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tv   Open Phones with Ian Toll  CSPAN  December 10, 2016 7:30pm-8:31pm EST

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host: been researching this book, did you are views down on pearl harbor change at all? ian: certainly. attack on pearl harbor was an extraordinarily well executed attack from the japanese point of view. former speaker of the house newt gingrich tweeted out to the effect that the japanese attack and then technique a brilliant. -- had been technically brilliant. he was criticized for that. right.some ways he was fdr essentially congratulated
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the japanese by saying this was an extraordinarily brilliant attack. technically certainly it was. the japanese accomplished something that never had been accomplished before. they launched a huge coordinated airstrike from six carrier flight next. that was not only beyond american capability, but beyond the capability of navy. it had never been done before, -- had never been a vegan never been imagined. that is the reason that pearl harbor was such a great shock. host: why did japan attack the u.s.? ian: that is a question japanese scholars and american scholars have been debating for 75 years. i think the best way to answer
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is with the understanding that the japanese regime prior to and during the second world war was essentially dysfunctional. shared across many elements of the military. it was an army dominated government. the navy also had a great deal of power. rival factions within the services, and each other's throats nonstop for control of the national budget, military and foreign policy. japanese needed oil. they had relied on texas crude. they have imported about 90% of their oil to run their more on on china.heir war
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as our relations deteriorated, we essentially cut off all oil exports. that created a crisis. the japanese needed to replace that source. in order to do that, they were determined to take the netherlands east indies toward indonesia, where there were productive oil fields. in order to take those territories, they essentially decided they needed to preemptively strike us have pearl harbor to clear the way. host: this is american history tv honors social scientific anniversary program on the type of pearl harbor. we are talking with ian toll with his book "pacific crucible." we looking for your calls as well.
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we look forward to your comments on twitter as well. guest: thanks for having me. could you ask the author to talk about the purple heart and did to the fire department, is handed to the fire department? i think that is the only award handed outside of the military. ian: i had heard about these purple hearts. you may know more about indian iq. -- about it than i do. it resulted in an enormous amount of antiaircraft fire from various interfaces around oahu. fell antiaircraft shells
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into the residential districts of honolulu, creating several fires and casualties. all of the first responders, civilian and military, had to get into the act to respond. you are correct i was unprecedented of the time -- that was unprecedented at the time. this was yet another way to measure what a remarkable and unprecedented event pearl harbor was. host: in your book you write name -- 8:10 a.m., the the main battle fleet of the pacific was crippled." ian: the japanese achieved complete surprise. their first wave came essentially in with little or no opposition, either from american fighters or from antiaircraft batteries.
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they were able to line up their attacks, the following torpedo attacks on the american battleships, which were moored in pearl harbor in a double file. they were essentially sitting ducks with no prior warning. the cruise were not ready to react, thereby returning antiaircraft fire. no time to close watertight hedges, which would have prevented the section from sinking. the air torpedoes did most of the damage. they were able to hit these battleships, immobilize large eight of the battleships in the pacific fleet of action. six were returning to service later in the war, so it was a temporary loss. yet at the time there was still
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a prevalent view that the battleships were the heart of any navy's fleet. that is one the japanese targeted the battleships. it is also widely shock in and around the navy was so great. we had lost all of these ships of the asset -- at the outset of the war. host: let's go to john in west palm beach florida. guest: good morning. i girl in the tv generation -- grew up in the tv generation in the 1960's. my father took me to the movie "tora tora tora!" when i was 10 years old. i viewed it the other night. after watching an in-depth program on c-span last weekend, i am amazed how accurate the
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movie actually was. it really was like the first docu-drama. i wanted to get your opinion on that. a producer made a great effort to keep accuracy in his movie. i just wanted to know how you felt about that. i agree with you. i think that is the best movie that has been made about pearl harbor. that includes the more recent 2001 movie. as you say, that is a film that tried to use all of the most up-to-date historical sources and to accurately detect what happened. i think it is driven it was a joint effort between american and japanese filmmakers. i thinknese sequences are a real highlight of that
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movie. i agree with you. i wish there was more filmmaking like that today. filmmaking track record of the pacific record in general is next. we could use a new movie about the battle of midway. the movie in the 1970's was quite good, but inaccurate in many respects. with filmmaking technology today, there is a great movie that can be made about the battle of midway. i want to point out the attacks on hiroshima and 90 sake are the last -- and nagasaki for the last mile of big-budget hollywood filmmaking. we have have not had treatment since. is going to make a great movie about the bombing of hiroshima. i expect that willw in for best
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oscar. ian: we're speaking with toll, author of "pacific crucible: war at sea asia-pacific, 1941-1942." let's take a look at one of the japanese newsreels reporting on the pearl harbor attack that day. ♪ >> nippon declared war against america and britain december 8, 1941. it attacked pearl harbor when the u.s. will serve its strength as strongest in the world. bolstered its strength as a strongest in the world. carriers on the pacific cruise tour hawaii.
