tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN July 29, 2014 10:00pm-12:01am EDT
of the export. we do take advertisement actions on that. >> secretary terry said on april 8 the administration is obligated to come back to congress for any relief of the statutorily imposed sanctions on iran and in the agreement they have to pass muster with congress. can you confirm that is the case and will you come to the congress prior to any relief associated with a comprehensive agreement? not, why not? >> senator, we believe strongly that any lifting of sanctions will require congressional legislative action. >> i heard you talk about the war it is tough to result. resolve. i want you to clearly state to me will you or will you not come
to congress before lifting there is a way of contemporary wave, escaped down the road in no way will you let any kind of release on iran, period after the next agreement isn't reached were not reached after coming to congress. >> we cannot left any sanctions without congressional action. we can suspend or wave under the current legislation. we will not do so without conversations in congress. if you are asking the senator, whether we are going to come to congress for legislative action to affirm a comprehensive agreement, we be leave as other administrations do that the executive branch has the authority to take such executive action on this kind of a political understanding that might be reached with iran.
>> i want to go back to what you are saying. you can't our representatives tolhad your representativestolde agreement. i want to go back and you told me you didn't have to come back to congress and i would like to find a way that you do. it's been unsuccessful so far. but on the waiting and suspending of any kind of thing should because you have the right to do that use a you will have a conversation. again, the conversations have been this is what we are going to do. and that is a very unsatisfactory place for us to be. you are telling us what you're going to do.
>> the united states congress and the senate has oversight authority, has legislative authority. you are free to decide what action you think is appropriate for any executive branch decision by any administration and i understand those prerogatives quite quickly and i will commit to you you will not be surprised by reading in the newspapers decisions or judgme judgment. >> i know my time is up and i think the world understands the disease euro commitment. it's not in keeping with what secretary kerry said on april 8. and i know they keep moving and i think that you can continue this hearing as evidence of why so many of us have the concerns we have ended and we wish you
well. >> both of the individuals that are with us for your continuing to service to the country these are extremely challenging issu issues. going back to the start of the negotiations for the original agreement i think we got off to a rough start in congress and the administration. and i think it caused more division band was in the best interest of the country. i wanted to thank you and acknowledge that particularly in recent months the cooperation between the administration and congress has gotten stronger. the openness of the briefings i think have been of higher quality and we thank you for that and being put. i did the administratio had thes done a commendable job keeping our partners together in unity
despite the challenges of international events. i think we have made a lot of progress and i just want to acknowledge that. i couldn't agree with you more that the objective of the visible mobility assuming we have an agreement, but the visible mobility to determine if that agreement is not being adhered to and as you point out, the ability that it would take time consuming to get back to the ability to produce a nuclear weapon that's certainly the goal and i think we all acknowledge that a bad agreement is worse than no agreement at all and the language we have been using has been clear about that and that if there is a failure here it will be tougher sanctions and tighter isolations. i just really want to follow-upp
on one of senator corker's pointing to that is november 24 wouldn't be the end of the process because if i understand you are successful congress and the administration have to work together and it does end and the process of november 24 of sanctions aren't going to be removed at one time. there is going to be a transition to your code that will require them to be on the same page. i would encourage you to use the same process that you've used during the last few months which i think has been a much healthier process between the two branches of government to share the same objective. i hope that you will continue to do that. i want to trust talk about the one part of your statement that you mentioned and that is we've also put pressure on iran when it is warranted whether it is a
relationship of the human rights records to support terrorism or hostility towards israel or its detention of political prisoners. and this is going to be a lengthy process and of course we are focused on an extremely important priority for the united states, and that is a non- nuclear weapon iran but at the same time, they are doing other issues that are problematic to the relationship of the united states and we have to use every tool that we can do detour them and put a spotlight on the things they are doing. you say you won't be silent and i assume that means more than just words and we will take action and other areas and nothing would compromise our ability to speak out about these other issues that are critically important to the united states. >> i couldn't agree more. when it comes to the sanctions
on terrorism and on human rights, they will continue in place and we have been quite clear with iran that if we get to a comprehensive agreement there might be a suspension and then ultimately after a period of time and after verification by the iaea in a variety of benchmarks after perhaps lifting that when it comes to the sanctions regarding the human rights they would stay in place. it is quite concerning the actions they take in the arenas that you just mentioned, human rights, and stability - and as e chairman said, who can imagine detaining a journalist hopes the negotiation? in the past i know it's been in the news as of late although hamas creates many of its own rockets of these days a lot of
the original supplies came from iran so that security is not only tied to this nuclear agreement but also to the rain of rockets that are coming down today so all of these areas we need to continue to have the endorsement of the existing shank--sanctions and continue to condemn these actions and insist that they stop. >> and i might point out that at the end of the day we must be together on this. it is like the preferred practice to use the authority that you have rather than changing the law in the event that we have to act quickly if there are problems in the compliance rather than having to wait for the congress to pay the new law in getting back to the
administration so i would point out there are advantages that are used at the end of the day that i would agree completely with senator corker and i think senator kerry it is critically important that we are together on this at the end of the day and i hope that -- and i know that you would agree we have to take sure that occurs. i want to ask you one question about the challenges you might be having today considering that europe and the united states are working for sanctions against russia and with regards to iran does that caused colleges for you? i hope that you are able to have more than one relationship at a time and this committee has been on record strongly supporting additional sanctions with regards to those against ukraine. but is that affecting our ability to speak out as a unified voice in regards to ir iran? to staciran? stack the answer is not in the least.
