tv Public Affairs Events CSPAN December 20, 2016 8:59am-11:00am EST
going to be many, many years before the u.s. has a fleet that no longer has fourth-generation aircraft in it. so we ourselves have to make sure that we can interoperate and we certainly want to continue to make sure that we can be interoperable with countries around the world who have fourth-generation and other capabilities that are not quite the f-35. >> i want to thank secretary james for being here and a very informative session, and best of luck. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations]
>> [inaudible conversations] >> c-span, where history unfold to daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable-television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> and live now to london where british prime minister theresa may this morning will testify before the house of commons liaison committee regarding britain's plan to leave the european union. back in june british voters decided to leave the eu but the british government has yet to announce its plans for the so-called brexit. ..
[inaudible conversations] >> okay, i think we will begin. prime minister, thank you berry match for coming in the south turned in. we are grateful and i think parliament is also very grave old that you are agreeing to do the sessions. can i just have confirmation that you will continue to practice in their predecessor were three a year? >> yes, indeed, chairman. >> bearing in mind that there is very big events likely take me so much coming in my be sensible to push scrutiny of article l and any accompanying documents after the spring race at and then we will have two meetings, one right at the beginning and one towards the end of the summer. >> they makes very well sense.
i suggest we will be able to talk about possible date. it's going to be quite busy in the run-up to the end of march. >> yes, i don't think it's going to be realistic or practical. we will see amar sin bowl arrangement. you indicated the forehand that you had to introductory remarks he wanted to make. why don't you make those now? >> thank you very much, chairman. just a few remarks that will be helpful to the committee. before i do that, i would like to take a moment to reflect on what happened yesterday. we've seen images in our news papers and television and i wanted to express our condolences with those who mourn and all those who've been accepted and we hold them in our thoughts today. i thought it would be helpful to set out a little bit of a we've
been doing a month since the reprimand him negotiations, which is the machinery of government in place. to establish two new depart and in international trade. this puts in place the mechanisms necessary for the work that needs to be done to make sure our departure is moving, but we are taking the whole of government approach to the issue and all departments working on policies affected by with straw and i would like to thank everyone involved stepping up quickly. we obviously also been engaged with other interested parties including business and representatives for the administration. 130 companies since july and roundtables with representatives enjoyed 12 more around the country and the business
organizations and parts of the u.k. to your about their particular concerns. i've also met with leaders from a range of our engagement with the administration. as we approach the negotiation to come in united kingdom, we want a truly joint approach. i've also spoken to the bilateral basis and the discussions are being can start date. throughout this process i've been clear i will not give a running commentary on our approach. [inaudible] >> except before us. >> i think chairman negotiations or negotiations. one can give a running commentary to everybody. i expect some searching questions from the liaison committee. but the negotiations will be challenging within international negotiations they will require some give and take. where possible i thought to give
reassurance to those with legitimate concerns. we look at the bastille for those who want to trade and the single market while guaranteeing we'll make her own decisions of how we control our law ensures diction. the way we spend taxpayers money. i wanted to have the kind of mature cooperative relationship that close friends and allies enjoy an excellent tactic to continue on issues such as security where corporation helps to keep the faith. as you alluded to in your opening remarks, the government would trigger article liv before the inch of march next year. we'll meet the timetable and don't intend to extend the process. we'll publish more information about our approach. i will make a speech setting out more about the approach in the opportunity of the country to use this process to forge a
by that, we should take that to mean the great repeal photo will come into effect in by 20 teen in april, direct ability of law will no longer be in the courts. >> as you know, the timetable is set out is the treaty gives under article lviii two-year protests were discussion about withdrawal and the future relationship and that will take us through march 2019. i fully expect to operate on the timetable set out in the treaty and the negotiations that matter
for the negotiations, but i fully expect the commission -- >> and all that, i heard a no. it may be the case -- have i misunderstood? >> if i may answer that, the intention is to introduce the great repeal bill next year in the next session so that it will be in place at the point at which we leave the e.u. at that point -- that the intention. the nature of legislation as a matter of parliamentary debate. it will be a repeal bill that will comment to accept the point at which relieved the european union. but at that point conic e.u. law will be in the u.k.
i think it gives people a certainty at the point at which we are leaving the e.u. as to how e.u. law is operating and so forth. >> i'm just trying to clarify one point, but a leaving do you mean what is commonly understood to mean that is the e.u. law would no longer apply directly to the u.k. court? >> when we were outside the european union, it will be british -- >> it will be completed by 2019. >> i fully expect to be able to meet the timetable that is being sent out. >> one further point for clarification. article l provides for the country to leave more than two
years as part of the withdraw agreement. do i take it from the answers i've just had that you are not seeking to withdraw agreement that will teach you beyond the two-year period? >> we are not seeking to extend the article xv beyond the two years. in fact, the european commission has indicated they considered it may be the negotiations would be completed before two years. but we are not seeking to say we want this to be expanded beyond the two years. i fully expect to be able to undertake in that time. >> we will not contain anything to leave it directly applicable in the u.k. >> the intention is when people voted they want us to take control of our laws. when we are no longer a member
of the european union, nor hear the united kingdom. >> i'm trying to get clarity that is not part of article l provides for the scope of negotiation of flexibility on the operative part of leaving is not going to be excited to try and make use of that flexibility. >> what is the article xv allows for days if there is an agreement that the. negotiation of the withdraw and relationship with the european union is extended, but agreed with the members concerned in this case, the u.k., the treaty is extended.
we are not setting out to extend that. we are setting out to negotiate this within the two-year time frame. >> good afternoon. prime minister, this marks six months and just over three months ago to article l. can you tell us in the government's plan is going to be published? the publication of plan when we will receive it. >> as i've indicated, i will make a speech in the new year which will send out more of our approach. we will before we trigger article l be sending out, as i've indicated, more details of our approach. i haven't set a date when the plan is going to be published, but you will hear more about our approach in the new year. >> can you give the committee reassurance that the plan will be published inside the parliament to scrutinize it before article l is triggered
and there will be sufficient time for us to do our job? >> as i said on many occasions, parliament need have no concerns about its ability to have an opportunity to comment on all of these matters. i would fully expect parliament would have proper opportunity to look at the matters before. >> what would be your view of a reasonable period of time to the triggering of article l. >> it's another way of embarking. i think it's not for me to set out a period of time when i think we will ensure parliament has an opportunity to look at these issues. we have of course to factor into the timetable the question of the supreme court judgment. we don't yet know what the judgment will be if they find in favor of the government,
obviously there'll be a need to reform to the supreme court judgment. >> is it your intention to ensure parliament has a final deal when it's being negotiated? >> the parliament will have every opportunity to go through the great repeal bill on the various aspects we will be having with the european union. >> that wasn't quite the question. the question is in the final deal was negotiated, is he your intention to ensure parliament has a chance to vote on that deal, yes or no. >> is my intention that parliament has ample opportunity to discuss the aspects of the arrangements we are putting in place. we will be going through the negotiations. it is not clear at this point in time i've vindicated my expectation for negotiating the deal. it is not clear this will take to parties in the european union and the u.k. to go through that process of negotiation.