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a strong wind blows. is rough, and the waves are high, crashing against the side of the ship's. our men below deck, the commander of the imperial air squadron sounds the alarm. war heroes determined to respond to their country's call. ♪ offby one, navy eagles pop from the deck. ♪
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on that memorable day, december 8, squadrons of nippon bombers head tour hawaii. first nippon planes attack america's air base. next, nippon planes lead heavy charges.
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enemy cruisers are hit hard in the harbor. of the american navy, which bolstered the strongest fleet in the world. nippon now commands the vast waters of the pacific. the greatest victory in hawaii allows us to carry operations of the philippines. new chapter in the history of asia begins. ♪
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host: an understandably bold newsreel after the attack on pearl harbor. back with ian toll, author of "pacific crucible" on the 75th anniversary of roe harbor. -- pearl harbor. one twitter user asking, what more of the attack did not go as planned? ian: the attack went largely as planned for the japanese. there was one element of the attack which was essential in a coordinated with the aerial attack. a number of what were called midget submarines. these were small 2 man submersibles armed with 2 small torpedoes. they attempted to penetrate pearl harbor. i believe one of them did get
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in. that may have contributed to the capsizing of the battleship oklahoma, although the crews did not survive. there is some debate about what those submarines achieved. it was hoped they might be able the crews of those submarines. none of them were recovered. as for the main carrier air attack, it largely went off as planned. it was a technically brilliant success. they lost only 29 flames. -- 29 planes. none of their ships were scratched. although they expected a counter attack on their fleet, and expected they might lose as many as 2 aircraft carriers. host: we have plenty of calls for ian.
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norman, welcome to the program. guest: hi, i would just like to in 1939, there was a battle between the soviet union and the japanese in manchuria. it was considered a decisive , some say in history. i would like to know if that have a bearing on the japanese at then to strike in pearl harbor. host: thanks, i think we have you there. ian toll?
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ian: yes, i think you can see the experience of the japanese army fighting the soviets in venture in -- in manchuria. ibuted tocision -- attr the decision to attack the united states and great britain. thee was debate whether japanese navy should concentrate their efforts on attacking russian, or whether they should look at going out and taking territories south pacific. these were two fundamental strategic directions that japan could have taken. war declared, but large-scale combat as the color mentioned, in manchuria. the soviet army got the better of the japanese army.
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for came as a wake-up call the japanese army, going against an efficient modern mechanized army was going to be more difficult then they don't -- then they fought. forward, point japanese policy making rested that they would avoid war with the soviet union. i continued through the end of the war. there were hopes that the japanese government might people to execute a diplomatic agreement where they bring stalin in to have a negotiated end to the pacific war. never amounted to anything. there was no chance that could have succeeded. host: we welcome ray, a world
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war ii veteran from arkansas. know why itt to hasn't been mentioned that the secret invasion of the mainland of japan has not been mentioned to the public. we would have lost more than the plus japanese bomb dropped at hiroshima. teasing has never been mentioned. -- the thing has never been mentioned. i have copies of the invasion order. but it has never been put in the history books. i think it is important that people knew what was to have been in november 1945 that did not happen. we were on our way to japan. i was in the armada when the war ended. missourissed the uss the david peace treaty was signed. -- the day the peace treaty was
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signed. host: do you know how big that force would have been? guest: they had every army, naval, and marine units banded together to attack the japan mainland. there would have been over one million men on the beach. host: let's hear from ian toll. s sorry, before they cut the line-- host: he's gone. ian: i was just curious to know what unit he had been in. yes, we had planned an invasion of the japanese islands. it was in two stages. rayfirst in november, as said correctly. then the main island some months
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after. that would have been larger than the normandy invasions. it would be more than 10 divisions slated to take part in that operation. it would have been an immensely bloody and really very terrible operation, not only for forces, but as ray said, for the japanese people. this has been the traditional justification to drop the bomb on hiroshima. i think that it is in the history books. certainly anybody that pays attention to the history of the pacific war is aware that we had these plans. they were well advanced. i spent time talking to veterans who would have gone in. certainly it was necessary to avoid that operation. he dide question that not directly worth of -- --
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directly bring up, did we need to use the bombs to avoid the invasion? that is up for debate. date for the mainland was november 1. that was a long amount of time. there was not an immediate invasion that was about to occur. in may when president obama went to hiroshima, i thought it would have been a good idea for our own sake to have provided an exquisite morning to the japanese. -- explicit warning to the japanese. i think this is important when you talk to adventure that would have gone in and might not have survived.