the efforts to address the destabilizing activities in ukraine and its invasion of the sovereignty have not been impeded one iota by the very important work secretary sherman and the team have been undertaking in vienna. we have been pursuing a powerful calibrated strategy to impose pressure with its activities in eastern ukraine and we have been working very closely with our counterparts in europe and elsewhere to coordinate these actions and i think there've been press reports in the last 24 hours or so of it is of additional sanctions to come that we have not encountered a difficulty in terms of working with our partners or ourselves to impose pressure on russia in
relation to the activities in ukraine. >> thank you mr. chairman. i haven't had the years of experience as the chairman has come about the chair was talking about moving the goalpost and i have experience in the negotiation and certainly when i sit down to negotiate, i want to know and have an understanding of both my goal is and i would like to understand what the goal of the party is that i'm negotiating with. so, my understanding is the goal of the community in the united states has this all began was well expressed in the united nations resolutions. can you state what that was? >> there have been more than one a security council resolution regarding nuclear program to ensure that iran cannot obtain and that its program is exclusively peaceful.
>> "-begin-double-quote those resolutions also wasn't the go goal. it enriches that they suspend the enrichment until there is assurance on behalf of the international community that the program is entirely peaceful. it's that we can resume. the preferences that iran don't have enrichment programs and that remains the case every negotiation i remind them that is the case. they can get anything they need on the open market.
they don't need an indigenous program. at the end of the comprehensive agreement there is potential for a limited enrichment program that updates t the date for practical specific date on the mechanisms verification. there is no reason to have enrichment correct? >> that is true in every country in the world that do have indigenous programs into some of our closest allies in fact i
want to get back to the motivation of iran. they suffered in terms of economics and they will continue to enrich what would solve this problem to stop. let's look at a peaceful nuclear program. but the show clarity in what the objective is. >> senator if we all were not concerned about iran wanted to obtain a nuclear weapon we wouldn't be in these negotiations. they would then have been going on for some time. up until 2003, the united states
and a public intelligence estimate said in the pdb that iran had been attempting to get a nuclear weapon. the intelligence community's assessment which they can discuss further is that after 2003 for that particular program ended but of course we have that concern. >> why do we continue to pretend publicly that iran will enter and agreement where it will be a peaceful program that will be exclusively peaceful as long as they can enrich their doing it because they want the threat of being able to weaponize their program correct? play not t be clear about what e motivations are quick >> i don't think that we dilute ourselves at all. as i said what they are trying to do is cut off every pathway to a nuclear weapon, to cut off the pathway through plutonium in the current reactor, to cut off the pathway of the highly enriched uranium through and to
cut off the pathway to the covert program by using intrinsic monitoring inspections of this is not about trust. this is not about being some have a lucia and some kind of evolution about them. this is about verification. this is about monitoring and ushered into the international community and about inspections so this is not about trust, senator. >> in the negotiation you want to maintain leverage. now i will stipulate that secretary there is still pressure from the standpoint of not as much but also just the fact that we agreed to be enrichment program also gave up enough on the negotiating defended? >> senator, we made a judgment,
ththe president of the united states made a judgment that we could say that there was a possibility for a very limited program mutually agreed under strict limitations with monitoring for a long period of time to impact to deal with the concerns about iran's nuclear program. as a result and that ability on the table brought about the joint plan of action. that joint plan of action has ensured -- >> let me ask my final question, and i will say if this fails on november 24, but then? >> i think we will have very serious decisions to make and we will have consulted with you all a long way. a lot of that in closed sessions so that i can provide a great
deal of detail to you and we will decide what judgments we need to make. there is no question. we said that if iran will not reach an agreement that cuts off all of the pathways to the nuclear weapon and that gives the assurance that we are looking for then we will step up to additional sanctions and to consider all of the options which the president of the united states remains on the table. >> wouldn't it be smart to declare what happened in the negotiating leverage so that they get more serious as opposed to the serious decisions are even worse they be serious consequences? a >> in our negotiations with iran, we are quite correct about what will happen and what could happen if we cannot reach a comprehensive agreement. they have no doubt about the united states results. absolutely none. >> thank you for being here today and for your efforts to