we will be ensuring to give clarity, then we will do so. >> i'm not quite sure i understand why it's so difficult given that we know the european parliament will have a vote on the deal. why the british parliament will also have a vote. >> what i'm saying is there is an opportunity to consider and go through more details as they do become available how this is going to operate. there is a question about the timetable in relation to the agreement that the deal and the necessity, how the timetable will operate in relation to the european parliament as well. what is also clear about is ensuring when we come to the point where actually delivering the british people that we will be in the european union. >> talking about the timetable, he expects negotiations to be completed by october 28 teen
indeed to provide scrutiny of what's been agreed. do you expect the complex negotiations about the arrangement and the new agreement about market access and trade. do you expect those to be done sequentially or in parallel? >> i am working on the basis that we will look to negotiate those in parallel. that is what makes sense. it is also article l in the treaty itself, which makes clear that you have to know what the framework of the future relationship is before you can idolize the deal for withdrawal. and of course the point to which we exit the european union, we need to know what our relationship with the european union is. >> are you wholly confident it's possible to negotiate both parts within the time available but as little as 18 months.
>> you indicated that a new -- he referred to it as being in relation to the european parliament to have a ratification. there is also a concern european leaders have the parliamentary elections taken place in 2019 and their point of view to ensure the arrangement are clear to be taken the parliamentary election. >> are you confident the 27 member states in 18 months given simon rogers is reported to buy that it's feel, but the fewer picks up from discussions that it could take up to 10 years to agree. >> i noted when i've been talking to individual theaters, the willingness from everybody to ensure we can undertake this
as smoothly and orderly as possible and recognition from everybody that actually we do want to make this arrangement, get this arrangement in place so people can move on to the new relationship that they will have with the united kingdom. there is a willingness to undertake this on that basis. >> can you confirm if the government's intention to seek transition arrangements of some sort to cover that. from the negotiation to implementation in order to give certainty to business and avoid the cpi. >> if i may answer in this way because i think when people talk about it, often different people mean different things. some people talk about transition as a deliberate way of putting off and leaving the european union. for others, transition is an expectation you can't get the deal in two years and therefore you've got to have the mother.
but if you think about the process we are going to go through once we got the deal, there will of course be a necessity for adjustment for implementation of impractical changes that may need to take place in relation to that. that is what business is commenting on in arguing for when they say they use the phrase they don't want to wake up one morning and have to deal the night before and suddenly discover they've got to do everything in a different way. as a practical aspect of how you insured people are able to adjust to the new relationship, which is not about trying to delay the point and not about trying to extend the period of negotiation. >> can you confirm the decision is not yet about whether we are going to remain the customs union and if that is the case, don't we have to stay in order to honor the commitment about
seeking a situation in which they can continue to trade with bureaucratic impediments. the mac first of all as i've said in the chamber of the house, this is not a binary decision. if the number of different aspects in a number of different relationships that already exist. said this is more complex than simply saying are you in or are you out. the way i approach this on the way government is approaching this and other issues is to say that the outcomes we want to achieve and therefore how do you reach those outcomes rather than assuming only one means to an ad around in one process to an end. as regard, the issue of the investment is a welcome investment to further investment made and remake it very clear we want the best possible deal for trading with an operating weight the european market.
that's what i've been saying publicly to companies and also that we want to ensure the competitiveness of the economy and i think the decision to invest in bringing the new models to be manufactured is actually a huge vote of confidence and is the most productive car plant in europe. >> can i just take you back to one answer you gave that sounded quite favorable to the financial community for some kind of full application of departure in 20 night team on the grounds of dave put themselves. do i take it the government is going to try and negotiate a standstill or transitional arrangement at that time for the
financial community to adjust. >> i wouldn't use the word standstill. the point at which relieved the european union, the point at which the relationship is going to exist is clear, then they will be practical issues that have to be addressed. >> asking something to be different, witches are you going to negotiate? >> i'm about to come onto that and explain. i want to make sure the full understanding of what i was saying in terms of the practicality of this issue is people may need to adjust i.t. systems, and other simple practical matter like that. of course that was just in the u.k. it would also be businesses and others operating within the european union. as part of the negotiations we
will be entering, felony to be a discussion about how those practicalities can be dealt with. >> is that a priority for your negotiation to seek an adjustment period after the date of application? >> it's a matter of practicality that we need to discuss with the european union. >> is a priority for you? >> i set out one priority that i think we should be making early decisions on the negotiations. part of the negotiations we will have to address this question of the practicalities for adjustment to the new relationship once that the relationship has been a great. when that takes place, the court will depend in the deal is agreed. that's why you can't say immediately that it's going to
be a period. >> is it a priority? sit down and start negotiating. >> when we start negotiating, we will be considering what the issues are, how the negotiations will be taking place. this will be one of the issues that will be on the table. i am well aware, chairman of the views and concerns business has to make sure that they have that ability to have it. a practical adjustment. [inaudible] we have called on the ambassador to the e.u. to see a short day some controversial remarks. complementary to the fact that reduced across the board, the
united kingdom, there is also this question that the coordination with the cabinet office, which also has to do with my committee as well. do you have the number 10 itself a full unit seated equally with negotiating instruments regarding political as well as economic trade policies. do you personally, number 10 and do they do so and if they don't, do you think it ought to happen? >> well, i have set up a unit of people with expertise in matters who are working with the department on issues related as we have to look at particular
decisions and as we go forward, and i to meet with them regularly. >> what assessment has been made in regard to the trade-off between your red lines, the new adjudication and those aspects of our relationship with the european union that you want to maintain. >> well, i don't look at these things terms of trade-offs between the issues quite the way it is sometimes portrayed. i think what is important to us when we look at the negotiations, not that we are currently members of the e.u. >> we are going to leave the british liaison committee for a brief pro forma session at the communicatio
>> the senate will come to order december 20, 2016. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, provisions of rule 1, rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable charles e. grassley , a senator from the state of iowa, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: orrin g. hatch, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate stands adjourned until 11:30 a.m. on friday, until 11:30 a.m. on friday,
giving them time to prepare for negotiations and also recognizing, thank you very much >> you said you listen carefully too different arrangements for scotland, do you believe scotland. [inaudible] >> obviously i haven't had it chance to look at the paper yet, but i welcome the contribution to the debate. it will be encouraging to take
that forward as part of the discussions we are having. i would expect the assembly to come forward with the concerns they have and discuss it within the structure that we have. >> do you suggest the border arrangements, could there be a fixture of a total uk exit approach. >> what we are negotiating is the united kingdom approach and the relationship with the european union.
