tv CSIS Discussion on U.S. and China Relations CSPAN July 7, 2017 6:57am-9:34am EDT
we are all independent scholars and so what we presented is not u.s. or chinese government policy but we think it represents a pretty good consensus point about how these issues are viewed in each country. of course, there are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea in both china and the united states. but we had for each of these papers three authors on the american side, three authors on the chinese side and a group between six and 15 other experts who weighed in and on the asia pacific paper, for example, and i think this was side on our
side for the military paper, there was an awful lot of consensus from experts from think tanks across the ideological and functional spell trum. it's quite interesting. between u.s. and chinese papers there were common themes, one was that we should strive to avoid becoming adversariesened that was consistent for both sides. there was a theme that we should build out patterns of cooperation between china, military asia-pacific issues and so forth. many papers concluded that the united states and china need a substantive honest and far-reaching strategic dialogue where each side doesn't cover up its fundamental interests or concerns and present thoses and
go from there to see what can be done. there are obvious strategic differences and they are not difference that is can be involved with a different six-character label or 120-character tweet or whatever you choose, they're fundamental, they are structural. they're historic. we spent a lot of time on the history of these issues for our countries. for example, there are between the two papers on the asia pacific some different substance about the future orientation of the korean peninsula. it's not just agreement over tactics in north korea. there are fundamental differences in south china sea or first island chain that encompasses, china, taiwan and
flip -- philippines. there were differences about how strong american alliance should be, very basic differences, not so much about the validity but how strong alliances should be in asia. there were differences about what china should be doing to assert sovereignty, what china should be able to do to assert sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. there were big differences on what constitutes a reasonable and acceptable level of defense capabilities. i don't think other side drew that yardstick the same vis-a-vis the other side and differences on how we should think about the future structure or order of east asia. there was more enthusiasm of some kind of bipolar u.s.-china
and there was much less enthusiasm on the u.s. side. i'm going to let my colleagues go into more detail in these areas and conclude for now when you read the papers, you'll find that these are -- papers that sort of stand the test of time. they are not based on today or tomorrow's g20 or korean problem, although we can talk about that and in some ways a useful dialogue and how to address each side's fundamental interest and find ways to minimize cooperation and realistic about some pretty fundamental differences that we have unearthed w. that, i will turn it over to bonnie and
yufong. we were short. about 50% short. this is online as well. you can get it online in chinese and in english, i think. with that, bonnie, thank you. >> thanks, mike. this is a very interesting project i would urge you all to read the papers very carefully and it's a privileged to be part of this. we have a very short period of time, each speaker so i'm going to hit on highlights and if there's time for q&a, we can go into greater detail. first convergences and divergences. that's a good start. we should have rules, but, of course, there are differences over not only what those rules should be but whether or not the international community is
likely to allow even welcome china's participation in the process of shaping the rules, so the u.s. paper is quite clear on that score. it say that is america is not calling on china so simply sign on the rules that have been written in the past but understands that the international community will draw the rules up together and china will join in the process. chinese paper is very skeptical of the u.s. willingness to do that. it says whose rules are these, how can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation, et cetera. so a lot of us possession and i think you find throughout the chinese paper in the asia-pacific security that there's a lot of skepticism of u.s. willingness to include china even though i would underscore that i think that the current administration, prior administrations have welcomed china to be a responsible stake hold ner this rules based order and that goes back as far as george w. bush administration
who coined that phrase. and it states that china favors open-inclusive security service rather than alliance-based system but says china can tolerate alliances as long as they're not targeted at china. so little bit of ambiguity there. whether ultimately alliances can be part of the system, but the bottom line is that the u.s.-led alliance system can coexist with increasingly influential china in the region if the u.s. gives up that effort. now, for the u.s., this paper doesn't portray in any way the alliances as aimed at china and
talks about the allies as the basis of our regional position, it lists several threats that our alliances are trying to deal with such as, of course, north korea's emerging missile and nuclear capabilities, talks about terrorism and maritime conflicts. when i was at the roll-out in may in china of the chinese version of this, madame, talked a bit about china's concern about alliances in the regional security, architecture. so i think that this really is a difference that the u.s. and the chinese have about whether or not the alliances should be part of this rule-based order going forward. third, both identify areas of concern, pretty much the same. as you would expect, north korea, taiwan, maritime issues. on north korea, the u.s. paper claims that china doesn't recognize the new level of threat posed by the kim jong un
regime and i think as we sit here today events that have transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that, the united states is, i think, incredibly concerned about the large of icbm by north korea. very upset about how u.s. citizens are being treated and the most recent being the very tragic death of otto warmbier. i think that the chinese paper in some ways recognizes the danger but insist that is the problems just can't be addressed through sanctions alone and diplomacy is necessary but i do sense a real gap between countries and assessment of the urgency. the u.s. paper had some interesting policy recommendations in this regard calling for not only more dialogue but very specifically on things like noncombative operations, north korea weapon's
proliferation, closing loopholes in un sanctions. and i would underscore the need for discussions on crisis response in the event of instability in north korea and that's something the u.s. has tried to do with china for -- for several administrations as well. there are solution that is are put forward by both sides and i want to highlight, again, some of the converge answers and dye verge answers and comment on them. both insist on peaceful resolutions avoiding military conflict though the u.s. paper focuses much on than chinas paper on the need to manage differences. of course, we would know that xi ginning ping talk about managing our differences.
regular mechanism between china and the u.s.-alliance system. there has been consideration in the past, for example, of a trilateral u.s.-japan dialogue which was supposed to take place in june of 2009 and for various reasons did not. should we consider once again ways that we can offer china reassurances about our alliances engaged in maybe trilateral dialogues. a couple of final comments on the divergences on the two sides in terms of recommendations. as mike pensioned, the chinese authors do not rule out a g-2. they say either a g-2 or through other forms of security cooperation, china and the u.s. need to establish a joint vision for the region that's inclusive
and based on mutual consensus. i think that would be a very difficult thing to do. i don't know if we can establish a joint vision but certainly the u.s. paper and i think reflecting mainstream views in the u.s. rule out such a g-2 arrangement. the u.s. paper say that is washington is not interested in any sort of condominium that implies inclusive power relationship. and finally the chinese paper continues to call for adhering to the components of the new type of gate power relationship. even though he doesn't use the phrase. we should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. and i think accurately reflecting the late obama administration as well as the trump administration has come to after its first several months
in power that americans in general don't like a bumper sticker phrase and there continues to be enormous discomfort with some of the implications of this new model of great power relations including the components, so again, u.s. shares the goal of avoiding conflict but it worries that emphasis on core interests may be an attempt to create sphere of influence and that could be destabilizing to the region, so on that area, i think there's -- there is some disagreement and i look forward -- >> thank you. >> thanks, mike, if your leadership in organizing such event and also looking but more important encourage me in the past we are working together,
thinking together and, of course , reports no matter how -- differently but it's a reflection is that we share the spiritualty, share the vision and regional security evolve in a way compatible with both sides. a couple things i would like to pick up and respond to go bonnie's presentation. first of all, divergence and convergence, it's some sort of reality and we need to getting through some sort of very accurate reality checking but finally consent and reality checking. very interesting studying point and we found u.s. has been very
positive security inquiry in the region. no matter how china matters, i think that china benefits a lot from americans very steady and very constructive regional, that kind of reality is a bigger one bearing on the chinese's side. second, i think, of course, some sort of a potential risk probably causing some sort of collusion between the two powers and what's the leading element to create or drive divergence and we have to say it's not a status driven but issue driven. yes, there's a lot of speculation, for example, the leading challenge is the china is coming after the transition, i have to say it's a fallacy.