reach a comprehensive agreement with iran. you talked about the economy and shortly thereafter there were a number of publications in various countries many of our allies that went through iran to iso talk to them about prospects for business either in the interim or after a deal was reached and i wonder if you can talk about what we know about those discussions and whether we are still seeing the number of delegations continuing to go to iran. >> we are not seen in the delegations going to iran in the initial days after the joint plan of action was reached. at that time the partners around
the world and others talked if it moves into deals that cross the sanctions lines that people take action and we did take a series of actions in the joint plan of action to make it very clear this wasn't just an idle threat that we were serious about continuing to enforce the vast sanction architecture that remains in place. >> cacan you delineate a couplef dozen details of that we have an idea of exactly what was done x. >> in response to the delegation -. >> we didn't think this was a great time to be engaged even in the conversations. many of these delegations were
from private businesses and not government sponsored and the way that we convey the message to those with both public messaging as well as the sanctions designations. i don't think anyone was confused that we were going to sit back and allow the sanctions to occur in the joint plan of action without responding. >> if we don't reach a deal with iran to what extent do we expect our allies and other partners that have been enforcing the regime to continue to be willing to comply with that effort? to make it difficult to predict the future and exactly how this would play out. but i don't have any doubt on the two scores. one if we do not reach a deal we will continue to enforce the sanctions vigorously and truth of the matter is because of the
significance of the u.s. economies and financial systems and sanctions if there isn't a deal the sanctions pressure on iran will be maintained and intensified to the actions of the u.s. alone. i'm also sure that we can continue to rally the international community to the objective that people have subscribed to, which is we are all working together to try to achieve a resolution to the concerns of the nuclear program and there was a complete by the end to the notion that this dual track approach on the one hand with the opportunity to negotiate and we will be able with necessary to regenerate that effort. >> i certainly agree we are committed to seeing those sanctions. i just am concerned about where
the rest of the international community is particularly europe and turkey into some of our other allies. >> what i can say is that in the run-up to the negotiations we were quite successful in persuading the reluctant allies to the wisdom of the approach, and if we are not able to reach an agreement, i think the utility of the sanctions approach and the opportunity to negotiate will begin to be persuasive to the partners around the world particularly compared to the alternative of iran developing a nuclear weap weapon. we will have work to do but i am optimistic that we will be able to if necessary bring together the international community to impose significant pressure on
iran if that's what is necessary. >> are we seeing you refer to the russia ukraine situation and respond to that but are we seeing any fallout from what's happening in israel were also what's happening in iraq having an impact on the negotiations? >> we have not to date. i can't say that it won't in the future but so far all of our negotiating partners have been very focused on what's happening in the negotiation room, and it's not to say that on the margins. since discussion of ukraine, iraq or when we go back together what's happening horrifically in gaza or most importantly to the israel security. but so far everyone has stayed
very focused on what's happening in the negotiating room. >> you talked about monitoring and continued inspections. what other metrics are we looking at in determining whether this is going to be a good deal for us or not. hispanic as they mentioned, senator, the metric is whether we have cut off every possible pathway to a nuclear weapon and whether there is assurance that it is exclusively peaceful. have we cut off a plutonium pathway there are two pathways to the material for nuclear weapons. weapons. one is coming in and what is highly enriched uranium. so in the uranium boat and iraq and about having them come and then third whether in fact we have cut off the pathway to the covert program there is no way in any country to 100% guarantee
that there will be no covert effort but what you can do is have enough intrusive mechanisms to assure yourself that there is a covert program you are going to know about it in time. >> thank you mr. chairman. in the terms previously i had urged that you do something about getting pas custody of thr two americans released. as you know, i was incredibly critical of you because you cut billions lives without demanding this tiny little thing as far as iran is concerned. i want to ratchet that up a little bit. you did it again. you cut billions lives without getting them released. do me a favor. do america a favor. tell them next time you're not going to give them any more money unless they keep them
loose. i can almost guarantee they are going to do that. you are talking about billions of dollars and about three people that we really, really need out of prisons in iran. try it and see what happens. i'm willing to bet you they are going to cut them loose in return for the money that you have available to give them. i want to move to the -- from that to talk about sanctions. there are a lot of us who were pretty critical about the temporary and partial relief from sanctions, and we have lots of concerns about it and those concerns have not gone away. you made a statement i found very interesting. no problem that sanctions alone will be able to do what we need to do to impose the difficulty.