i don't think it's right to accept, when i first met the minister, we would look very seriously at the proposals that come forward, but there may be proposals that are impractical. one of the key issues is the question of border because it will be the one part of the uk with a land border with the country remaining in the european union and a lot of work is being done to ensure we do not returned to the hard border of the past. >> do you view. [inaudible] >> i think we will discuss them probably have discussions on this with in the gmc environment about how the arrangements will
work, where we have to take what is a framework currently set out in brussels into the united kingdom and recognize the roles of the administration and the deals that are currently in place. >> you think scotland should hold another referendum if the government refuses to see scotland's interests. >> i don't think there is a need for the scottish government to hold an independence referendum. i think i would go further than that and make this point, if scotland, and this is one of the points of the papers that the scottish government produced, if scotland were to become independent, not only would it no longer be a member of the european union, it wouldn't be a member of of the market of the
single market of the european union or the united kingdom. >> it simply the whole idea, and the thing that's most informing, does immigration take precedence over all other. [inaudible] >> as i indicated, i don't see these things as trade-offs between these issues. the people want to take control of our borders from the eu as well is from countries outside the european union, but what we also want to ensure is that we get the best possible trading deal, operating within an
trading with the market. we also want to make sure we are able to continue to cooperate on crime issues. all of these issues will be part of the negotiation that will take place. >> prime minister, you briefly touched on northern ireland. there's obviously a special relationship between the united kingdom and northern ireland and the republic. should that special relationship continue? >> we don't want to see a return to the borders of the past. the common area has been in place since 1923 and continues to be in place and we are working very hard with the government of the republic of ireland to ensure we can find a solution moving forward so that
we don't return to borders of the past. >> they take the view that that should be the case. the problem is. [inaudible] do you have any indication of what attitude they will take toward that aspiration. >> the indication so far has been that the other states are well aware of the sensitivity of the issue in relation to the border between northern island ireland and the republic of ireland. they want the solution to work to both sides of the border. >> they will probably be prepared to bury the rules they said about a hard border of the edge of the european union? not all countries in the european union, there's a degree
of flexibility there produced expect that to continue? >> the question as to the extent that there needs to be a differential arrangement and its possible to come to an arrangement that reflects the wider relationship that the uk will have but i think everybody, obviously there's a number of discussions taking place at the moment about the external border and what arrangements they will have on that external border which will involve countries in various formations, depending primarily on whether they're in shangri-la. >> obviously the rights have changed over the years, but do you envision that the citizens will, if they they want to come to the united kingdom, remain? they have the same opportunities
of the commonwealth. do you think that arrangement will continue? >> the issue of the republic of ireland, this is on a different basis from other members of the european union. obviously up and clear that i want to look at an early stage how we deal with other members were living in the uk. >> it should be up to us once they've left the european union and how we treat citizens of the irish republic. >> i want to ensure that they are being treated on a political basis. >> as we move forward, as you've indicated, it's a deal for the united kingdom but that means he
would not access any passport checks between northern island and great written. >> we want to ensure that we've got the right border. >> as we go forward, how do you see the relationship between the uk and ireland developing after the exit? they might take more towards the uk than the eu. >> that's not for me to say. i will say i hope everybody would accept and agree that there is a growing relationship between the uk and i want to see that continue. >> they have the ability to make laws themselves, how is the great reform bill, would they be
required to adopt any legislation or would that be done on the uk basis? >> these are matters that we believe could be affected by the arrangement in each of the administrations. there are aspects of eu law in the uk, whether that is specifically in a government would be a matter of discussion for the government. >> to get people the confidence and the clarity in relation to eu legislation it would then be
an opportunity for parliament to determine which of those pieces of law they wish to continue with or if they wish to change any. of course will be coming out of the treaty. >> when do you intend to publish proposals of immigration plan. >> we are working on our proposal. there are a number of ways in which we can address the issue when we feel it is appropriate to give any in the occasion of those details that we would do so. >> does that mean am i not be part of the february plan. >> as i said what we have those details ready we will do so. >> that means it might not be part of the plan. is meeting the target going to be one of the targets of the exit negotiation. >> for very good reason and the
impact that they have on people on this country and when you change that target, the objective of the negotiation will be to ensure that we get the best possible deal for the united kingdom. >> you said that many times. does that mean there's a tension between what you conclude is in the best interest of britain as part of looking at immigration control and it makes it impossible to meet the next migration target. >> you're making an assumption that you can automatically extrapolate, from any discussion that takes place through net migration figures at some point in the future. looking at immigration numbers is not an exact science in that sense in that there are a number
of factors that come into play that are obviously not under the control of the government. i would say you can't look at it in the way you suggest we look at it. we want to get the best possible deal in terms of the relationship for trade and operation and we also want to ensure that the british government will be making decisions about the immigration and arrangements from people coming from the european union. >> you have yourself set on many occasions that the reason you aren't able to meet your target was because of these arrangements. you currently have that migration from the eu at 189,000. if you're to stand any chance of meeting your net migration target you would have to get eu not migration down to what? 60000? >> we will be putting in place the immigration arrangement
within the european union that we believe are in the interest of the united kingdom. >> does that mean that if you conclude that it is not in the interest of the united kingdom to get net migration from the eu down to 50,000 you will ditch the net migration target or will you give the net migration project priority over what's in their best interest. >> this government will bring migration down, we set out very clearly for some time that we believe sustainable levels are in the tens of thousands and we do that for good reasons because of the impact we believe that immigration does have and research shows it has on people, particularly those at the low end of the income scale and understand the reasons behind it. >> the question is what is your objective going forward. you've got a net migration
target, i'm simply asking you whether you are planning to meet that net migration target through the exit negotiation, and if so, so ,-comma what are you aiming for? if you've got to get it down from 189,002 below hundred thousand, who do you want not to come. >> you've asked me about the bricks at negotiations and i've been clear about the exit negotiations. they wanted us to have control of immigration in place for those coming from the eu. we also want to make sure we get the best possible deal for trade within the european union. that is what we will be looking for in relation to the exit negotiation. it does have its target and its ambition of bringing that down. you're right that one part of migration that we haven't been
able to put controls on so far is migration from the european union. we will be doing that in the future. i'm not setting a figure in the way that you suggest, precisely because, as i have said, there are many factors that come into the whole question of immigration. there are many questions that determine the movement of people across the world. i've been very clear with my european colleagues and they are now also clear him up but one of the things we all need to do is actually working countries like those in africa where people are coming from, try to ensure that there is economic opportunities there. >> none of that answers my question. >> you're trying to focus on what we do on immigration. what i'm saying to to you about how we deal with immigration is
a much larger issue. >> you are refusing to answer my question and you have a certain amount of contempt toward having a figure, however you have chosen to have a figure for the whole of immigration and you have chosen to stick with it rather than to change it when you became prime minister. let me ask again, in terms of meeting the net migration target, given that net migration is currently 196,000 which is actually the same level it is when you became secretary in 2010, so that hasn't changed after six years. how do you expect to meet your net migration target if you have no way to reduce it and you're refusing to say what your plans are for eu migration. >> what i said is that we will of course, in due due course, set out and make decisions about the arrangements that we wish to have in place for the immigration control from people
coming from the european union but it is not possible to say that only one aspect of looking at the issue of migration is the only one that you need to focus on, the only one that you need to think about in order to look at the net migration figures. this is a very wide issue that cannot be in encapsulated simply in the brexit negotiations. >> your chancellor, your porn secretary and your home secretary and the previous chancellor have all said that they have refused to endorse your target on that migration with students in it. do you think it is time to remove students from your net migration target. >> students are in migration figures.