some chinese nationalists may see it that way, you read some recently published book, it's called everything and china may think some sort of chinese leadership very, very from a historical perspective but i think for most of high niece well educated scholars, that kind is totally gone. i don't think it will be stated out once again in coming days. so then, there's some sort of powership compared to 20 years ago, 30 years ago, china-u.s., some sort of such a disparity is truly very significantly diminished by u.s. remain, have a very solid power hate over
china. we don't think in the coming days such a power disparity will truly is getting undercut. asian pacific area is china relations because a lot of interest now is some sort of collusion and competing and path-taking solution and methodologies but the problem if we get back to some sort of center piece to be behind the strategy, then we prefer to see and also very adequate and also very reasonable, it's not a status driven. the second is -- then we see
some sort of chinese assertiveness in asia pacific. of course, this place is very important ground as i mentioned to have a serious examination of china's foreign policy redirection or strategy but from a perspective, i consider chinese methodology in the region remain largely, some sort of china domestic transition is not the power competing based, for example, north korea issues. i consider china's policy has been consistently and smart. [inaudible] >> indecisive dprk, but why it's
hard for china, very tangible change of moscow policy, most importantly deeper into factor. before china can become some sort of very successfulfully transform the power, consider china remain vulnerable at large . in the region, competing place, inherent assertiveness. another point is, we consider no matter how way die verge but strategy and policy should be rendered is not history -- [inaudible] >> well overshadow power relationship between china and
beijing. [inaudible] >> harvard professor, sense -- sensationalist, u.s. and china can jointly create some sort of new modeling of power relations. conclusively, i have to say chinese reports on the asia-pacific area is of course very interesting challenge for us. so on the one hand, we also have to balance -- [inaudible] >> some sort of china traditional policy narrative but on the other hand, also allow today bring about some sort of new inspiring points. it's not an easy job.
i have to say most important is not how we can just envision some sort of power story between u.s.-china in the region but china overcome some sort of domestic inherent. let me stop here. >> excellent, thank you. >> thanks to john, without him as the glue on the american side would have been in high state of entropy. thanks to that and scott kennedy .
all three engaged in our personal and private capacities and i would be remised if i didn't state that nothing in the paper or anything i state today reflects the views of cna or any of its sponsors. if randy and phil were here up here on the days with me, i mean sure they would provide the same caveats. as you heard, we are not supposed to summarize our papers, ours is 25, 26 pages long. you can take a look at it but i feel a need to at least provide you a sense of our overall assessment and the reason i feel a need to do that are assessment of the state in u.s.-china military relations because this major area where u.s. and chinese side did have convergence recognizing positives and recognizing negatives. let me give you the u.s.
assessment of the state of being and it goes like this. at the moment, the relations between u.s. and chinese militaries are more stable than they have been in decades, the two military are engaged in wide range and unprecedented number of interactions from the strategic level down to tactual level that they have never done since relations were established in 1980. both militaries are working together at risk reduction to ensure that highly contentious issues do not result in miscalculation and the u.s. team assesses that neither military seeks a conflict nor cease it -- sees it in nation's interest to resolve differences between us by military means. however, all is not necessarily well in military and defense dimensions of the u.s.-china relationship. the u.s. writing team has judged that the competitive aspects are growing and intensifying, both
sides having deepening concerns about the other's defense and military policies as well as uncertainty over each other's future intentions. the competitive dimensions are most intention asia-pacific region where traditional u.s. predominance in maritime and aerospace domain are intersecting. strategically the u.s. is determined to sustain military predominance in the regular owned and system of alliances and partnerships whereas for its part we assess that china from a u.s. perspective is purposely developing u.s. military bandages to weaken the u.s. alliance structure in some instances. operationally, this competition is being characterized by the development of weapons and technologies aimed at advantage
to maximize effectiveness and shipping force postures and deployments. beyond asia and other parts of the world, there are and will be more opportunities for u.s.-china military cooperation and we look forward to that. but and we also recognize as china's military fingerprint around the world steadily increases, the potentially new misunderstandings beyond the asia-pacific region cannot be discounted. because of this intensifying competition. carefully managing the military dimensions of the u.s.-china relationship has to be a top priority for american and chinese civilian and military officials to reduce the chances of confrontation and ensure that military tensions do not overtake other areas in the relationship that are cooperative in nature. so those are the u.s. sides bottom lines and if you read the two papers you won't see a lot of daylight between them. now, on convergence and
divergence, both sides agree that the relationship between the militaries is more stable but both also assess that this is taking in context that i lay out in which they are suspicious of each other's intentions and both militaries are in fact, hedging against each other operationally and on this account the chinese paper was a bit stark maybe than the u.s. paper where the u.s. paper, my paper talks about intensifying competition. the chinese paper talked about concerns that, quote, the potential for clashes over security interests between the two countries has grown rapidly. so both writings did law the effort to have pentagon to introduce confidence building measures into the relationship and both sides agree that had a military conflict would derail both countries, larger domestic and strategic objectives and both acknowledge that each side is presenting significant security challenges to the other
and both are exacerbating each other's security situation in the asia-pacific region. on divergence, the two papers diverge but explaining motivations and impact. i think bonnie or mike raised it already, differences in respective view on the motivations behind the u.s.-alliance system or the chinese's part, motivations behind modernization. very different views on what they're all about. overall, i think that the two paper ifs you read them will provide readers a very sound appreciation for the strategic perception gap that exists between the two countries on a wide range of military defense and security issues. and readers should also come away with an appreciation that the military tensions are a reflection of competing national
interest and fundamental policy decisions of civilian leaders in beijing and washington and not just the decisions of military officials. it's much broader than just military issues. on future cooperation, if you take a look at the paper, we found many ways where we can be cooperating in nontraditional security, some folks have mentioned that already. but i think the most important thing to zero in on is what both teams did zero in on and that is cooperation on the very difficult issue of north korea. and i think if you read the papers both the u.s. and chinese teams cited the need to engage in crisis management activities as regards the peninsula. and i think that's an important potential opening that we need to pursue either at track one or track two level. final points going forward, developments since 2017, i think the events to have past week have underscored that the u.s.-china relationship remains
tangled and messy web of issues which impel the two countries on one hand to cooperate but another set of issues that create tension and competition and great tension between the two. the military dimensions of the military are no different though some are concerned that the competitive dimensions are in ascendancy and both recognize problem and attempting to manage the two sides of this relationship to include on the defense and military side one of the recommend allegations in our paper was to conduct assessment of the efficacy of the military and security dialogues that have proliferated over the past few years to determine whether or not they were serving a good purpose. now clearly leaders in washington and beijing have voted on that account having dismantled the s&ed and creating comprehensive dialogue and with diplomatic and security dialogue which had first meeting, of course, two weeks ago.
now, after the defense and security dialogue, defense secretary mattis comment that had the idea of the new venue is to, quote, elevate and focus the discussions and i think that on defense and military relations elevating the discussion and focusing the discussion is a pretty good idea. so there's a new start to these discussions whether they'll be new solutions remains on open question and i will stop at that point. >> thank you. [inaudible] >> i will be focusing on two points, first about my viewpoints about the two reports. i think there are a lot of consensus and similar observations in the two reports. for example, both sides believe that relations is very
complicated relations with both cooperation and the competition, but this is a very, very different from that between the former soviet union and the united states. another example is both sides believe although in recent years the frictions and the suspicions has been increasing specially in the western pacific region. [inaudible] for this, both sides have achieved a lot and crisis management. another example is both reports believe in recent years the military relationship is highlight of the whole bilateral relationship and it has been in
decades. but also in the keeping and upgrading talks, exchange and developing more cooperation on nontraditional security and the global federal governments. both sides proposeal has a lot of convergence. both sides reports have lot of differences. [inaudible] >> first, americans report believe that it's asia-pacific strategy and operationallization of the rebalance by dod is inevitable and very positive. it's in the interest of the united states, its allies and
expansion and china policy and activities, which are the root of the maritime tensions. both reports pointed out our differences in reference to taiwan, korea and partner that-- peninsula. now, we can ask a question. why we have this maritime relations cracks mostly part answer is that economic independence, the common global challenge we're facing. the common of no confrontation. on this decided that both sides
including security cooperation. on the other side, because we have different political systems, we have different values and we have some different national interests. it has decided that we must have differences especially in the new background of the changing of china at rising power, us is existing power, so because of this it has led to the aggravation of military frictions and competition. then, how can both militaries close their differences or manage them while exploring the
potential areas for cooperation? both reports have raised proposals. in summary, we must always keep an expanded in exchange the military exchanges especially we should have new talks in the new strategic domain. just like the new killer talk, cyber talk and out of space talk. in this way then we can increase the understanding of both countries strategic intention, decrease misunderstanding. secondly, we must reduction of risk of a regional safety, crisis management with our
effort to stabilize military relationship and avoid military conflict. the third is that we must understand nontraditional security cooperation. in this area we are in the same boat. now, i will talk-- my second point is about bilateral military relations in the first half of this year and the prospect. i think in the first half of this year, generally speaking relationship is stable. we keep talks and expand new talks and especially earlier this year when the two presidents meet. they meet-- reach consensus to extend cooperation in the korean
peninsula and also because of relaxation in the south china sea and china sea, so all this beneficial for the bilateral military relations. [inaudible] >> us has talked twice the so-called freedom of navigation operation in the south china sea and declared military-- [inaudible] >> this bring about impact on the relationship. now, the two leaders are at the g20 conference. both leaders will meet each other and very soon we will have first talks between the two.
