Skip to main content

tv   Ronald Reagan and Cold War Europe  CSPAN  March 12, 2017 1:29pm-3:11pm EDT

1:29 pm
thank you. >> interested in american history tv? visit our west van -- visit our website at www.c-span.org /history. programs andew our view archival films and more. american history tv on www.c-span.org/history. unfoldan, where history daily. created as aan was public service by america's television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. next on american history tv, historians discuss the reagan administration's cold war relationships with the ussr, poland, another european countries. this was part of a three-day conference titled "ronald reagan and the transformation of global politics in the 1980's."
1:30 pm
hosted by the plymouth center in austin, texas. >> i'm a professor here at the lbj school university of texas. it's a great pleasure to welcome you all here. it's my pleasure to moderate this panel. i will introduce the panelist really because you have their bios. i won't go through their bios in my introduction. it's an interesting time to be talking about europe. period in which the attention of the world shifted away from europe, we tended to take for granted the achievement of a more united europe. now that assumption is being called into question. the achievement of a more united europe, including eastern europe and western europe, is one of the most monumental achievements of my lifetime. i wouldn't say it's under threat, but it is facing numerous challenges from russia, from the greek debt crisis, from
1:31 pm
immigration, from brexit, and from the president elect of united states. all the things conspired to make europe more interesting. let's put it this way. the period, the reagan administration, was pivotal in the evolution of europe. even those areas where nothing much seems to happen, such as eastern europe after the crushing of solidarity and up until 1989 there was a lot going on the need the surface. eastern europe was becoming prerevolutionary. it took a sparked to ignite this revolutionary tender. western europe was more obvious. it was a period when decisions were made about a common europe, a single european currency, single european market. ultimately towards political union that were historic. it was a period of some divergence between europe and the superpowers because
1:32 pm
u.s.-soviet detente went into freefall in the early part of the decade, the 1980's. but european detente picked up speed. on a personal note, i was living in germany for the first five years of the 1980's during the missile debate. the red army faction, red brigades in italy. it was a time of ferment there. in the last half of the 1980's i was in the reagan administration. and i moved to the bush administration at nsc. this period is fascinating to me. panelists,r -- five four excellent papers. i look forward to this discussion. i will try to moderate the time. i have asked the speakers to present for 15 minutes only. and then we will send questions for the very end.
1:33 pm
i want to save a good chunk of time for your questions, comments and reflections. let me introduce all the speakers briefly so i don't have to interrupt them in between presentations. omas is at harvard. charles and james graham wilson are both at the office of the historian at the u.s. department of state. james is a product of uva program, as was i. i know he will give an excellent presentation. susan cole bird from the university of toronto speaking on nuclear cap weight, ronald reagan, transatlantic negotiations and detente. -- from cambridge will speak on ronald reagan and the transformation of the transatlantic relationship in the early 1980's. we will go a little bit out of srder because susan and metai asked to switch.
1:34 pm
thomas? good morning, ladies and gentlemen. thank you, professor hutchings, for your kind introduction. we have so much ground to cover today. i will skip the procedural thanks to organizers and so on because we have like 15 speakers today. we really need to stick to the 15 minutes and proceed directly to my paper. 1992, carl bernstein the a cover story wrote, " solidarity flourished underground. advice largely by the network established under the auspices of reagan and john paul ii.
1:35 pm
presses,nes, printing shortwave radios, video cameras, computers, word processors were all smuggled in a poll of their channels established by priests and american agents and representatives of the afl-cio and european labor movements. money for the union came from cia funds, the national endowment for democracy, secret accounts of the vatican and western trade unions. much of the equipment destined for solidarity arrived by ship, often packed in this market containers sent from denmark and sweden. by doctorsed secretly working with solidarity. from the polish docks, equipment moved from destinations in trucks and private cars driven by sympathizers want to use churches and priests as their point of contact for deliveries and pickups. bernstein merits attention for two reasons.
1:36 pm
of theexact mechanics covert maritime support for solidarity still remains under explored. what need for research are maritime channels of traffic from commercial shipping to cruise lines, fishing, even naval wargames. in the ways in which these channels were utilized by the west to exert all kinds of influence more or less camouflaged on the soviet bloc. my own dissertation returned -- "how the baltic sea trade washed away the iron curtain." in my project i rely on the recently declassified kgb and polish files, as well as some cia materials. precisely uncovering the role played by the cold war baltic cities from hamburg to leningrad in the east. i think the connection between
1:37 pm
the -- was first created in port cities, it's cradle and headquarters. and the fact that maritime channels where one of the main avenues of supporting the underground position in eastern europe are far from accidental. account isernstein's slightly inaccurate. those underground or sometimes even underwater to be precise networks demonstrated in my dissertation where pioneered across the baltic largely by sweden in the 1970's. there were not established by reagan or the pope, rather the leaders inherited and developed them. when you do get this story straight in order to understand how reagan's widely known and advertised intention to support the polish materialized so rapidly and effectively. as well as in order to truly appreciate the tremendous role
1:38 pm
the maritime channels and networks played in dismantling the soviet bloc. when ronald reagan was inaugurated the polish had been an officially recognized trade union for over a year. his second term was over and the commonest regimes of eastern europe were shaking but no one predicted they would all be gone by the end of 1989. in a strictly chronological sense, reagan's presidency saw a period of continuity and transportation. preservation is the right word, but revolution would perhaps be an exaggeration. nonetheless, certainly in polish memory for sure, it is ronald an comparably more than any leader is associated with ending soviet dominance of
1:39 pm
eastern europe, marked by street names and monuments. you can see one in the city of gdansk unveiled a few years ago. profile is in striking contrast to his appreciate a successor, george walker bush. reagan always -- george herbert walker bush. to be sure his administration's resolute adherence to the sanctions introduced in 1981 and other means of power politics played no small role and have been appreciated by historians. an popular memory he is chiefly remembered for his speeches and potent one-liners. reagan was a master of imposing his own narrative, even when his actual knowledge of foreign reality was not necessarily extensive.
