rancor between buhl be and halleck. get thewould ultimately command of the west and grants operations-- grant's had been a successful and buhl became part of the success and adventure. in the meantime, however, you'll had the misfortune of being the commander in a region that was turning over confederates oil and engaged in two-pronged war, when political and won -- oneily and occupation
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militarily andne occupation. of railroad connected the mobile and ohio railroad in mississippi. occupying the southern populace required the union army sees resources that would weaken the confederate war effort and convince them to come back to the union. hallock ordered buhl to marches armies to savannah and he obliged. had he been aware of grant's vulnerable position, he would have rushed to savannah and aided grant's move down the cumberland and the tenancy simultaneously. -- tennessee simultaneously. halleck had only ordered buhl to enter tennessee as rapidly as possible.
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it essentially meant whenever he was ready to move his army in full. hissed grant and halleck of own progress and neither commanders and of his rate -- said his rate was moving too slow. however careless grant was in his approach to pittsburg landing, when the battle of shiloh opened on the morning of 6, he stayed the course because he knew buhl was on his way. he retreated to dependable ground and was more determined to counterattack. the addition of buell's men aided in the victory. some soldiers have begun to question buhl's judgment regarding the conduct. slow progressis
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had begun to trickle down through the ranks and during an act in shiloh, private edward why do we move so slowly? this is when things begin to go to downhill. after shiloh, hallock moved to capture the confederate stronghold in mississippi. he supervised buhl's operations and that bothered buhl. relationship during the campaign eliminated -- illuminated the difficulties and it was another indication of his unwillingness to conform to someone else's idea. it placed them in a better position than capturing bowling green and nashville -- the confederate army escaped.
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beulah was associated with slow movement in the failure to meet and defeat the enemy. while john beatty perceptively characterized the failure to capture the confederates as a significant missed opportunity in the war, arguing the enemy still is as organized and ready to do battle on some other field. in the summer of 18 six to two, the culmination of a series of political and military factors directly affected buhl's reputation. -- in the summer of 1862. journalists had followed his army. he had difficulty adapting to the strategy of an expansive war that included prohibiting return of fugitive slaves to their masters. he accepted his soldiers at -- he more politicized
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failed to accept the political realities that the war was fundamentally changing. buhl thelock's orders, parted in june of 1862 and moved east to chattanooga. political pressure to seize tennessee and he presumed lack of confederate operations in the region, he presumed the operation would be successful. that -- as advanced the army advanced, they would way.y the region on the and forced him into a barren countryside during the summer. inhospitable military realities were troublesome.
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his initial reluctance to obey hallock's orders aroused a bitter debate between the two commanders and his slow progress in moving toward corinth still lingered in hallock's mind. buhl was not enthusiastic about the chattanooga campaign and he instead determined to move along to chattanooga -- this march would march him toward his supplies and back into middle tennessee, closer to nashville. it might accomplish something more strategically valuable to the union in the west. it was a series of unfortunate circumstances politically and militarily. it began as owners lee as it it ended.nerously as many considering the chief cause of the maddeningly slow camping.
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he was concerned about supplies and the vulnerability of his army in hostile territory. so slow was his progress in july that halleck said at the time the president telegraphed that your progress is not satisfactory and you should move more rapidly, so rapid as to move all cause of complaint whether well-founded or not. he regretteded -- that it was necessary to explain the circumstances that make my progress slow and yet the dissatisfaction of the president pains me. he regarded the railroad as crucial to his success. it would be impossible to hold chattanooga without holding the railroad. despite these problems, he told hallock he expected to accomplish the operation without necessary delay in such a manner theo neither jeopardize