with all due respect i think that is incredibly naïve. if they come up to the indians and chinese and russians and turks they will do fine regardless of the factors u.s. sanctions. and i don't know how you are going to get the genie back in the bottle. i can't imagine what that conversation is going to be like between president obama and mr. putin regarding putting those sanctions back on. i hope this does not fail and that you are incredibly successful and that in november they say we've changed our ways and we are going to be good people and we are not going to pursue these things. i hope you get there but given the history that we've got with this country i have reservatio
>> we also called for full array and disclosure on the nuclear program and enforcement mechanisms and i am convinced if there is success with negotiations in november or after that we imposition of the next page we will be in a very difficult period where over many years we have to sustain sanctions with the intrusive inspection regime to keep our allies engaged over five or 10 or 20 years the temptation to cheat given their history or destabilizing efforts will be very strong. secretary kerry recently spoke to find a different
purpose that could be used for a nuclear weapon in purpose. could you explain it could have for a facility in that location? >> i will say as much as i can in this session. this is an agreement that the only enrichment facility if there is one at all. and under discussion is there are several ideas put on the table. some of them we could agree to. said is the subject of negotiation and to tell you what those options are. >> under the additional protocol what progress has been made with iaea or
assurances iaea has the funding and thus get -- and the staff to carry out over the long haul is intrusive reliable inspections and had they been denied access? >> the iaea just issued a report recently that iran had complied with all obligations that iaea had all the access the past four and could verify that the obligations had been met. indeed when the j.p. 0a was finalizing close consultation with iaea to meet those additional obligations the community came forth quite quickly to supply all the money that was needed in fact, if we
are able to get the comprehensive agreement and i am not sure if we will or not i am sure the iaea will need additional resources for the international community to come forward because any additional budget the iaea needs is small potatoes compared to the cost of iran having a nuclear weapons. >> i suspect you could sign me a buzz enthusiastic with that regime possible with that iaea distrusted and verify given the past and current unlikely future activities like cheating on the nuclear efforts in the past we should invest heavily into a proactive inspection regime. undersecretary:that turns to a subject when you testified
before the of british services subcommittee i asked about the burdens facing your group within treasury. the number of sanctions programs expanded from 17 through 40 with even more recent developments with the complexity that we are taking on against russia the course the largest is against iran and i want to commend you to make this possible. i asked if you need resources you said the budget request was fully sufficient we advocated for additional resources but d you currently have the resources and the staff that
you need? i it really concerned we will have great difficulty to keep together the sanctions regime over the long haul with the temporary belief after the interim agreement you have done a great job so far with those allies at the table don't you need more resources to do this? >> let me express my appreciation of the folks that treasury for your support. it is noted how much you appreciate and supports our work. we do have sufficient resources that we not in this alone rework very closely with the state department and with respect
to iran or russia the sanctions programs is the inter agency efforts to have the lead and enforcement of these programs that we draw of the resources to do this. we are stretched. the last time we spoke with knowledge people are working flat out to and they are. but we do think we have the resources we need to ensure the programs are effectively implemented and will continue to do that. >> i would like to see we have invested everything we can the you're not here in one year to explain the sanction regime became unglued because we did not invest enough for the iaea inspections failed to catch
the cheating because we did not invest i feel we will have tougher sanctions and want to make sure we have the skills and resources to do that. >> thank you for holding this hearing and for the work you do. but my opinion is this is a disaster not just an embarrassing diplomatic failure by the national security failure in my opinion. examine going into the negotiation with the goals were and ours are transparent to prevent a nuclear arms to iran why we had sanctions with the hopes they would say we would walk away and prove to the world we have changed our behavior and try to become a responsible member of the community. and i said this in the past
i believe that you believe they went into this negotiation with a simple goal to achieve the maximum allowed to of sanctions relief without agreeing to any irreversible concessions with their nuclear program. but what we gave up to get a joint plan of action we agree they now have a right to enrich headed the level. we will always argue we can pull that back the we have walked away from multiple resolutions that have implicitly agreed iran has the right to enrich that is a baseline for any negotiation moving forward they have the inherit -- inherent right and they have enjoyed real relief not just the direct sanctions but the in direct relief the increase of consumer
confidence. third is stopped momentum there was real international momentum that brought them to the table the it has been stopped in its tracks. it has now made it more difficult to reimpose sanctions for the future to say you violated this the task of doing that is now more difficult. and we have left completely untouched and let me explain if you're watching at home with that missile program is about their developing a long-range rocket to reach the united states and other places and that is what they are headed towards. that is to put a nuclear warhead. there is no nation on earth that uses terrorism more than they do. so let's back up to look at iran point of view.