1:40 pm
in unambiguous words of the martial law in poland signaled the sharp departure from carter's softer light which and posture. in this sense reagan carried a big stick and spoke softly only when he considered appropriate, and that was very rarely. and always from a position of power. this alliance with the vatican is widely appreciated and often -- regularly questioned. what is lesser-known are those elements of reagan's foreign policy that required to carry over from the years. what i would like to stress here is not so much the opening of 1981, but the administration of continuity that continued to transform the global landscape. they are worth emphasizing both because they are less prominent than reagan's departure, and
1:41 pm
also because some credit visa be given for resisting the temptation, especially given the strength of reagan's electoral ticket for wholesale demolition, including some that had worked pretty well and reading for the electoral ace at home as weak on communist. this continuity access goes against reagan's stereotypical image as a heart ideological crusader. behind the facade construed for elected consumption, there was a flexible foreign-policy strategy. the catholic church in breaking down the comments regime in poland is beyond any question, so is the significance of john paul ii. reagan's main contribution was the forage -- forge a deep personal relationship with him, which soon led to their unanimous voice on many issues. the pope was a pioneer in the
1:42 pm
guiding force behind the partnership and reagan was wise enough to follow the advice with a more experienced partner in eastern european affairs. after the martial law in december 1981, the rhetoric and washington and vatican converse completely -- converged almost completely. he was also the head of an organization in latin america. these often came to conflict with the american agenda. this move transcendence of these potentially destructive tensions illustrated the reagan administration was serious about a certain order priorities, that is subordinating everything to the one overarching goal of weakening soviet influence around the world. in eastern europe after the chance appeared on the horizon. yet there was one other paradox. he was both formally and practically a trade union of the polish historian put it
1:43 pm
recently, solidarity was certainly not the movement in favor capitalist. still it is both carter and -- as did a rumored as the four leaders into the heavy lifting. this paradox can be seen in broad day light in the first year of reagan's presidency. he was supporting him well crossing the air traffic controller strike at the same time. this gaping inconsistency was quickly exploited by moscow's mouthpieces around the globe. somewhatbatic was unusual. the wall street journal released an article supporting the afl-cio and its engagement abroad. this article was just one prominent example of how difficult it was for the new administration to strike a balance between overcoming malaise at home and supporting
1:44 pm
various labor organizations abroad. what reagan did initially was simply allow a continuous grassroot support for solidarity to be collected at home. he also let the department go undisturbed. later he became personally and gauged supporting the union, right after the introduction of the martial law. at the same time he had to be careful of not to cross the invisible redline and provoking his soviet intervention. while the stock and a communist stance faltered, he remained open to the possibility of internal changes at the soviet union began to bear fruit after gorbachev came to power. the wall street journal article for shadowed some of the fundamental trade-offs between domestic and foreign policy that persisted until the very end of reagan's presidency. the way that paradox was handled contains the key to understanding how the administration transformed politics while setting the u.s. economy back on a path of
1:45 pm
sustainable growth. the kind of illusory advantage of hindsight, the fact that with the anglo-saxon variety of capitalism rather than the scandinavian social democracy that ensued after 1989 in eastern europe he's to be fully discarded. in a general sense reagan's lesser-known contribution consisted of a cultivation of the processes that had been set in motion by helsinki accords and the human rights agenda. at least in some regions of the world. already at thes helm of the holy see for over two years at the moment of his inauguration. the soviets have been around for quite some time in afghanistan and the islamic revolution in iran. defenseo the workers and supported the grassroots position across the iron curtain, it was already underway for several years. while the last formal acts of
1:46 pm
the carter administration in december 1980 was to inform the soviets the potential cost of an intervention of poland would be. in this sense the main contours of the international playing field had already been set for reagan in 1981. that's why i think it's important to highlight the administrations continued reliance on the scandinavian -swedish connection. thatact of the matter is connection was largely initiated by the social democrats, polish-jewish immigrants and other forces usually associated with the left why do i consider this fact significant? first of all i think this continuation is either missed or so presented by historians. importantly i think it demonstrates the white center wide -- bipartisan --
1:47 pm
reagan chose not to rely on the channels of influence by people who in other contexts were certainly outspoken critics of his course as illustrated by the widespread opposition to deployment of cruise missiles and so forth. the ability to eventually transcend those seated divisions in the western camp without compromising america's leading role in the underlying foundation of the successful aspects of reagan's foreign policy. in my paper and in my dissertation i talk about some of the details about how the maritime channels are used by the cia and various other services. because we are running out of time i will not delve into details. if you're interested, now you know where to look for them. [laughter] concluding, i believe the genius of reagan's strategy was rooted
1:48 pm
in the all-inclusive inflatable nature, contrary to the hourly uncompromising trappings. the president was both relying on the micro scale processes evolving and the environment and reverting back to the hard military options demonstrated by the able archer and so on. he was thus able to bring together this qualified ila to dialectical influence and deploy them simultaneously while keeping an eye on the official tones free of ambiguity. and you opening is also evidence reliance on old advisers and adding some new blood such as richard pikes. one can speak of a gradual accretion of expertise and resignation of efforts rather than a revolutionary start. one last final thought. i think what was new at the
1:49 pm
moment of reagan's inauguration was the lack of a direct soviet military intervention in poland. break withpartial the brezhnev doctrine and provided a short window of opportunity seized by the u.s., despite the country's preoccupation with the transition period between administrations. reagan's early moves in foreign policy were certainly almost by definition a reaction to soviet adventures, but they were skillful enough to clear the ground for the strategic offensive of the second term. the first term and the president's own words was a return and pretty straightforward eisenhower rather than information. lifes gorbachev and say, keeps teaching is new lessons before making the greatly one is to return to their roots once again. thank you for your attention. [applause]
1:50 pm
thomas. you, you are on 15 minutes exactly. amazing. and amazing president you set. let's turn to elizabeth and james. obliged to begin with a statement here that the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the department of state or the u.s. government. i have to say this every time. i really mean it this time. [laughter] on paper is based declassified and publicly available sources. elizabeth and i am working for the last five years on -- and are just about done with four big u.s.-soviet volumes covering the reagan administration in the formulations of the u.s. the first two we have online at history.state.gov.