you'd choose the target. the target figures are calculated from the overall migration figures and students are in the overall figures because it is an international definition of migration. it's used by countries around the world. having students in that figure actually shows what we have seen in the previous years was significant abuse in the united kingdom. they were not offering an education to those individuals ,-comma what they were doing is to reduce abuse of the student visa system by looking at those figures and focusing on those figures. >> but you don't have a way to meet the target. it's a bit of a mass. >> let's be clear. minister, that abuse is largely
been sorted out. most people agree that students are a huge success story. they are a major british export and there were many debates about migration. don't you get might be a good idea to reconsider that. >> we use the international definition of migration. >> so is that a no. >> we use the international definition and choose our target >> what contingency planning has your government done for the end of the two-year negotiating time. >> we are obviously looking at all of the scenarios that might
pertain in relation to this. as we get into negotiations, we might be able to much better understand where they're coming from from in terms of expectation. they are going to have to do this within the 18 month time. >> so i take that as a yes, they are planning. who's responsible for it and on what expertise are you relying? are you seeking advice of outside folks in trade and education. >> as i said, we look at a variety of scenarios. they have responsibility, they have within the department experts from other government
departments but they also work with other departments others no duplication between the two. >> we publish this amount it will be published alongside the statement that's going to be made in february or march? >> what we will be publishing, you will see what we publish what we publish it if i may put it like that. you would expect government to be thinking what various scenarios that could pertain. you are asking me to accept that we are going to fail, which i don't accept. what i believe is that we should go into this and we have an
intention to do this in a smooth and orderly process and we do meet the timetable that is set as indicated. i had a good meeting to discuss the negotiation him brussels and the parliament is also keen to ensure this is a process that a smooth and orderly. they pointed out that parliament had to approve this. it is entirely possible that the european parliament veto the agreement at the end of this two-year process and i'm assuming your contingency plan takes into account of that possibility, of course you are
not aiming for it. >> we want to make sure that we get that agreement. as we understand it, they have agreed a different arrangement for the european parliament and they did that last week. >> were not going down the roots of the last government which was grossly negligent and did no planning at all around the possibility that the country may vote in the european union. [inaudible] this planning is taking place. >> we are looking at a variety of scenarios that could come
forward in relation to the negotiation, the deal, the timing and what other opportunities could be there. >> i'm hoping that's a yes. >> we are looking at a variety of scenarios. we are looking at all of the options. >> all of the options, thank you very much. >> but crucially. >> all of the options is five. >> but crucially we are trying to set up the relationship so that we have every expectation that if we can't get that process right then it will be possible to see the outcome. >> have you determined the issues under article 50? >> when you say which issues were formed under article 50? >> it's possible that our partners could find themselves in the same trap the government has found itself in with action
being taken, the ability to conclude majority, there's actually an agreement that would be so extensive that it will be out of the scope of article 50 and we could find our seven with ourselves with a 27 on the the council and in the same position that way now. >> if i understand the question correctly you are saying that there may be, at the end of this process, some matters that are ratified by individual as well is by the parliament. that is something we are aware of and something we will be negotiating.
>> you say you're confident you know what the issues are. >> i think work is still going in great detail on this, but i think one of the questions is a matter of legal discussion and that is the question of any trade arrangement with the european union and the extent. >> would that be published as part of the formal negotiation to the european council as to what might be seen. >> i don't think that's appropriate for the triggering of article 50. this matter, i hesitate to say this, but there will be legal discussions, this will be a matter on which the lawyers will be discussing.
i think it will be for us to assert. >> there upsetting the timetable of your own government in a move to the supreme court ,-comma what judgments we be making about achieving under the article 50 negotiation and will you be reviewing those in the process. >> first well, i would point out that we hope to have articles 50 by the end of march next year end had to come forward with the judgment. i expect to be able to trigger this of march of next year. we haven't blown the timetable off course. >> it is your intention to cover as many aspects of our future
relationship of the european union as possible within the article 50 negotiation. >> within the negotiation we will be having with the european union, it would be my intention to cover not just the process but also the future relationships. >> okay ,-comma what would be the major consequences of failing to agree, in your view? >> you mean failure to agree in the european union -- >> if we find it them vetoing any deal. >> i imagine the process then will have whether or not they wish to continue negotiation. imagine that would be the next step they will take.
>> my committee is looking at the government issues. they say the government is working well and you have your own specialists advising you personally and you also set up dat and each have their priorities. how will the government synthesize these different approaches in a single uk negotiating policy. >> i have also set up cabinet subcommittee which is responsible for looking at the brexit on trade. there are number of cabinet subcommittee to address that approach to government and debates taking place regularly
within the committee on issues we are thinking about the future trade relationships and aspects of the legal processes in article 50 and so forth. >> what kind of capacity does the relevant subcommittee have to synthesize different approaches coming up from other departments? >> the papers are submitted to the committee by the state. the majority of papers will come from the state court brexit of the european union. they were put forth the papers to do so. >> inevitably because brexit is a separate department, it will be seen as something is arrival to other departments and who is holding the weight between these two departments and what
capacity do you or the cabinets office have in order to make sure these different approaches are drawn into one approach? >> i'm afraid i would challenge the concept. i think it is the focus of the work that's being done, but it does call on the expertise of other departments. what were very clear about, we don't get that rival or duplication between the departments. >> the cabinet office department that is correlating the other departments on your behalf, is that correct. >> it's the government department that is responsible for working with the other government departments. >> so who will actually negotiate the agreement. >> the negotiation will be conducted at a number of levels. obviously i will have a role to
play regarding the european leaders and the state within the european union will have a key role to play and there will be technical negotiations and discussions that will take place. >> who will actually negotiate the uk new trade relationship with the eu? >> that will be part of the negotiation. those who are negotiating will be part of that. >> will the trade minister have a special role in that? >> obviously we will bring in expertise and ministers as appropriate from the department of international trade.
>> many governments have a single trade negotiator, the u.s. government, for example, has a single trade individual. do believe we should have someone playing such a role. >> we are currently building up the specific trade negotiation expertise within the department of international trade and in due course we will be setting out more clearly. >> do you think that should be applied. >> where it is appropriate. the institute of government suggests they are having to
choose and the brexit priorities. how confident are you that these departments can handle the priorities. [inaudible] >> right, okay. the chancellor suggested that the foreign office taking over the aspects of foreign affairs that are currently hampered by the eu, that would need to change the layout. how will they reinforce their diplomatic network.