they have achieved the acknowledge right to enrich and stop the sanctions make future sanctions even harder. they're not concerned about carrying out any military action. i know we hear this talk this is contingent upon other things but in a nuclear weapon in program has three critical components enrichment, a weapons station and delivery. we have now given a big knowledge right on weapon is station that has been outsourced said iaea said there over the having trouble getting into the sites they wanted even show us what they did in the past and the missiles are not touched but if you do reach a deal if they violate any component to find a
violation and punishment. and the finding of that we deal with the government that has a secret program. you thank you have inspectors crawling all over the place? hopefully the the world is distracted by another crisis on the planet and a rope and a dope on the inspection. when we tell you how hard the separatist russians shot down a commercial airplane killed almost 300 is and civilians we had to drag our allies kicking and screaming to do if sanctions just a little bit more. >> the danger is quite frank we will wake up one day with this administration is long
gone with the future administration or president and realize they had a secret weaponization program all along they just now have to flip the switch with a long-range weapon they can arm there are nuclear power and at that point what do we have? the country that has spread their influence to asymmetrically attacks those who seek sanctions against them the regime that fell apart and is impossible to put together with europeans and others invested in their economy and will have a nuclear weapon think of north korea but motivated by radical islamic beliefs with the capability to hit major u.s. cities not to mention the allies in europe and israel. by the way all those rockets landed in israel? where did they come from? every and. we all hope and wish this will work out but there are very few that thing get well
and i hope we are wrong. and if anyone criticizes the deal as a warmonger we just want to go to war but here's what i don't want to seattle like to see is all into a situation where it is no longer an option. war is a terrible and horrible thing the only thing worse is a nuclear weapon. i hope i am wrong but i don't believe that i am and i fear mr. chairman someday soon they will do in north korea on us. and there is very few or the little we can do about it. mr. chairman. >> would you allow me 30 seconds to make a statement?
i have to go. it has become obvious to me today that with every aspect it is a treaty being considered and i believe it requires advice and consent of the united states senate and i hope we move forward with legislation that would require that. thank you. spending aphakia for holding this hearing. i don't have questions because my staff had spoken while i was that another hearing. but i have to say some of the language digester heard bringsptxtñ&í
allies. like this -- israel. and our language should reflect although we are very skeptical we are supportive of this opportunity. is real security is threatening us, so many fronts through the tunnels and what we know about we also know the rise in syria as a terrible threat as the world moves in the direction to focus our attention i don't think it should be lost. i know how hard our negotiators have been working and i know it is tough is incredible and complex why we have another extension. i want to be on the record
those that have the preferred outcome with sanctions we have lots of time to do that. it with that strategic partnership act that should not be burdened by incredibly sensitive complicated narrative and i want to be clear and i have said any final agreement has to be airtight and verifiable and long-lasting we cannot accept anything less because we cannot trust the rand. we know that if they walk away from negotiating table with is a sad day for them also because we will all
come together with the robust response and includes some immediate restoration of any suspended sanctions on iran the that would go further to make it clear that all options have to be all on the table. so the next four months are critical to help them pray they would result in the a agreement that is acceptable that brings a peaceful end to nuclear program. we could lead it pass us by is worth a chance. we see how easy it is to go to war. that is all over the globe.
and in six or 10 cases go to war america. we need to resolve the issues anwr is a last resort not the first is an opportunity that we have. i do not want to gloss over how hard it is a share to 50/50% but then to go the right way. but it is important to keep congress informed and the complaints are legitimate. we know there are details q are working 24/7 but with
the kind of government we have been here in this together and it used to be stopped at the water's edge but it isn't that way for whatever reason. that means more important you let us know every twist and turn because at the end of the day there isn't anybody to turn away from a solid verifiable agreement at the end of the day any of us that can i use the tools of our disposal so how important for you to keep us informed. think you. >> i appreciate this hearing and testimony this is an opportunity and may not bear fruit but it is incumbent to do test to do so but i just
want to clarify a couple of numbers with the amount of sanction relief that was taken advantage of the three or $4 billion figure is that expected with the jpoa war what they have realized so far? will initially it was eight or 9 billion tell us how much they have taken advantage of over the next couple of months. >> that figure that i referenced is the top end estimates what it's iran may enjoy over the next four months comprised of the 2.a million dollars with its own restricted assets and then
some of figures for additional sales and auto imports which we estimate will be about $500 million altogether so that low estimate precisely how iran can take advantage of that suspension of the sanctions we see how it turns out. the initial jpoa period the estimate going in was that iran would have $67 billion as a maximum relief that estimate was actually overstated the best figures that iran enjoyed a little over $5 billion worth from that period with no relief
on the petro chemical suspension because it is difficult to take advantage that the one key fact is that it cannot be saved to have petrochemical sales it is difficult to find financial institutions to do that work but iran is at the table because of the effectiveness of the sanction is largely because it is the reverse is the west versus just the u.s.. it is important to keep the allies on board. do you have a concern mrs. sherman that to not extend your continue these negotiations they may cut
their own deal or move on without us? >> i wrote down which is exactly our point we would not proceed if we didn't think there was significant progress but having seen some progress heading in the right direction with the possibility of a comprehensive agreement, we thought it was critical to take diplomacy to the last possible point to get that agreement because the international community united in the enforcement of sanctions our partners are those who are not saw that we would cut it short but