1:51 pm
reagan eraut 15 volumes in production. they will be rolling out every few months as we go forward in time. i would like to start with a 1989,from january 20, from a very widely read newspaper at the time. henry tells me it was very widely read in academic circles as well. the quote is, "it has to be admitted with all that only under survey stated reagan frequently -- underestimated reagan frequently, bubbly over simple fight him. his outward simplicity was taken for simplemindedness. is rhetoric for substance and ostentatiouson -- -- the reagan of the years 1980 in 1981 who promised to leave communism on the ash heap of history, or the reagan of
1:52 pm
1987-88 the signature is on the soviet having u.s. treaty on intermediate range and short range missiles. the first agreement in history on the physical elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons." prefer to of this fortune magazine with a quote. "it is hard to evacuate -- evaluate reagan's presidency because it is about the paradoxes. in this journalist words, one of the main paradoxes is that the regular administration's achievements in the area where it had no plans and where no one expected anything of it. i mean this fear of soviet-u.s. relations. sovietsphere of having u.s. relations. the world has changed. people's sentiments have changed in the united states, western europe and everywhere." ronald reagan must surely have appreciated this generally
1:53 pm
positive assessment of his presidency that appeared on the on januaryof provda 20, 1989. he may also have smiled at the suggestion he entered office with no plans and low expectations when it came to the soviet union. when other quote we heard yesterday that reagan had confided in his advisor richard allen, what was his objective? we win, they lose. he said to another advisor around the same time that his purpose was to end the cold war. there's got to be away. when he left office, reagan regarded the cold war, i would say, as neither won nor over. he said my view is that president gorbachev is different from previous soviet leaders. he said this in his farewell oval office address. "i think he knows some of the things wrong with his society
1:54 pm
and is trying to fix them. we wish him well and will continue to work to make sure the soviet union eventually emerges from this process is a less threatening one." the rush of that emerged from the ashes of gorbachev's performance in january 1992, proved to be less threatening, at least for a while. the calls will relationship between reagan's soviet policies and transformative change is a complicated question that has generated much debate and will do much in the future. our focus in this paper is identified, try to flush out three basis of reagan's soviet policies. one, the perception and framing of the soviet threat. two, deliberation and decision. three, the execution of policies. elizabeth and i find that reagan's optimism was the common
1:55 pm
variable any trace. "the country is in the grip of a national sickness. asnut farmer jimmy carter, having said during 1980 campaign, no, ronald reagan responded. america is walking tall once again and looking to the 1980's with courage, confidence and hope." i think that quote really encapsulates a lot of about the differences. let me talk for 30 seconds about the first part, which is the perception and framing of the soviet threat. it is very clear in reagan's diaries when he enters office what he thought was the problem. high spot was the security council meeting. "absolute proof of soviet and cuban activity to delivering
1:56 pm
arms to the rebels in el salvador. and their worldwide propaganda campaign that is succeeded in raising riots, to ration in europe and the u.s." thomas laid out the biggest short-term possibility of catastrophe, which was the soviet invasion of poland. waschief long-term threat the continuation of the negative trend and strategic balance between united states and the soviet union that had really commenced in the aftermath of the cuban missile crisis. they will hear more tomorrow on the panel on nuclear weapons. i will say quickly that the perception of soviet strategic advantage did not abate over time. in particular even in the second administration, at the end of the administered and where he had it coming online with the soviet ss 24's. intelligence
1:57 pm
estimate on december 1 set the large cost of production for new strategic weapons and the fact that such reduction facilities cannot be readily converted to civilian uses mean that gorbachev's industrial modernization goals almost certainly will not have a major effect on strategic weapons to employment there the mid-1990's. i would close by saying although the reagan administration went to great link to play up the ferocity of soviet forces in the 1980's in publications like the soviet military power, which had an overlay of the soviet tank factories on the national mall, it did not fundamentally misrepresented soviet strategic capabilities. on firstat assessment and foremost the treaties on imf at the start.
1:58 pm
if you triangulate the figures and numbers and then look back to what the administration was saying about the soviet capabilities, i don't think there's a real gulf. i'm basing this on the terrific set of oral histories the office of assessment did with soviet generals that is available in the national security archive website. extentstion was to the to which this capability shaped soviet intentions. following his interaction with gorbachev, the president was confident that he could share , the way of dealing with this problem of the city strategic -- soviet strategic advantage and he was confident he could share with moscow to eliminate his weapon someday. >> i will take us back to 1983.
1:59 pm
my section of this paper deals with the liberation in decision-making. about one write period in time from early 1983 until the summer of 1983 when george scholz really seems to take hold of what reagan is trying to do in relation to the soviet union and push back against the nsc and move forward with soviet policies. i want to start with a quote from reagan's diary on april 6, 1983. s.arn to the office george is upset. thinks nsc is undercutting him on plans we discussed for quite diplomacy with the soviets." then he goes on, "we had a meeting later in george and i cleared things up, i think. some of the hennessy staff are too hard lined and don't think
2:00 pm
any approach should be made to the soviets. i think i am hard lined and will never appease, but i do want to try and let them see there is a better world if they will show by deed they want to get along with the free world." i think this april die reentry really encapsulates the issues that were going on in the spring and summer of 1983. clearly reagan has given george scholz a mandate to talk with the soviet ambassador, to try to push the four-part agenda that which is aut in 75, big document in january of 1983. it's all with human rights, bilateral relations, arms control, and one other thing. [laughter] i'm having a rick perry moment. i'm sorry. [laughter] regional issues.
2:01 pm
thank you. did not have enough coffee. right. sholtz and reagan seemed to be on the same page. reagan and scholz had a lot of private meetings. one very famous beating scholz describes in his memoir. he goes to dinner with reagan in february during this blizzard. he had just about on china and they have this really deep conversation about communism and communist states. reagan seems to have a very different attitude than his public rhetoric and persona, which is very tough and hard lined. this eerie anti-communist public stance was very different from the reagan he talked to behind closed doors. this was the big paradox of reagan during this period. publicly he is anti-soviet, anti-communist. they lie, cheat, steal. behind closed doors he's riding
2:02 pm
letters to soviet leaders. he is trying to open up some kind of dialogue because of his optimistic attitude, which is kind of the current that runs through our paper. reagan's optimism was he believed in his personal ability to negotiate with the soviet leaders if he could get in a room with them. he believed that the united states had gotten stronger. by 1983 we had built up -- the economy was slowly starting to turn around. reagan was in a physician for he thought the soviet-u.s. relationship could start to change. he tells scholz to start this quite diplomacy. he did not want it to be a front page of the post and the new york times. you're unsure of its going to work every what are the soviets thinking about reagan. he does have this harsh public rhetoric. scholz meets with him very frequently. i should say all this will
2:03 pm
eventually come out to my first volume, which are stuck. james' volumes are out. my will appear. sorry they are not out yet. not my fault. [laughter] they have all these meetings. scholz sticks to the four-part agenda. the one thing reagan really wanted shilts the push on was the pentecostals, which sarah talked about yesterday so i will not delve into it. i do go into it in the paper. it is important because it is not been really publicly. scholz makes the point that with sabrina -- reagan wants this to happen. reagan decision-making had a lot to do with as many -- what he took a personal interest in. things he personally got attached to an empty feelings about and really, really firm
2:04 pm
belief for the things he pushed on. sdi was one of those things, the pentecostals are one of the things, other soviet dissidents. he tells scholz in these meetings, push him on the pentecostals. must get these people out of the embassy. catalystes this as a to move the relationship forward. if the soviets do this and reagan does not grow publicly about it, it will demonstrate to the soviets they can negotiate with reagan, he can be reasonable, and they can move this in a new direction. by july the pentecostals are released. reagan does not make a big deal of it. he talks about it in his diary and other documents, but he does not have a press conference that he pushed the soviets to release these people. and happens quietly and scholz sees that as a major victory, to
2:05 pm
push this relationship forward. it slow progress in 1983. slowly.appen and happen one other aspect of this paper -- i don't want to run over time, is scholz's internal difficulties with the national security council. he and reagan had this quite diplomacy plan. they talked about it in their meetings. there were the hard-liners at the nsc that reagan talks about in the diary entry. how does he get those people on board? bill clark was in a really interesting position. i wrote about a february 4 memo he sent to reagan. scholz seems to think that clark is one of the hardliners, not on the side of change, once the work progress with the soviet union. but in this memo he actually lays out a lot of the same ideas
2:06 pm
that scholz had also talked about. clark road to reagan that one major concern was that there is a deeply felt ideological bias that exists within your administration against arms control. this small group of professionals in the defense department believes arms-control generically is bad. that there ared these massive bureaucratic hurdles in dealing with the dod, dealing with the state department and the soviet union. how you move forward? clarke continued to reagan that it would be worthwhile because it would make clear that you are not ideologically against solving problems with the soviet union. it would show you are at least willing to try. clark sent this to reagan. he said at the bottom he did not send it to anyone else. it is unclear who else at nsc saw the city clark at these positions.