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army nor its honor nor trifle with the lives of loyal citizens betrayed to the vengeance of the enemy by a promised protection and hurried abandon. the circumstances could be explained and he repeatedly made his position known to stanton. the railroad was crucial to his overall success. this movement mirrored his belief in a limited strategy and consequently as operations during chattanooga supported that belief, whether by design or not. his operations played into the strength of the confederate cavalry and the weakness of his own and demonstrated the competitions of relying on the railroad for supplies. that complications of relying on the railroad for supplies. even had middle tennessee or east tennessee or north alabama abounded with -- he was unwilling to live off the land. he strove for good discipline over military success, which meant his army could only move
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as fast as repair crews could rebuild the bridges and railroads. movingatty said he was the master policy -- no hurry, take your time. his conciliatory attitude also reflected his limited view of war. not only did he issue and enforce orders against foraging, he also put his men on half rations. it appeared he was less concerned with their welfare than the welfare of the enemy. he stipulated that the army's purpose was not to invade the rights of our fellow countrymen but rather to maintain the integrity of the union and to protect southerners' private property and constitutional rights. if the army did not antagonize civilians, it would not suffer
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the rage of confederates in the countryside. in fact, he believed a benevolent policy would entice southerners away from the confederacy. to some degree, his policies had a positive effect. a favorable made madession -- mcclellan buhl aware of the nature of the conflict when he appointed him command in kentucky. please bear in mind the issue for which we are fighting, he emphasized. the issue is the preservation of the union and the authority of the general government over all portions of its territory. we shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by rigorously respecting the constitutional rights of all. by the summer of 1862, however,
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lincoln and congress and the northern populace had moved beyond this attitude. congress passed two laws that instituted a more severe war policy. union's mission and the use of its armies in winning the war -- they brought about a significant hardening attitude in the army, inflaming the southern citizenry. buell had the misfortune of being in the midst of an extensive overland campaign in hostile territory. however noble's intentions may have been in following the administration's earlier desires, keeping his army on half rations or limited rations while ordering payments made to incurred bydamaging union troops, he eroded the year.ll in his earlier he gives turn instructions --
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stern instructions that removing horses should be done in such a way that an ordinary person may not be deprived from ordinary work. when the army needed slaves to -- caret fortifications should be taken to equalize the number in all instances. unfortunately for him, has believes more than his actions undermine his -- williams characterized him as a mcclellan without charm or glamour. suggested that was the reason he was so unpopular. as the war involved, so did political military attitudes. buhl cared nothing for popularity, not for the approval of others. but mcclellan and sherman were was.r on him than buhl
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he realize the implications of military actions -- he was reluctant to modify policies, even when it became evident that they had adversely affected the morale in the ranks. he was held them in public and therefore was perhaps unaware that his soldiers viewed his policies as outdated. they saw fuel only when he made his hasty sour mouth inspections. the good, he took for granted, road shall be put -- wrote shall foot. that othersnates viewed him as a loop, cold -- others viewed him as aloof, cold. the dissatisfaction of the soldiers added to the impracticality politically in
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northerners- blamed buhl for his army's bragge to capture braxton in chattanooga. bragg'sies into, movement into kentucky brought about his demise as the commander in the west. the maneuvering between buhl and bragg ended when the two armies clashed in the hills surrounding the town. what began with scattered skirmishings soon gave way to full-scale fighting. confederates the conducted a surprise attack -- groove the confederates back through perryville and waited for buhl to come to his defense with rest of the army. the hilly terrain and atmospheric conditions created an acoustic shadow that will hold the battle sounds.
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these deprived buhl the knowledge that a portion of his army had been fully engaged. consequently, he allowed bragg to escape from the battlefield he said buhlt -- had fought a great battle and had completely used up the rebel force, arguing there's no mistaking the victory this time. lincoln, however, had grown frustrated by buell's poor performance and his failure to pursue bragg completely disgusted and western politicians. they pressured the president for his removal. lincoln had lost his patience. wired lincoln that military operations of late and the commands of mcclellan and buhl would ruin the state's november elections.