deliver what members of congress have said will the administration come back for statutory relief would is the mechanism if it is reached? >> i can assure every member of the united states senate and of the house of representatives that congress is a constant topic of conversation by the iranians. they are well aware not only in terms of oversight or legislation but we have been clear initially there is only suspension of our sanctions regime and the international community to lift the sanctions we must return to congress will only
come when certain benchmarks reached because this has to be the agreement and only if the united states congress and governments believe the compliance is real and sustainable over a period of time. >> if the agreement is reached it is verifiable we will follow through i hope they also understand if we don't reach the agreement fits existing sanctions will be enforced and additional ones added ambles sides need to be interested. >> in the course of the joint plan of action we have committed to use certain sanctions as well as in good
faith to fill our commitments on the release side to take seriously what we have committed to so the iranians can understand there is potential light at the end of the tunnel with the steps necessary so we have been working hard on both sides of the coin. >> embassador sherman with those nonproliferation experts in the middle east it is critical if it succeeds to prevent iran from developing a weapon but even under the final agreement it has the capability i am concerned it could still raise fears in the region to prop up the
states with there contingency plans in their posture will saudi arabia and jordan are looking to agreements with united states had we convince them not to a demand to enrich uranium especially since we just concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement in vietnam to enrich uranium as well? >> is no question that is quite critical to ensure we do not have a proliferation cascade but if there is the comprehensive agreement the of the program it is very small and limited so for
other countries to proceed down that road and the untied states does not recognize that in the country has the right to enrichment in we will continue to vigorously enforce that. >> i want to comment on the claims that the country would lead the industrial scale capability to generate power the in the final agreement the every enrichment program is consistent with practical needs.:::::
could make the demand as well. is a possible a final agreement allows enrichment to continue would cause a proliferation in cascade in the region as other countries begin their own programs. >> we are well aware of potential risk of any agreement that allows in the country to enrich because we don't believe any country has a right with you on the open market for power generation so if we've reached a comprehensive agreement and to the enrichment program we believe that must be very small and limited fed is not industrial size and indeed i rand has talked about what is fuelled by russia and has
committed to do so and iran does not have the enrichment program so we agree with your concern and believe there should be limited and small need under intrusive monitoring s.a. a disincentive to want a similar program spinets this agreement does allow it to enrich from something better is more profound. >> are you concerned other players would seek their own capabilities and how does that impact regional tensions? >> we hope no one goes down this road as we try to create incentives to do otherwise or to proceed and we think they have more economical ways to get fuel for power generation and
clearly we want to make sure we have in place tremendous compliance should make it to the comprehensive agreement. >> then the greater the risk for those of national groups and so the smaller the program the more likely we will see that diversion so we're very close to reach that cascading point we have held off for decades since kennedy warned as we have held a number of countries. with u.n. panel of experts reminding us it has wide reaching procurement
networks to obtain materials on the global market these are complex operations with warehouses and airlines and violate u.n. security council resolutions passed in 2006 with the provision of items to be used in the program if it gains further sanctions as part of a nuclear deal what challenges with that goes to the efforts of facilitation and procurement networks that exist today? >> et un rapport is right to it does continue to try to illicitly acquired material through the procurement networks we continue to
identify and disrupt those networks and have taken action to disrupt those networks. going forward if there is the agreement that we are focused on we are sure during the course of the agreement we are able to continue to ensure the security council resolution there is for the of rules out what about paving over the site is that the urgent priority acting in a suspicious fashion? >> under the obligations to
the iaea to the analysis said is a critical element. >> we could be sure there is no planned test connectivity >> the final agreement includes iaea being satisfied the military dimensions of the program have been addressed. >> including inspections? >> that is where they are today. >> the queue for having this hearing with your work with iran and the nuclear activities and to the witnesses. one of the natural questions where are the gaps now and
we have had that's in another setting we realize that is not a good thing to have or discuss. but i know senator flake mentioned it is a historic opportunity but you although everyone a - - everyone wants a diplomatic solution but i think when the jpoa came out and acknowledged enrichment you saw a strong response from all involved we just went through the of one choose three agreements to not in rich bay at acknowledging enrichment there are concerns but i want to close by saying
despite we want you to be successful i heard what you said today that there is no deadline and i know you have to fudge a little bit but in essence there is not a deadline but you hope that there is. you would talk about double digits but may be that is better said in a classified setting of less is is very long we have done nothing. that you will have a conversation. we had a conversation with
the treaty we have known about with classified documents and that is not exactly the consultation and from when the jpoa discussions began. but it is beyond the lame-duck session and it appears he will do whatever you wish to do you will not consult congress you don't believe that is your responsibility you will have a conversation but not have the ability even though not in place but then to push
this tomb multilateral types of sanctions but again congress is relevant to raising concerns but not relevant to if this is approved by congress that is something all of us if way into into one there is the way to deal with that in the responsibilities and i think the witnesses. >> with all due respect senator i take the as states congress seriously and we do not believe it is a
conversation better consultation we believe you have or recite -- oversight authorities to provide you with realtime information and to continue to do so and every step of this negotiation it is critical the united states the one congress and working together for year to achieve that comprehensive agreement to carry that out to give us the assurance that every pathway to the nuclear weapon is closed off and a agreed with your opening statement we share the same goal. >>.