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it was clear that we needed to avoid ending the war with an invasion of japan. host: we should point out "pacific crucible" is a trilogy by ian toll. i assume this information you talk about in the book, you are working on currently. ian: yes. i will get deep into the plans for the invasion of japan in the third book, which will be entitled "twilight of the gods." host: when will we see that published? ian: that is a very personal question. [laughter] host: we won't hold you to it. ian: i would like to say 2018. host: let us hear from dave in new york. guest: good morning gentlemen.
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my visit question -- my basic question, when exactly did the --realized when the relievedrrived, with a the battleships were hit and that they had most of the fleet intact? what was he in a state of panic that we lost most of her battleships, what i like going to do with all of these carriers that have not been tested in battle? when the americans bashed the two ocean navy act, that included six battleships and a montana class battleship. they were of 1942, going to four, in the montana council. -- and the montana.
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ian: i would say mcginnis was not panicked. he was captain of the arizona. he has been an admiral heading the battleship division. of thely the loss battleships came as i got punch personally, as it into many officers. i think it is fair to say when he arrived at pearl harbor on christmas day, 1941 and spent three days touring the navy he recognized the loss of the battleship will not be a permanent setback, that several could be returned to service. that the carriers, having been spared, meant that he had the means to be striking back at the japanese almost immediately.
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againstt carrier rates japanese home islands began february 1942. midway just six months after pearl harbor was a devastating counterpunch, in which 4 of japan's airline carriers were sent to the bottom of the pacific. realizedal navy weekly the aircraft carrier would be the most important weapon, with submarines also. that the township would be placed into a supporting role essentially as an antiaircraft gunnery platform, and as a specialized weapon to bombard island beaches prior to any various sold. -- prior to an amphibious assault. of emotional gut level shock
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losing the battleships, particularly losing the arizona -- those were terrible events. they were not crippling events. his subordinates were relatively quick to realize it. host: were the japanese expecting the u.s. aircraft carriers to be in pearl harbor that day? ian: they had targeted them. so yes, i think they did expect them to be there. or at least had contingency plans to attack them if they were. what is notable is that the primary targets were the battleships. the irony is that the attack on pearl harbor itself demonstrated
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that the carrier was a much more important weapon. because the carrier can strike across a range of 200-250 miles. a battleship under optimal condition might be able to strike over five, seven miles at most. it was that difference in striking range that made the carrier the most important weapon of the pacific war. submarines perhaps a close second. host: one of the photographs inside toll's "pacific crucible" looks at the white house in december 1941. you can see christmas trees on the front lawn of the white house. people remember the next day to joint session of congress to f
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dr. what they might not know is that eleanor roosevelt spoke to the session. . that address. -- fear is that address . >> i'm speaking at a very serious moment in our history. the is convening congress is meeting with the president. army and navy officials convened with the president all afternoon. the japanese ambassador was talking to the president at the very time that japan's airships were bombing our citizens in noisy and the philippine, and seeking one of our transports loaded with lumber on its way to hawaii. by tomorrow morning, members of congress will have a full report and ready for action. in the meantime, we the people are already prepared for action. for months, the knowledge that something of this kind might happen has been hanging over our heads. and yet it seemed impossible to
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believe, and possible to drop the everyday things of life and feel there was only one thing that was important, preparation to meet an enemy no matter where he struck. that is all over now. there is no more uncertainty. we know what we have to face. we know that we are ready to face it. i should like to say just a word to the women in the country tonight. i have a boy at sea on a destroyer. for all i know, he may be on his way to the pacific. to a my children -- two of my children are in cities on the coast of the pacific. many of you have boys in the services that will be called upon to action. you have friends and families in what have suddenly become a danger zone. you can speak to the anxiety, you can speak to capture the fear of your heart.