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lincoln relieved buhl on october 30 and the command of the army felt to rosencrantz. the news related northerners. the most cheering item of the news this week is the has beenent that buhl relieved of command or rather that his command has been relieved of him. [applause] [laughter] >> the wars changing nature in 1861 and 1862 highlighted and undermined buell's significance in the west. his tenure was later scrutinized by the so-called buhl commission, and investigative body that can be to examine the operations of the army of the ohio during 1862 and to report an opinion in the case the commission resulted from
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governor oliver p morton and andrew johnson. it can been for nearly six months. it adjourned may 6, 1863. in some and 72 witnesses, a master report quoting 721 pages. it takes up an entire volume of the official records of the civil war. his failure to move quicker in meeting up with grant and shiloh, invasion of kentucky, the pursuit of bragg, but most of all, his conciliatory policy. although the commission was neither a court of inquiry and had no legal authority, many northerners interpreted the investigative sessions as a move to convict buell to satisfy vengeful politicians. perhaps most important about the commission itself is not that it condemned buhl for his
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shortcomings but that it represented the ideological debate between limited and total war aims during this period. this reflected that a similar philosophical views of war by examining the two types of generalship as described by williams. buhl served as his own counsel and his defense presented the limited philosophy in which he emphasized the science over art in achieving military success. the prosecution represented the opposing brand of generalship in which their counsel represented more momentum and had little regard for science and concentrating on the end instead of the means in achieving military victory. he was caught up in a philosophical debate between conflicting attitudes of warfare in which he defended his .onception of a limited war he argued the commission had erroneously criticized the
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campaigns for being too slow and contended the commission's opinion on the subject could hardly be considered important since his decisions were based on the circumstances at the time and it was impossible to say what would happen the consequences of different action could he questioned the value of the commission opinion saying will in thinking then hesitate to declare a judicial verdict that the commander ought to have acted differently." the prosecution acquitted buhl of wrongdoing, but the war had moved beyond his usefulness as a commander. after the announcement in the press that the commission had finally ended, someone asked the judge advocate and recorder about the commission's conclusion. even impressed by buell's performance and his ironic response told the story. buhl was to throw a soldier to command one of our armies -- too
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thoreau a soldier to command one of our armies." -- too thorough a soldier to command one of our armies." [laughter] >> in may of 1864, he resigned. his mark on the army of ohio remains shrouded in mystery. military plus be him without a complete understanding of the war's political nature. he could never see confiscation and emancipation as a precondition of reconstruction, refused to subordinate military operations for political necessities and failed to calibrate his conduct with the desires of the administration. has flawed conception of civil military relations and his refusal to grow with the work reflected his political conservatism and his obstinacy to appreciate the war for what it was. his focus on conciliation was
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part of his dismissal. in the end, lincoln had moved beyond commanders who built armies and embraced those who used them effectively for union buhl's and story was written. thank you very much. [applause] we have time for questions. again, my lovely assistants will hand you a mic. we have several here. >> [indiscernible]
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>> how does he manage to make it to louisville so quickly? it's one of the great feats of the war. i don't know whether political pressure, but i actually believe that he felt kentucky was threatened and it was in the vital interests of his operations within the state having occupied the state that he couldn't lose kentucky. whether to bragg or not, he couldn't lose kentucky. marching back to louisville he thought would aid his army, which was suffering incredibly that summer. great question. of overched an average 30 miles a day for several days just to catch up and make it there to make up for the lost time in getting to chattanooga. one of the great feats of the
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war. yes, sir? he needs a mic. >> [indiscernible] what was the war department's relationship with -- >> he was only in the war department right before the , so he had no connection with jefferson davis and none with winfield scott in that capacity. yes, ma'am? right here. >> in your opening remarks, you said buhl and when phil scott -- and wheniends a when phil scott were best
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friends at west point. >> i don't think hancock would say they were best friends. he thought he prevented him -- befriended him. buhl was fairly quiet. modest, unassuming, not a social person that all. the only correspondence i can find it all was with winfield hancock. he was there with grant and a lot of others who were much more prominent. no mention about buhl that i could find. great question. >> [indiscernible] how would you compare him to bragg? [laughter] they areyou know,
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probably right about the same place at the bottom. it's interesting because there was some rumor at the time that buell was so slow in his movements against bragg that there was collusion with bragg. seriously. tonight before the battle of perryville, they had spent the night talking about old times because they were distant cousins and this circulated through the army and it got back halleck --on that there was a great series of gossip columns in washington about what was going on in that army. they were writing tremendous columns about the collusion between buell and bragg and how it was furious that halleck was furious that this was circulating. this was on par -- for different reasons, i think.
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yes? >> [indiscernible] >> that is a great question. why could mcclellan see in buell the deficiencies he couldn't see in himself? i don't think mcclellan sought deficiencies in himself. [laughter] >> they were very close, very good friends.
