tv The Atlantic Council Hosts Discussion on U.S. Policy Toward Russia CSPAN November 3, 2016 9:00am-12:01pm EDT
i respectfully isn't not only that who do you think will be act in more bipartisan manner congress? i went to congress because i said things were broken. i went there to try to fix them. i became one of the most independent members in congress. i did so having guts to stand up to my party when i felt it was right. i did so making tough choices on votes despite being politically expedient for to do otherwise. we accomplished much this term but there is so much more i want to comply. i will continue to work on jobs and economy. continue to work night and day make you safe, feeling safer as american. i want to continue with many other programs. with your help and vote on november 8th, i would be able to do that would be nice birthday present for me too. thank you very much. god bless you. god bless the united states of america. . .
these are things my opponent doesn't even talk about. we need summit in congress going to represent the people here who know for so many families are struggling. someone who just paid off my student loans last year, paid my way through college with minimum-wage jobs in student loans, someone who is a single mom whose son goes to public school and a series of cedar key. i know what we face. but i want to go to congress and viavoice at the table we've not had a voice before. i hope i can count on your vote on november 8. thank you very much. >> thank you very much.
that doesn't for our time warner cable news new york debate. thanks for participating. and thanks to you for watching at home. election day is november 8 so please go out and vote. be sure to stay with time warner cable does for coverage of this and other races around new york. had a good night. >> here's what are road to the white house coverage looks like today.
>> 27 million, it's not just a number. it's all latino sisters and brothers eligible to vote thanks to the fathers and mothers who, through struggle
and strife, sacrificed to give them a better life. 27 million strong already to vote for freedom, equality and reason, traits that seem to of got out of season. of vote to make a difference, to fight indifference, to silence the ignorance because when you are 27 million strong now and tell you that you don't belong are expected to just move along. 27 million are ready to put up a fight and not be intimidated i hatred and spite. that's what on tuesday the
eighth of november let the little go to the polls greater than ever not to elect a president of united hate but to elect her the next president of the united states. >>
i am hillary clinton and i approved this message. >> there's a movement building an america everyday people stand united are ready to replace decades of broken politics with a new leader is not a part of the system your donald trump, his plan to lower taxes so families get child -- childcare tax credit, law and order, balance and fairness. and america's respected in the world again. this is our country. we can change direction and make america great again. >> i'm donald trump and i approve this message. >> the clintons, from dead broke to with hundreds of millions. how did hillary in that filthy rich? pay to play politics.
hillary cut deals for donors. now the fbi has launched a new investigation. after decades of lies in scandal, her corruption is closing in. >> i'm donald trump and i approve this message. >> a national race is essentially tied between hillary clinton and donald trump according to the latest "washington post" abc news tracking poll. scotland has been looking at the numbers as polling director for the "washington post" your thank you for being with us. >> great to be your. walk us through the numbers. what a we looking at? >> guest: so this is the national preference we were measuring on a four-day tracking poll and we found clinton and trump tied 46% in the most recent wave it has been fairly stable over the last week encompassing the news of friday regarding the fbi, but it shrunk from mid-last week where we had clinton up six percentage points. of the things we asked in the
survey were trying to gauge reaction to some of the recent news, particularly whether people changed their minds. that's clinton's answer your questions on e-mail issue as well as whether the perceptions of clinton and trump as being more honest and trustworthy. >> host: on the question of trustworthiness, some interesting numbers on donald trump. >> guest: that's right. we found trump had an eight percentage point edge is seen more honest and trustworthy. this is different from what we found in early september when the two were tied on this question. clinton has sometimes had an edge on this. no candidate has had a big lead. one thing our are the poll found that majorities of the country think each candidate is dishonest. this is very much a measure of relative honesty. >> host: explain the margin of error and the methodology with regard to the tracking poll. who are you surveying? >> guest: sure. so the margin of sampling error
refers to the expected amount of just random variation we did when we draw a random sample of the country you're right now the margin of error for the poll was 2.5 percentage points. that means a best estimate of their sport is 2.5 points above's 46% are below that. a sample for the survey came from a random national sample of cellular and landline telephones, about two-thirds images conducted over cell phones. we have live interviewers that are calling, about 450 of those adults each night. people are asked whether registered vote as well as their intention to vote and past voting behavior of which point we determined an estimate of those likely to vote. >> host: early voting in place in well over half the country, and the national polls opening up next tuesday. so how fluid is the electorate at this point do you think?
>> guest: i think what appears to be most fluid are the republican leaning segments of the electorate, who have resisted trump, and then resisting them earlier this month on what led to some of clinton's very large leads in service following the debate. what we've seen in recent surveys is that those groups have been coming home. we are talking about independence building republican in particular as well as rank-and-file partisan. one thing that's also uncertain, still at this stage, is how early voting will play out and who will show up on election day. that's a big question given that less than half were just about half of supporters of each candidate are enthusiastic in the people are paying an enormous amount of attention try what we have talked to so often during the course of this can be, to these numbers distributed before next tuesday's election surprise you or are they typical
of the closing days of a national campaign? >> guest: the race does it would have more similarities to four years ago which itself is a surprise because clinton has generally had a steady lead in this campaign and trump is struggle to unify his party. we're seeing a lot of similarities to four years ago. same time, there are a lot of built-in advantages for clinton that she is going for her, particularly in battleground states when polls continue to show her leading as well as where she has a stronger traditional ground game in place in one scott clement as polling director for the "washington post." his work available online at washingtonpost.com. right now a national campaign that is essentially a dead heat between the democratic and republican nominees. thank you very much for being with us trying to thank you for having me. >> we have a terrific -- >> damon wilson with the elected
council opening up a daylong conference on u.s. relations with russia featuring former defense officials, diplomats and foreign policy specialist looking at how policy has changed as a result of the elections, sanctions out the next president might do with russia. you are just getting under way. live coverage here on c-span2. >> one of the most interesting election cycles in recent history. regardless of who the american people choose on election day the next president is cleveland-based difficult decisions. and assertive russia under president putin will be chief among them. with the ongoing conflicts in ukraine in syria, a rise of far right political parties in europe and the ideological affiliation with the kremlin, and alleged russian interference into the u.s. presidential election itself, the next u.s. president will need a clear and definitive strategy for addressing putin's russia. so today's conference convened top russian experts to bring a plurality of views and dialogue
and i suspect a bit of debate with each other on these issues. here at the council we understand our series challenges posed by putin's russia which informed our work. these are challenges that could not only threatening global stability and security also undermine a rules-based international order. there are differing views over the next administrations russia policy should be. should the u.s. engage russia, or should we pursue more policy of containment, or even disruption? doubling down on our security commitments in europe and elsewhere deter or provoke russia? this'll be a difficult path for the next president to strike. it's striking that balance is will record to grapple with in today's conversations. of an outcome of the florida get this conversation to our first panel to discuss hotly contested issue in this election cycle. the russia factor in u.s. presidential election. so please join them looking our distinguished figures for the benefit let me invite
dr. mitchell orenstein who will serve as the moderator and the rest of the speakers to join the stage, please. >> welcome everybody. we are here to discuss a really important issue, russian factor in u.s. presidential elections. and i'll go from my left ear with mr. steven lee myers his correspondent of the "new york times" and author of the book the new czar. miriam elder who was world editor at buzz feed news and has been responsible for setting up the network of correspondents internationally. for that organization.
we have dr. michael desch, professor of political science and director of international studies center at notre dame university. and john haines is codirector of the eurasia program at the foreign policy research institute. i want to begin, i want to begin this discussion today with a number of important ad hocly controversial questions. and i'm going to start with miriam elder, and ask one of the big issues i think was implied in the introduction is our -- pass rush intervened in the u.s. presidential election? you can maybe tell me your views about that. >> that question can be taken in a bunch of different ways. i guess the most concrete thing to look at is the role of russian hackers and misinformation in the campaign. and it really was an extraordinary moment when the obama administration call that russia free being behind these
hacks. we've seen i believe the second time ever the u.s. has actually called out a specific state actor to be involved in hacking. it fits in provoke the with russia's kind of approach to undermine stability around the world and attended in particular. it to question reality in which we are functioning. questions the basis of democracy as such. and so in that regard yes. then there's the question of what are the connections between trump's advisors and the kremlin which is a lot less clear but in terms of hacking the u.s. election in order to undermine its legitimacy come it seems a resounding yes. >> anybody have a dissenting or different view on the panel? >> what sort of the striking is russia is the big factor in the debate, in the sense that a lot
of the big issues most recently the e-mails are associate with russia. but i don't get the sense that the level of public opinion that, for example, the most recent e-mail revelations are generating a lot of heat because they came from russia. that's what the clinton campaign is trying to push. but i think a that the level of the wreck and public, the store is the e-mails themselves and the fact that they came from russia is really sort of secondary. so i think there's a difference between how russia plays at the elite level in the debate about the campaign, and how it is playing in peoria. >> so why do you think that the u.s. electorate, if you can call it that, or many people, don't really seem to mind if russia is involved in hacking or anything in a really much more interested in the content of these hacked e-mails or other sorts of
things? why is that? people are just not interested in international affairs? >> i think it's not a question of they don't mind. i don't think the public is happy with a form government perhaps reading people's private e-mails. but i think just in the grand scheme of things of the big issues in the election, russia just isn't that high for most voters. foreign policy is not generally one of the most salient issues at a mass level. and among the salient foreign policy issues, russia pales compared to terrorism or free trade or even the climate. >> john w. seem like you want to jump in. >> i think intervention is a pejorative term which i'm not just particularly -- russian action for sure, foreign
governments act all time to intervene or to interject themselves into other nations elections. we saw in moldova over the weekend. with respect to hacking, the instability is of hackin hackini think us on the we've spent a lot of time on but the real issue, the underlying issue is if the documents produced a genuine document, we talk about the production of bogus documents, not talking about production of genuine documents which have been doctored to change the meaning which is what we saw for example, in ukraine with russian intelligence agencies. what we're looking at here is by all accounts so far production of genuine documents, that feeds a narrative. that feeds directly into a russian narrative which looks to discredit american democratic processes, political processes both your but more important abroad. >> you seem to want to say something to that, respond to that in someway spent i think
there are a lot of things to say about that because i think on one level as a blow to putin might say there's been a little bit of hysteria about russia's role in our election, which is not to say that it doesn't exist and some people think you should take what putin says and believe exactly the opposite of it. but i do think it's been with up her house for partisan reasons. i actually think it does resonate a little bit in this election particularly because we have one candidate who really as bad the orthodoxy of his party -- bucked -- republican party. there are people, republicans who are agitated by that. upset and think trump is just wrong on russia. i think conversely the democrats have used russia as a very convenient instrument against trump to talk them with putin, to tar the aids who worked there and many of trump's ideas. i think there's no question now
that russia has intervened in someway your what that means exactly, why they're doing it is still somewhat debated even inside the administration. but i'm sort of reminded of fdr's phrase about fear. we need to kind of keep it a little bit in perspective. >> let me ask a slightly different question bouncing off that. what's striking to me is that you have republican voters, approximately 85% of republican voters, around that, voting for a candidate who is openly pro-russian. win in washington, d.c. at least as i've experienced it, republican parties tended to be rather hawkish on russia. how do you explain this if not by the people just don't really care actually about the russians so much? >> but isn't that a sufficient explanation? i think the trump another non-is
not going to be explained by russia -- trump phenomenon. it's an effect a protest vote against a lot of other issues in american politics. and so in a way the russia issue is a little bit of a side issue. you are absolutely right, but both on foreign policy and international engagement and on free trade, the political party have flipped flopped in this particular election. and that's an interesting story, but i think it's more a symptom of what's behind trump, which is a larger repudiation as usual been any really concrete position, certainly on russia or a lot of other foreign policy issues. >> how was this going to affect policymaking in washington?
if the case that you describe is more less right, and you have republican party flipping to a pro-russia decision, how does that affect policymakers in washington, d.c.? a lot of people in the odd is now the policy community purdue under what i'm talking about, where republicans typically stand. how is that when you change things? >> i don't think that the republican establishment that this show has changed yet an obvious it will depend on what happens on tuesday. i think there are a lot of people even before this election looking at how do we deal with a newly resurgent company with aggressive, and newly belligerent russia now. that's a conversation that's been going on in this town for a couple of years and that will continue. but what outcome it takes will of course depend on the election. if donald trump when i think he's going to come and have that conversation with the same people in this town.