president trump will visit china in the second half of this year. i hope this stabilizes the military relationship and the overall relationship of our two countries. is beneficial for regional peace and stability. think you. >> thank you. let me ask one or two questions of the panel and then we will open it up for audience questions. we covered issues in these papers and of course all of military defense issues in different domains, but let me focus first on one area in the news much right now and that's north korea. of all the issues we have looked at in the paper including a aib, all that we have looked at the
korean peninsula is the one where the us and china could because of our interactions on the north korea problem in a few years become much more trusting of each other across a reissue or truly sensing adversaries as we were when the korean peninsula was out tour. it seems to me that is the one issue you could have the biggest impact on the overall sense of whether we are adversaries or whether we can work together and we are not in a good place right now on north korea. you mentioned part of it within beijing is hard politically. the president announced his disappointment that china could not do anything and yet probably gdp is doing more than was done before, but it's clearly not enough to convince the us. let me ask you all, are there
concrete things we can do? right now russia, china are blocking the us british french dropped in the security council on the north korean launch. us has announced it will impose secondary sanctions because the chinese aside has not cracked down on those themselves. are we stuck? very specific set of issues right now, but has broad geopolitical implications on what a relationship looks like. can we expect more out of north korean cooperation than what we are getting? >> well, i think when they met at monologue zero and agreed in principle to cooperate after that meeting the chinese really try to identify what it was the us wanted and first the chinese interpretation was compliance
with existing un sanctions. china has always opposed unilateral or secondary sanctions and china has banned ports from north korea after reaching the limit under the un security council resolution was passed at the end of last year. the chinese also told the us it was typing up in terms of the border of but i think there's been maybe a failure on the chinese side to identify what it was that would really satisfy the united states, not meet all of our expectations because that was not in the cards anyway and it goes to this issue of banks operate in northeast china that are facilitating north korea's access to the international financial system and enabling north korea to engage in these illicit activities, so there has been efforts by the trump administration to provide evidence on banks and companies that are enabling north korea
and the reaction as i understand it from china was not sufficient and that's why we saw this 311 action last week, but there can be a way forward to. china can take action against these banks. if not, i suspect we will see the tip of the iceberg. we've only seen one bank cited and there are more, but it would be better if china does this rather than the us does it. in particular because some of the small banks and french companies do business in currency other than us dollars and they really are beyond the reach of sanctions like the ones we oppose the under 11, so there is a potential way forward maybe when president trump calls xi jinping sunday maybe our tigre some of the things we are looking for if xi jinping can deliver some of those things in this meeting may be there is a positive pathway. i think neither governments
really wants the relationship to sour over this issue. of the best outcome for the us is more cooperation from china on north korea and i think the best outcome for xi jinping as he heads towards the annual meetings the 19 party congress and eventually trumps visit to china later this year, he wants the us china relation to head in a positive drug-- trajectory also, so i think there is a way forward. we will see whether we get there. >> you raise a very important question. of course china and the us could do a lot more to-- [inaudible] >> becky is how to define china cooperation. for example i know how frustrating maybe, i mean,
china's policy and president trump has complained some sort of significance, some sort of help to many, but for xi jinping , we will not overwhelmingly cut off relations because trade relations is china's leverage, is china's political preemption because expect. [inaudible] >> is not easy for china to cut off all trade relations overnight. i think the issue has become
some sort of leading points where, how strategically we adjust the relations could be significantly crystallized the, just imagine back to the korean war. north korean means chinese-americans-- [inaudible] >> it would be crazy if us just say kick his militarily. no. it's a big strategic chance. we are also getting close to
some sort of judgment of what it is. it's a threat, not to the us. it's a threat to china either, so we need to figure out some sort of joint contingency plan to-- [inaudible] >> where's the starting point? how can we move firmly go beyond some sort of historical heritage's for better cooperation for example for the chinese. d prk is china's security way. d prk is some sort of entangled, personal, emotional, you know, connections. it's not easy, but it's
positive, so i hope to things can serve as decisive criteria. one, if there is one more nuclear pass i really hope chinese government gives bigger punch even just suspension. second, if kim jong in really wants to house say turned back to international appeal to de-escalate pension and stop the missile test. we also need to give pinch economically and commercially, so i put a lot of hope on trump and xi jinping summer meeting. some summit momentum and we could see both sides behaving to
more specified and immeasurable cooperation. >> thank you. i personally think that china's approach to north korea is not what it was a year ago and now it was 20 years ago, but the changes are incremental compared to the growth of the threat itself. for our chinese friends, i can tell you if chinese security services turned over several containers of centrifuges or precursors or reprocessing or shut down specific way bank accounts in about a dozen banks, having worked this issue in the white house for five years, boy would that have a huge impact on how the administration, and emit administration thought about this problem.
i'm going to come back to david, but i want to give the chance to the audience for one or two questions here is your hand. where microphones. briefly, who you are and your question. the gentleman in the blue shirt right here. >> thank you. i'm from the university of washington, chinese student and i have a question about north korea situation. we have been talking about what we should do, which is per plans to solve this crisis, but i want to put force one scenario for the palace to respond-- >> can it be a brief scenario? >> yeah, yeah, how about having china to have the kind of dominance control over north korea nuclear scenario and having the us internationally
recognized north korea so we can solve the problem. thank you. >> one more. yes ma'am, in the front. >> my name is jamie. >> a little bit louder. >> my name is jamie and a couple of days ago north korea launched a missile and landed in japan seat and i was wondering how far it let it go for security wise in building the momentum for figuring something out with what actually should be done in letting north korea keep testing the missile and a landing in the sea. >> you are asking about what is china's light of tolerance or the us? oh, okay, internationally. one more.
>> hello. my name is cameron and i'm a international relations student at miami university. my question regards the idea that mesh-- mutual issued restraint and whether that's a viable option given the two papers viewpoint especially from diplomatic and military channels. thank you. >> we will work this way. >> power talk with something with how to deal with north korea nuclear issue, so i think china's position is clear that in the interest of china, not just try to satisfy the us because we think if north korea became back to a nuclear state it would be a disaster for china for example, north korea is the
number one country and its so-- [inaudible] >> finally became a nuclear state, so very bad example to the other countries. so, many people will follow suit so many nuclear states surrounding china. it's not an interest of china. nothingness-- the risk of this is high. any country really try to solve by military means, but if this extent to conflict, if there is misjudgment, there could be even a war and a nuclear war just at the border of china. it's terrible.