>> we will look to see, there will be a number of areas where the european union has been negotiating and undertaking activity, notably in trade, we know we need to build off our trade expertise and we need to do this for appeared of time because it's being done under the european union. we been contributing to that debate within the european union, but as we look to the role outside of the eu, it's it's not just about what we do in relationship to the eu, but it's how we build the our presence globally. we have to start looking at europe and the rest of the world. >> can i just come back to one of these points that we touched on earlier. they made a firm commitment on a number of occasions that
parliament will be informed as well as diplomatic committees. in the course of those negotiations, are you committed to that as your brexit minister. >> we are committed to ensuring that parliament does have an opportunity to look at these issues and discuss these issues. we have been very clear, we're not going to give a running commentary on every aspect of negotiation, but we will make sure that parliament has the opportunity to be informed. as we make information available we will. >> so you are supporting that objective. >> we are very clear that we want parliament to be able to have the opportunity to debate and discuss these issues. the european parliament has a
specific role within the negotiation which is different from the role the uk are hearing about. >> there seems to be this idea that somehow were not letting parliament do anything. we have made statements to parliament, we debate in parliament, we had the great debate deal and we will make sure that parliament has the opportunity to discuss these matters as we go through the negotiation. what we will not be doing is setting out, as i said in detail , on an hour by hour basis of running, tree of what aspects of negotiation we are discussing or what the particular discussions are that are taking place. we need to have that flexibility in the government to be able to enter negotiations on that basis. >> people can draw their own conclusions from the response, but i have to say for my part, i
didn't hear a yes to the question. i have a couple other points, is it your intention. >> it was a question put to me earlier and it's my intention that parliament should have every opportunity to consider these matters but what i'm also clear about is to ensure we actually deliver on the vote of the british people which was a vote to leave the european union >> was that a yes or no. >> i gave the answer i gave chairman. >> in the exchanges at the beginning, you did give a very clear answer to one question that it ruled out seeking an extension of the negotiation time period.
>> as we go into negotiations, it is not our intention to extend that time period of negotiation. >> but you didn't completely rule out completing the negotiations within the negotiation. but, applying an implementation date at some point after 2019. >> what i said -- >> that was specifically provided in article three amounts what i'm seeking clarity of. >> article 50, sub clause three is not about an implementation phase, it's about the extension of the time. of negotiation. >> well, i think that's a matter of interpretation. let's just read it out. the treaty shall seek to apply to the state in question from the date of entry the withdrawal agreement. so, that date of entry and withdraw agreement can be after 2019 and indeed it is generally understood by most people have
looked at it. that's why been asking this question. i just want clarity about that question. >> i have misunderstood the question that you are asking me earlier because i thought you were asking me if the period will be extended. i asked that we negotiate the deal within the two-year time. that is set out. >> we all agree on that. >> it may be the case that there are practical aspects which require a time period of implementation thereafter. that is what we will need, not just for us but for businesses and that has to be part of the
negotiation. >> thank you, i quite understand just to clarify, you therefore may seek to use the discretion provided by article 50, subclause three, to negotiate an implementation date after the end of the completion of the negotiation, even if if the negotiation time. is within the two-year frame. >> we will discuss whether we needed implementation phase, whether it is a issue of an implementation phase. >> the reason i keep raising this question is because what i get privately from major institutions and businesses is that we are at risk of walking
straight toward the cliff of what they want is some kind of assurance or they will take measures now. if i can just read you what one large financial institution has given me. i have read this to the chancellor as well on the basis that he reply. he said two years is unlikely to be sufficient to complete the changes that are needed. the same document says severe disruption to client services may occur causing financial instability and significant costs and the firms may need to activate contingency plans at this point rather than waiting until the terms of the agreement are known leading to the instability discussed earlier in this document.
that is what is being put to me and to the treasury committee and i think to a wide number and it is that that is leading us today in various ways to press too for a commitment to you for an early negotiation of some kind of transitional arrangement and clarity that there will be one to prevent. >> that's what i hope to get clarity on. >> it's precisely because we understand that businesses, financial services and other businesses may need an implementation phase that we are talking about that. it may be that government actually needs a period of time to ensure that its systems are adjusted for arrangements. the difficulty here, and the uncertainty here is that the extent to which that is required actually depends on the nature of the deal, and the extent of
change that is required by that deal. >> thank you very much prime minister. we have had just over an hour on brexit. i'm sure we will be coming back to it are many more occasions. we are just going to move on to health and healthcare. >> prime minister, do you feel dhs can do everything needed with the money at scott. >> we've asked them to come forward with their plan, they did so, we have provided the money they requested for that five-year plan. >> we aren't getting too much detail about. >> the british liaison committee is now moving on to other business. they finished up work on the brexit portion so we will leave it at this point. you can see prime minister questions on their return in the new new year on c-span2.
>> this week on c-span, tonight tonight at 8:00 p.m., jerry greenfield, cofounder ben and jerry ice cream talks about business practices. >> the idea that we couldn't sell enough ice cream in the summer, that fold forced us to look for other markets. >> wednesday night former vp dick cheney and leon pannetta on the future of the defense department under president-elect donald trump. >> i think the challenges are very great and i think we have, unfortunately, unfortunately, over the course of the last many years done serious damage to our capabilities to be able to meet those threats. >> we are living in that time where there are a lot of flashpoints and the new administration is going to have to look at that kind of world, and obviously, divine policy that we need in order to deal with that, but then, develop the
defense policy to confront that kind of work. >> thursday at eight pm eastern, a eastern, a look at the career of vice president mike pence. >> admitted and missed the shifting sands, we have stood without apology for the sanctity of life, the, the importance of marriage, and the freedom of religion. >> on friday night beginning at eight pm, farewell speeches and tributes to several outgoing senators including harry reid, barbara boxer, kelly ayotte and dan totes. this week in prime time on c-span. >> the presidential inauguration of donald trump is friday, january 20. c-span will have live coverage of all the days of events and ceremonies. watch live on c-span and c-span.org and listen listen live on the free c-span radio
app. >> this week on c-span two, book tv in prime time each night. tonight biographies and autobiographies. we will hear from authors of books on out compound and a secret service agent who worked under eisenhower, kennedy, nixon, nixon and ford. also autobiography by diane and darrell asa. >> the american enterprise institute last week looked at what the new congress and the new president plan for the nation's health care law. the first we will hear a discussion about a potential replacement for obamacare. >> good morning. >> welcome to the american enterprise institute for today's discussion. i am joe, i am the scholar at
aei and i'm delighted to be inside today. [laughter] contrary to what some have claimed over the past year or two, there is no shortage of proposals to replace the affordable care act. from republicans of all stripes, members of congress including speaker paul ryan who produced something called a better way which you may be familiar with, they are empowering patients first act, and other proposals going over at least the past six years or so from members of the senate and members of the house. think tanks have also gotten into the act including aei project that we produced in
collaboration with a total of ten of our colleagues from aei and other think tanks. there is no lack of ideas. the only question now is there a willingness to move forward. the proposals that we have seen in the past promotes several things. typically they've retained subsidies for people purchasing insurance on the individual market but they've changed the way those subsidies are designed. they eliminate the mandate to purchase insurance, but they create new incentives for people to buy coverage. they create high-risk pools intended to stabilize the market, they transfer regulatory authority for the insurance market back to the states.