>> nonetheless it strikes me that if you have, not only, all these voters, all these republican voters, which also have a lot of republican politicians, right, going on record supporting a pro-russian politician your i mean, i yes, i have too many things are not going to change but it seems like something has changed, right? i don't think in the past that's happened before. and rhetorically doesn't it make it more difficult for people to take a hard line on russia when they've endorsed the candidate >> but then you mike pence coming out in the vice presidential debate and giving the exact opposite position to donald trump. like it doesn't seem to be like the republican establishment had suddenly switched and his pro-putin and propublica i think will be a huge reckoning in the republican party no matter what happens, and russia will be included in that.
>> i'm not sure that a russia may be is altogether a fair conversation of mr. trump or republican voters. i'm not sure you can be pro-a country that aims nuclear missiles at you. i don't think there's any question hopefully much anybody is going to vote on tuesday that russia is an adversary. i think the issue is is the nature of engagement, whether the question is, our current engagement with russia or how we can engage with it engaged with us as a result of anybody has found satisfactory. what we see his reaction to that. walking way from plutonium disposition agreements doesn't favor either side. i think looking at that is the beginning, it's a framing effect that we see long-standing agreements between two countries starting to fall apart and mutual antagonism exacerbating that. so if you so deeply anything
with respect to russia it might be a bad phrase but a recent if you will where a different approach, hopefully let the linguists get it right this time, but a different approach about a more positive engageme engagement. >> john is absolutely right. i know you're just kind of a provocative early in the morning, but the idea that held his pro-russian in anything other than being sort of less hawkish than hillary clinton strikes me as a bit of an overstatement. certainly in terms of the american public, the american public is not pro-russian. a public attitudes towards russia are not at cold war levels but they are lower than they were in the heady days of the immediately, the immediate post-cold war period. but where the public they think is breaking from the old hawkish
consensus on russia is they willing to stipulate that vladimir putin is a rotten guy and engaged in some nefarious behavior. but the idea that the united states has to engage and contain russia in the same sort of way we did with the soviet union during the cold war, that's what the evidence, for example, against further expansion of nato, evidence of little public stomach for using american forces to defend our new nato allies in the baltic states, or using military force in the context of a russian escalation in eastern ukraine, that's were you saying that public breaking from -- seeing the public breaking from the hawkish consensus. >> speaking from the heart, not just provocateur of getting the
juices flowing this morning, but i think it's fair to say that trump is if not a pro-russian politicians certainly pro-putin. he's made very, very favorable statements about whether putin saying is a strong leader, a great leader, better than recent u.s. presidents. he seems to be, to admire his strong hand. he admires a certain tendencies that he has and mechanisms of wielding power. so is it really too much of an exaggeration to call an eight pro-putin politician? i don't really hear so much from him about what sort of different strategies you do to counter russia. i rather hear him saying that he wants russia as an ally actually. >> if i could just jump in. i've talked to some of the
people who advised trump, and trump himself if you look at his record in russia. they clearly approach rush as a country, as a policy differently. they look at the business opportunities that are there. that pro-russian or pro-putin, not necessarily but they see it as a place where you can do business. to the extent tropez talk about policy with regards russia it's that if we got a lot better perhaps we could resolve the situation with the islamic state. guess would have been more cooperative attitude instead of the sort of new proxy where we have going on in syria right now. >> so do business, i think is the right way to think about it, but not business in the sense of opening trump casino moscow, but do business in the sense of fight isis in syria and deal with the iranian nuclear problem. in both cases people can be
unhappy with the details of these business relationships, but the fact of the matter is that in a number of important cases, russian and the united states have had more common interest than they that opposing interest. my sort of take in listen to donald trump is that this isn't pro-putin, that this is a recognition of you've got to do business with people with whom you have, interest. and there are big issues around the world that we have common interest with the russians on. >> just to clarify, business is part of it. you can go and you can just not build casinos, don't mean that, but people who think of the energy trade, any kind of investment opportunities in russia, with natural resources
and beyond. so i think that is what kind of unites a lot of the people around comes campaign as they look at russia. >> i think the definition is what it is to do business with russia's interest in because it's the definition of the recent which hillary clinton championed, which is we work with russia on things that we have a life interest in them and put everything else aside that is going to be problematic. that obviously blew up in everybody's face. i think it's much more interesting to discuss what hillary clinton's approach to rush would be because that seems a lot less sure than trump which is very much pro-putin as an integer, pro-doing business. that hillary seemed to reset kind of love and not have much of a replacement and not really understand what her position would be going forward. >> i wasn't thinking hillary clinton i was thinking michael corleone a. [laughter] spin let's talk about clinton for a second.
i'm surprised you say that because it seems to me pretty clear if you look at other people close to the clintons that there's been a trajectory which is similar to the bush to trajectory which is first we tried other good relationship and for doing everything we can and overlooking a lot of issues. and then it's abuse enough in this perspective that ultimately they follow the arc to being firm and sharply opposed, and basically supporting policy containment of russia. do you see anything different going on in the clinton camp on that? >> the other side questions have popped up in the interim come in like syria. hillary wants to impose a no-fly zone, what does that do to the relationship with russia as i'm not sure i have an answer. >> i would just add, not just the bush administration but the first clinton administration. every presidency comes in and tries, has to do with russia. whoever is elected next week it
will come in and do have to deal with russia. i don't think anyone is ever going to use the word reset again but that's what's going to happen. it's unavoidable. >> so you think clinton is going to start another recent? >> i think they will not use the word, or the silly red button. but no, i mean, to the, i guess i can predict what hillary clinton's going to do as president but i don't think we'll be a lot different than what you saw at the beginning of the administration in that as miriam was saying, trying to say where can you work with russia right now. rush has to be done with syria. this can't go on like this forever and it's going to involve a solution with russia i think in the end. and so have a sit down and navigate that, do they compartmentalize it the way that john kerry seems to be trying to do? and then you get into ukraine
and nato and all the other issues. one other thing i would say is what often focus on our policy here, but to a great degree you can blame the deterioration of relationships in the bush administration and the obama administration on russian actions. the invasion of georgia in 2008, the invasion of ukraine in 2014. we can manage a relationship. i think we have to but we can't assume it's all in our hands to fix. >> michael, did you want to jump in? >> i'm wondering if we can blame it all on russia. i was in a meeting with russian foreign minister andrei in 1996, and he was very concerned about the effect of nato expansion on the prospects for further democratization of russia. his argument was what i you guys doing?
if you care about reform in russia, why are you expanding nato? particularly given that gorbachev believed he had very solid assurances from the first bush administration that nato, in fact, would not expand. and that's pretty well documented at this point. i think if we start asking about whether the problems in the relationship are in our hands, i think where to go back and ask why did we expand nato when it was pretty clear that a lot of the people we wanted to see prosper in russia were telling us that this would be very bad for the future of reform and democracy. >> i'd like to echo that go back to what -- if it's prosecution of a containment doctrine, i think we can pretty much
understand how that plays out. claiming the label can do without buying the whole canon doctrine i think is folly. jenin was emphasized far more than this sort of things in the notion of containment, a deep understanding of cultural and political occurrence within rush which i think are almost entirely absent from a prosecution of russian policy today. so the constant vilification of russian leaders. kennan would tell you you'll get the reaction you have gotten now. went back to sort of how mr. trump sees mr. putin, i think he sees and if you don't have a counterpart, any business negotiations you have to have a counterpart. if you don't come if you go into a negotiation and to have what are you don't respect your counterpart, you're unlikely to yield anything.
it's very characteristic of the way he's talked about everybody. >> getting back to the election of want to raise another question about hillary clinton, which puzzles me, which is why do you think that the russian government dislikes hillary clinton so much? i say that not, this is not conjecture i don't think that they dislike her because all's look at some public opinion polling within russia. donald trump is five times more popular than hillary clinton within russia, which neither of them are very popular actually. her popularity is very, very low. that's reflective of realit of y of russian state television but within russia and also if english-language program to in the u.s., which unilaterally slam on her all the time and spend all sorts of conspiracy theories about her as she is responsible for this or that or created isis or the protests
were very things, shot down an age when 17, i don't know. why do you think they dislike hillary so much? >> i'm happy to jump and. i think one, it's sexism that we can put that aside. >> why should we put that aside speak with because it's kind of obvious, powerful woman. not necessarily a mainstay in russian politics and i think politics is a much crafted as like male genitals. i think it's personal between putin and clinton, in fact, during the protests in 2011 and 2012, you might find a putin personally blaming the protests on hillary clinton saying that she was almost with her own hands paying protesters with money or cooking or whatever to get them out into the streets against him. so this is a campaign that's
been building for years and years but it didn't just come out of this election cycle. >> it was on hand gesture but i don't know. i missed it. now, he literally thinks the state department through clinton orchestrated the protests of the parliamentary elections in 2011. the one thing i would add about the sexism clinton herself tells the story in her book, some of the time she met putin and there's this scene where she's trying to engage with him on sort of not personal level but now his interest in wildlife and nature conservation efforts and so forth. she asked him about it in the kind of very excitedly, tuckered out in the basement started the carts or do basement started the cards went down basement started the carts or do not expect it is the american sector is to come through and showed her this polar bear that was stopped and talked about efforts to protect the polar bears from being
endangered in the arctic not as wwe all know the end of the into said bill should come and we'll go out that dean. it didn't even occur to putin maybe she would go. so i think there is a kind of male sensibility to that, but not necessarily openly hostile which is something reflected in putin's mind. and his relationship with -- i don't think we should discount the sexism at all in about a debate it's much more motivated by the sense that she was part of this effort that putin at a time when he was i think feeling quite a global because of the protests in the arab spring, the toppling of moammar gadhafi. he really thought that there was a western, you know, campaign two topple dictators starting into niche and making its way to syria, next up moscow. >> but there has been, hasn't
there? >> acer dudley south. >> hillary clinton is the candidate of america as the indispensable natured and also steve would say is the candidate of militant democracy and militant liberalism. that's just going to be a point of friction for the leader of a country whose view of the world is very different from hers. trump in a sense is in a probably more congenial figure because putin sees a similar sort of mindset in terms of politics. let's do a deal, even if you don't like somebody, let's find common ground. ironically, i don't think they see that in the clinton administration. >> interesting.