the third, i think even without work, but because of the attention to asia us will increase military and strengthen military alliances, so not in the interest of china, so i think china determined to realize, but we must have cooperation with the united states. without coordination and cooperation we can achieve everything and the us-- north korea will make some compromise. otherwise, we can also achieve anything, so in the future i think china's policy is clear. first, the-- freeze the nuclear program should be the first to step and in the long run nuclear's eight is their goal
and then secondly we should rip-- prepare for the worst case scenario if north korea refused to go back to negotiation table. if they made six nuclear test, so we should put more pressure on them, but now there is still a chance for resumed talks and we should have a try. anyway, we should also not put pressure on them here we should also-- [inaudible] >> we can just depend on the pressure, but if they refuse to go back to the negotiating table , we must prepare for worst case scenario, said that time
especially after six nuclear tests may be china and the us and south korea should have a talk of how to deal with contingency in the interest of all the countries. it's also a kind of signal to north korea you can't go further , so anyway we should strive for the best. we should prepare for the worst. this is the only way to deal with this crisis. >> can i follow up and pick up the question over here about how much the international community should tolerate? for my sins i have been working on this north korea problem for 20 years and others have longer and every time i hear someone say we have to give north korea one more chance it reminds me of bars where i used to live in
japan and inside there door there was a sign fate starting tomorrow there's no drinking, so everyone felt good about themselves while they drank. at one point-- at what point do we decide to realize north korea's just not serious about negotiating away its nuclear problem? i think that's what you are asking. so, is it your view that this is the last chance? i mean, how much more do we have to try this thing which has not worked for 20 some years? >> north korea haven't totally realized their weatherization, nuclear weaponization. they still may be in two or three years they will go across-- totally go across nuclear threshold becoming-- [inaudible]
>> at that time there's no way to force them to go back, but before that there is a chance to do something. even if the international community can have more coordination and cooperation. just like in our daily life, some people make a decision. we have to do something, but we must be successful. the objective condition is very important, so if we can imagine and persuade them to change their idea we can force them to change their idea, so they are still a slip of chance, but if we can't resume talks in two or three years i think the situation will be very pessimistic and finally we can
only prepare for the worst case scenario that is the future military conflict and even more war, so that's very bad situation, but anyway we still should have a try. that's my point. >> i'm going to go here next and then to david and bonnie on those three questions or the other ones. >> i'm a little bit more pessimistic. i'm a little bit pessimistic. i don't think the lack to negotiate in exchange for any better off by dismissing their nuclear weapon. they consider in the minds nuclear weapon is only last result to secure the regime security, secure regime tactics
and national security. the second is nuclear bomb is the only way for kim jong-un to magnify how i'd marvel he is to the top leader. by all means negotiations-- yes, we should leave the option there, but unless two conditions there is no way they will abandon their nuclear weapon through negotiation. to be honest, one is us is seriously signaling military strike is coming over and second condition is china is unbelievably clear in signaling xi jinping we going to abandon you. so, then, yes, i consider
negotiation is always operable. history is paling in the past three decades, so we need to be more serious. a second question is about for example about mutually assured restraints. i consider most important thing we should have some sort of bottom-line mentality. if both sides have a bottom-line mentality and somehow very smartly and also constructively accommodating i think such a mutual assured restraint will be totally achievable. >> thanks. i don't know what i could possibly add except to say that the visual of president vladimir putin and president xi jinping:
four dual suspension approach to korea does not give me a lot of confidence that the gentle men's prospect or id. china taking the lead in dealing with north korea has any legs. i think that's a nonstarter and doesn't give me any confidence. the second thing i would say is that if ever any country deserved an award for strategic patients should be china with north korea. if you look at the last 70 years if it were not for north korea china would probably have totaled taiwan in 1950 and if you don't believe me you can ask professional-- professor warren colton if not for north korea and their missiles japan probably would not have signed the revised guidelines for defense cooperation in 1990. i was at the pentagon at that time. had it not been for those missiles north korean missiles you would not apply japan
providing billions of dollars for the very ballistic missile defense china sees as a threat to itself and there was no rationale for approximately 30,000 troops and us american forces in china's neighborhood which is viewed by china as not a good thing, so how much is enough? we will leave that to friends in china to deal with the third thing i would point as that you're dealing with north korea and that's a trip to the land of that policy options, but not just for the us, also for china. i know chinese decision-makers and policymakers and leaders must be struggling with the monumental implications of what they are being faced with at the moment because of north korea to which of until now china has not had to choose between north korea and south korea. china has been able to have both ways to a certain degree and sooner or later china will have to lean to one side on this issue and how it leans to one side will say a lot about
exasperation's for world leadership, so this is not just tough decision for the us. these are tough policy decisions for leaders and friends in china as well and i'm honest to god that i don't have to make a decision on this because there are no good options at the moment and if you had the time i could give you 15 minutes on wife secretary mattis says the conflict in korea would be the most disastrous departure we have had in this century. >> very short since we are about out of time. the question this gentleman in the middle asked suggest somehow that we-- that what we china and the united states are willing to do will satisfy north korea. may be a useful conversation between the us and china is what does north korea really want. you saying us recognized north korea. is that really what they want?
they want to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state, not simply diplomatic ties with the us. i don't think china wants to take over the north korea problem, but i can be confident north korea doesn't want china to take over the problem. if china offered north korea today a nuclear umbrella the north koreans would say thanks, but no thanks, we have our own, so i think maybe that would have worked before 2006 when the north koreans tested their first nuclear weapons, but i think it's clear to me that what the north koreans want is a nuclear weapons capability. they have it and they want to be able to deliver it to the continental united states. i think he's far too optimistic in terms of his timeframe the us and china and russia will have to work out what the classified recent test as, but i think for the us point of view if it were a standard trajectory it would have traveled approximately i
think it was 6000 miles. that is in the range, so i think the north koreans have already miniaturized a nuclear warhead and i think most people believe that it may have mastered reentry capability without the warhead burning up. we are probably far closer to this goal not to a nuclear deterrent, which is really something else, but having a deliverable nuclear weapons capability and i will end on one specific point because back to the issue of north korea using chinese banks and why this is so important to address between 2009 and 2016, approximately $300 billion was laundered through these banks in the us financial system. this money is going to support the wmd programs in north korea and so this is a place to start.
we can also cut down the north korean labor because a portion of their salary is going to north korea's elite and i think we should take a look at issues like crude oil. why do we have to wait of north korea did does such a nuclear test to cut back on crude oil? this is an area where china has enormous leverage, so there is more we can do. overall trade is going to be on the trumpet ministrations agenda china conducts north korea's-- 80% of north korea's trade with international community is with china and that's a very sensitive issue, but it will be discussed. i hope that our two countries can have a more serious discussion about what's really doable and not just talk about suspension for suspension or things that frankly are not workable at this point because we really reached a very critical turning point i think with this icbm test.
particularly those with policy significance. our panel will deal with a different set of issues, but ones that are actually also fundamentally important to the bilateral us china relationship. economics, this is the area which during our election campaign seem to be the most competition will issue between china and the us and unlike the exciting north korea issue, which gets a lot of the attention, the problem with the north korea problem is no one knows what to do. there don't seem to be any good options, but the administration thinks it has options for dealing with the trade imbalance with china and how the us handles attitudes on economic issues has a potentially major impact on the bilateral relationship. global governance is another big issue.
it has to do is china really out to undo the liberal world order that the us set up after world war ii? doesn't want to push us out of asia? how are the government issues playing what role is it playing in the relationship between the us and china cracks politics is fundamentally important. attitudes in both countries public attitudes often do not support the declared policies of the government. poland shows-- pulling the shows attitudes for the us and china or more hostile than attitudes in the us towards china, but when you think about it you realize of course, because from china's a standpoint the us is supporting countries who are making territorial claims against china or we are supporting taiwan in ways that china sees as interfering on a
very important territorial issue to them and we don't have any territorial issues with china in the same way that the chinese see the issue, so it's not surprising that if one site has a territorial issue that will affect public attitude. public attitude is important and our panelists will get into the subject. i will encourage them to be equally diligent in speaking within the time limit. please remember we have one additional member of our panel so the pressures on as will be even greater. we will start off-- there was a chinese purchase that who was supposed to be commenting on the economic side, one of the drafters of the chinese papers. unfortunately, he could not be per-- present to the economic issue is where the us will dominate the presentation. although, i'm sure if we say any think the chinese feel needs rebutted they will not be hesitant in doing so.
scott, why don't you read off. >> thank you. it's an honor to be a part of this project with everyone on both the first panel and this one as well as other contributors and i want to talk about the economic relationship. the paper you have in the report that we published today was written jointly by myself and liz on the council foreign relations. we had several other people who acted as advisors who helped guide us along, but we are jointly responsible for what you like in the paper as well as all the mistakes and challenges as well. we also-- i also want to commend the peking university school of business who cannot be here today because of a family illness, but the other three authors on his team and the rest of their group really should be commended for thoughtful analysis, serious discussion,
presentation of it-- as it-- evidence which is on the website that you can read. let me say a bit about sort of the differences, similarities and differences in error analysis on economic issues and then similarities and differences where we come down in terms of policy prescription as well. particularly since he's not here and went as much balance as possible even though i probably cannot fully meet that, but i will try. in terms of our analysis, both sides agree that the us china commercial relationship has been largely mutually beneficial and benefited both sides, that despite the fact that there is this larger trade deficit bilaterally that number should it be the measure by which we judge whether the relationship is beneficial or not. i think also we agreed on both
sides at the us economy faces a variety of challenges and not all of those challenges emanate from beijing or anywhere in china, but emanate domestically and there are things the us needs to do to address those that don't involve china. we also agreed china's economy is changing, evolving with the roles of government and governance in managing the economy and that china is still trying to integrate itself in the global economy. i think we all agree to that. those assets of analysis, but we differ in her bright another ways that are important, i think. i think the us paper you will find if you look at it we focus heavily on what we see as the growing centrality of tiny-- chinese industrial policy and protectionism in managing its economy and making life more difficult for those that want to export to china and those that do business in china.