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yeah i hope the necessity of what we have to meet will make you rise above fear. we must go about our daily business, determines to do the ordinary things as well as we can. way to dond it a anymore in our communities, we must do it. whatever is asked of us, i am sure we can accomplish it. we are the free and unconquerable people of th the united statese america. two young people -- to the young people of the nation, you are going to have a great opportunity. there will be high moments in which your strength and your ability will be tested/ i have faith in you. i feel as though i was standing upon a rock. rock is my faith and my fellow citizens.
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now we will go back to the program which we had arranged for the next. host: back live for our 75th anniversary of pearl harbor. back with us is ian toll. what did you hear in the tones of eleanor roosevelt? ian: was a terrific address. i have not heard that until the producer scented to me yesterday. that was the night of sunday, december 7. the news of the attack only arrived in washington afternoon. she had gathered her thoughts and written that, or perhaps she had some help. but these remarks were given in the first flush, just hours after we had learned of the
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attack on pearl harbor. there were a couple of inaccuracies, which is understandable given the timing. the japanese did not think a transport. roosevelt was not talking to the investor at the time of the attack. -- ambassador at the time of the attack. that was the secretary of state. those are inaccuracies given that this was all happening in real time. host: let's get back to your calls. thanks for waiting. go ahead with your comment question. guest: during my childhood, my stepfather told us at the dinner table he was graduating from
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a possessor, or more than one at west point and told the class that the united states knew that the attack on pearl harbor was coming. catalyst fored a the american people to be enthusiastic about going to war. i wondered if you had heard that before. it struck me because he said that professors had told him that the codes were broken and they new pearl harbor was going to happen, but that people in the u.s. were not behind going to the bar with japan. and that is why they needed this catalyst. ian: i don't know who those professors were. the conspiracy theories have
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been persistent over many decades. the theories go to the fact that fdr had a tremendous political problem in fall 1941, which is that he foresaw correctly the u.s. would have to get to the second world war sooner or later, but that our people were divided. the isolationist sentiment in the nation was fairly strong. it was stronger than that in congress. there was a bipartisan movement in congress to keep us out of war. many leading newspapers had taken a strong isolationist stance. how to unify the country around what fdr saw has the need to go
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to war was a tremendous problem. harborack on pearl literally solve that problem overnight. on december 8, congress voted unanimously the exception of one vote in the house to declare war on japan. if you were prosecuting attorney and trying to make the case that fdr and other leaders had advanced knowledge of the attack on pearl harbor, he would begin by saying you have motive. motive is not enough to prove the case in court. it is not enough to prove it in this historical debate. i don't believe our leaders had advance knowledge of the attackk. i do understand why the conspiracy theories have resisted, and why they continue to be active today. we had broken the japanese diplomatic codes.
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we were able to read the veil between japanese foreign ministry and japanese embassy in washington. based on reading that diplomatic mail, our leaders knew and expected there would be a war, and that it might begin even on that day, december 7. i think the evidence shows the expectation was the japanese might strike somewhere in the western pacific, and that if the attack came, it would fall on the philippines territories of our british allies. convincing evidence that anyone in washington, any of our military or political leaders, had any reason to believe we would be attacked in
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pearl harbor. the technical difficulty of that attack would take a carrier task , that would time have been beyond our capabilities. i could say more about this. and recent attacks in 2001 9/11 are a good analogy in the sense that after this summer attack, there are a number of occasions. -- number of investigations. there may have been reasons to think that attack like this would come. but at the time, you are searching through a haystack and trying to find a needle. just as the fbi had evidence , theing 9/11 hijackers
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time it was difficult to see that pattern. very few historians of the second rule for believed the conspiracy theories. guest: i am certainly enjoying this program, especially mr. toll's comments. i don't know as much about the pearl harbor attack as i intend to learn, but my father died when i was very young, and had served on the carrier saratoga as a jag officer throughout world war ii. when he was put out of commission, a belief by, causing the tech, -- i believe by kamikaze attack.