i sort of want to ask a follow-up but maybe it would be too argumentative. do you mean 12 is not a military democrat or militant liberal? >> i think he's made that very clear. that one of the breaks he would make would be with this sort of end of history mindset that we sort of figured out the way the world should be. in essence as a businessman he is committed to a version of capitalism and things like that. but on the other hand, i don't think you hear the ideological triumphalism in trump that you got in the first clinton administration, and that you often hear from secretary clinton. >> so let me go back to something we are talking about a bit earlier. i think we talked through,
everybody more or less agrees that there's some level of russian intervention or involvement in this election, right? there's fingerprints over the hacking scandals and such. and clearly they are tilted in one direction. i think people would agree with that. they are tilted against clinton at least. will we also talked about the fact fully reckon public it's not clear that's a major issue, in the sense that maybe people think it's time for change in russian policy anyway or they are open to it. and anyway, foreign policy may not be the noble issue voters are looking at. all those issues resonate very carefully with the national security community i would think. because from a national security standpoint what we, in fact, have is a foreign power intervening in our elections, pushing at least against one candidate is not in favor of
another candidate. and doing it pretty effectively and in a way pretty openly. as the u.s. done anything to counteract that? and my follow-up, anything effective or is that even on the table speak with let me suggest how that might be heard elsewhere. and that's an example two hours ago, radio liberty published a story that they been given preferred access to the latest cyber clinton attack, those documents. we have to ask ourselves, if we change the ever-present and says it's been given preferential access to the latest wikileaks hack, how would that be heard here? i'm not suggesting more equivalency but i am suggesting an element of a symmetry. we ought to understand this in its larger context as a security matter because we rely on the opinion of our allies and others in other parts of the world and
they don't necessarily how we may believe this is heard and perceived is, in fact, accurate. accurate. >> so are you saying, just be clear about this, that the cyber attacks were a u.s. retaliation speak with him not saying that. what i'm saying is windows documents are published or when the agency sosa with united states government is rightly or wrongly is given preferred access to those documents and publishers of those documents, it's i think the inference that strong by many people who hear that is that there's a connection, that it is, in fact, a u.s. government action. >> or are you sourcing the u.s. regularly ask into other peoples people's political systems to influence the course of their election? >> no, i'm not saying there. we are serving as involving other political systems as we can others may be here.
i think our purpose is -- >> i'm glad you got one taker. >> in a sense, what's interesting is that is likely woke up one morning and again started with allegedly the russians hacking the dnc, as if there was no history before that in terms of our relationship with russia. i mean, given the differences in our political systems, the manifestation of how we would get involved in russian politics would look different, but the idea that this is anything other than business as usual between two frenemies, countries with both common interest and divergent interest seems a little bit naïve. and so it adds an element of unreality to the discussion of
russian intervention in american politics, you know, in the context of this election as if it never happened before, were as if we never did it. >> it is actually unprecedented. yes, hacking has happened before. there's numerous times where you have, use has officially called on russia for hacking into the sticky bubblegum into the defense department but this is something that's been happening for years and years. the differences these e-mails were made public. the question is also the role of wikileaks which has been mentioned at all. the question is how did this stuff to do somebody in intimacy in london and make its way into the wider world? this has never happened before. whether we want to engage in questions about -- another story, not saying it's good about the it is unprecedented. >> steve? >> in the administration, they talk a little bit about, obviouslobviously they called at
and they said they will respond. and asked when the leaks came out, might this be a response quick somebody told me they didn't think it was because there's a concern that you can begin to escalate, tit for tat. so seemed to me like nice, the dnc will hack your political guide by somebody suggested that wasn't the approach that they would take because they don't want to get into well then, you have act and so now we will hack the white house. it just goes on and on and on. i think there's some effort to try to contain just a little bit. i think they will respond in a way that probably most of us will not know about, though we will try. >> the previous cases, they responded by issuing sanctions because they also did want to get into this escalating cyberwar. >> it is business as usual
despite. we all do it. we want to know what's going on in the russian political system and with people employed to do that. it's true with them as well and, of course, that is business as usual but i agree with miriam that, as the intelligence agencies say, it was ever a rush to tilt the election one way or the other, that isn't something that would be ordinary. >> hide the history of cold war spies, covert operations going back to the u.s. intervention in the elections in italy immediately in the early cold war period suggests that this is not unprecedented. the one thing i would say though, if you said, if you asked me would i want the russian sniper capability are what i want the american cyber capability, i would take the american 70s a week, 365 days a year. think about it.
it was a russian internet security company that first broke the stuxnet virus. lovably the most effective and consequential example of cyber warfare we've seen yet. you are looking at this from the russian side competing with the west, and particularly the united states and cybercom actually an 800-pound gorilla versus a chimpanzee. >> i think you underestimate their capabilities that way. to a quite sophisticated. >> i just wouldn't underestimate -- >> i agree with you on that but somebody and law enforcement last week was talking to me about this and they talk about how the internet is an american invention to russians think cia invention. it's created this open space that we all live in and is vulnerable in places. the russians i think were slow at that. they were sold under sin health internetwork and how they would
respond to it. the political threat they posed in some ways. if you read a great book to read web talks a lot about how the tide of need to manage this information space up there. i think according to the people of been talking to recently, i think the russians have got a. a country could understand what both the volokh those are able to the opportunities are. >> i think we ought to qualify virtual all cyber activity occurs in the darkest days in the dark. what is the product of espionage now in the daylight because it's useful. because it feeds into a russian narrative, again the production of genuine documents, the release of documents that can, in fact, speak for themselves support a russian narrative and that narrative is the west is hypocritical. it's what they said to the united nations in the 1960s. if you live in a glass house, don't throw stones. putting those documents into the public domain fee to the russian
narrative overseas in particular but to some extent in the united states, that american political systems to operate the way we said operate. they operate in a far different like and here's evidence of it. it's a useful product and we just got a small peek into the dark world. >> i want to challenge, i mean, it strikes me that this is a highly consequential use of cyber warfare. if you're able to hack into somebody else's political system and tip the results of the election against a candidate that you don't like, it would strike me that that is maybe less technologically sophisticated and other things where capabilities of the doing. nonetheless, this is extremely consequential. >> it's a chicken or the egg question, because i think john's right, that this is an attempt using real documents to cause some mischief. i wouldn't blame the russian
production of these documents who as being the most consequential part of the. the fact of the matter is that the contents of the documents resonate with widespread perceptions among many american voters about our political system. whether if it was the russians coming up with the stuff or wikileaks on their own is secondary to that, that big question. >> yeah, so you know, this is, you know, kind of fascinating discussion. i wonder if that would be a good time to open it up to the four. i'm sure we have quite a lot of people's interest at this point, and maybe we can take a few questions. made i will interject at some later point. the gentleman in the white shirt on the corner. i think you may have to wait for a mic to come by just for the
recording that is happening. this is all on live tv. >> thank you and good morning. thank you for an interesting panel. my question to the panel is, whom on the panel has actual operational experience in elected politics? because what i'm hearing is a massachusetts avenue narrative of the u.s.-russia. i'll submit this as if in addition and welcome your comments. with trump and what's left of the gop base, the issue has never been really russia but it starts with race. and if you don't understand the racial connection and vladimir putin's role as representing a defender of white racialism which begin with the outreach to the gop base in 2010, which is pete sessions, stephen miller who wrote donald trump's
address, at the center for national interest. there's a neocon in this debate which we heard here but there isn't an understanding of what putin now has a 52% approval rating among republican base is going to vote for putin. it's not that you pull the -- your politics are talking of it starts with racial identification and anti-liberal democratic authoritarianism. if you miss that narrative then you will be surprised. >> i think that's a totally legit question, which is we've been talking about one narrative and what he is intersecting the election but another way is intersecting the election is by positioning himself as the protector of christian values and, therefore, poking into a kind of discourse. is kind of a key row among certain white nationalist essentially. that's pretty much a question, right? and so why are we ignore that come is that your question?
>> looking at the trump phenomenon. >> that's just a little bit in the near to i had earlier which is like isn't there a bigger change going on in the republican party. what do you guys think? >> first of all i was student body president of my high school. [laughter] that was my last elected experience. i see your point and i would push back a little bit in the sense that i think a lot of what motivates pro-putin -ism in this country is anti-obama attitudes. i remember when the redline in syria that was not crossed, was caused by the syrians can we didn't respond to that. and lateral putin intervened with obama to try to deal with syria's chemical weapons issues in a way that was kind of successful. the point trump has made that we
should be cooperating with putin instead of opposing and. i remember it was matt drudge who called whom the leader of the free world. i don't think it's all just fringe, but it is a response to what many think of something is perceived weakness obama on foreign policy issues. i do think that the conservative values of think of something that resonates with people. i would point out it's pretty new in putin. it wasn't what you saw in the first terms of his presidency. so i think it's convenient for him politically to some extent. and it does resonate with some people here. i wouldn't say it's the entire republican base by any means but it certainly is an element. >> putinism to the extent that there's a coherent ideology is about russian nationalism.
nationalism is renaissance in a lot of places around the world including the united states. >> absolutely. i'm going to go with his gentlemen up here in the gray suit. >> and observation and then my question. this has been going on for a long time. you may recall in your history books that the soldiers were trying to influence british politics. how do you think franklin roosevelt recognized the soviet union that was not accidental comrade? you had the whole scarce in the '40s and 50s for those of you old enough, the leading television document to rooting out the red threat. and by the way, we did bug brush in his -- so it works on both sides. i don't think there's anything really new. i question is this.
could get one specific policy recommendations you would make if hillary were to win or if a five word with? >> i have to say that's the topic of our third panel today. i don't think were going to get too deep into also but i'll take another couple or should have been if people wish to address the question, i will certainly allow the but let me go to the gentleman here in the front. could you bring the phone over here? >> thank you. i'm from the office of congressman steve chabot, and i want to ask you, for two questions in one. the first is a lot of the discussion has been about putin demand, couldn't the decision-maker. if you go back maybe a week ago there was no room for debate in the times talking about how much does individual leader matter? how much do think we're overstating the agency of vladimir putin?
do any of you buy the argument that plan is actually just, he's a typical russian statesman? and whoever replaces him, whenever that occurs, is unlikely to be significantly different? and the second thing is that it was just announced kiriyenko of all people is that could be the deputy chief of staff of the kremlin. what do you think that signals that there might be a reset on the russian part of things or do you think it's meaningless? >> let me just say these are great questions but i'm going to exercise my authority as moderator on a panel that is focusing on the election and the russian factor in this election and the united states, to ask everybody who's raising their hands to focus their questions on the u.s. side. maybe people will again come back to the. i'm also going to choose people in the back over there some going to choose this gentleman on the aisle.