each of these proposals that we have seen in the past would repeal the affordable care act, but put in its place a policy that promotes a more market oriented, consumer driven view of american healthcare. the specifics matter, obviously, and agreement on the philosophy does not guarantee that there will be agreement among republicans on the hill or people in general about the individual provisions that would make up a replace bill. our first panel will focus on what can or should be in the replace bill. beyond the general principles, what is needed for a replace bill to ensure access to appropriate and ideally affordable coverage for everyone i'm emphasizing access. that's not necessarily a guarantee that everyone must or
will have coverage, but they have to have the opportunity to get coverage, and ideally, it should be affordable. what is needed on the way to this replace that would ensure that the individual insurance market would continue to operate while other changes are being implemented, and in particular, now that they are in charge, do republicans support the ideas discussed over the past six years, and are they ready to put the reelections on the line for them? the second panel will discuss the challenges of enacting such legislation in the face of a narrow senate majority, complex legislative rules and a timeline, but we will start first with the first panel, and let me briefly introduce everyone here in the order that they will speak. first up is scott harrington who is the alan b muller professor in healthcare management in insurance risk management at the
school of the university of pennsylvania. next up is bob reischauer who is a distinguished institute fellow and president emeritus, among many other things, former ceo ceo director. finally tom muller, my colleague at aei will wrap up the panel and we will have discussion, maybe arguments among ourselves and with the audience. with that, scott, scott, please take away. >> good morning everyone. i'm going to focus my remarks on the individual market and what a replacement bill would need to consider in order to make that market perform reasonably well and i'm not going to talk about timing of any repeal or replacement, i'm not going to talk about logistics, i don't have anything to say about medicaid, i will have to get into a few of the weeds, one of
the things that goes down what the debate is to set a very high and simplistic level, but now that were at the point of changing the law, it will have to get very specific. let me remind you what the affordable care act did with regard to individual and small group health insurance market. it provided a guaranteed issue and guaranteed rating without regard to health status. that is a big deal. it did restrict rating based on age within a 3 - 1 age bands older people can only pay three times as much as younger people. that was designed in part to make coverage more affordable for older people but at a cost of having some younger people face higher premiums. the aca provided minimum essential benefits, minimum tears that had to exist. this game is fairly complex. it's based on income and cost-sharing in addition to
premiums. then of course there's the individual mandate which has what i think is fair to characterize as modest penalties there are open enrollment periods every year where people can sign up for coverage. the problems that have arisen. these problems vary across states. generally, the markets do not appear to be achieving sustainability, at least at this time in many states. the coverage by the uninsured has been quite a bit lower than has been predicted. the risk pools are sicker and older than had been predicted, they are some anecdotal evidence that people have waited to buy coverage and then sign up during special enrollment periods when they need care, and what gets the headlines, there have been fairly large premium increases and then that sort of sitting back in the big picture. in a lot of states premiums are
high and cost-sharing deductibles and coinsurance are also very high. people of relatively modest needs can look to this coverage and say it doesn't seem to cover much, the senate is very asked benson for the lowest income participants are heavily subsidized, but people that are much above 253, 300% of poverty and 400% of poverty have really gotten hit in some states in recent years. the other thing that's been going on is that insurance companies, overall, have lost a lot of money in the individual market. it varies across company, but overall the losses are big and many companies have decided to pull out of the exchanges, at least in some states. now, let me touch on some key features of what a replacement might look like and i would really commend the reports that joe mentioned, especially the aei that is really wonderfully done in terms of laying out the groundwork in some of the pros and cons of proposals.
one thing that we would expect as a return of substantial regulatory authority to the state regarding minimum benefits and design issues as well as any pricing regulation. second key component would be to change the form of the subsidy from an income premium based subsidy under the affordable care act to some form of refundable tax credit, most likely with the tax credit increasing with age to make insurance more affordable for older people. now i really keep part of the proposal would be what you do about the problem of pre-existing conditions. the better way proposal basically would provide guarantees for people who are continuously insured. if a person had insurance they would be able to switch insurers, moved from the employer market to the individual market and not pay premiums that affect their health status. there also would likely be an initial aroma.
where previously uninsured people could sign up and save premiums that don't depend on their health status and have guaranty issue. people waited, if they didn't sign up relating continue coverage, they would lose the protections against being underwritten for pre-existing conditions. people would ultimately fall through the gaps in and up without coverage, the proposal would establish state high-risk pools with a certain amount of federal funding so people could get some coverage at a higher price. now there are some issues here. very important issues. the details will really matter. one is the amount and the design of the tax credits. my opinion is they do need to increase with age. if older people don't get a bigger tax credit, i fear coverage will be unaffordable and you will get extreme adverse selection among older people. another thorny issue is, should should the tax credits be tied to income? it is not clear how a refundable
tax credit related to income can provide as much support to lower income people as under the affordable care act. and get a tax credit and by an individual market while remaining employed in the group. the tax credit would not be portable. if you're in a group plan your offered a group plan, you stay stay in the group plan. the proposal would allow the tax credit to be portable.
in theory have a tax credit be portable so people can choose between coverage and work and coverage from individual market could be a good thing. in practice i think it creates a lot of uncertainty and i have a great resistance of doing anything to undermine the employer-sponsored market which serves 160,000,000 people and in my opinion is a bulwark against tapping future congresses under future unknown scenarios really move towards expanding government insurance through out broader segments of the population. the design of high risk pools will be key. what you want up and a high risk pool is enough of a penalty so the people are encouraged to sign up and not go into high risk pool but you have to provide protection for people but to fall between the cracks. it's clear to me that significant federal funding will be required to make this work. i would like to see discussion of providing state flexibility
so maybe any federal funding for higher risks buyers and the judge that would go into a pool, maybe there could be a single pool, may be federal funding could be used to subsidize some people more directly without having the prices of other people have to go up to pay the costs. now, this whole issue of what we call adverse selection and guaranteed issue. we are in this world, if you keep insurance you don't have to worry about having to pay higher premiums or be denied coverage because of a pre-existing condition. you have an initial sign-up. we can take advantage of those protections. will those markets perform well? will to be a disproportionate number of people that are in poor health that will sign up in that initial enrollment period? with people who those coverage at work, lose their employment, will they be disproportionately less healthy and as a result drive up premiums in the guaranteed issue market? this is an open question. a lot of people will say that
you have to have an individual mandate to make these types of markets work. the individual mandate in the affordable care act is pretty weak so if you design the incentives besides having an upfront mandate, if you have enough incentive for people to buy, they did it later with some penalties, we may achieve some form of stability and this guaranteed issue market, but there might be considerably the issues associated with that. related to that is i think went to worry about instability as we make changes. there could be significant instability during the repeal and replace debate but i'm thinking ahead to le let's say e have a replacement plan, will markets be stable, well this guaranteed issue market be stable? my training in insurance economics and my conversations with actuaries lead me to believe that companies are very nervous about having a whole new set of rules, a whole new
underwriting pool and to worry about what the risk pool will look like. i think it would be desirable to give very careful consideration to some form of stability mechanism for some number of years to ensure our help ensure a stable market as we move to the new world. this gets politically touchy because the building mechanisms can be things like reinsurance and risk corridor doors which republicans to some extent have viewed as an anathema. and clearly i believe the risk for our system under the affordable care act which ostensibly is going to protect companies against adverse costs from a worse than average risk pool, i think it encourages overly aggressive pricing. i think some stability mechanism really would be desirable to make sure things were. one other comment. a quandary, academics and
practitioners in most peoples think that basic coverage should include catastrophe protection, that no matter what coverage people are buying for health, it should cover the very high end. there should be no limits, no lifetime limits, no annual limits. the problem is that many buyers of modest means are likely to prefer coverage, if they have to have a trade-off between getting coverage for the very high cost which likely will not happen and things that are more likely that may involve modest expenditures, 10, 15,000 a year, a lot of peoples modest means will want to get something covered at the lower end. i'm not talking about $100 deductible but i'm talking about the seven, 10,000 dollars expense that can be damaging to people of modest means. i worry that our emphasis on catastrophe coverage can give rise to a situation where people of modest means they will enter
policy with a high deductible which protects them against very rare events but they don't view as very attractive because it doesn't help them pay the bills and meet their obligations every month. they might get richer coverage which does provide more coverage for more modest expenses but the premiums will be so high that they basically you as unattractive. also those phenomena can reduce take-up and he can make voters unhappy. i don't have an answer to this question but i do think sometimes we underestimate the desire and the need for people of relatively modest means to actually have insurance that pays for the shock to expenses that they really can't budget for. health savings accounts if they are promoted clearly can help but i think we could think more about is there a way of providing some form of subsidy to maybe subsidize that catastrophe coverage so that people of modest means would be able to give more of the dollars on things that might really matter to them more of the time. >> take you very much, scott.