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i would like to know whether you agree with an admiral who was interviewed on the panel -- i remember seeing a panel of high-ranking officers, admirals, and generals. they were asked the question, what was the most terrifying event in war that you can describe in your theater of battle? an admiral said the kamikaze attack was probably the most terrible and fearful event. saratoga was b ombed by kamikazes numerous times throughout the work. s would like to have mr. toll'
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reflection on that. i would like to know whether he agrees with another comment i have heard another historian say, that the model of okinawa was the greatest naval battle of the war. host: eugene, appreciate the comments. isn he says kamikaze, he talking about suicidal attacks? ian: yes, exactly. thank you for your comment in question. begin ining attacks fall 1944. this was something that began in the last year of the war, and very quickly became the principal means the japanese -- too get partnerships get at our ships.
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it was during that time the japanese first use this tactic of flying their planes into our ships. leap, ina conceptual that it allowed them to send guided missiles against our ships about 20 years before the law man guided missile -- before the non-man guided missile was used in warfare. in a sense, they were able to use this futuristic weapon because they had a cadre of young pilots that were willing to give their lives. uniquelyink it was a terrifying experience for the cruise of our ships to be faced
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with this kind of attack. it was so far out of our own suicide on such a massive scale. azes did a great deal of damage. they probably accounted for 6000 k.i.a. talking to a crescendo during okinawa. -- that came to a crescendo during okonoboh. it wasn't a naval battle in the sense that japanese chips weren't able to get near our fleet. it was the largest fleet brought into action. pril-may 1945.
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the japanese were able to launch kamikaze attacks on a major scale as they landed out of okinawa. in some cases, hundreds of planes coming at the same time. when there are that many planes, ,t is difficult to stop them either with fighters were antiaircraft guns. they exacted a terrible toll during that period. host: your comments and questions also welcome on twitter at @cspanhistory. this one is going about douglas macarthur. how is it that he was so unprepared for the attack on philippines the day after pearl harbor? ian: it was the same day, just nine hours later the first japanese era tax fell on the philippines.
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-- air attacks fell on the philippines. a dozen b-17out bombers were destroyed on the ground. this is not after the attack on pearl harbor. macarthur's headquarters had ample warning we were at war, and yet this extraordinary attack was permitted to occur. why did that happen? the questions are still being asked and have not been answered. i think it is likely what happened was macarthur and his that of staff were hoping if they did not make any sort of hostile to 20 japanese -- hostile move toward the japanese, that they might be spared.
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that is the most likely explanation. the commanders at the herpes and called -- at the air base had called manila. two perhaps launch airstrikes on japanese airfield. they were essentially grounded. they were not given any orders. macarthur was never held to account for that. i think it is somewhat of a mystery. time the american people and leadership in washington focused on what was happening in thephilippines, by then american press had chosen to show macarthur is making a
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heroic stand. it shows that how news is reported in an arbitrary way and can shape public perception, and that can shape strategic decisions. host: did he suffer any disciplinary actions that were imposed upon the commander -- that war imposed upon the commander? ian: after pearl harbor, i don't know. not enough. best not at home. -- not at all. he was given a congressional medal of honor. that was normally reserved for hair was in incumbent. in combat. he was ordered out of the philippines by president roosevelt in april. he went to australia. he was made supreme commander of the southern theater.
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led troops from australia through the axis of new guinea, and was eventually permitted to recapture the philippines in october 1944. even today story and and are hustled about him. -- puzzled about him. he arouses questions after his death. he had a mixed record. he was an extraordinary soldier in the forced -- in the first world war. first in his class at west point. he had courage, and he had brains.
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his campaigns were successful. where his talents came through was in postwar period, where he a military dictator presiding over the reconstruction of. reconstruction of japan. his understanding of the asian mindset, his experience in asia, help them to do a remarkably good job in rebuilding japan as , and inatic country putting the bitterness of the war years behind us. host: we have a call from rubber in north las vegas -- robert in north las vegas, nevada.