>> thank you. foreign service, retired. i'd like to address the discussion of whether trump is an admirer of russian or admire of putin. i think that's off the market when he showed is he is an admirer of a strong leader, and just the way trump i has gained the system in the united states as far as, is just bankruptcies, his use of the tax system, who knows what other kind of things he's done. he likes the way who has gained a system to what he can be elected over and over again. what he's done in ukraine, what is done in the crimea, i was able to support -- i think he is an admirer of a strong leader, and he doesn't pay, we have seen by the way he addresses foreign policy, he is really not focused so much on the issues as much as
it's amazing to me that our government has arrested any number of russian cyber criminals who have hacked the bank accounts of american citizens and businesses that we seldom see any of that in the media and our policymakers, including hillary clinton, never raise it as an issue in any way. the russian government defends those people. they accuse us of kidnapping their citizens, but we seldom see any pushback on that. i guess my question is, could we do a better job about why we are concerned about russia, if that's that's part of the problem. >> can we do a better job of explaining why this is a problem to people presuming they don't know that is already.
the other question is trumps admiration for vladimir putin the fact that he's a strong leader rather than anything in policy. >> if we started making cybercrime a major issue in our relations with other countries, it strikes me that russia would not be the only, or maybe even the top of the list. not sure that would help. i think the american public has a pretty good sense of what the issues are and the issues are, putin is not a democrat and he has said some nasty things, particularly in crimea but on
the other hand they have concluded we don't have a dog in those fights, and there are other fights they are happy to let the russians take the lead of, particularly in syria which is what the american public really cares about which is international terrorism, top of everybody's list. >> i would agree, this is not just true in this election, but form policy is really the decisive factor. i think his admiration that he has expressed for vladimir putin and russia, i actually think it's kind of sincere. i don't think it's thought through, i think he had a great time with the ms. universe ms go is great place. you can have a great time there. i think it's almost an emotional reaction in that sense anything we've talked already that it's a question of how he perceives a weakness in obama.
some would argue that putin is not on the great winning streak either. i think for voters in the election as their deciding, if they are with trump then may be prudent, maybe not. here's the candidate that is pro- putin. i've been looking for that leader. or the reverse by the way. i think that democrat has been effective at tarring trump and that's been a very deliberate strategy on their part. again, i'm not not sure that's going to win any voters because you're going to be with clinton or you're going to be with trump and i don't think putin will
decide for you. >> i think to the question, if you don't think about matters clearly, you are unlikely to explain them in clear terms. i think what underlies the clarity on the explanation is the thought. i think a beginning point might be. [inaudible] these are our geopolitical interests. i challenge anybody to find somewhere in the debate over the past 15 months where anybody has said anything like that. if we are not able or unwilling to articulate what our interests are in a critical part of the world, i think they will do that on their own. >> can i press on something about understanding and response wasn't really that satisfied
with the discussion we had on how to respond to this because i think everything agrees something is happening. we are being intervened in. i heard a lot of information about should we even be concerned about that. i see some people saying we do the same thing so what's the big deal, but the fact is, i would suggest there is a national security issue. certainly latin american countries, if they have elections they get intervened in what's our response? >> if i could jump in, i would remind you of fdr's comment about fear and the only thing to
fear is fear itself. i think we can overreact to that and we shouldn't. at the end of the day, let's just assume putin himself has hacked into the dnc and give an e-mail to wikileaks and we've already, it's, it's great for journalism, by the way. so, that isn't an attack on this? i think it's weapon rising information and it's part of the game that is going on. i can tell you, in the national security side of town, people are very concerned about this and concerned about the election on their going to be on alert on tuesday and beyond about what this threat poses. i think we can be hysterical if were not careful so maybe the answer is satisfying to you. >> that's an answer. i was can ask a follow-up question. how about the media?
how do you feel the media has responded to this issue and you think that response has been adequate? >> first of all, i love the media. we've all made mistakes. i will include the new york times in that. i think we have a pretty good job in our job is to inform. you do your best. there's been some sloppy reporting and by and large. at the end of the day, you keep
reporting the facts out and affects it out in the election will be over at some point, and that we will keep reporting facts in learning more about these hacks and russians intention and what the next administration will do. >> there has been a range of work, there's been incredibly careful work and then there is work with this hysteria. it's tough when the subject you love that is taken up by people who latch onto it with a passing expertise and then they whip up this hysteria where i think, over the past two months, it seems like people are looking for little red telephone on trumps desk and the little red telephone on putin's desk and they're looking for these commands to be coming from the kremlin, straight into trumps here without the understanding
that russia doesn't have to even work that way to mess with the election and the way they want to. there's been a wide range, some some great and some not so great it's very similar debate in terms of the effective propaganda within the united states. it's ironic that putin cites that act repeatedly in cracking down within russia, but i think we want to be cautious about how much power. [inaudible] i understand, but for those web watched, i don't think we have seen a flood of american viewers vote to watch it or somehow that changes american opinions and i don't think they would be bouncing around at 1%. i think we have to be cautious about how much potency we
ascribe to russian power within the united states. >> this will be a historical election but it won't be a historic election because of russian meddling. it will be a historic election because it will be indicative of pretty fundamental changes in the historic outlines in american politics. i think there is a danger in losing sight of that if we say it's all being driven by the nefarious activities of a foreign actor. there are big fundamental structural things that are going on that would be going on irrespective of the big office in the kremlin. >> time for one more question. then i think we will end in the back. >> i'm a volunteer with the
lithuanian community inc. and i've been bemused by the panelists claiming that trump pro- putin, pro- russian imperialism comments haven't been heard by the communities of eastern european americans. our numbers months ago became alarmed at trumps ignorance and characterization of nato as a protection racket. he thinks he can do do a deal with putin. i think people should remember that there are american citizens with the memory, a history and they value the fact that nato helped secure the democratic evolutions of the 1980s.
>> can you identify for us particular states where you feel the election may depend on the voters are talking about? do you have a sense of any elections that may tip because of this? >> traditionally one would think that our members in the west belt, and if you go back to our parents or grandparents generation, you will have those voters in michigan, illinois, ohio, massachusetts, connecticut , pennsylvania, but our members actually, we have around 70 chapters in 27 states including alaska and hawaii and the sunbelt.
i would imagine that is true for most of the eastern european ethnic communities. >> i have a question about ohio and there's a large enough east eastern european block that could have an effect on the outcome, you're absolutely right. i don't think it will swing alaska, but ohio and pennsylvania is another one. a few percentage points would make a difference. >> there's a long and well-documented history of special interest groups shaping u.s. electoral politics. there's also a countercurrents, for example, where's the cuban lobby these days on u.s. cuban relations. if you look at a change policy and the by partisan policy, it
isn't what it once was. somebody lived for six years in chicago and is familiar with baltic politics, i might suggest that might be something that may be diluting as time goes by. let's go to this gentleman second to the left over here. >> one sentence observation that trump isn't saying that he wants the united states to do what putin wants. he is saying that putin is a
role model, that he thinks is worth emulated. it's a different way of being pro- putin. the question has to do with the way in which electoral politics may or may not be changing. it is not unprecedented, but this is the first time since 1945 the any foreign government has made a serious effort to influence the u.s. election and for most of my lifetime, the united states has been unique in the world to being the only country whose elections were not being influenced by foreign government. assuming that this isn't just a one shot, that in the world of
the internet we can expect all of our politics to be a target for other countries whose interests are affected by who gets elected. is this going to make the change in the way in which the united states conducts our democratic politics? >> that's a great question. >> i was just an essay, if you would ask the obama administration whether they agreed with your proposition that this is the first time a foreign government has intervened in our political process, they might point to the unprecedented and quite controversial speech by the prime minister of israel to the american congress in the context of a presidential election. in a sense, this is business as usual. foreign governments or interest group, domestic interest groups
with foreign connections have long tried to influence american politics going back to the revolutionary. in the founding fathers. it's not new. it's just the medium is new. it's connected i think with a really important election that we are going to remember throughout the region. >> i was thinking about the crisis in the early 1970 which is in an effort, i don't think it's novel. i think what is novel, we don't understand particularly well and we haven't thought of it because it's relatively new of the most part it's not well understood. it's assumptions in the dark. what we have today which is different is that domain. that domain has never had the
prominence that i had today. it certainly is not going to go away. there's an area for the next president to think of. >> talked a lot about the presidents who are intervening in the u.s. elections, but we haven't talked about very explicitly that we have been intervening as putin would perceive it or other you eastern european and former communist for a long time. accuracy is a threat. we promote democracy. that's our policy. therefore we are promoting -- if he gets that he will intervene as much as he can. from a historical perspective and as a journalist, my question is, is there any support in the
american electorate. this is not being talked about. hillary will say he's an authoritarian dictator but there's no discussion about the old vision of american city on a hill and promotion of democratic values, it's not been discussed very much in the election. is it because we are losing support of the eastern europeans what is your take on the meaning of this election in terms of the american electorate and what they will and will not support from a future president knowing that he will continue to protect his regime and that we, unless we change our policies drastically will continue to be seen as a threat to coast democracy is the antithesis of his role and on any other dictator. >> my impression of having
covered this in washington and on the receiving and in russia and iraq is that mission is falling greatly as bipartisan in our foreign policy. there's the freedom agenda at the end of the bush administration that they pressed which the russians will point to as being a threat in ukraine. the obama administration, as they have more broadly said, we need to engage the world differently and they've not pushed us as hard, despite what he thinks, i don't think he was trying to orchestrate the regime in 2011 and 2012. i thousand 12. i think in some respect, the trump worldview of let's face
our problems at home and make our america great again and fix our problem, i think that's true for voters, at least the ones i've encountered, except for very active blocks out there. where i'm from and central california, ukraine is just not a big issue. i don't think georgia was, i think both clinton is perceived as being a more active foreign policy or having a more active form policy, but i think she will also, if elected more or less reflect the view of the obama administration, sort of like we need to disengage a little bit. not entirely. i don't think anyone is advocating that the united states walk away from the rest of the world. i don't think we can in this day and age, but that aggressive policy of promoting a democracy abroad is far down the
priorities. >> we have time for one more question. i'm going to recognize the lady in yellow in the back over there >> i'm interested in what you think the fallout will be for the republican national security establishment in congress from trump's popularity as the gop reconcile and these murky russian and isolationist general tendencies. you think republicans in congress going forward continue to take a very hawkish position like arms control, providing lethal weapons to the ukrainians and such? >> this is where the congressional leadership in the republican side who was little more open to electoral influence, what are they going
to be doing? >> a lot depends on what happens next tuesday. if trump wins, i think the shakeout from that in terms of the establishment and republican form policy community is going to be quite dramatic. on the other hand, if he loses, the short-term effect will be to reinforce their conventional wisdom which is sort of animated, how they thought about form policy since the end of the cold war. i think given that form policy is really an inside beltway issue, the effects will be somewhat muted. the issues that most voters are going to care about, particularly in terms of congressional election just not going to register with them.
i think they will be able to go along with business as usual, assuming trump loses. if he does win, all bets are off >> i think that's a great place to wrap up. i think we have an irregular threat that thrives and drives, these are issues that have serious form policy implications that are virtually undiscussed. there are opportunities to take the message from this election and apply those in the policy realm. >> i think it's a great place to stop because the consensus, as as far as i can see among the panel, with one outcome, conventional wisdom will be reinforced.
conventional wisdom will be out the window. we are going to be in a new world. that's the subject of the third panel. today i hope you will stick around for that. i think it's time now to transition onto the second panel which will deal with particular policy issues. anyway, thanks so much for everybody's question, for your attention and discussion today. thanks for the panelists and we are adjourned. thank you. >> thank you. i would like to ask everybody to stay in their seat. we will bring the second panel to talk about another controversial issue when it comes to russia, u.s. and european relations.