this is not a question of just whether how much it contributes to us trade deficit or not or how much job, but first the question of basic unfairness and difference between behavior and chinese commitment as well as the affect on companies that are competing with china in the us and elsewhere, but even beyond that because of china's size car unique size chinese industrial policy is having a huge global effect on business models, not just in china, but globally so it's really important not we address this issue, not because we are trying to support one coming wayne over another, but because of china's size with a special responsibility. that is something we focus on. i think his group on the chinese side did focus primarily on the benefits that both sides gain from the relationship, the need
to continue that and to avoid any path which would lead to growing protectionism on either side. our sense was again from our report is that the chinese declarations of continued reform and opening, although, repeated consistently by chinese leaders, officials are inconsistent with the reality on the ground in china. in addition, we don't see because blasi between the challenges that foreign companies face in the chinese market and some of the things the us has already done with regard to market access in the us or things we are thinking of for example including revising saphenous. there's not much the us has on its table that would come close to what our ongoing obstacles to
access in the chinese market and i think you see this difference in approach in analysis in the current rhetorical fight between the us and china where china says it opposes protectionism in the us most recently at the g7 in italy and i suspect we will see at the g20 and germany its opposition to trade distorting measures. i think that is a good summary of the different overall visions of what's going on. now, as the ambassador alluded to when we got underway, we expected that after that-- president trump came into office the us china economic relation would be very contentious right away based on everything we saw the campaign and also there was concern in the obama administration and also growing consensus about a need for of a more tougher approach on china, but that is not what we saw.
that is what we have seen essentially in the first several months of the obama administration. we describe the american policy so far pursuing general cooperation and openness and we expected the us to move to what we call conditional cooperation openness, which is essentially much more like the idea of reciprocity that is now circulating around that we hear about everyday. so, now there is a chance as we sin of the last few weeks that the us may be shifting and moving away from this effort to see cooperation and deliverable towards putting more pressure on china to get outcomes to address these questions of the chinese industrial policy and considering penalties and pressure, so we can be sure
because we are not exactly clear what american policy is, but we will see over this coming weekend a discussion of the global for him and weather-- what's going on with chinese subsidies with deal and aluminum and i think we will have a better sense text week of whether we are seeing just some media coverage on trying to push things in a new way or whether it's a substantial turn. in terms of policy recommendation, i will conclude i think again we had a lot of common agreement about the commercial relationship in terms of policy. i think we agreed the us should not engage in wholesale protectionism and using a convenient tool sitting around above a border or below board to just punch the us, for example. we again agreed the us needs to do a lot to improve its domestic
economy that is not dependent on china. i think we also agreed in both reports that china needs to continue to reform and open up and in the us report we say china needs to resume that. chinese says continue, but nevertheless i think the direction is the same on both sides. where we differ as i think again the us believes in our report that china is into living up to its commitments and that much more needs to be done to bring china back into compliance and restart liberalization and there are a variety of things the us can do bilaterally, multilaterally, and be proactive in pushing for that outcome. so, to begin with simply just rigorously enforcing us trade laws bilaterally and in the wto. we are not advocating
discouraging chinese investor in the us because it strengthens the economy, but we do think it's reasonable to strengthen the process for considering whether individual investments particularly in high tech may have concerns for national scary. within our group there was no consensus about the principle for this term reciprocity, but we think us investment policy should be somewhat affected by health chinese treats american investment. finally, the us side things that the us china bilateral dialogue is extremely important, but addressing in solving all the problems this economic relationship isn't just about bilateral track. the us and china need to engage in multilateral forum, regional form and the us needs to further engage its allies. you can't pick a fight with
everyone at the same time on every issue if addressing these type of core strategic challenge is a real important goal. the us needs to pick its priorities, pick those it will cooperate with so we can engage china more effectively on these issues and achieve what we hope would be a more genuine win-win outcome. thank you. >> we will now move on to global governance with the professor leading off. >> thank you, ambassador. it's been a privilege to participate in this project and i think it's important to say that because this project demonstrates how much goodwill there is in each country to work hard to try to get this complex us china relationship on the best possible path. it's been good to participate in that and to continue to produce
it in that. the topic of global governance is one that has been particularly disoriented, i think is the word by donald trump's election as us presidents and i will get to that in a few minutes, but i want to begin with the report because the report, i think, reflects and demonstrate a rather surprising amount of agreement on this large topic of global governance and i want to give quick examples, also noting along the way some of the disagreements, but in the current climate i think it's important to emphasize those agreements. we agree that global challenges of which there are many require global solutions and that no single country is going to be able to address them effectively
in isolation, that cooperation is the path that produces the most shared benefits and that route -based approaches are usually better than ad hoc responses. second area of agreement, the main institutions of global governance established after world war ii remain central institutions in the system of global governance. of the chinese paper probably puts more emphasis on the united nations and criticizes the us for sometimes departing from un processes and norms, but the truth is the us remains strongly committed to the united nations and truthfully no country has a perfect record regarding the united nations. third, we agree that the established institutions of a
global governance needs some reforms. taking account of new power relations, taking account of new realities. yes, there are differences on what those reforms might be, but there is a shared agreement that we should be talking about what those reforms are. fourth, we want each other both the us and china want each other to be active players in global governance. there is some difference in the nuance that the united states has wanted china to be a full stakeholder and china by calling itself a developing country has sometimes seemed to the us to want it both ways, but recently by both ways, i mean, being a partial stakeholder, but i don't think that's really a concern
much anymore. it's very clear china has been stepping up and changing-- has changed both its self understanding and its ambitions in playing a full throated global role. indeed, that may be creating problems for the united states that are more substantial man china being a partial stakeholder. fifth, we agree that the established institutions of global governance can be and already are in the good ways supplemented by various multinational mechanisms of governance. now, not surprisingly this is an area where i think a number of more substantial differences have surfaced in the two reports and in the discussions around those reports. of the chinese as has been noted
criticize the alliance system and the us considers the alliance system especially in asia or certainly in asia has contributed to the stability of the whole region, which has allowed china itself to prosper and we, i think, recognizing the us the alliance's come in rather broad spectrum of different kinds of partnerships and commitments. another difference, the us applauds china's ambitions to make a greater contributions to global development, but has also expressed concerns about whether these chinese lead institutions will develop norms of adequate transparency and governance and of those concerns among others
led the us to decline to participate-- to join a aib, but i think as we indicate in the us report that there's been a change set of views on the us side and the report recommends that the us consider ways of cooperating in a aib nsu probably mostly no a high level us government representative was recently set to the forum in beijing. the most complicated and difficult difference that has emerged, i think, in this area concerns the phrase liberal international order and what that implies. ..
of great significance. the papers lastly agree on the areas where global governments is really needed and you know those and that's why there's agreement, economic architecture that addresses current realities and problems in globalization addressing issues of cyberspace, terrorism and serious problems of climate change. and the last example is the pivot to my sort of closing observations which climate change as an example crystallizes the point i began which is an essential problem in the moment currently in the field of global governance, is that our american president has already taken the sharp turn
away from the decades long path of american leadership in the global order. his slogan is america first. he's begun the process of withdrawing from the paris accord and scrapped tpp and criticized nato and he's given no sign yet of nurturing and focusing on the strengthening and building of institutions of global governance so it's fair to already start wondering what is the fate of this project in the upcoming period and i want to close by simply mentioning reasons why i think this current moment is not one that should prevent the efforts of people
like us be developing and working hard on thinking through there's ideas. let me just mention quickly three factors, one, it's early in the trump administration, we don't really know where this administration is going to go on these issues, secondly, the united states of america is not just the period after donald trump's election until the next election. we will have a long future and the issue of global governance is not a made-up issue, it's a response to realities that require international cooperation and the united states will have a future after donald trump which i believe will focus more again on issues of global governance and lastly in the present right now, the united states of america is not just the national government and there are enormous numbers of
actors who are working in spite of what the national government may be doing to sustain and develop and be active in issues of global governance and i will mention three states. under the american system, yes, states can't sign international treaties but they have sovereign powers and they are standing up and particularly after the announce withdrawal from the climate, the paris climate agreement. take jerry brown, governor of california, 40 million people, he has organized other governors to take collective action to meet the paris climate guidelines. he med xi jinping. bigger role in california for
u.s.-china relations. interesting. he invited california to join the belt and wrote initiative. states, don't forget about them. two, companies, businesses are active in the enterprise of global guidelines, and global judgments. lastly ngo's which played a role in the united states in galvanizing public opinion, helping on implementation of rules and sometimes even sitting at the table at global governance institutions so there's work to be done in the present regardless of what the national government is doing and i consider this project even in the small working group on global governance to be part of that. thanks. >> thank you, paul. dr. li.