>> secretary sherman house significant is it the iranians have converted the 20% stockpile down at 5%? >> they have taken and they're 20% and either diluted did or oxidized they will take 25 kilograms about 25 percent of what they have a of a oxidized portion to turn it into a metal plate for the reactors so the likelihood to be converted back is extremely low. that is important. in addition as a result of the extension oxidize up to the 2% that is three metric tons although that does not have significant work units
the way you talk about the energy with the breakout scenario it is significant but that being said we are concerned about the 5% stockpile under the jpoa but we would want to deal with that as part of any comprehensive agreement. >> they have oxidized up to 20% that they have met their obligation. >> what is the administration's position to institute more sanctions and part of the bill is the right of any enrichment to be persuasive that
encourages them to do what they need to do or pushes them away from the negotiating table? >> we believe that this point it pushes them away and would push others as well. said to have great respect for the chairman and all members of the u.s. senate and the intentions are right to keep the pressure on iran to do what is necessary to do give the international community insurance to cut off the pathways the administration believes from this moment additional legislative action would potentially derailing the negotiation and iran is quite clear to congress will
pass legislation at any moment. >> can you quantify how this delays that break out time? is that quantifiable? six months? five months? >> what i prefer is in terms of specific breakout times to be fed in the classified setting. >> but it has to be. >> every element helps a breakout but until we get the comprehensive agreement we will not have the
be incorporated. i will say for the record the problem of course, iranians know we will pass sanctions but it is the lead time that is necessary has required a six months of notification and then the process to set them into enforcement takes longer unfortunately that amount of time is greater than breakout if they determine they want to break out so that is the conflict we can wait with the consequences is less so there is no greater thanksgiving day gift for you all to be successful for our country and the iranian people and the world. but the concerns here are
legitimate in the next panel which is excellent looking at the testimony of who's spent 27 years it was well-respected and what he says what it demonstrates iran continues to challenge the obligation to verify the declaration with the safeguards agreement the of legality of the resolution and the iaea practices reporting the findings to the iaea board and to win security council that letter was june 4th, a 2014. challenging basically everything it is doing but we are in the midst of negotiations that all these
questions we have discussed we will get their informants maybe there is something in between? second, i a appreciate what treasury has been doing that even despite that part of the challenge reface -- we face yes of iran's economy is bad but it is better than it was because the of that positive sentiment created by virtue of the joint plan of action and its extension that helps to create some modest growth. gdp will grow at 2 percent that is modest but a huge improvement over the fiscal year with gdp contracted 7.6 % and inflation will go
down in the first quarter so the rate of inflation dipped below 20% but less than half than 45%. so there are consequences for our wray and -- for iran to get them to do the right thing. and i spend the fair amount of time but i went back to read years of the editorials about north korea and it is amazing to me the language that was used about the aspirations we were seeking with north korea is the language used now with their real.
there is an example the no deal is better than a bad deal that was devised with north korea because it failed to dismantle the infrastructure. and we all thought it was success than the seeing that they cheated we cannot have that. i am glad to hear they pay attention to congress that since one hell of a message but because the stakes are so high we have a deep respect and we have a neutral cool you may not
always like that but at the end of the data is positive positive:the call of our next panel mr. heinonen from international affairs at the kennedy school of government and mr. singh see your fellow and managing director at the washington is to. -- institute. we want to thank our witnesses, a please do so quietly and the new panel's full statements are included in the record without objection we would like you tussaud verizon in five minutes so we could have the give-and-take like the first panel and now going to
mr. more who was listed to be a witness but took ill today so we do not have his benefit today that we will at another time. >> chairman and ranking member and members of the committee thank you for letting me address this hearing we have experienced much from iran it has not cooperated with iaea in particular with of military nuclear program. jpoa has proceeded well but they have also seen headwinds. iaea demonstrates iran into tears the challenge.