that panel will be moderated by daniel hamilton who is the executive director at johns hopkins. he will be joined by this english group of panelists dashed distinguished group of panelist. we will have a set of different views, opinions, a lot of disagreement and i think this will prove to be a lively debate. if you could just bear with us for another 30 seconds as we pull everyone on stage. [inaudible conversation]
[inaudible conversation] >> okay, good morning everyone. thank you for sticking with us. as alayna said i'm dan hamilton and we are very pleased to be cohosting this event. the topic now is sanctions. their importance, their future, their effectiveness. i think our treasury secretary had a quote to put this in context. he said economic sanctions have become a powerful force in service of clear and coordinated form policy objectives, smart power for situations where diplomacy alone is insufficient, but military force is not the
right response. i think we see, not only in russia but in other contexts that the u.s. has been using sanctions to accomplish a variety of goals. we see our european allies and others engaged in similar activities. we would like to explore, especially after our election how those sanctions, what are the sanctions and other possibilities for others, how effective are they. we have a great panel here. you have everyone's bios, but just briefly, to give you a quick some come a david kramer, here is, at the mccain institute, the senior director of democracy, former president of the freedom house and secretary of state for democracy human rights and labor and much of eastern europe.
we have emma here who is a researcher at the cato institute and politics of energy issues. her research is examining the extent to which international sanctions on russia have been effective and their affect on u.s. and european economies and businesses. we have elizabeth rosenberg who is a senior fellow at the director of economics and security program at the center for new american security. she is publishing a lot right now on national and foreign policy security implications of energy market shift but also the use of sanctions, economic spacecraft. she is formally in the u.s. treasury department as a special advisor financing against that and the undersecretary for secretary and intelligence. then we have alexa shymko was a nonresident senior fellow at the
brookings institute. former deputy and chairman of the central bank of russia and former chairman of merrill lynch russia. you see a great panel, great expertise, different views and so we will start this way. i think to give everyone a lay of the land, david, david, if i could ask you, just to start us off, what are the sanctions that are in place right now? just to give us an orientation point. there are a number of them and it's very complicated for people to keep track of everything we are trying to do. could you give an opening outline of what we are talking about? >> sure, thank you very much and thank you to the sponsors and terrific audience. it is great to be here. let me talk about four sets of sanctions. two of which exist and to have been talked about. the first is the rule of law and accountability act that the u.s.
congress passed by a huge bipartisan majority in 2012 and the president signed in december of that year to go after russian officials involved in gross human rights abuses and that has been in place. only the united states is a country who has passed such legislation despite to get europeans, canadians and others on board, no one else has passed similar legislation. in 2014, the second set of sections were imposed and they break down into two sets. one is related to the illegal annexation of crimea by russian forces in early 2014, sanctions connected to those and additional sections for russia's ongoing invasion and aggression against ukraine in the eastern part of the country. those sanctions have been passed not only by the united states but the european union getting all 28 members on board as well as canada, australia, other democratic countries, japan on board with them. those are the sanctions that
have been passed and ones that are target against individuals, the they go after individuals and entities as well as prospects for development and energy as well as limiting finance opportunities. there are two other sanctions that have been talked about but nothing has been done in regard to those. those are in connection with russia's military aggression and attacks in syria, particularly aleppo where u.s. and other officials have described yash russian actions as constituting war crimes. the un had talked about those a few weeks ago but did not get consent consensus to pass sanctions on russia. the fourth set has only been talked about, nothing has been done and those are related to the hacking by russian security packages into u.s. computer systems and neither the europeans or other country have
talked about sanctions in relation to russian hacking and interference in politics and elections. >> thank you. let me take that further. that gives us a sense of things. you've been writing that you are in the treasury department and had to be involved in these types of activities. you have been writing about what you call next-generation sanctions. is this not an option? should we be thinking about additional activities? how do you assess the effectiveness of what's been done so far? >> thank you for the question. let me offer my thanks as well for the opportunity to be here with all of you. next sanctions, perhaps i will just restrict my comments of next-generation of related to russia. i think this is the topic at hand. we have a set of sanctions.
there are concerns about activity in the ukraine and crimea, destabilization, peace and security, that's the nature of those things. i will set aside for the moment hacking issues. this is particularly contentious because there is disagreement about whether or not that should be the tool as to which to address that issue. certainly, any amount of sanctions are punishing and hurtful when they are imposed in the near future but they won't stop what is going on with the destruction and devastation in aleppo. it may not be the best tool for the only tool to address that
situation. nevertheless, this is a train moving forward and there will certainly be some sanctions with russian activity in syria. there are packages prepared and ready to go in the united states and in the eu that relate to human rights abuse and syria, also the provision or what can be called material support to weapons and other materials to support the violence and aggression going on in syria. while there has been disagreement particularly, publicly voiced in the eu. there is no new need for a new executive order or new legislation.
there is a high likelihood that is ending on a political situation. >> so there's a possibility of extending for the original disapproval of action in europe to consider syria, but it's a capitated issue. you have have a sense of how this might evolve under a new administration. assuming there would be a clinton administration, she has offered some tough rhetoric when it comes to russia, and i think there is a strong likelihood that there would be a response with sanctions and other measures to russian activity in syria. i'm speaking just about syria here and we can and should speak
about ukraine. i don't think there's a likelihood there would be additional sanctions in that context, under those multiple authorities in the near future but certainly in response to syria. many people in her camp and in the united states are very frustrated with the diplomacy as it is currently, and it is mostly diplomacy rather than sanctions or other measures when it comes to russian involvement in syria. i think we could expect to see a sanctions response paired with other tools. if there is a trump administration, we have left to go on by way of prepared public remarks except for an indication there could be an interest in exploring rollback of what are now ukraine sanctions which could be an indication that there are not an embrace of a tougher stance with regard to sanctions for syria. this is it tricky set. >> that's why were here.
i think in the end, your assessment of how this affects russia is quite important. you have been critical. i just wonder, when you hear all of this going on and you talk about further sanctions, more next-generation, how do you reflect on that? >> i really like the quote that you start with where sanctions are one of our most useful form policy tools. that is what we can see the sanctions as. we think of them as a political tool that helps us increase our leverage against other states and brings them to the negotiating table like iran with the nuclear deal. maybe it forces them to reconsider their actions and that's clearly the goal, but what we seen with the sanctions on russia, and there are a lot of moving parts as several people have noted, but we have seen minimal economic effects and almost no political effect.
the sanction weren't enough to stop boot moving from crimea into further agitation in ukraine. it has not remotely than enough to convince them to finish or conclude the process and so what were talking about the future of sanctions, were talking about more sanction, more individuals, more entities more entities with regard to syria, it seems like those sanctions will be largely symbolic. maybe we will send a message that we very much disapprove of what russia is doing in syria, but i really doubt it will have the political effect we want or that we will change any russian policy or the way they are implementing that policy. how do we measure whether sanctions are effective? you're saying it doesn't achieve our political goal.
i wondered, are there other reasons why one could impose sanctions besides trying to change the behavior of the regime? do you think those are things that can be taken into account? sanctions should be part, i hate the phrase toolkit, and sanctions in many cases are an alternative to use of military force. i wish the president had agreed to apply legal military assistance with the ukraine. i think that would have enhanced the impact of sanctions on russia by beefing up ukraine's ability to defend itself. to emma's point, i would argue the sanctions have kept putin from going further into the ukraine than he has. the ukrainians deserve credit for stopping the russians where they are. where we have misplaced sanctions as we have to let the targeted sanctions no that we will get more sanctions if we don't change behavior.
we should be talking about not lifting sanctions but what additional sanctions we will impose on the putin regime for failure to abide by our agreement, which i'm not a big fan of, or this aggression in syria. we are having a long conversation about the kinds of sanctions and the way forward with sanctions. i think you raise the distinction between the way our european colleagues come to a decision on sanctions, how do they impose them, what are they about so we will come back to that. i do want to move to serge now. you've heard about this i know you been looking at this closely you think the sanctions have had an impact in russia?
[inaudible] there are some experts who say sanctions that high levels may affect one or two percentages. year. [inaudible] >> can i offer some perspective on that. i think one could take an argue someone who worked on technical issues and sanctions from the treasury department, if you take as your parameters the idea that it was never the intent of these sanctions to collapse the
russian economy, and furthermore , as a parameter that it's not possible for the sanctions, that they must be updated constantly if they are to be effective. furthermore, sanctions are much effective when they happen to, by design coincide with economic factors or pressure points. the perfect storm you're talking about is when they try to capitalize. they would dispute the fact that the oil collapse was much more powerful for the russian economy than the sanctions.
for careful or technical executions, that is the point to try to piggyback and compel the spending down, piggybacking on the need with sovereign debt. >> looking at the russian economy, it's rather pessimistic failure to diversify and reliance on energy is the back bone of the economy and pressures will start to accumulate. what i'm hearing you say is that might not be true.
i think before we get back into the sanctions themselves, do you think the russian economy is doing better and the economy is coming out of the store minutes had in a different direction? >> i agree with what you said. the design of sanctions by that time were good. you are right it was a combination. if you read the statements of president obama and other political figures they say we will increase forces. there was not increase of cost, there was a decrease. it has decreased, okay, we discussed this in two and half years time.
there's a whole back and forth with ukraine and so how do you square that circle. if they're not that effective, what's the motivation for russian officials to be doing a similar type of activity? [inaudible] he does feel that it is painful. they believe. [inaudible] neither european countries. [inaudible]
it's in the toolkit that you mentioned, political unity, solidarity, isn't that another reason for sanctions regardless of their economic impact? >> i think this symbolism of sanction can be important, but in regard to russian sanctions, i would make two points. one is that do sanctions sometimes have counterproductive political impact. the majority thinks that we effectively cut off their food supply, they think the inflation that they are seeing is caused by us even though it was their own government that did it, that's a very negative political counterproductive political impact that we are seeing. it has probably actually drawn the russian people more politically, rather than turning them against these policies.
the second point i would make is that you're right, this coalition of european state and u.s. coming together to sanction russia, it does look good. it provided a wonderful political combination of his actions in crimea and ukraine. the problem is, in in the two years since then, what we have seen is that coalition start to fray at the edges. every six months when the european union comes back up to consider renewing the sanctions, when they are put on and last indefinitely, they have to vote every six months and that has to be unanimous to reimpose the sanctions. every time this debate happens in every time you see european countries that are losing out start to question and it's a counterproductive impact that suggest there isn't much unity.