>> thanks, good presentation and i also working on the global part of china side report. i would like to see -- both sides of the reports are positive and constructive. >> please be sure you're close enough to the microphone so everybody can hear you. >> okay. china and the u.s. all believe that during the past years both countries have met great contribution to the global governance issues such as protection of the environment and the cooperation of global economy and information of the weapons of mass destruction, et cetera, and that's why it will come china to play more active
during the future and china also attached to great importance to bilateral cooperation on this era. u.s.-china also reached comments on what's the future challenges facing both sides that's if we all caught -- uncertainty about the continuation of such good cooperation and both sides provides the observations and conclusions, some conclusions are similar such as we are all concerned about trump's policy focus transfer from the global to the domestic, domestic will bring reflect on the future cooperation and some conclusions are very different, for example, what impressed me most is that in the u.s. reports when they
are talking about the future china maybe bring some uncertainty to the global governance cooperation as china wants to change current term just because they think the current system is developed by -- created fbi developed countries and the particularly lead by the u.s., actually it's not true. that's why in the china's report , our team provides attitude of china side on how to understand the whole system reform. i think we have two key points in this area. first thing is china always thinks that reform when it's necessary, indeed, in the practical level we all know that
there are some specific mechanisms, have some problems that many of them cannot cope with new emerging challenges, so that's why we sometimes we need to take some reform to improve efficiency and other key points is that reform should be based on the consensus, that means no one country -- no one stakeholder can do all on its own and it needs to cooperate and needs the worldwide and i think there are differences between china and the u.s. and after future challenges, both sides also kept focus on how to gap the differences and how to enhance other corporation and
global governance issues. both provide some basic suggestions or divisive. i would like to conclude them with four keywords, two from the u.s. side and two from the china side and i think the most keyword from the u.s. side one is the mutual trust. that means -- that means both sides should judge one another global governance initiative based on its targets objective but not simply on its ideological state and the second one from the u.s. side is that -- is that consensus, it means whatever happens in the governance system reform, we should cooperate and make
consensus, just focus on the same consensus, we can make some reform, reform majors. i think that two words from china's side is one the practical. that means we should need more practical common actions to do something, not just stay on the stage of arguing or planning. we all know the process of governors, global governors actually is a process which has been proved is the most efficient way to enhance communication and improve the cooperation and the final keyword from china side, i think it should be the focus, that means that as we all know not
only for china but also for the u.s. states, the governors' resources are always limited and there are so many different global governance and we should allocate these resources in different governance issues and balance between the global governance at the same time so we should do something really efficient in this area. i would like to end with another, maybe a little bit pity from the u.s. side. we are talking about this issues, the team looks forward to figure out how the u.s. -- u.s. colleagues think what
specific or practical actions or the projects under difference global governance issues. that's why we spent time to discuss this question but comparing with the china side, i think the u.s. colleagues make a very general conclusion in specific areas so i really look forward to heard about on more specific details, detail information about the different governance issues. i would like to stop here. thank you. >> thank you. we will now move onto politics. evan, would you like to lead off ? >> thank you, embassador roy. i would like to begin by thanking chinese colleagues, when we embarked originally on this project, we weren't sure exactly how it was going to go.
i worked on collaborative projects between american and chinese scholars many times before and it's a challenge for the obvious reasons. and as a result they gave me the hardest topic of all, politics and it was the hardest because it's so sensitive, it's, of course, sensitive in america but more sensitive in china. but yet the two teams work together, persevered and i think we are able to generate very credible products. so what i would like to do is make three points about how i think politics impacts the u.s.-china relationship and weave into those comments, some thoughts about the drinks where views can verge and diverge and hopefully make it policy relevant. my first point is that when one looks at the u.s.-china relationship, and i look at it from a very practical perspective. i was fortunate enough to
receiver in the obama administration at the white house for six years and i had six years where i got to sit at the control panel of the u.s.-china relationship and see all of the lights flash and the button's world and figure out how this big relationship operates an it was fascinating and one of the lessons that i took away from that and many lessons and i'm still digesting them years later is that this is a deeply mature relationship and what i mean is as of 2017, this is a 38-year-old relationship, right, this is not young kid, it's not even a 20-year-old. 38-year-old relationship which means america knows china and china knows america. that doesn't mean that we still don't have a lot to learn from each other. we are constantly changing and evolving as societies, as countries but nonetheless
there's a big data set that both sides can draw from in understanding the sort of the pace, the scope, the tenure of the u.s.-china relationship. and i think that the -- the scope, the depth and the quality of the papers in this particular project reflect that underlying maturity in the u.s.-china relationship. look no further than the current period of the u.s.-china relationship. in all the sensitive areas. did the bottom fall out of the relationship? no. is the relationship in a rapid spiral downward? no, not really. both presidents talked a few days afterwards, they're going to meet on saturday.
so in other words, you know, there are boundaries around this relationship that are shaped by politics but nonetheless i think it's important to keep in mind the maturity of the relationship. that was point number one. point number two, as we try and understand what these boundaries are and how we get things done and then in the case of the work that myself and mr. yiao and others did on politics, as we try to understand how politics affect the u.s.-china relationship, i think there's one distinction in understanding how to access the relationship and it's a distinction that i have used before, some of you have heard me refer to, which is distinguishing betweening -- between the structural features of the relationship, features
that are enduring and will have a deep and profound effect on the ability to stabilize the relationship and to shape it, so a distinction between sometimes they don't have a long-term effect on the trajectory of the relationship and in particular what is the shape of that curve look like and so i think this is an important distinction because when one thinks about these issues of politics in the u.s.-china relationship, that is deep structure, that's something that probably isn't going to
change any time soon and it's important that we not always get caught up in the day-to-day debates about north korea, south china sea and taiwan, et cetera, and focus on structural features and the first it's clear that competition and the competitive aspects of the u.s.-china relationship are coming to the four and that's not meant to be a negative statement but rather a statement about sort of the balance of issues facing the u.s.-china relationship and dave began to go down this pathway in his description in u.s.-china military and this is not a statement about issues that we should shy away from. we need to embrace the
competitive aspects of the relationship because that's the only way we are going to manage them. in fact, one of xi jinping's attributes is he's been frank that we have disagreements and they are going to generate competition. the question is not can we avoid competition, the question is what kind of competition is it, is it competition that leads us both to improve our game and raise our capabilities or destructive competition, militarize competition that runs the risk of instability and militarized conflict. the second is resilience and stability in the relationship. from my perspective, there's a big difference. while i find that the u.s.-china relationship is not always the most stable relationship, there's lots of disagreements,
we disagree regularly but it's a relationship that is actually quite resilient. in other words, even though there's disagreement and even though there's competition, there's a sort of core of stability at the center of it that has, you know, bounded these disagreements and this competition from leading to, you know, a free-fall, that's something that could change but it's something that i noticed of all over the obama administration and one of the features that could become structural depending on how for politics play out. i would say that these papers are excellent complement. they actually do two very different things. they highlight different aspects of the relationship. the chinese paper was very focused on history, ideology and the way in which those issues affect chinese perceptions of the u.s.-china relationship. i think the papers are very good
description of how china believes that ideology and in particular this feeling that china has been the victim, china has been wronged by the united states and how that -- that affects chinese perceptions of the u.s. and the u.s.-china relationship. and it's clear from the paper that china really holds onto these and that even in 2017, that these issues affect chinese perceptions of u.s. strategic intentions and the quality of cooperation that can be gained in the u.s.-china relationship. i was -- i have to admit i was surprised by the fact that there was so much discussion in the paper about the u.s. trying to change china's political system and that that is a -- continues to be a core fear at the heart of u.s.-china relationship and i
say that because as somebody who spent six years in the white house, i was not in a single conversation with the president, the vice president, the national security adviser where anybody said, china's political system is a threat to american national security and we have to do everything possible to change it, never once, never even remotely close. now that said, of course, we have questions and concerns about human rights in china, the clamped down on political freedoms because that's what we are and that's a structural feature of the u.s.-china relationship but that's very different than the kind of claims addressed in the paper. the u.s. paper took a different approach when mike and i were working on it, we focused less on history and ideology and more on institutions, actors and changing american perceptions and how the changing set of institutions, the fact that the
executive branch appears to be playing a much more consistently active role in both formulating and implementing china policy, the fact that there's a broader sect of actors influencing the u.s.-china relationship. we talked about the business community, we talked about ngo's and paul's great presentation reminded me of the importance of sub national actors, states in the united states, governor brown, for example, and the important role they can play in bounding competition, expanding cooperation. now that raises the question, does that mean ideology and history doesn't play a role in -- in the -- in american perception of china? i would say no. i would say that in the u.s. we don't really call it ideology. what we call it is international relation's theory and what i mean by that is there are different schools of thought in the united states about china's strategic intentions.