bob? >> thank you. it's a pleasure to be here in adis new home. glad it preserve the historic aspect of the building. i'm just going to make six rather simple points. and the first of those is that of the last six years has taught us anything, it's that if we want major health reform to be politically sustainable, it's going to have to have a modicum of bipartisan support. and that's both a political reality and a procedural -- a political rally because of the health sector constitutes a sixth of our economy, involves the service, the vast the vast majority of the population think it's essential and is represented by a powerful interest groups and poised millions of workers, and not all of the folks involved in this are republicans or democrats.
it's a procedural impairment because while partial appeal of the aca which is what the republicans are proposing can getthrough the senate with a simple majority vote using the budget reconciliation process, that's not the case for a comprehensive bill that would replace the affordable care act because the reconciliation process is limited to legislation that affects only taxes in mandatory spending. so a replacement is going to have to have 60 votes in the senate and that's almost assuredly going to involve attracting summer between eight and more democratic votes -- somewhere between. the second point is taken together the goals that have been articulated by the incoming administration and by many of the repeal advocates are impossible to achieve. to refresh your memories, these promises include first, sustaining or broadening the number of folks with insurance.
second, making health care more affordable for americans. third, improving the quality of care. fourth, reducing government health spending, and fifth, providing more flexibility and choice and regulations for states, providers and participants. there's going to have to be some trade-offs made. all of these can't be achieved if the bar were comparing this to what exists today under the affordable care act as opposed to what existed pre-2010. third, crafting and enacting a replacement for the affordable care act is going to take a good deal of time. three years i think would be warp speed for a legislative process. notwithstanding what joe said, at present there really is no consensus approach, let alone any specific agreed-upon plan
among republicans. as he said, there were ideas, philosophies, it's a very rich menu but that's easy to do. writing the legislative language is much, much harder and they are going to be complexities, they're going to be controversies as professor harrington pointed out. once a republican consensus emerges it's going to have to be modified to attract some democratic support. then the cbo will have to score this legislation, and none of these philosophies, ideas, whatever, have been scored the way cbo scores of them. and the results are going to be compared to what a continuation of the affordable care act would involve. that could send the policymakers back to the drawing board for a few adjustments. our legislative process is not
known for its speed. several committees in each chamber are going to have to do their drafting. they're going to have to be for vote in the house and the senate. there's going to have to be a conference that resolve the differences between the house and the senate. once th the senate, the presidet has signed the bill, the executive agencies are going to need time to write the necessary rules and regulations. notwithstanding the fact that we don't like regulations now or we won't starting on january 20, you can't just throw a bill out there with no rules or regulations on how that actual legislative language is to be interpreted. and then you're going to need time for the various stakeholders, the insurers, providers to prepare for whatever this new system is. i would be very surprised if
individuals who are not covered by employer health insurance are able to enroll in whatever the news system is much before january of 2020. so we're talking i think about taking a deep breath and going about this in a very deliberate kind of way. it's worth remembering that this isn't the only thing on the plate of policymakers. we hav had tax reform. with infrastructure. we have reforming entitlement programs, increasing military spending, reduction of domestic military spending. all very complex and controversial issues which are going to be going on at the same time. fourth point is that the affordable care marketplaces are
in shaky shape and are going to need some shoring up. this was true whether clinton won the election or trump won the election, we were in a situation where some reinforcement is needed, whether it's to keep the exchanges going permanently or just in the interim. before a new system can be put in place. we need to ensure that nothing ensures our plant and adverse exchanges, we need insurers with workable mechanisms for managing unpredictable risk and to compensatethem for adverse selection which hasn't really worked out as once intended on the affordable care act. every also need to reduce the uncertainty among providers and insurance about what might come next. repeal without concurrent enactment of replacement will create a greater uncertainty,
and without some remedial assistance, and intervention i think the exchange component of the affordable care act will begin to crumble very shortly. if the decision is made to repeal the individual mandate immediatelyimmediately, and that the component of the reconciliation bill that was vetoed by president obama in january of 2016, or a decision or and a decision was made to drop the cost-sharing suit that is currently on hold, this process of unraveling could occur much, much faster. fifth point was substantial fraction of the voting public may not like the affordable care act as a whole. they like many of the parts, and they know that, that they know about, and unlike consequences of some of the provisions they are not very familiar with.
some of the parts they don't like were thought to be necessary to ensure that the parts they do like function effectively. and professor explained one of these which is the unpopular individual mandate, the tax penalties for failure to maintain adequate coverage, if pre-existing conditions were to be covered and medical underwriting was going to be limited. as he has explained, advocates of replacement plans or propose alternative mechanisms that might encourage high participant, participation rates on a voluntary basis, like premium surcharges on those who don't maintain continuous insurance coverage. but we don't know whether these approaches will work. they could prove to be horrendously complex to administer and proved to be quite intrusive. we have to keep a record, every month that every person has insurance, and the insurance may
maybe is given to a family but the family begins to split and then as the kids get older, you have to keep track of everybody and so you don't like complexity. complexity. you don't like inclusiveness before. well, here it is in a different flavor. six point, final point, while many of the public may not like certain aspects of the affordable care act, that doesn't necessarily mean that they are going to be enthusiastic about some of the alternative approaches that have been put forward. nor does it mean these approaches would be devoid as i mentioned before of complexity or implementation, just as all the complexities of the affordable care act ran into trouble. let me just illustrate this by saying a few words about two components that it been put forward i advocates of replacement. first, opponents of the
affordable care act like to rail against the cadillac tax and suggest that if it's dead and upper limit the impose on the tax deductibility of employer-based employer paid premiums. but i cap, would it be as effective for employers who make decisions on what kind of insurance the workers are given a choice of. would that be as effective at restraining costs when it's on the epler initially, the employer would not pass it down and in a visible way. the employer is making the decision with the insurance company, past due to various employees, it it becomes a different mechanism for exerting pressure. and with the design details of a cap prove any more popular than the unpopular detail of the cadillac tax?