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this was very hard on mcclellan. one of the reasons he wanted buell to be successful, he started to halleck's rise in the west because halleck was maneuvering to be -- if halleck could be eclipsed by buell, buell wanted nothing to commander.n army he couldn't get him to understand the political nature of war. he's pouring his heart out -- you have to get moving here. i will have to do something to keep explaining why you are moving so slowly. buell never seems to have this sense of urgency that mcclellan does. there's a great tension going on between halleck and buell as well that is important in understanding the high command politics and white buell -- why it buel buell didn't want to
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participate and halleck always saw him as a subordinate. he saw buell as a pretty subordinate. -- petty subordinate. didn'tyou say that buell have the same demand for urgency as mcclellan? [laughter] doesn't seem like a real high standard. [laughter] >> i think mcclellan -- buell didn't realize the urgency politically that mcclellan saw coming from the orders as being commander in chief early on. he was also frustrated by buell 's inability to see the political nature of the contest. mcclellan understood that, he just didn't think it was relevant. i think buell didn't understand
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it. in shiloh, he gets a lot of -- grant seemed under control. why does buell get the credit? do you agree with that assessment? >> that is a great question. shiloh is one of the great controversies in what actually happens and what we come to believe happens. if youtually happens, read the comments of the day of the people who were there, buell saved the day. the further you get away from shiloh -- here's the interesting rises,- as grant's star so does his battlefield command in shiloh. and buell's diminishes because
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his credibility diminishes as able. as we think about shiloh in the sense of a memory, because grant's star rises, his exploits at shiloh become more positive and buell's are diminished. the nextllow that day, few days, the journalists who were able to cover the campaign, it was pretty clear that the mood of the army and the mood of the people following the actual events is that buell had actually saved the day. s german's memoirs, -- herman's memoirs, buell is diminished. at the time, people who were there thought that buell had saved the day. profile diminishes in civil war history, so does his contribution in shiloh, tragically.
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[indiscernible] >> did grant comment on buell in his memoirs? no. the interesting thing about, at the time, grant will give you the sort of buell arrived at this time, there's no acknowledgment from grant that buell in any way saved the day. grant would argue that he had moved to a defendable ground by this time and he was able to pull off victory out of the jaws of defeat without buell. and readnt to go back the testimonies of the people that were there, that wasn't the common sentiment.
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the transports at the riverbed, one of the fascinating things is that during that retreat, you found hundreds of soldiers running down to the river bank to try to get onto transports that buell's men working to get off. buell's soldiers had to break to get bayonets the soldiers away from the transport so they can move up the banks to the field. it was chaos. this leads to the credibility saved them.ctually great question. thank you very much. [applause] >> a couple of things before we
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dismiss for the next event, we do have a prominent historian here from oregon i want to bring up. chet orloff is the representative of dr. buel pamp. he finally got here last night. he's here this morning and he wanted to give some greetings from dr. pamplin. come on up, chet. [applause] >> two good decisions i made -- first, at the opening of this great museum 25 years ago, i befriended will green. tea and i have been staunch friends and colleagues and compatriots since that time. i miss him in this position. i think the second good decision
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i made was hiring dan. i think the staff up here feel the same way. i just want to acknowledge all of you who have been supportive and on behalf of who'smplin, dr. pamplin, vision created this place, he gives his high regard, he sends them with me, and most importantly, his gratitude for your support, which is critical to this place, as we all know, and encourages us all to continue this work. thank you from him and from me and from the staff here at the museum. >> thank you, chet. [applause] reminder to go out there and
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buy those raffle tickets on that wonderful plank you see out there. buy some books. are authors will be out there to sign. make sure you are back here at 10:45. our authors will be out there to sign. make sure you are back here at 10:45. you are watching live coverage of the pamplin historical work syllable war symposium on c-span3's american history tv. after this break, we will be back with craig simmons from the u.s. naval academy, author of " joseph e johnston." for the next hour, we highlight the history of the port. >> during the colonial period,
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this area was filled with white pine trees used to make masts on the ships like the one behind me. museum locatede three miles from downtown portland. , completedas built in 1755. it was started in 1753. it was built on a piece of land which is in between two rivers in portland. it stood pretty much all by itself and was built in such a style called georgian style, architecture, but it was also the largest house built in portland at the time.
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portland was known as falmouth back then. for 30 years, this house standing here was actually in the section of falmouth. this house was built for captain george tait and his family, his wife, mary, and four sons who came here in 1751. he was appointed by the british royal navy to be the master agent for the area. the mast agent is someone who is in charge of actually recognizing and appropriating trees, white pine, which had to be in diameter of 24 inches and height of 72 feet at the minimum in order to provide the british navy with their masts. importantwere an commodity back then, just as oil is today. when captain tate came over here 1751, we were still part
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of great britain at the time. we were all english subjects here. the people that captain tate would have hired to do his work would have been the local folks. they would have helped support the industry. they would have had jobs, which i'm sure they are grateful to have. it was that way until the revolutionary war, which was 20 years later. as the revolutionary war approached, a very interesting period for the tate family. sons one left home stayednd went to sea and abroad in england. he supported the british side of the revolutionary war. his name is samuel. in fact, there is some believe that he actually brought


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