>> dimension the difference is also with europe and let's come back to that. you had mentioned in the opening that they are into the eu. [inaudible] that has given them more backbone on this. i just wonder if you share this conclusion or do you anticipate it will go forward. >> i think because of russian actions in syria, the eu will reduce sanctions. i have more confidence in that prediction that i would've two or three or four years ago. let's not inflate the impact of sanctions with the policy and public diplomacy that go with them. we allow the job of explaining
to our own constituencies that they are the ones that putin had enforced himself. he banned the adoption by american citizens. he goes after the most vulnerable group and punctures them. then in 2014, the sanctions banning the import, that has driven up the price of food higher than inflation. we have not done a good job of explaining to russians and others that the sanctions that hurt you more than any others are the ones your own leader has imposed. we have to be careful about how we describe and justify the
sanctions that we have done as well as explain much more clearly the impact of the sanctions that putin has put in place. let me ask you, you talked about different kinds of sanctions. some are ukraine, related, but there are a set of sanctions regarding crimea. some of those are targeted, more individual. russia, they're doing things, there's companies involved in these activities, have we forgotten crimea, is there something we should be doing more about that part of the sanctions regime as this just continues :
if we had imposed sanctions on russia for its go to live up to the same condition, i think it would've been more pressure on putin to of least done something along those lines. i think we have to be careful. the problem is not with the sanctions in my view. the problem is in our failure to ramp up the sanctions as we go along so that putin understands there will be continuing costs for this kind of aggression and behavior whether it's in ukraine or in syria. >> would you say we us are forgot about crimea and haven't done anymore. what you think make sense to have a crimean version, that is
target individuals are contributing to the furthering annexation and incorporation of crimea into russia, that type of thing? >> i would target each member of the federation council voted four the annexation of crimea. it just doesn't get as much attention. at a certain point i think you need to look at additional sanctions. i've been told by someone in the administration the russian central bank, look at kasparov. it's the entity that has cut off gas to ukraine twice in eye of the wind and 2006, 2009. if we started going after ahead of the fsb. he came to the united states in april of last year for the counting of violent extremism conference. to meet it's hard to fathom how we could have ahead of the fsb coming to washington. we need to widen the swath of
officials that are involved, including every member of the federation council the photo for the annexation of crimea and go after businessmen who are thriving. and to some extent this is being done but there are a lot more officials we could go after. >> let me ask you, would like to focus on the presidential election but we are having congressional elections as well. david, your sense of republican but on sanctions particularly in the house, i know you can't speak for everybody but just give me your sense of is the continued support for sanctions on ukraine going forward? working with a democratic president be something to be accurate or not, or would you with a president trump how would a player in terms of republican politics? >> on a huge bipartisan majority, this is a become a political football issue. the same with ukraine related sanctions. huge bipartisan majority.
support for legal assistance for ukraine, huge bipartisan majority. this hasn't become an issue to be upon the white house. i think that will continue regardless of how the senate or the house bill. there is strong support in the congress for ukraine and i think the sense in congress is that to ukraine you need to tighten pressure on russia. >> this legislation ready to go. there's a variety of measures, a lot of support. this isn't something that the current administration has been willing to go to the mat to prevent. in fact, they support pressure on russia, although i agree with your characterization but it hasn't been enough and we don't see a code of sanctions the rather a failure of maintenance which is what has caused the fall of an economic impact you describe. the legislation that exists is a brighter differ proposals. there's lots of calls. i think the tiny chance but it could be a lame duck passage of
more measures from congress this year, more likely next year. the challenge is there are a number of ideas and it's a concern, a real concern, that this idea isn't just on the congress companies elsewhere. linking to economic leverage such as it is pursuant to ukraine related sanctions with measures to try and pressure russia over syria. so linking the two which i think is a really concerning idea but it's one that some members of congress would like to run with another people, too. you already see this coming going. it has been said one of the reasons why it was easier, easy to go over to contemplate well over economic sanctions comes the turn of the year is because syria if you will stiffens the spite of those in europe who would have been more comfortable
with exploring alternatives to roll over and kind of rollback. so i think the commingling of these two areas has already begun conception would and will be a challenge for policymakers negotiating had to do with ef4 per i think would be a tremendous mistake to link them inextricably. it removes the off ramp which means that a longer an incentive for behavior change because this no clue off ramp. we get into a version of the iran problem we have where iran says wait a minute, you have removed nuclear sanctions but they're still so much in place that is very difficult for other people to do business here. >> i would also like to see the congressman or dissipation of russian privatization. by definition if western entities participate in privatization they are giving money to the russian state because the state-owned enterprises that are being
privatized. that frees up money for putin to go after ukraine, to go after syria, do whatever he wants. i don't think western firms or companies should be involved in privatization and russia. they need the money as we've seen. we shouldn't be helping putin carry out his aggression military action. >> i think the issue over your same does race is -- sanctions, never really work. if they were to work as part of strategies that include things like close the engagement, trade, military pressure. was all of those things brought to india radio a couple years ago in this way was eventually successful. the sanctions were eventually successful. if as you know we start linking the sanctions on ukraine with syria to get to a situation where it's not clear exactly what we are negotiating on, why would we lift the sanctions on safe russia makes progress with
ukraine, the whole things become a lot more modeled. that seems like would be a very bad idea if we do want to get something political out of it. i would also caution on the same note against some of these further sanctions that david is suggesting. if we start to sanction basically everybody at the top of the russian government we cut down on opportunities for diplomacy and engagement and that means we can't eventually find a way out of this mess. >> can i -- >> and if we prevent all american companies from investing or trading with russia, all american banks and doing business with russia we run into the same problem. you and up with economies that are distinct from one another, sanctions become less effective. those opportunities for engagement and action kind find diplomatic solutions to problems just go away. >> sometimes diplomatic solutions are not there. i don't think with some for a lack of engagement with russia
on city. john terry and sergey lavrov midas will move in together. it's not a lack of talking to each other that we don't have a diplomatic solutio solutions sh. the russians and the knowledge they bomb the human chain combo. on ukraine -- i don't think chancellor merkel wants to spend a lot more time with vladimir putin and geography has. it is a lack of engagement. i guess the question for critics of sanctions i would ask is if not sanctions, then what? more john kerry, sergey lavrov meetings in geneva? i don't think that will solve anything. if we see something is unacceptable and a prevalent in the room would agree that russia's invasion of ukraine and illegal annexation of crimea is unacceptable, what am going to do about it? there has to be some consequences from this kind of egregious behavior. if not sanctions, then what? >> that was a direct question.
>> your basic is suggesting suggestions art -- that's an argument we can certainly make that they should suffer some consequences but the question would be are the sanctions were in place the most effective in doing that? the sanctions that prevent things like dual use technology transfers from the west that's already in the russian military modernization of it, those might be more effective as part of a long-term strategy to punish russia for what it's done and prevent it from doing the same thing in other countries, then the sort of high level individual entity sanctions that we have in place right now. >> i would like to remove your proposal on the privatization. privatization and the other stories like central and russian oil sector -- on the with the
price of over $45 per barrel, it's useless to you might have sanctions but they don't work. like privatization. [inaudible] you might perceive americans and europeans but they're not going to buy. they are not going to buy any russian oil. what you can do is to enforce ban on providing loans to russian government. just do not allow american and you're being investors to invest in russian people's. -- bonds. in 2015 come in 2016 all domestic finance was budget deficit was financed by foreign investors. russian ministers have reduced their holdings of russian bonds, but for investors have finance russian budget. the same way year for bonds
issued by russian government. in spring it was unofficial event and no one, european, american investors touch those bonds. while in september the band was removed, 70% of the issue of the russian federation eurobonds was purchased by americans and europeans. so make what works. just been providing finance. it's much more effective. >> i agree but western investors would buy if it's not -- if they thought it was a good investment. i want to make them understand it is illegal to participate in privatization to the fact means a clue as that getting an infusion of new cash. that to me is the main goal here which is to dash the i agree with your treasure and other things. that's not to provide any confusions of new money that would free up the build of the
crew to carry out its military actions. >> i would just recommend to any foreign investments -- [inaudible] but because of their quality. speed speaking of things that are illegal, and back to companies and businesses, there's a lot of russian money that flows westward as well. and finances lots of things in the west. there are lots of laws that we have on our books against companies engaging in all sorts activities. it's not a russian example. just in a session to the about moldova which is at this huge banking fraud i think as people now. it turns out all of that money was funneled through latvian banks pics a member of nato, member of the eu, ma city of london is very dependent on all sorts of financial flows. so i'm wondering, shouldn't we
be not just thinking the sanctions imposed on russia but simply upholding our own laws? are some of our own institutions, companies and members of the same type of activities we're trying to prevent the kremlin from doing? >> what you were talking about, this is one and the same. u.s. sanctions apply to use the jurisdictions. so u.s. companies, they can't apply, currently would not talk about a set of secondary sanctions. gulf coast to the point of what u.s. companies or european companies can do in russia or with russia but it also of course can apply, authorities are older, for what russian entities can do in the trade which is to say a certain bank or company and the united states shall not do business or a certain kind of business. in the continuum of escalation
of sanctions, and i shook are thinking of a whole lot of things before we get to central bank or that kind of incredibly strong sanction, in their that's all the space were hypothetically they would be restrictions on u.s. persons, legal our national persons, doing business or hosting business with russian entities. that is obviously an opportunity for the eu as well. you mentioned london as a major source of russian investment. >> so you make the u.s. case, but much of the case is also about europe i'm just wondering, do we see a potential there of some splits between how the europeans are poaching these issues whether enforcing their own laws or whether we are, and is that a potential that the ultimate effectiveness of the sanctions regime is dissipated because of our own internal differences speak with it's already an issue.
another distinction between the u.s. and eu sanctions is that in the united states, sanctions are created in a simple manner, by our federal government and their similarly enforced and monitored centrally. however, in the eu policy is created centrally, but monitoring and enforcement takes place at the member state level which means that it is dependent on the political will and capacity of a member state to carry it forward once it's in practice. it should be to no surprise that the debate about whether or not sanctions are a good idea or should be rolled over is an excellent proxy for what is allowed or people, officials they look away from within their own jurisdiction. so there's an opportunity that some people may call for regular arbitrage if you will. there are companies interested in circumventing russian sanctions.
so as to avoid detection or scrutiny. >> were going to turn to question and answers. going to come to you in the second. one last lightning round. put you on the spot the first 100 days of a new administration and congress, what should we do with the sanctions regime? must united states going to do? [inaudible] >> okay. >> signal immediately to europe that they should roll over sanctions. not just for six months but for longer part of time in order to try and see the ground for coordinator transatlantic strategy which is essential for the effectiveness. >> sanctions will stay in place and he wrapped up and if necessary it will be danger levitt by the united states. i would love to see the europeans on board. it's hard to get agreement about 20 candidates one government. >> sometimes, yeah.
>> make up offer to the russian very early on that we will lift the majority of the sanctions, be very specific about what is an exchange for full completion of the mask process. naked tousled explicit what that you would be because there is a lot of to buy it is right now and that would hopefully help negotiations. >> we are going to turn to the questions in the comments your is keep your comments brief if you haven't instead of a question to keep the question breeze. if you can identify yourself briefly. we have microphones, is that right? right here. >> hello, good morning. new president at the atlantic council. i think the discussion has revealed that sanctions either in perfect weapon, and they are necessary but they are not merely a sufficient response to the challenge we face from russia. in response to the concern sanctions may be having a
counterproductive effect, i asked the question what would they be without any sanctions? what else we have in our toolkit? i think the political symbolism will be underestimated. entrance of the concern about whether they are changing russian behavior, it's hard to prove a negative. we don't know what else russia might have done were there no sanctions, but equally it hasn't rolled back to concerns that originally precipitated those sanctions. so i want to broaden the debate because the discussion appears to revolve around more sanctions or less sanctions are rolling over or rolling back. i would like to ask the panel what are the other measures that could be taken? one of the things that a think rush is rather good at, sort of trump complement come is that putin has the ability throw marbles on the diplomatic floor and have us all scrambling, as
he constantly undertakes actions that take us by surprise, put us on the backs urge or broadening the issue that with the leading issue in crimea and suddenly it's syria. what could we be doing to change putin's political calculation? not diplomatic engagement but it diplomatic setback and get more engagement, more serious efforts to address the conflicts that gives them leverage over these countries, more aggressive action in nato, changes calculation, banning participation in sporting events, for example. so what else could we do that would put him on the back foot, surprise them? >> i'm going to put some questions so we can give the panel is time to reflect on some of these. right here, please.