you have the -- and i will use schools of thought to make my point. spectrum is obviously far more diverse. you have the offensive realist, china wants to recreate the system and will do everything possible to become the hedgemon in east asia. you have a group of specialists and maybe point to michael's work that tries to point out that china has much, much more nuance approached to the region, it's not trying to recreate a sinocentric system but trying to find space for rise in east asia as it tries to protect itself, define economic and security interest. but my point is in the united states we have our own competing schools of thought and those
have different influence on u.s. policy over time. so the chinese paper would benefit from greater attention to actors, institutions and the u.s. paper would benefit from more discussion to the range of schools of thought in the united states because we have our own manifestation of ideological and theoretical lenses that inform our approach. let me end with this point, which is what does this all mean for the trajectory of the u.s.-china relationship? i'm very much of the view that the evolution of the u.s.-china relationship is -- is one that is going to be determined by a series of ad hoc decisions by both sides. to put it differently, the future of the u.s.-china relationship is a constant search for a stable strategic
modus oprendi, but the strategic modus is not going to occur, many people in this room wish it were, that you could have two leaders sit down and hash it out and move on, but rather it's going to be a series of ad hoc stations and the question is, will the political institutions in both countries institutions, actors, perceptions filter through ideology and history allow that sort of series of actions to be one that takes the u.s. and china down a pathway toward a gradual convergence of interest where there's both cooperation and competition or one where the pathway looks darker. thank you. >> thank you, evan. and now mr. dowming.
>> it's difficult to talk about politics. [laughter] >> i will do my best. i'm honored in writing of the chinese part and to attend the panel here today. actually my research is focusing on u.s. politics so the process of writing for me is to reconsider about chinese politics, about the u.s.-china relations. i will say that i have read very carefully and about the u.s. congressional role on the u.s.-china -- in the u.s.-china foreign policy-making. i totally agree of the idea of ups and downs of congressional
power. we have a lot of consensus. we all agree that domestic politics is one of the most factors in u.s.-china relations and most importantly we all believe that when the two countries protocol goes are consistent, the relations, we all make significant progress. i think this is a very important consensus. some difference. personally, i think the biggest difference between the two reports is that the two sides seem to think about the word of politics in different ways and for the chinese report, we talk
about politics as very big issue such as political system, ideology, or even political stability, but u.s. report make me -- give me some impression that politics is about governmental process, decision-making process, specially the key player during this process. i think just because of this difference, the chinese report has bigger political background in future of u.s.-china relations and the u.s. report talks about how more discussion about the key, details such as congress, such as in this
community ngo, even personal factor of the leadership. personally, i think for a lot of the issues, if you talk about -- if you focus more on the details, very easy for people to find out some problems. but when you pay more attention and overall history, maybe we may see a better term. so why there's some difference? the reason for the difference maybe is the -- the mutual trust. is that china and the united states still have doubts on how to look at each other, how to deal with each other. china is still worried about political involvement of the united states and for the u.s. part maybe diversity of the --
[inaudible] >> more and more different even conflicting views from china on chinese politics. for a long time, i will mention that there's a long history of u.s.-china relations. we have a long time to try to resolve the difference gradually . both of us -- i mean, both of these reports mentioned that the subnational level relation, i think that's a -- [inaudible] >> i think that is one of the -- it's a better choice for us to strengthen the u.s. -- the subnational relationship between u.s. and china such as the state to province, the city to city,
county to county or the local level. the subnational relation cannot only bypass the high politics and maybe can improve a lot of people to people exchange such as economy, technology science, education and so on, and we all -- maybe it will consolidate the basis of the relations. in addition, i think that the chinese report mentions that there's a situation that the u.s. and the china conflict come from -- kind of the same challenge, same problems but the solution maybe not the same. as we know, china is continuing the economy reform, reform and
improve the people's welfare and as we know the trump administration proposed america first and concerned more about the economy, the jobs, the immigration and a other domestic issues. so maybe there's some more room for kind of mutual learning, mutual cooperation and mutual benefit between our two countries. for the new development of the political factors since trump took place, i think for the -- on the chinese side there's no big change. on the u.s. side maybe there's new points that we should talk about. one of them is that the -- the
so-called politics of trump white house brings more uncertainty to u.s.-foreign policy making. outside the world, totally no idea who at what time and how much influence on which issue. it's a very big uncertainty for the united states. another point recently is in case of trump's unclear policy, u.s. congress seems to once more dominate some foreign policies, for example, the taiwan policy, so we can see the sales, the various taiwan sponsored by
marco rubio and steven in the house. i don't think this trend -- [inaudible] >> stable development of u.s.-china relations. my time is up. i will stop here. >> okay. we have run over our time. the panelists have raised some fascinating issues that we could usefully explore for the next hour or two but rather than eating into the time of professor who is going to make concluding remarks, i will thank our panelists and if you have questions, maybe you can call her. members of the panel of the conclusion of our conference this afternoon. [applause]
>> i want to thank the panel and specially embassador stapleton, on the u.s. side of senior china hands and veterans of foreign and defense policy who provided overall guidance and worked with john to produce overview paper. the chinese had steering group with very distinguished scholars, diplomats, defense experts and also produced an overview paper and the principal author was our closing speaker professor. so it's now over to you to sum up and tell us what do we do know, embassador, professor
duong. >> i'm not going to summarize and i'm not going to tell you what to do. [laughter] >> but i will have to say something. first of all, on behalf of embassador and all the members on the chinese research group who want to express heartfelt congratulations on the comprehensive report, that is the u.s. side, the report on the u.s. side and we also want to express our sincerest appreciation to csis for collaboration with us and support to our joint effort. so actually we have two set of
reports, parallel reports. the beginning of this joint effort was the spring of 2015 and the abled stewardship of embassador and we initiated the research work on the future of u.s.-china relations. the initiative has been endorsed and financed by the chinese academy of social sciences global think tank. i don't remember the exact name of that. it is called something like global strategic studies think tank and we have been in touch with chinese foreign ministry and other government agencies,
senior diplomats and u.s. embassy in beijing and various u.s. counterparts, individuals and institutions specially csis. we are very much indebted to their advice and support. the research team on the chinese side was composed 20 to 30 researchers and scholars and policy analysts from numerous leading think tanks in china. beijing and elsewhere. they include academy of social science, china foundation chief studies and national defense university, the pla academy of community of science, my
university peking university and shanghai, shanghai academy of social science, and many others. we held dozens of closed-door debates and discussions. some were small group meetings and we also held many meetings with our american counterparts in beijing, washington, d.c. or new york city. the end result is the chinese report publicized in both chinese and english and we also want to thank csis for publicizing for chinese report
and the chinese report in both english are already edited in the volume which will be published by the chinese academy of social sciences published in-house and i hope it will come out pretty soon. in may of this year, we launched a roll-out event in beijing similar to the one we are holding today in washington, d.c. we had people from csis and other think tanks from the united states. this is simply my story. the chinese side of the story, equally important or even more important if the -- if after a few round consultations, csis made the decision to help out
and to coordinate american think tank to write a report instead of -- instead, the first idea is to write something called the joint report. like a -- the publicity of a team work, collaborated by both sides, but because of the lack of communication, the means we are separated so widely and we don't -- we cannot reach consensus on every single issue, so we decided to do something like the shanghai communicate, we express our views and they express their views and you can compare notes, we compared notes in the first place. so the end result is two
separate and parallel reports reflecting our views of several dimensions like trade and economics, asia-pacific, global governors, the impact of domestic politics on the bilateral relationship and relations and also, of course, an overview. and we have frequent exchange of views between the united states and chinese teams when we have two teams in washington, d.c. and another in beijing respectively. we compare notes and we improve the quality of the papers.