2:07 pm
scholz definitely did not know because scholz and clark butting heads about this throughout the until june 15 and have a meeting and these positions that scholz of been talking with reagan about opening consulates in kiev in new york, moving ahead with cultural agreements, restarting these kinds of things that would really be small steps in moving the soviet and u.s. relationship forward. thatin argument here is without scholz and without scholz's discussions with reagan and his understanding that reagan really did want to open up this relationship, wanted to have productive negotiations. he thought that his ability to talk with the soviets could help improve things. without scholz i'm not sure everyone ended up. when jack matlock comes into the
2:08 pm
scholzthe fall, definitely gains an ally in the soviet union -- in the nsc about the soviet union. sorry. it is time. scholz is a really big catalyst in all this. i will stop there. sorry i went over. [applause] >> thank you very much, elizabeth and james. noble here from matthias. >> perfect. thank you very much for inviting me to speak on this historic day. today i will talk about the
2:09 pm
impact of reagan's election on the transatlantic relationship, particularly during the first term. reagan's election is in europe seen as a fundamental scene change, moving policy back towards a more open sense with the soviet union and so on. in western european domestic politics reagan became a symbol of a stance ever ejected -- that rejected these movements. some popular memory. the election is still a sharp break in the trans atlantic relationship. as a story and swing now know things were not that simple. many historians have pointed to a much greater continuity with the carter administration. assess context i want to the short-term impact of
2:10 pm
reagan's election on the transit planning relationship from a western european perspective by comparing and contrasting trans atlantic relations first under carter and enduring reagan's first term. i want to do this particularly through the prism of high-level diplomacy between reagan and his most important european counterparts, helmut schmidt and margaret thatcher, the british prime minister. why? britain and germany were the two most important european members of nato. second-biggest britain and -- commonly these have different attitudes towards the transit link relationship. the so-called special anglo-american relationship embodied by thatcher's relationship with reagan. we have the u.s.-german relationship. [laughter] with germany also dependent upon american security, but frequently appeared much more overly critical in public about the american administrations.
2:11 pm
reading too much into the exhibit as both countries are riding in the cards for faster is happy that the american president is taking the lead, while schmidt was much more skeptical about being a better driver. it is interesting to see how these countries cope with the reagan challenge in the early 1980's. finally, why focus of high-level diplomacy? high-level diplomacy has frequently been seen in respo -- as responsible for the relationships under carter and reagan. carter's and experience in office, the peanut farmer, and reagan's cowboy policies. these high-level dynamics tended to its here are a few of a much deeper structural difference during the united states and western europe apart, at least in the early 1970's onward. classfrequent high-level
2:12 pm
brought to the floor in a cellar to deeper conflicts and confidence between superpowers in europe that had been ingrained into different american and european cold war strategies since the early 1970's. had been a settling of the gs political status quo in the early 1970's, which outlived its usefulness for the late 1970's. european detente always dynamic elements, creating dependencies that in the long run would create long-term stress rations, etc. i think it's really the ingrained tension that trigger the strength of an ecstatic both under carter and then under reagan. we will start with carter first and then get to reagan. relationshipntic was overshadowed by clashes between carter and schmidt. part of it was a personality
2:13 pm
clash. the coolheaded north german helmet should and the more idealistic, to missionary-minded carter. that's how they described each other in the memoirs. carter was idealistic and fickle. carter writes schmidt was a strong-willed incompetent chancellor. he seemed to know more about each of the countries and their elected leaders. at themidt standing podium talking down the carter. more fundamentally i think is carter revealed deeper tensions with the american and european cold war strategies. human rights. carter sees no problem and ly calling out soviet human rights abuses as he is able to say this is something can pursue armed control simultaneously.
2:14 pm
feared how this would be perceived by the soviets as a threat to their political supremacy. interestingly given the different attitudes towards transatlantic relations i alluded to earlier, the british largely shared germany's concerns. already under james callahan, critical of the american stance behind closed doors, but the most striking example of the sort of shared european view on the cold war that included britain can be found in the transatlantic response to the soviet invasion of afghanistan. that's under margaret thatcher. here the americans call for strong political sanctions that put western europeans in a dilemma. soviet aggression demonstrated it on vulnerability and continued dependency on the united states. on the other hand the confrontation pursued by the carter than assertion was to
2:15 pm
jeopardize the achievements of european data on further. detanteop further -- further. it was much more forceful than schmidt's, of the policies were markedly similar. written was a major influence by the european community. and continued to strongly resist any economic sanctions that were beyond their symbolic gestures. the difference was the british did that behind closed doors, and schmidt could score political points by doing so in public. after the merchants of an increasingly homogenous western european position, that did that escape american attention. as early as march 1980, carter's national security advisor complained the carter in a memo that the western europeans had an effect been in bilateral relations with the soviet union over afghanistan. this includes britain in this criticism.
2:16 pm
the u.k. had taken a strong public lead, but it had resisted any proposals for money and with afghanistan, they were distancing themselves more and seeking to return to the european community fold. they increasingly ganged up on the americans and the carter years, including britain's public rhetoric. on the service you have these personality clashes between carter and schmidt, by adequate transit that consultations and so on. i think these of tended to overshadow the white and strategic tensions behind these debates. this is what we conceivably look at reagan's election. western european reaction was very positive. after a quick visit to washington shortly after the election. schmidt tells thatcher of any president made it very clear he wants" operation, consultation, and they might finally get back on a steady course after a couple of months.