>> i'd like to take the conversation from the macro down to the pkk and general staff. the 2020 plan has not been fulfilled in large measure because even though it's a fourth generation weaponry, missing high-tech components are western. we know now the ministry of finance has tried to reduce the budget. the costs to submit the sanctions are now being buried in black budget that minister of finance has gone public about the size of it for the first time. my question to you is, when we talk about what's really important to putin, which is the cost of the plan not just for the 2020 plan which is fourth generation weaponry, i.e., the western equal that of the 1990s, now they're look at this generation stuff. i'd like to the panel talk about the real sexual costs for the
russian rearmament plan and isn't that, in fact, a huge success for sanctions? thank you. >> right here. >> actually a segue to the gentleman's question about the military modernization. we do not have, since the end of the cold war, the equivalent of -- for our young participants here was an organization that coordinated the block on exports of military intelligence technology. whatever the sanctions are trying to accomplish, there is no one address for that. when i bought it up with an official he responded that we do
not want to quote institutionalize the cold war, unquote. regardless of whether you think there is a cold war or not, what does the panel think about having an organization that will bring together not just nato members but our non-nato allies, such as japan, south korea, australia and others, that would block and prevent this technology that is necessary for russian military modernization to move to russia? argument to third countries like we saw with example of armenia breaking the iran sanctions ending a conduit during the iran sanctions. thank you very much. >> so we have a question, she would broaden the discussion, include sanctions over broader debate. should we know the discussion talk about specific sectors and should we institutionalize the response, whether it's the cold war or not, to have some more
systematic way of organizing ourselves. i'm going to ask everyone to be brief including our panelists. don't feel compelled and to every question. just what you think you can add something to come and we will start. >> what else could the west to? you have diplomatic solutions, talks between secretary kerry prime minister lavrov. with no results there's a limit. economic sanctions you might increase or you remove them. [inaudible] putin is a man who thinks about hard power, not soft are. if you want to resist them, if you wanted to listen to if you want them to understand you, you have to use hard power, not soft power. he is on kgb. there's nothing about soft power.
i would say very important not only me but for all industry. it is not measurable in the short run. we cannot measure how the technological gap is growing between russia and the west within 2016. definitely it impacts russian economic growth but mostly it is, because, not because of the west. because of putin's decision. he decided to deal -- he decided to build, to invest huge amount of budget resource -- [inaudible] he spends money to build isolate economy and that will prevent him to deal this generation of weapons. >> just two quick responses. first, there's been a push with some malls behind it to try and help europe become more energy resilient.
i don't love the word energy independent and there's no possibility that europe could be underlined on russian energy sources. however, their sentiments about the can be done at the level of infrastructure building or market deregulation to try and enhance the energy resiliency of europe which would give fewer soft power's or economic to russia, and that is a good idea for many reasons. this is just one of them. the second one i would suggest is to make it harder, harder than it is now, much harder that it is never russia to acquire military technology. and some restrictions exist. to that effect. there's much was a candidate including at the level of material and equipment that come from non-russian manufacturers or purveyors. one interesting technical
innovation that existed that came about for the u.s.-russian sanction is to link the financial and criminal penalties of sanctions with e-commerce trade controls on certain kinds of material and equipment which makes it much more expensive and criminally exposed to violate the sanctions. so you could do a lot more with that. that tool hasn't even been taken out of the toolkit. furthermore, massive international push with allies, like-minded push to try and restrict the provision of military technology, equipment, material to russia in its military modernization plan and other armament activity. >> first i wondered% agree about hard power. i think it was the biggest mistake the president made and it was the president has everybody else supported providing legal assistance from the congress to think almost to
seoul national security council and cabinet. might additional comment, it's not meant to sound partisan, i'm a republican, i brag about the less these days than they used to, the president himself has failed to show engagement. he has failed to go to ukraine a single time as president. i think that's a disgrace. for the president not to have shown the fly, to show soldier with the country that has been attacked by russia company has gone to georgia. we need to show much greater support for russia's neighbors. we're doing the right thing with the reassurance initiative sending forces to the baltic states and poland. i support what nato has been doing. there have been steps done. but the president himself cannot delegate his to either chancellor merkel or two joe biden. he or she the next president has to personally invested in these issues because, frankly, that's where putin is going to be watching and listening.
>> there is a broadening of his even further -- >> go ahead spirit this entire discussion has been based on the premise that we should be pushing back strongly against russia. and i'm not entirely sure that that's the case. so i think there's a good case to be made for some form of response, with its sanctions, diplomatic to the crisis in ukraine but i also think the question we are not asking is what are our actual interest in resolving the uk and crisis with what our american interest in street was there for less than people have suggested. when we talk of whether we should you sanctions, whether we should take for the action, we have to put that in a cost-benefit calculus. what does it cost us to do this? with some measures particularly as the gentleman suggested, if we start to institutionalize the sanctions regime, create the structures that are very reminiscent of the cold war, we could end up making it a cause of ourselves going forward by
creating a new cold war dynamic. we to read also ask ourselves what are the actual costs of sanctions for american companies. we've had this discussion almost at how the premise of the national star debases and that's where we should be discussing it but we haven't talked about the cost for american energy companies, american banks in the limiting the sanctions and abiding by it. so when we are talking about creating a response we need to come up an approach that balances our actual cost in doing so. so it's not more costly than or interest actually are. i would argue some of the responses that panelists have mentioned, things like technology transfer and military or energy, those are relatively cost was sanctions that could pay dividends in the long term. when we start to talk about large-scale financial sanctions or indeed sanctions on entities like gas bombs can also be very costly in the short term and
probably not as effective. >> can't i just say, look, with 10,000 ukrainians killed two russians envision, without knowing syrians killed by assad and now russian complicity with iranian complicity, with the buddha patient memorandum of 94 which was incredible important do you think of ukraine to denuclearize in exchange for the other signatories respecting ukraine's sovereignty and territory integrity, with ukraine on the outlines, if ukrainians, it's not asking americans to fight for them, if ukrainians don't stop the russians the russians could well go also. if they see us weak and feckless and likely to a nato ally. if we don't defend a nato ally and nato is dead. to me that underscores our interest. we have an absolute interest in stopping plan, helping the ukrainians to stop putin and also stopping what they're doing and syria.
here again i think the negligence of the president to do anything in syria is contributing to a catastrophe their where it has been bad enough if our russia invaded and intervened, it is not exponentially worse spent 30-second rebuttal. >> i disagree on the extent of her interest in ukraine and particularly in the city but i think that's a debate we can of lighter. maybe we should get back to -- >> we can easily expand thi the question of how to deal with russia but that's the topic of the entire conference. the of the complete sessions dedicated to the become trying to keep us on the sanctions topic. i realized you can't departmentalized too much but with our next round, stick to sort of the topic. we had a question right here. we have to get a microphone. >> george from the atlantic council but i'd like to follow up on the ladies question and i think about different mechanis
mechanisms. but before we get into the mechanisms, i'd like to raise a question of what a return to accomplish with sanctions? are within the rule of a paired with punishing a child for bad behavior? are we pretending to play the role of a therapist is engaging in behavior modification, hoping that people will come despite centuries long habits, change the behaviors? or are we trying to do with a threat that is a threat not just to ukraine but a threat really to the west? one extreme to the other extreme to another like to hear your views on what is working to accomplish with the sanctions and what kind of gold we hope to achieve. >> i'm going to compound our microphone holders by going way to the back. >> thank you. a little input from central
europe to this topic. speak a little input. if it's not a question -- >> okay. two quick remarks. [inaudible] is family of the deal, the pipelines and the baltic sea, german, russian pipelines -- becomes the new transport hub for russian rail. so isn't that a danger to the u.s. might be waving the red flag while the european economy just goes on, moving on as normal in dealings with russia? >> there was another way back. >> on these you ways of doing sanctions, a quick comment leading to real question. that comment is yes, talk about sanctions six months and potentially counterproductive in terms of -- is also flexible
because the eu is considering sanctions as a means to an end. it's linked to i think the debate. it's not just about whether -- that's when sanctions were. sanctions work with their content you. that's what research shows. when sanctions are non-contention, with a target of suppression is punished for what it is rather than what it does, it's actually not bringing any results. and with all due respect to my american colleagues we would want the sanctions to end up like the jackson -- stay for 20 years after the end of -- [inaudible] my question is if sanctions are a means to an end, the end is clear we want russia to stop supporting the east. we want russia to stop meddling and creating conflict in ukraine. how do we do that? what you think of the proposal which is sometimes in europe about linking partial lifting of the sanctions against explicit partial implementation of minsk?
isn't something possible or realistic to you? >> the defense and aerospace reporter the question is what happens to the sanctions regime and any path where towards russia went all oil price start to go back up again? so what happened to our leverage when oil is 100 or $150 a barrel? >> paula stern, the olympic council. great discussion. there hasn't been any references to iran, turkey, to other countries. and the degree to which sanctions as we all know are most effective when they are multilateral and not just the west. would you comment on that linkage?
>> dubrovnik, it's not just u.s. injured. who else is engaged in this and what of the difficult of keeping a coalition together that's broader than the transatlantic. we have a number of questions. let's go the other way. >> let me address the question of our european colleagues in the back. i may have misspoke earlier. i completely agree. i think the european method of discussing sanctions every six months is a very valuable policy to edit think it's what present statements turning into things like the amendment or the cuban embargo. the last 50 years and there was no clear political objective for much of that time. so i think that's a good way to view the process of how do we link sanctions outcomes with actual sanctions. i think this idea that's been proposed that we would link steps in the minsk process to lifting specific sanctions could
be a good way to go about resolving the conflict. i think what exactly russia will get into and sanctions relief for taking specific steps is probably the only way that we see a political resolution to this. that is exactly what happened in the iranian case, the jpoa was clear about laying out exactly which sanctions would be lifted from the nuclear sanctions, human rights one, terrorism would sanctions on iran, which sanctions will be lifted, when any response to what iranian action. that could work with russia. >> first of all, jackson was incredibly successful. it did bring up the immigration of saw it just make a mistake to lump sure. they were efforts by several administrations to i could graduate russia. it took the act to enable russia to get out from under the
jackson-vanik because of russian human rights abuses, the congress felt that it was right to replace jackson-vanik with new legislation that would go after russian human rights abuses. on partial lifting it was right in the poster, particularly given my position in which we talk about ramping up its sanctions not easing sanctions for partial implementation of minsk. as i said earlier i'm not a fan of minsk are i think we should do away with minced. we should get away from minsk not ukraine. we should so go tell the russians sanctions will stay in place and the rent of overtime unless anything to get out of ukraine, period. negotiating with russia is pointless. when they don't acknowledge that there in eastern ukraine, what exactly are we negotiating? they haven't fulfilled a single condition under minsk. multilateral, a number of countries that have joined the eu and the united states, canada, australia, new zealand,
japan, around of course is to iran is not going to join. turkey is a competent relationship. we don't have time to go into that. but there are other countries that have. but we also to recognize there are limits to me country will go along with it. >> the energy question, so the energy question, energy sanctions the russians sanctions decide to go after what market price as frontier or future energy production. they did not cut off for the most part energy production development now. so when prices however come with the does make it difficult for russian energy projects to receive financing to raise money and european and u.s. capital markets. so with a rising energy prices it may mean that russian companies can finance more off the balance sheet and have to turn less to the eu and the u.s. so that is a clear area where
sanctions not be addressed if the political will is for them to continue to have a lot of pressure. to the point about what's the goal for sanctions, is it, are they designed to be used for signaling, for deterrent and coercion or other net to be a method our strategy for punishment? i think the answer is people break on methodological issues, how do you, do you do. i am deathly in the camp that that ought to be used for coercion, deterrence and signaling which mrs. remained you must make sure that the object of the sosa the sanctions stay updated, and that there's a clear offramp or a path for the escalation. and that requires creative thinking to we've seen, with a couple of great examples with that has not occurred.