substantively we debate it more on the chinese side more than we publicized them. honestly, we have different views among the chinese on some issues, we don't have identical views on issues like north korea, on sensitive issues in chinese foreign policy policy. of course, we have consensus but on specific issues, we don't have everything in such a large group of 32, 20 to 30 people, we cannot agree on everything, but what is available is -- is generally the consensus on the chinese side but the consensus is not necessarily the government point of view and this is our think tank's swroint -- joint effort. we consulted the government but we did not seek endorsement from
government agencies. in our cooperation, i'm talking about the strategic oriented think tank. first, the frequent substantive and sustained dialogue, it's very useful and when we constructed the report, i cannot help but thinking about some earlier episodes of the u.s.-china relationship and in the early 1990's economic and cultural exchanges were influenced by the political storm in beijing and then in the
mid-1990's our bilateral dialogue was suspended by visit to the united states and then in the late 1990's there was the embassy bombing incident and so the academic and scholarly exchange between universities and think tanks of the two countries was all often -- very often interrupted by political events. but now specially since the beginning of this century, we have very intensified views of think tanks and i think personally speaking, i think that the intensity and extensiveness of the sustained dialogue between the two sides,
it feeds as what i know as the exchange of views between china and other countries will have very strong ties with countries like russia and europe and many other countries but i don't think, you know, intensive -- extensive dialogues are less frequent than our exchange of views with the countries we have friendly relationship with like russia. and if -- to be very honest, if i compare this relationship with our relationship with south korea or japan, in recent years, unfortunately sometimes the exchanges of views have been interrupted by unhappy events
happeningment so what does this tell us? this tells us that we have reached a new level of maturity and in the words of evan, this is resilience of the relationship. the second striking thing to me is, of course, how much we are familiar with each other's views and how much we are -- we know each other personally and individually. that includes younger generation scholars and think tank people. in fact, because of the deep understanding of u.s. think tank like csis, chinese think tanks have been established in china in recent years. when we have specific issues to discuss or to debate, we know
who we are going to talk to or to seek advice from. and -- and i would like to mention a paper i did with my friend five years ago and we coauthored the report on china-u.s. strategic distrust. and distrust was reflected in evan's discussion of whether the united states wants to change china's political system, that is what we see as very deepened distrust. in the last five past years
since we published the report, half of the distrust been dispelled or reduced? my answer is no. i think the distrust has deepened and become more expensive, but at the same time helped the two countries moving -- move closer to confrontation. again, my answer is no. but why is that? why is it a contest between the two? i can give some reasons that reflect in the joint report in our parallel reports. first, we increase mutual understanding. we share our more balanced, more sophisticated views, the think tank views with larger, with our separate domestic audiences and
we are much less influenced by, for instance, conspiracy theories because the conspiracy we can think about among the audience here, if they don't have conspiracy, i don't know where we can have those conspiracyies and -- conspiracies and you know well and government officials much better than before, so it is very difficult to believe in conspiracy theories. i'm not saying that there's no conspiracy, but conspiracy is not widespread. secondly, we have more institutional linkages which are pushing against possible conflict between the two sides. we are helping government
agencies to construct crisis-presentation and crisis-management skills and devices and this is what donald trump is very good at. and also my friend has talked about that and third despite the dye instruct, the two countries greatly enhanced their practical bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation reflected in the part of local governors and reflected on the papers on economic and trade relations and what is not talked about too much is the booming tourism between the two countries and the united states is more interested in one belt
one read initiative and china's best students continue to come to the united states for advanced studies. i'm not extremely happy about that because i'm losing some of my best students who i want them to -- i want them to attend our graduate schools but instead they go to the best universities in the united states, but at the same time we have many good students from the united states studying in china. so this gives me somewhat reason to give optimistic. i don't want to negligent -- neglect the differences and pit falls. what we see is a new normal featured by increased
cooperation and increased competition and i don't know competition is greater or cooperation is greater. they are rising simultaneously. and another future i see in the bilateral relationship is the increased degree of influence from domestic politics on both sides. and what should we do next? i don't have any good advice but i'm thinking about more substantive and more collaborative projects. for instance, we can be somewhat more specific in discussing relations, one aspect is, for instance, investment, trade and we can talk also about more extensively security, multilateral security,
architectural in the asia-pacific region. there are already proposals in that regard and we can launch some joint programs on great number of projects and we should also try to bring countries like japan, south korea, india and russia into our collaboration and we can even think of our joint effort to analyze the situations in the middle east. this morning, i read very carefully a publication by your vice president john altman and that's something that we can think about. in any sense, the joint effort
we have made so far has set up a good foundation for think tank cooperation in the future. we will continue to rely on csis as our partner, of course, we are also trying very hard to reach out to other chinese -- u.s. think tanks and on our side we are also want to reach out to other universities in china to bring them together to cooperate with you. thank you very much. [applause] >> on behalf of the american participants i want to thank professor and embassador who brought this idea to us a little over a year ago. everyone was interested, probably a dozen think tanks and universities at least heard her idea, we weren't sure how it would work, it was an experiment
and i think it worked quite well. for three reasons, one, the good will and the candor of all the participants, we structured structured in a way how they thought about each other's relationship but most importantly, third because of maria sinclair, example of american university graduate going to work for you, professor. we owe them special thanks. thank you all for joining us. [applause] >> tonight book tv is in prime time with after words. utah senator mike lee is interviewed. new america president and ceo anne mary discusses her book, networked world. elizabeth examines the business side of health care in her book, an american sickness. nebraska senator ben sasse
interviewed about his book, the vanishing adult. book tv all this week in prime time on c-span2. >> tonight on c-span harvard university and sociology professor and author william julias wilson what he calls income and residential segregation and the effects of donald trump's candidacy and presidency on race relations, the event took place earlier this year at stanford university, here is a portion of his remarks. ..
between black and white college graduates between age 22 and 27. however in 2013, shortly after the economic downturn, the gap had surged to a 7.5 percentage point difference. race is obviously a factor at play here. because historically periods between and immediate after downturns adversely impacted blacks more than whites. >> harvard university sociology professor william julius wilson and effect on donald trump presidency on race relations tonight on c-span.
>> this weekend on booktv on c-span2, saturday, at 11:00 p.m. eastern pat buchanan talks about his book, "next son's white house wars." his time as former speechwriter and senior advisor to president richard nixon. >> they were going to break nixon as they had broken lyndon johnson, but at the end of that year, 1969, richard nixon, if you can believe it was 68% approval in the "gallup poll" and 19% disapproval. astonishing. here was nixon seven years before, had been written off as the biggest loser in american politics. >> sunday at 10:00 p.m. eastern sas professor and novelists roxanne gay, discusses her life and her bod sy and in her memoir, "hunger." >> standing on cover of her book, formerly i did it, i can't
write that book yet. but i want to write the book. why don't i tell the story of my body today, without apology, just explanation this, is my fat body. this is what like with it is to be in this world in this body. >> for more on this weekend's schedule, go to booktv.org. on monday french president emannuel macron delivered his first major speech at a joint session of the french parliament which several media reports described as u.s. state of the union style address. following the president's 90 minute dress, france 24 panelists provide analysis of the speech. >> translator: thank you, mr. president, you have the florida. -- floor.