they still have to decide whether that very health status of the firms workers, geography, the costs of healthcare in different areas, the riskiness of the occupations the workers are doing. then there are the myriad of applications, how would employers allocate the proportion of the premium above the deductibility cap across the workforce? we now have different categories, different from set different categories. individual, family the individual family adult with a child. they aren't generally varied by age. how is, how are the younger workers of the firm going to feel if really their coverage is well below the cap of the average for the firm as a whole is above the cap? would they want to be hit by that? a second example is a suggestion
that a refundable tax credit equal to the belly of the tax benefit associated with the average employer plan replace the premium subsidies that are provided to low income individuals purchasing through the affordable care act exchanges. even if this credit were to verify income as well as age, most would find the subsidy pretty skimpy. there's probably about enough to buy a bare-bones catastrophic policy and not much more. how is the public going to respond to that? at the complexities of the credit which include such things as determining how to chemically the average tax benefit of the average employer plan, and how one would handle the differences between attacks filing and the insurance filing unit, would easily be as great and complicated as they are under the affordable care act. so we are comparing sort of an image of the desirable to the
reality of the affordable care act. when we talk about this. let me just concluded by noting that contrary to what one hears in the political echo chamber in which we live, the public is not clamoring to have the affordable care act ripped up by the roots and replaced with something new and radically different. the latest kaiser family foundation poll found 26% of the country wants to repeal the entire law. 17% want to scale it back. but on the other hand, 30% want to expand the law, 19% want to keep it where it is. in other words, are split pretty evenly. we are a divided nation which says that as we move forward, we should try to come together. and coming together might mean revising, reforming the reform as opposed to trying to create something absolutely new and different because it has a label
on it, obamacare. >> thanks for that very optimistic view, bob. [laughter] >> but label -- labels do matter. matter. tom, you are up next. >> thank you. good to be with you this morning, joe, scott and bob have done an excellent job. so let's move on to the entertainment portion of this reality show. a strange new group of political aliens landed in the white house and other policy centers. the previous income at an allies support having trouble understanding them. they did speak the same language. that's not surprising. they didn't come from the same political universe. and the main leader seems to have seven wings, least when seated in first-class. so the translators here a
different kind of landed hard on working on converting abstract into something we can understand about what's ahead. let's start by contrasting the different approaches by aca supporters, opponents and constructing healthcare reform system. president obama and his allies try to build a complex, expensive vehicle that had never seen before. sort of like the spruce goose of the 1940s, the howard his project that ran a little behind schedule and budget only got off theground once. you might say it was too big and unwieldy to land on the runways of the time. republicans and aca opponents plan to build a much smaller health policy airship, a very basic stripped-down saw almost anyone can fly it. consumer driven as it were. i just assume there would be a runway where it can land safely. just but anyone we might do but they haven't built one yet. that fellow hanging out of the
biplane was a member of the house freedom caucus who wasn't fully on board. [laughter] let's get to the basics. what's the game plan for republicans and the aca this year? their main goals. repeal as much as possible. and, dammit, were going to have to replace and revise as much as is necessary in that order. some targets out there. most of them have been discussed by scott and bob along the way, who gets the money and where it goes. regulation and mandates, individual mandates, take out early. hard not to do it politically. a lot of the regulations is in the reconciliation, hard to take out in the first goround. everybody wants to get rid of taxes. the problem is just to replace the revenue and the kickbacks to industry, you change the leverage factors. scott didn't talk much about
medicaid. medicaid passed over to the states. it's both a budget donor, a big deal. it's also a place to say the problems will be fixed by someone else and also the blame will be assigned to those. big deal in terms of the federal and health care and reducing it and maybe along the way this is politics, settling some old scores. what might be some better steps? this is the area where we all tune out so you can just read them yourself because the real details are not what most washington observers are interested in at the moment particularly saw get to the main political horse race action of the pari-mutuel betting window even though i recommend all these it's like flyover land because we will do what we have to do. the real political bottom line, from republicans, if you blow all the smoke away, here it is. we won't reduce your subsidies, very much. you have to make the numbers
ballots basically no one is opposed to getting money in the pockets from someone else. the most important point is we just won't interfere as much in terms of how you spend it. the one caveat, your mileage may vary in terms of how far it goes. there's some come you can't go that fast. that's the usual caution. a quick summary of institutional -- bob hit a lot of these. they are all important but i will underscore a couple of them. the past dependents which is never as of congress and their staff have a deal of difficulty in going in new directions. where they were in the recent past is where the logo in future. you can't rewrite epoch in general unanimity so you end up going in a similar direction you did before. the transitions usually kill you but think about the different cultures and commitment of the house and senate. in the house of the talk about regular order on replace. in the senate are going title up, we thought about it forever and have no way to delete any further.
they will operate differently. it will be a bit of a mismatch on the timing. the danger it is all this come if you kind of move to quit, you might end up getting exposed while think you're playing out on the grand stage and it turns out you're not going to appear for the folks. it is some risky business. these are the different tactical moves. they are very good at this one, fire, aim, ready. right out of the bat on that one. defendant various alternate scenarios in transit playing chicken and the miss timing but the hard one is when you're trying to diffuse what's been out there. cutting the wires on the bomb, sequentially. the example here is is it the green one or the black one? what we have are two mutual hostages there is going on, two different sets of bombs. the one and right i suppose is dreams, let's just blow up the aca, full repeal, no collateral damage, no harm. there will be some are if you don't blow it up entirely. that will be a different type of
political explosion but the other one is basically the status quo saying don't touch a thing. this was carefully constructed and if you just cut the wrong wire at the wrong time in the wrong sequence, not only with a blow skyhigh, we will have tens of nights of people without insurance coverage, tens of thousands of people will die within the next year as a result of it. so that's the alternative hostage theory if you don't cut the wires carefully and, therefore, you have a little maneuvering and you end up back in assembliein the same place if the status quo. there sometime in factors for major changes. this is what's driving the process. one point of view is if not now, whenever? you have to seize the moment although sometimes in the bomb squad it's not shocking all, it turns out later on you have shock and awful. there is of his pent-up political emit demands a human talking about all this stuff forever, put up or shut up. you are not going to get this gentlchance he can at present oa found out, he had a simple
majority for two years, things change. if they don't strike while it's on the table it can be a different environment. the less it is we need to more bipartisan gestures at the adolescent is bipartisan gestures only go so far and you start getting bogged down and you end up having to cut to the chase. that's one theory of what happened about eight years ago, we will see what happens at this time around. on the other side of this rhetoric, having to run on those results and that has a disciplined force when you're firing real bullets. nevertheless, i do think that would be some real changes ahead in direction and emphasis am just never as much as people either fear or hope. what i'm going to have in that direction? more private, less public matters of degree. lighten the load in terms of regulation and mandates. a rearrangement but not essentially a reduction of the overall subsidies, anwh