and a dynamic political environment it is essential that that occur in this instance. i have full confidence that would mean their needs to be an adaptation of some sort or an abolition to the minsk set of requirements in order to keep the objectives current overtime. there's no way to know that at the what i will look like. finally, on the view from central europe, so the own the project or the partners, yes, it's true that europe is split on how that wants to engage with russia on energy issues. nevertheless, if the main trends shift, if the country saving energy from russia directly change in the consolation of the, what does that leave -- these changes laid out in the cold a variety of russia's new neighbors including ukraine and
others, so what should the united states or europe and europe to be a year to view be towards how to use the leverage of their dignity as they block? if russia succeed in dividing it energy, the european energy consumer at a different constellation, it comes out ahead on that particular fight, if you will and makes things more difficult for european unity and transatlantic unity on energy issues and others when dealing with russia. [inaudible] the minsk agreement is very simple. [inaudible] giving control of the russian crimean border, just do it and that's it. there is a special decision with
european union that has minsk is implement it comes sanctions will be removed. if after six months, before six months, the use of the station supported this idea. they said we share, we join, we join the decision of the european union. while i completely agree with -- any contingency, okay, please implement bullet point and we were the sanctions and if you haven't, i don't know number five and we remove, it's counterproductive. it open space for bargaining while it does not solve the problem. the public is to stop aggression from russia and ukraine but that's recently there is no other interpretation. violence in ukraine in case, there is no easy process. the experience of a random iranian sanctions, you must
tread very well that sanctions work if they are escalating the in case of iran, sanctions were escalated to a we went resource and central banks were frozen. results of all iranian residents were frozen and, in fact, -- that harmed the economy to a great extent. if we waive sanctions on iran and russia, russia's do with a 5% of our brain sanctions. so there's a great, great way to move, unless the west in the case decides to move this way, putin will not go to the negotiating table. i would emphasize that it's not on the european financial sanctions. it is on the u.s. financial sanctions and american its editions cannot give finance to guess pro-bloc european can. what is important in alliances i
would say of course i do not believe that u.s. to influence china to join western sanctions, but i believe west can influence israel. that some technological point of view. it's much more important than the alliance with china, with india. >> one point, it's not only that difference but, in fact, the eu, the commission upon heading toward a settlement on eu's own case against it in terms of the eu's version of antitrust laws rather than really go after them. there will probably be a settlement. that's a different outcome. [inaudible] >> you say that a lot of american companies, and it looks a little different. there is some potential there for dissidents. we've had a range of views, lively discussion, very good. the thing that always comes back to me is despite how you might
think about it, how you used sanctions really depends on your own agility. are you agile as a government to a just either tools to the offramp, tv different things. can you do it quickly in real time or does your system lock in the things that makes it cumbersome and do not achieve their own goals? no matter how you think about their effectiveness, if you are not agile as a covert or as a coalition, a lot of that sort of dissipates. anyway, everyone has been good. audience, good, hope ritalin is happy. we're going to go to the next session but please first -- once about? 30 minute lunch break but please first thank all participants. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]
[inaudible conversations] >> wrapping up the morning portion of this daylong forum on u.s.-russia relations. she's been through will pick up our live coverage this afternoon in about 30 minutes. the afternoon session began with the general don't breedlove, former supreme allied commander and nato commander and they'll discuss about foreign policy, what's next under the next president. and again you can follow earlier coverage, we covered this morning portion, you can see that at c-span.org. on the issue of u.s.-russia relations, russia did he write the us will have to negotiate with russia on finding solutions to international issues as
they're able to act alone. russian foreign minister says two or three months ago u.s. president barack obama said it is they who set the rules out of our american partners to think so, they will go through quite painful to to realizing that no one in this world could act alone any longer. you can read more at the russia today website. >> this week on c-span2 we are featuring political radio programs with a national talk show host live today from noon to three offer and progressive radio host tom hartman. at on friday from 9 a.m. until noon at conservative political perspective on the mike gallagher show live from new york city. all this week life on c-span2. >> our road to the white house coverage features melania trump, donald trump swipe for skipping
a parents and the convention to her first solo appearance of this campaign season. that is live at 2:00 eastern. hillary clinton with the three to 4% lead in the state according to real clear politics, and hillary clinton will be campaigning today in north carolina. live coverage of that at 7:45 p.m. eastern also on c-span. back to pennsylvania battleground state to be sure. more about that state in a conversation with a political reporter. >> professor, what is pennsylvania stand right now? >> guest: interestingly we haven't seen that much change in pennsylvania in the statewide polls for a few weeks. and so clinton remains ahead, and i would expect that in the end she went the state and maybr but about three or four points which is a little bit south of where i think the polls are finding are at the moment. >> host: what is happening in
pennsylvania? explain the state demographically and geographically. where are the votes for donald trump and where are the votes for hillary clinton? >> guest: that's an excellent question. pennsylvania was made famous by james cargill remarks about the baby being alabama between two cities. that might overstate the case. the rail is that pittsburgh and philadelphia are large cosmopolitan areas with very diverse populations and tendenca to vote overwhelmingly democratic. their population is so greathe that that is where most pennsylvanians are living, living in or near one of the two major cities. but then there are other parts of the state, the part along the top of the state and in the middle with the exception of where pennsylvania statef university is antistate college
of pennsylvania, most of those counties are very republican and that's where the trump voters are, if you've heard a lot about his enthusiastic support inte places like harrisburg and lancaster. i am certain the people livinge there are very enthusiastic for him. halibut they just don't happentc to be very large population centers your that's always how things look when you look at a map of the county by county vote. you would think that pennsylvania is predominatelybes republican because there's a lot of red, meaning those counties will go republican. however, if they are lightlyt populated, at the end of the day of vote totals tend to favor the democrats because of the concentration of the population around the two major cities. >> host: the "washington times" this one has the headline, gop aims to flip pennsylvania. the keystone state is a white whale that has eluded every gopl nominee for the last sixlectio presidential elections,
stranding them brokenhearted with the same broken promise ringing in the ears. this time will be different. >> guest: the first part of it i would agree with the i remember very vividly this time four years ago in 2012 that american crossroads the enormous amount of money advertising in the philadelphia area for mitt romney, and it didn't move the needle at all. i ended up concluding when it went back and looked at their ads that they spent three on fretfully no purpose. so don't confuse a lot of activity with the real promise of progress. at this stage of the electionw there are very few i decided voters anywhere.e up most people already made up their mind. what makes pennsylvania different is that we do not have any early voting. so we remain the blank box compared to other states where you can get a sense of who may be showing up to vote early and who seems to be enthusiastic.
>> host: is pennsylvania in a state where people can changeth their vote, and would that have any impact on this race?t: >> guest: so yes, but in a much more limited way that i think the trump organization is making it seem. i looked up some of this debate to be sure, but also noted from my own working of the polls in my own polling place, so in pennsylvania when you ask for an absentee ballot, there is a clear warning of the very bottom of the application that if you're in the area in person on election day and not absent like i just said a quad for any of the other reasons for the absentee ballot, it says you must show up at your physical polling place and you absentee ballot will be forwarded. so, in fact, that my polling place and am polling place and i'm certain this is a case all across the state, there is a list as you come into its new use of the sample ballot, ofivia
individuals who are registered vote in the polling place who have sent absentee ballots. so if any other people on that list showed up to vote in person, the polling placeth actually has possession of thehe absentee ballots and then they are required to find an absentee ballot, boy get in front of the boat of a the voter vote on the machine. so that's what it means. what he is saying is there is the slightest chance that you ask her absentee ballot because you be out of the municipality or your neighborhood for business and then that wouldhb change and then you would haveu the ability to show up at the same things also, pennsylvania allows elderly people or people with disabilities to ask for an absentee ballot but again, ifif you didn't thought you were able to physically come to the polling place, that's what it would require. it's not as if you can get the absentee ballots sent back to oe put anyone in of the old one for you. i can't even imagine how that
would occur. >> host: we saw headlines that saw the pulse of time in pennsylvania'e has eloquence laid has lessened. what do you make of those stories, and could it be a hidden trump vote in pennsylvania? >> guest: well, the name of the game right now is voter i cs turnout, and what i can say is that given the distribution of votes for the two parties that i just mentioned, the thing that remains an open question is how good will turnout be in places that fit each of the parties? i can say right now but what happened in the last severalion presidential elections that expect this weekend to see a lot of people volunteers, party regulars and union affiliates to come from other states, close by
states where they are not really competitive elections, to gond knocking door-to-door andn organize rides, voter mobilization effort. i think you will find that it is tremendously effective in ourrog two largest cities. so again with polls it's tough at this time to figure out who is truly undecided or who may be moved from voting for gary johnson to trump, but it's more important i think to look at the direction of the polls, the consistent traction for the last month and a half or so has been that clinton has been on top. i would just say that as much as trump would like to eventuallyrt has motivated some other voters in other parts of the state, i'm pretty certain that the democratic party is equally well mobilize for hillary clinton drama finally, what is the senate race looking like? >> guest: latest polls i've seen show mcginty slightly up. it could very well be that at good turnout for the top of the
ticket for clinton would also mean a victory for katie mcginty. however, i would also point out that pennsylvania you said, it has been known to return interesting split ticket returns in this regard. the most famous of which was in 2000 when this state went for al gore for president at the also for republican rick santorum on the same day. that is the kind of outcome that could very well happen, that the state would return both for too hillary clinton at the top ofmee the ticket and pat toomey for senate. so that's what i think the senate race and the campaign going on there will be in place up to the wire, and why people are considering this in a race too close to call. >> host: robin kolodny, professor and chair of the political science department at temple university. by the way our bus is that, our
2016 campaign bus is at temple university today from 10 a.m. to noon. the visit is part of the c-span bus battleground state to her, the final week of election. we want to thank our cable partners from comcast for hosting us while we been in the philadelphia area. professor, thank you for your time this morning and insight into the vatican state of pennsylvania. >> guest: thank you for having me. >> election night on c-span and watch the results into part of a national conversation about the outcome. be the outcome. beyond location of hillary clinton and donald trump election night headquarters and watch a victory and concession speeches in key senate house and governor races start live at 8 p.m. eastern at the following 24 hours. watch live on c-span, on demand or listen to our live coverage using the free c-span radio app. >> this weekend on american history tv on c-span3, saturday
night at eight eastern on lectures in history. >> these redcoat to present themselves as allies and friends for the future are clearly our enemy. they are occupying our land with troops which is the one thing we were fighting against, and at the same time by cutting off and withholding gifts, refusing to give kids, living in trade with us, that's essentially a declaration of hostile intent. >> and later on real america we look back to the 1966 campaign for california governor between incumbent democrat . ..