2:17 pm
after agrees, thinking the relationship will be much better and more firmer and widely discussed. they do make quite a few loose to improve this early. they appoint arthur burns as ambassador to a -- he was a close friend of schmidt's in the 1950's. all these improvements in the trans atlantic vacation i think are insufficient to overcome the wider gap that emerged between the u.s. and western europe. the immediate issues, combating stance against the soviet union, which was seen to endanger, rearm and negotiate parallel. there is a significant domestic dynamic to this as well. that peace movement in germany included many members of schmidt's own party.
2:18 pm
the western europeans try to cooperate closely to mediate the american administration's. in 1989, writing to reagan that thatcher appears deeply concerned and would take an account the federal republic of germany. he almost pleaded in london not to isolate chancellor schmidt, who she described as a really good friend of the u.s. again we can see the philosophy. was that europeans are desperate to hold onto arms-control talks. both for domestic party politics. seem increasing the convinced it at out used its usefulness. note.re was next to the so it is scribbled in handwriting. he was probably -- you cares.
2:19 pm
faith is saving the european governments and the interview with the overriding concern u.s. policy. he said that makes it intensified with the siberian gap pipeline. tensions think the -- europeans against a way to extend economic inter-linkages. the americans fear the service will be on the blackmail western europe with the influx of hard currency on the eastern block. again we have is different sections of detente coming in. october, 1981, got quite right, you westernuce european trade with the soviets. it's a state of increasing level of trade in directly contradictory. you have the dependencies in the early 1970's at play here. it's not surprising when the reagan administration trainees the declaration of martial in poland to delay or cancel the pipeline the europeans are
2:20 pm
completely denying this in their resistance. for the americans, including reagan himself, the question becomes one of principle. national security council meeting on turkey in may of 1982, reagan says "we said the morehey would be sanctions. we top up at the europeans always back off. this is the time to punish them. the europeans should tell the russians to ease up in poland, we are not able to afford this to relax. europeans should have a little bit of guff. why don't we provide leadership until europeans who is the enemy. it is not us. jessica include briefly, by the end of banking 82 the fate of transgenic relation is not that was different than it had been towards the end of the carter administration, whatever of
2:21 pm
european hopes had been. the europeans think they have a president that is preventable, he single-minded, and he's interested -- he does not take into account european interests. i think this is regardless of the personality and power, that you look for strategic differences emanating from different conceptions of superpowers versus european detente. reagan anything was the revolution? for the transatlantic relationship. naturefact the outspoken hurt his ability to put it in simple language and puts these issues at the forefront of the trans-atlantic debate. these different conceptions from the 1960's. schmidt says tnf goes back to the nixon failure. the early 1970's, this has been
2:22 pm
a bird over by the nice, benevolent diplomacy between nixon, ford, kissinger and the europeans. is explained by the europeans officially by reducing at all to carter's and experience in office and idealism. it was only the reagan administration accord with the clinical village in strategy that made the western europeans realize there were much more fundamental differences between american and european cold war strategy. they took their conclusions drawn at the 1980's when on, as to the americans. george scholz is important in terms of the trans-atlantic relationship. first --d of the reagan managed to bring these issues forward and made visible both the european decision-makers and the wider public as well, which is way proved such a controversial figure in early 1980's europe. i will shut up now. thank you very much.
2:23 pm
[applause] >> perfect. thank you very much. susan? >> ok. thank you. i we get? -- are we good? so, thank you all for being here. i know it is a debris to be watching many other things so very happy you joined us. from ally to pick up the other papers and say a few more things about the trans-atlantic relations, mostly focusing on reagan's first term in office. i want to start with this image. is from 1980. it was done for a british newspaper called the socialist worker. this is right before reagan comes into office. this is of course reagan and thatcher modeled off of the poster for gone with the wind. i think a catholic a few things
2:24 pm
with the public impression of reagan and thatcher. the tagline is, "she promised to follow him to the ends of the earth. be promised to organize it." there are subtle hints that maybe are two small, but it ties the other factor in reagan as the new era in many ways. not just a defense buildup in the litany threat of nuclear war, but also in terms of their economic policies. in one place it says milton friedman in association with pentagon pictures. [laughter] linking the conservative ideology with the defense buildup. they talked about reagan's reputation as a saber rattle her, a button pusher and anti-soviet crusader. i want to talk about how those kinds of perceptions impacted transatlantic relations. and certainly these predated reagan's time in office.
2:25 pm
in 1976 when he was running against gerald ford for the republican nomination, he famously derived -- in a given the nsa's nothing more than the right to sell pepsi-cola in siberia. when a because president, and his first press conference he comments about how the soviet union will do anything. they reserve the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheap to insure the threat of coming is him. that phrasing becomes the shorthand for the administration hard-liners approach. at the time but also in common memory. it has come up a handful of times in raleigh on the second panel of papers. detente to explain the administration's policy in the war on drugs. he said there would be no detente with the mob. the link detente to a broader sense of malaise, western weakness and a decline in the united states. things like the iran hostage -- visceral visual
2:26 pm
side of american decline. and the 1976 bid against ford and the large in his car in 1980. we often talk of detente dying in the 1970's. be at angola, the horn of africa, the soviet invasion of afghanistan on christmas day, 1979. in this narrative, a new cold war, a second cold war. was did remain of detente was european in nature. this narrative goes regularly returns to take on and diplomacy in the second term in his storied cooperation with mikhail gorbachev. this is maybe part of the reversal school district mentioned, but it's been in a number of other interpretations as well. one of the big conundrums idea within my work is both of reagan's terms in office, nato spouseues to a detente as an official policy.
2:27 pm
it is there in the 1957 harvell report, and its reformed -- reaffirmed time and time again, including 1884. so why?? if the administration is accused of jettisoning detente and abandoning it, particularly in the first term, why not talk about with this paradox between the administration and nato means? it suggests a few possible excavations in reasons we can draw. the administration didn't try to move away from the two-pronged 1967ach outline in report. because trans-atlantic risk and spurned wife for criticism yet again about whether the alliance could survive. secondterestedly entered -- intersected with young people's concerns. people taking to the streets in europe and canada, and in the united states against nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war. they did not appreciate the
2:28 pm
reasons nato had been made in the first place. they said they could not remember the second will were anymore. but often as was the case i believe in 1982 over the siberian pipeline issue, the ministry since efforts to live life in the heart of report and my other aspects of the administration's goals and transatlantic relations, such as on inf. richard pipes writes back this is a strategy the united states is already tried. it was known as detente. of the power within the administration shifts, particularly with a headache-scholz transition. i figure resembles the two tracks. you have the fundamental shift in the perception of u.s. power and confidence.