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guest: i appreciate your program. i have two quick questions. atr book, is that on sale barnes & noble, or do i have to order it? ian: yeah, it's on sale wherever you can buy books. guest: good. well i'm going to read that. i was on enough to remember world war ii. not old enough to fight nazi germany with all her relatives. i did join in the korean war. the 11th naval district on the destroyer division. questions -- i understand that when pearl harbor was bombed, there were
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more than 130,000 japanese living in hawaii. i never heard it there were any spies or not. that was my first question. question, i understand it comes up every so often, china is still waiting for japan to apologize to them for the atrocities in china. they won't apologize. i just wondered if you have any comments on that. host: good questions. ian toll? ian: both terrific questions. said, japanese-americans were the largest single ethnic group in hawaii in 1941. so fear of sabotage or espionage
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was something that had really occupied the minds of our military manners for prior to the attack. that is little evidence the japanese-americans living on the islands had any sort of structured kind of connection with the japanese government. there was an incident on one of the outer islands in which a crashed japanese pilot was able to get some japanese-americans to help him. of course, he was armed. it is not clear to what extent they had volunteered. aside from that one incident, no evidence has emerged to suggest that japanese americans in hawaii had any role at all in helping the japanese navy to attack pearl harbor. i would also point out the
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japanese-americans on the , that did not occur in hawaii. that was not considered feasible given the size of the population, given the fact that their labor was needed. many of the national guardsmen in hawaii were japanese-american, and had an important role to play in guarding installations. many hawaii in japanese-americans worked as translators in the pacific. weref course, some of them enlisted in a highly decorated combat unit that far in the european theater. whatur second question, was it again? host: preparations -- reparations from japanto china.
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japanese government has expressed remorse for the war. the degree to which they have apologized or to apologize, you have to parse your statement. looking at the current prime minister shinzo abe, he has expressed in strong terms remorse for japanese war crimes, including against the chinese. i think larger questions in asia about the way the war is case,er, or and japanese not remembered, is quite significant. 70 years now since the end of the second world war in asia, and yet the memory of how the japanese treated other asian peoples continues to be at the heart of foreign relations between japan and china, between japan and korea.
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decades later, these are still wounds. what i have said to the japanese scholars, leaders, and so forth, the better approach for japan would be to acknowledge the record of japanese forces in the war was deplorable the way that they treated civilian populations in china and the philippines. also their treatment of prisoners of war was horrible and disgraceful. but to say that was a 15 year period of japanese history when those things occurred, and that japan does not deserve to be judged only on the experience of that one 15 year period. host: we just have a minute or two oleft. that was published in
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the boston globe, "the paradox of pearl harbor." in particular, the losing of pearl harbor vets. ian: the point i wanted to make in the article, there is a paradox generally driven history, but especially true we studyl harbor -- these events retrospectively and very closely. pearl harbor is one of the most exhaustively studied events in our history. there were nine congressional investigations producing hundreds of volumes of testimony. we got to the point where we understand clearly what happened, why it happened, what the decisions were, what the effects were, all of that. we can get to the point where we say, we understand what happened
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in a better sense than the men fought the battle. by getting this clearly in hindsight, we inevitably begin to lose touch with the immediate sense of shock and horror, and the volcanic rock that results from an event like that. to try to get in touch again with the way that it felt to those on the receiving end is important. shock, thety of that horror and anger partly explains why pearl harbor is such an event in our history. host: ian toll, we appreciate you having join us. the book is "pacific crucible." ian: thanks for having me on the program. on "american history tv," we will be back in 10 minutes or so. we will hear from paul travers,
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who has written a book of oral histories from pearl harbor veterans. originally published in 1991. and your calls and comments here on our 75th anniversary for the attack on pearl harbor. ahead of that, one of the oral histories published by the national parks service. >> as we prefer to get the vote ready for both parties to go to what the did not know red ball meant on a ship. i thought it was just another stunt act. but sure enough, ricochet's from bullets coming down over the bulkheads, bouncing off the thing hands, man hear "all
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your battle stations." duty, youring to heavy any mission would -- heavy ammunition would endanger those of oahu. we were restricted. the only thing we could fire was a 20 millimeter machine gun. >> my aunt told me this guy i had spent school days with was parked on a ship with the navy. as soon as that happens, i went over to the arizona. i went from the gangplank to the arizona vessel. i got there to the deck, and as
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his tradition in the navy, you have to salute the flag state your business, and they can let you aboard. davis i wanted to see ted from colorado. i said about that time, i turned around, faced him, and i looked out. about that time is when i seen there were four planes coming direct, straight at us. and we did not think much of that because they used to, kind of, use us for target practice, dropping balloons, balloons full of water on us on a sunday, but this was not that. it was a real fact because as soon as the ship dropped -- you could not see the torpedoes


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