2:29 pm
the administration regains his confidence around 1983 and they feel he can comfortably negotiate. you have early opposition to reagan. his defense buildup is seen as a were fighting strategy. people wonder whether regular be able to sit down with the soviets. when schmidt comes to washington in may 1981, deemphasizes this is the most -- he emphasizes this is the most important question he would get home. this matter because of the dual decision. by pairing the deployment of new u.s. missiles with u.s. negotiations with the soviet union, it created a vicious cycle. the carter administration has summarized is a long-term problem in order to keep consensus for the women of the missiles, particularly in western european countries. the limits are scheduled in 1983. united states needed arms control. but they feared and assumed they would get a progress on arms control until the missiles were lloyd. how they -- missiles were
2:30 pm
deployed. how you paper over this problem? they stay the course with the decision, although there is suggestions they should leave it. in november, 1981, reagan revealed the zero option that offered to stop deployments if they scrapped their missiles. the speech is designed to cultivate a statement image, something the new york times comments on a link. and responding directly to nothing fears about nuclear war like a large-scale inciting fear demonstrations taking place in october of 1981. many did not believe it. the next month time i think conducted a poll where 50% of respondents said reagan intently made his remarks for political and propaganda reasons. on the 29th of december, 1981 reagan announces new restrictions on oil and gas technology to the soviet union as part of a package on the
2:31 pm
soviet union and poland after .artial law it seemed to go against all the earlier contingency planning nato had done because all of nato's contingency planning was based on the premise of whatever do if the soviets invaded. the europeans and canadians responded by saying the soviets had not invaded. many in the reagan administration to write it that reaction as naive and you responsible. washington does not introduce the grain embargo. -- this isrepealed seen as yet further evidence that the americans are interested more in punishing their allies in punishing the soviets. mostly it boils into the fact that many at the american enterprise
2:32 pm
institute, the official famously remarked, you are asking us to go with you on a journey but not telling you where you are heading and where we will end up . nicholas henderson, the british ambassador in washington, they did this was symptomatic of a bigger problem, u.s. foreign under reagan. the pipeline brought up a much larger debate straight it was at its core a debate about nato's approach to relations, one that became embodied by a competition between bond in washington. the german foreign minister accused the reagan administration of abandoning the harvell reports. they pointed to the need for , arguing that any analyzing ofh as strategy would only present moscow with more opportunities to defy the alliance. but the interagency group
2:33 pm
pressed on. they look for ways to reformulate without directly challenging carmel. in the eureka college speech in may, they promised a five-point approach. they also looked to use your regular and the later trip to europe as a public relations moved to offset images of reagan as bombastic in a nuclearapproa. cowboy . instead it look to cultivate an the even proposed placing photo op's with mother teresa to help cultivate this image. they talk about the eureka college speech as one that sugar mind audiences -- should remind audiences. the british share this. in one such cable they insist it would be better if he appeared more like if only uncle than a nuclear cowboy. in large part. the address reagan gave that british parliament, so famous
2:34 pm
for him commenting about leaving communism on the sheep of misery, confused. but the confusing nature of the speech was long forgotten and it .as remembered for the remark problems then only get worse in 1982 great attribute on an versailles summit, the reigning administration introduces another set of sanctions over huge opposition within the administration. met with a furious response by many of the allies. one official remarks, what is the good of discussing things and reaching agreed assessments if ignoring solidarity, the united states goes ahead on its own regardless? the canadian ambassador in washington remarked that the americans must rule the world. european firms ended up simply ignoring the roles, and british and canadian's helped to resolve the problems trying to bridge the atlantic. ultimately they did come to a
2:35 pm
solution, in large part due to george schultz's rule, scholz defeated hague at this point. the fundamental questions about east-west relations remain open. in an article in the errors in the autumn of 1982, dietrich offers a clear vision of what he thinks relations should be like, which is fundamentally the harmel vision. reagan had spoken of allied unity as a precursor to relations with the east. he insisted it was the inverse formulation that needed to happen. if the west had no strategy for east-west relations, how can they be united or cohesive? problems only seem to get worse. u.s.-soviet relations seem to deteriorate. reagan gives the evil empire speech in march 1983 and then unveils fbi. peace protesters continue to march. in 1983, the united states tried to improve its image.
2:36 pm
the united states introduces two interim proposals at the inf negotiations in geneva in hopes of combating these public relations problems. they even stay at the talks after the september shootdown of the korean airliner. but these u.s. negotiations were often dismissed as a public relations move even within the alliance. trudeau launched his peeps -- peace mission. to be sure, met with a furious inf was a public relations issue and it had been since the carter administration. but was that all it was? i argue that the answer is no. it also gave the administration a means of testing its relationship with moscow while looking to reconcile competing impulses within the administration. reagan's own advisors talked about the importance of also gave the administration a means of testing its relationship with moscow while
2:37 pm
looking to reconcilenegotiatione u.s. strength had improved. reagan cultivated a domestic reputation as an opponent of detente, one that still mattered for his political position. at the same time he was faced with the need to be seen as a custodian of immense u.s. power, arsenal, tow your keep inf on track. i want to conclude briefly by talking -- structure versus agent. i want to suggest that maybe it can be a little bit of both, i did talk about where that fits in my paper. the problems reagan faced were in many respects continuations of carter-era disagreements. reagan stayed the course of many of the existing policies, that committed reagan to dialogue with the soviet union, many of which were relics of the carter years. individual, his
2:38 pm
leadership style and public reputation all exacerbated the situation. he became an embodiment for many people of what was wrong or flawed with u.s. foreign-policy. arsenal, to you can see this in the kind of antinuclear and peace to testing material that was produced in this era. a plague and stereotypes about the united states, the prominence of this cowboy rhetoric trait within the transatlantic community, this cowboy rhetoric intersects with a broader assumption that because reagan as caliph -- is from california, he can't appreciate the value of the transatlantic partnership has he is to or removed from the atlantic to really get it. this is amplified by the fact that the california team is how his administration is so often described. i also can't help but think of some parallels with other cowboy presidents of u.s. history, someone like lyndon biggs oftenn or george w. bush, this language of cowboy is used as a pejorative stereotype about america.
2:39 pm
meant this image of reagan as the hardliner meant the ways that he did remain committed to dialogue with the soviet union were often ignored. orks like the inf talks mutual and balanced force reduction talks which had been taking place it's the 1970's were not seen as meaningful dialogue, instead as a formulaic to manage west-east relations instead of east-west relations. i will leave it there. [applause] >> thank you very much to all of our panelists for excellent presentations and keeping us on time so we have a good chunk of time for questions from the audience. first, i think these presentations underscore the value of this conference. it is a perfect time to be taking up hard, serious academic look at the reagan administration, which had been sort of dominated by competing
2:40 pm
narratives of reagan as an innocent, naive, but also reckless, or the reagan hagueography, theyou reagan whod it all. a morese papers show us nuanced and balanced way of understanding the reagan years. second observation is, this is implicit in several of the papers. it explicit, that is to try to explain the difference between reagan's words and some of his deeds. to say the word duplicitous does not capture the point. the words themselves have independent meaning for reagan, to a greater degree than any presence, serving more for his successor, george h w. bush, and certainly more for his predecessor jimmy carter. for reagan, the words have force. presence, serving more for his successor, george h they could standalone as an
2:41 pm
element of american foreign-policy, and any other elements of american power and influence he treated in somewhat more traditional fashion. that's the way i tend to understand reagan's use of sometimes scary rhetoric. they could to the audience, if you could please identify yourself. we have a microphone coming around, if you could identify statelf reflate and then the question. you could throw it to the panel whole or to individual speakers. yes, please. >> hi. i have a question for susan. sarah snyder from american university. i was struck by your suggestion hate to transition from scholz we might see as a return to this dual track approach in deterrence.
2:42 pm
i was hoping, given that is the dissertation, that you could explain more what you mean by detente. and in particular how much you and in particular how much you see it as a strategy to manage cold war competition versus to end the cold war. but schultz also manages to
2:43 pm
converse with reagan on these in a way that he gets the president on side and much more obvious and clear way. in terms of what i think is i think it isnte, points elizabeth is talking about area that four-point strategy is very in-line points elizabeth is with the major issues the europeans, americans, and canadians debate is a detente strategy in the late 1960's, throughout the 1970's, and into the 1980's. that to me is the neatest encapsulation of why i see that in that two-pronged light. >> if i can jump in very quickly. with the majorscholz has very s with thatcher and smith.
2:44 pm
there are very disappointed when scholz doesn't get nominated. >> excellent papers, all. thank you very much. i wanted to ask you -- i'm sorry. henry, george washington university. a specific question may be to each. in so many cases it is so important to keep the larger context in mind, when you are aspectsg more specific of policy in this period or policy in any period. you have said aspects of policy in this nothing aboute soviet military buildup on the borders of poland in 1981. some 25 divisions are so that were eventually moved into a position to invade:.
2:45 pm
-- invade poland. did reagan defense buildup? the fact that reagan had spent that first year successfully getting his economic and defense in some measure through congress, did that have anything to do with the possibility that it made the soviet union think twice about a 1956 style or 1968 style in the case of mattias and susan , i think the only thing reagan
2:46 pm
cared about in terms of the alliance in the early years was the deployment of the inf. that was the essential purpose. he had to rely on a sense in the was alived that nato and well after their invasion of afghanistan, after their threatening posture towards poland, etc. purpose, ahis main lot of other things seem to be falling into place. pipeline sanctions were designed to let the europeans know, look, we have a serious issue here and we can't on the one hand be buying gas from the soviet union and convince our publics to deploy the inf weapons. scholz said the inf deployment was the key turning point of the war. his conversations with soviet officials, it made the biggest impression on them. they knew who they were dealing with in terms of the reagan administration.
2:47 pm
i will begin by saying that certainly when0, the prospects of soviet intervention seems most realistic, reagan is not even there yet. when we are talking about a later build of an soviet response to it, this only comes into play in the second term, and of course has enormous consequences but about this particular situation in december 1980, i don't think the soviets were afraid of a u.s. military reaction. i think they were more concerned with what's going to happen in poland. i think they had some doubts about the reliability of the polish army, and they thought it's not going to look like in chechen slovakia, it would be more hungry in -- hungary in
2:48 pm
1956 on a scale much grander. they were more concerned with economic sanctions. there are various moments in the 1980's when the threat of intervention comes into play. when i would emphasize is the fact that as the soviets spent more and more in the second half of the 1980's in their own response, so forth, they become increasingly aware of the burdens of their empire in eastern europe. it becomes clear for both the leadership and eventually the public, that they are subsidizing eastern europe in many ways. they come to a conclusion that it's not worth to intervene because they are the ones helping to prop up the region economically. >> and you for that question. for that question.
2:49 pm
i did not mean to insinuate that shall was pushing reagan's policy. it was reagan's policy and ideas and scholz was the way the reagan could execute trade scholz said in his memoir that he felt very much that reagan was almost eating held hostage by his staff in some ways on these policies. i think scholz was -- the way reagan could execute this was crucial. so, for reagan, not these set
2:50 pm
ideas of this is how he wanted to approach the soviets, these were the things he was trying to do. publice didn't realize hardric and stance made it for other people and the soviets and europeans to see that was his vision. that was another example of that. >> if i could just -- let me add one word about your question about the impact of inf deployment. i think you are right, the soviet peace hard for other people and the soviets and europeans to see that was his vision. offensive which they believed was working was designed to divide the western alliance. i was in germany at the time and the mantra in the streets was, the shorter the missiles, the deader the germans. schmidt deserves great credit for standing up to that domestic pressure. reagan too for seeing the importance of getting a nato consensus, tough and contentious as it was, nato came together. the great irony is that this soviet campaign then blowback on
2:51 pm
eastern europe. freetente went into a deep ze, the east europeans had become exposed and it added to the firmament of their -- >> steve hayward from uc berkeley. a question for susan, though i would love to hear others'comments. first is fyi, reagan put that poster up in the workshop of his barn, his santa barbara ranch, because he liked it and thought it was fun. i'm not quite sure i heard you write. if i got this wrong or badly wrong, hear me out. i thought i heard you say is that reagan's westminster speech of 1982 was confused. i wonder if i had that roughly right. i want to say more about why you think it is confused. >> that's a direct quotation
2:52 pm
from a british official who observed the speech and then wrote a summary for the fco. he said it was a rather confused if not confusing feet, that's how he characterized it. he talks about there being two different impulses in the speech. one is this hard-line, bombastic speeches, what the famous for, and the other is a tonemore conciliatory about just wanting a sign from the soviet union that they will match their deeds to their work. paper, iout in the mysonally cut it from remarks, when i find fascinating about that assessment is that britishmption that this official makes is that the hard-line stuff is the real
2:53 pm
reagan, and that the conciliatory, all we need is a sign kind of rhetoric is actually the speechwriters trying to moderate reagan's tone to make the europeans happy. british official makes is that the hard-line stuff is the real that strikes me is the opposite of true. the fact that is even what the internal fco assessment of the speech is telling about how much reagan's rhetoric takes over policies, and how they can be at odds with one another in reality but for even written is policies, considered to be the closest of the allies. they think the hard-line reagan is the real reagan. i think we share that this is a pivotal speech in the reagan administration. i kind of view it -- reagan launching a crusade for freedom
2:54 pm
launches the national endowment for democracy. i wrestle with this speech a lot and i wonder who is the audience. my sense is that this is very -- the audience is shoring up the western alliance on the eve, the start of negotiations in this broader period of the in f deployment. reagan's best and it's definitely worth digging into it, with the way it was put together, mark palmer and sent to george will to look over, really important moment. and it' [inaudible] josh, texas a&m university. [inaudible]
2:55 pm
the notion of a reagan reversal has been bandied over and over again on this panel so far. reading over james' book, for example -- [inaudible] our interest is to keep the russians well behind us. number one, going on to describe sdi. concluding with this how toion describing lock the soviets into our position and verify our advantages. if that's the case, maybe the notion, the advent of scholz -- here is agn ong on shift, the desire on reagan part to maximize american advantage is a constant.
2:56 pm
and wondering how you respond to that interpretation -- i'm wondering how you respond to that interpretation. i don't think there is a reversal. i agree with everything you just said. you're always right, josh. [laughter] >> let's not go that far. this, youchapter on deal would all of this. i think the reagan reversal paper and assessment was a long time ago. it was before we had a lot of this documentation, before we were able to see a lot of these things. --re is a consistent reagan about the thinks soviets, thinks about these negotiations, to me seems to be
2:57 pm
very consistent from the beginning to the end. he's optimistic about his about the soviets, thinks about these ability to deal with it. he does want to build up first. throughthis piece strength. we have to be strong to get to the negotiating table. i don't really see it as a reversal. this is what i've been saying, why is this new? bute mentally he had been, publicly it was coming off totally differently. so yeah, i really agree with it. i don't think there is a master reversal and policy. it was fairly consistent, if you kind of read all these documents and draw it together it seems fairly consistent. >> can i say a word or two about that particular document you cite, which is george schultz's -- a letter he wrote in 1987. the first part of that, scholz writes, because of strength and philosophy, the u.s. relationship will always be unique and difficult to manage. but it is increasingly clear that the soviet union is going
2:58 pm
to be seen by history as ronald reagan's china. the soviet union is now changing because of fear, fear of china's reforms, fear of europe, eastern european restlessness, but most of all because if you are falling permanently behind the and i read that significance is that by the end of the reagan administration, that it was still the view of the soviet union's reagan's china. very important in terms of thinking about reagan and europe and the end of the cold war, because there was tremendous improvement after 8 years, but the cold war, the fundamental components of it were still in place when reagan left office in january of 1989. questions?mments or yes, please.
2:59 pm
this is more a comment. always got the impression reading the documents and things that most americans, many or most american policymakers don't consider the british europeans. talk about the europeans, they don't mean the british. the british are different, special relationship and all of that. it's interesting, they seem to come and go as europeans and the documents. that's more of a comment. it always sort of jumps out at you, to get an exemption or how they are set >> they like us, they want to be seen as european. they are. it, they areabout geographically within the
3:00 pm
region. ,he reason they invented nato it's an of retroactive, they downto keep the russians and that is the european objective. , it the thatcher government is trying to preserve the cohesion. both means taking care of sides of this from this 20's and so on. they have very european objectives, even though they would never say they are european objectives, they would be going back to churchill's concentric circle. point, he would that because he thinks there should be this balance and
3:01 pm
substituting weapons. that is what he comes up with the whole speech in the first place. side,exactly on reagan's he has her hundred thousand people demonstrated against him. he seems, ironically, as an , but in the states he is seen as anti-american. thing, he isline on a state visit. it is very unfortunate. troops ande nato there.- in is in a very difficult position to play dramatically and nationally to try to reconcile the irreconcilable. >> if i can just add something
3:02 pm
about the talked british and canadians, the two who really try to bridge the atlantic so to speak. i think it is important with geography and an existential crisis where you fit. when you are not sure if you are here, the canadians are certainly sure they are not here , they were entirely forgotten. this in the t approaches stunning, but also very telling. betweenish can be a go and can translate europe to america, and translate america europe. they can pull up that relationship car to offset it. takeas the canadians they a much more cautious approach, they offer to hold a meeting
3:03 pm
only if he wants. if not they will offer territory canuebec, they said they see it with your idea and it is fine but we are worried -- flips, which at the end of the year it is going to happen. it is going to leave them screwed basically. their investments are in a political term of these express relations that the law of the sea is a big deal. they disagree with the reagan administration entirely, but geography, escape what happens when their political relations when they want to be closer to europe but their economic relation is in the other direction. they are worried that the entire fabric of foreign relations will unravel.
3:04 pm
the have the same concerns in one sense is the british. but bridging the atlantic is a very interesting commentary. plus it also makes the british much less credible, they basically said the special nations are not special on only one side exists. [laughter] >> if i can offer a few words, in the same way that moscow tried to drive a wedge between america and europe so did americans and western europeans. it did not see that eastern this.an was a model of there was conflict within the b reward for good
3:05 pm
behavior regime such as poland and hungary. , in themany, romania same way calling feast germans these europeans is not exactly that accurate. if someone is called in eastern european they get offended. you have to look separately at now regime in each country, eastern european is formerly soviet states, you can see how much there is even if you look at attitude for russia, if you look at poland and hungary, you would hardly see different attitudes. the u.s. was aware of that. they tried to play the card as well.
3:06 pm
back where thego rebirth of the time. that thision is evolution has to start before atgan, what was happening the states during the 70's. workingy 70's was not anymore, the buildup started with carter. the decision was made in december 1979, even in a year reduction, they were not enough.
3:07 pm
in march 1977, they proposed the deep cast proposal. maybe it is an accessory to how reagan and the evolution of his ideals change. he was looking at things during the 70's. it is for everybody. time for oneave more question. if not, please join me in applauding this wonderful panel. [applause] >> we will answer you after.
3:08 pm
>> it is a very important question, in the continuity of the military buildup, the thing iat pops in my mind is that do think the reagan administration is shifting the , they deserve tremendous credit. frameworkerent as a with the role of verification is extremely important. with the deep cuts proposal that the carter administration , it is very important for people in the first year. there are elements with the mx missile, where they have an
3:09 pm
effort to not look like carter. we can talk more about this tomorrow. >> i apologize for cutting off the answer. >> you are watching american history tv 48 hours of programming on american history on c-span3. follow us on twitter at c-span history. keep up on the latest history news. >> next on american history tv, historian katie cannon discusses female beauty standards of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. it explores the ingredients many women used to make their own cosmetics. such as flour, tree bark, and chalk. she also describes many of the ingredients included in the cosmetics of the time like lead,
3:10 pm
mercury, acids and arsenic, and the side effects women experienced. this event was hosted by the daughters of the american revolution museum in washington, d.c. >> hello. i went to injured is what we are going to be talking about. the scope of my research here on cosmetics and beauty care products that americans of european descent were using in the 18th and early 19th century. is a research topic for you have to be specific, i will be talking about beauty standards that were basically present in eastern europe. and americans of european

138 Views

info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on