[inaudible] in reporting its findings. iran has been running the nuclear program with the obligations to disregard the resolutions it bears heavily to show the program. and with the negotiators crafting the agreement i highlight some of the basic reasons. the first it is important for the agreement to look devil elevations and delays to achieve compliance. iran has a complete declaration of the program to serve as a clear cut baseline for military base
practical needs go straight to the verification. it is a complex task. [inaudible] iaea must have a prompt warning of violations so the declaration is acquired by iran with the iranian stocks keeping track of the of the activities and their efforts. the long term agreement and other provisions are referred to as additional protocols.
iran has also resisted making concessions about what to do with that which would exceed the total agreed number. if not removed and rendered harmless, it would reconstitute the operations and create a sizable breakout capability. adequate for the last point. and it must remove the response to the major violations by iraq. reports from the key part of member states can use these reports to complement their findings. the uranium is the more difficult and time-consuming person and the uranium at its
disposal the material would vanish. [inaudible] as wa was the case of south afr. in a summary it would be more time-consuming over many years. it took for the medium-sized nuclear programs in europe with the comprehensive agreement and that is implemented about five years of the nuclear material in the countries and forcing peaceful use. forthcoming and cooperation in iran could set the tone for the country to have in place but limited nuclear program. the system endorsed by the security council is needed to support a long-term deal. thank you.
>> chairman and is thank you for this opportunity to address the committee. i'm a strong supporter of the diplomatic resolution to the iran nuclear crisis and i've been involved in the talks since their inception. i am concerned that we are not close to the true diplomatic resolution that in fact is we have a deal it's likely to be postponed. and aand at weekends or it begio achieve such a resolution. i am concerned it is going to be one that falls short of the minimum requirements. it's not likely to require them to dismantle anything including facilities that have built a violation of the requirements. to permit new activity under the jpoa. on the weaponization activity or give access to military sites as
was said. it won't deal with the missiles that are such a vexing threat in places like east asia as we have seen in other reports and it would allow in a matter of years to be free of any constraints whatsoever and what we get in exchange for this deal is a commitment not to build nuclear weapons but of course the reason that we are engaged in this process is they have violated a similar commitments in the past. we would also get an enhanced inspections but i do think we are placing too much stock on what inspections can achieve because they would be hampered by first the size of a program m that we would leave in place under such a deal and by the refusal to come clean on its past work. frankly the absence of the willingness on the part of the u.s. or the international community to enforce. and the mor more that we leave n place, the less likely the community will be to punish incremental obligations.
the regime as bot both if you kw plays a major role in the stabilizing the middle east and supporting terrorism. frankly the arms embargo that is in place which would address for example groups like hamas comes from resolution 1747 that could be lifted as part of the deal. this deal that we are talking about would leave tremendous nuclear capability in the hands of the regime and enrichment regime but it would also have other negative implications for the interest. i think it would give other states have the opportunity to match the capabilities and would undermine the nonproliferation efforts globally and encourage the spread of admiration technology to other places. and i think it would damage our own influence and prestige which are already pretty damaged and this is the issue i think those would be most judge in the middle east. how have we reached this juncture that we are at right now? if you look in exchange for
temporary steps we have made major concessions they have been seeking for a long time that it could enrich uranium indefinitely and any constraints would be temporary. we have the saying tha been sayg is agreed until everything is and i think it is more complicated than that. it would be difficult to take back these concessions for any future negotiations. we also frankly have not put forward a frightening alternative to an agreement which i think is later on to reject very generous offers our sanctions threat has been undermined and we've not responded to that increase that we were talking about earlier. our military threat has been undermined because of the paralyzed decisio decision thate the situations in syria, iraq and elsewhere and i think that it was in error for us to stray from what had been the previous approach. they dismantled their nuclear
facilities in exchange for the dismantling against it. iran and our own officials have portrayed that as maximalist. but it's reasonable because as it was stated there is no need for those activities that we are asking it to forgo but it does have the need for sanctions relief. i think we should be prepared and we are prepared to accept the nuclear program in iran on the condition that the imports of fuel as most countries in the world including the united states. the only scenario that we should be prepared to live into capability is one in which we see evidence of a broad strategic shift by iran and it is not an evidence in its refusal to be transparent about what it's done on the nuclear issue in the past. the most important question for policymakers is how do we make a good deal.
i think we can do that in a number of ways we can strengthen the sanctions threat in the congress and the sanctions will following the agreement and i think the action is required now. we need to act more in response to what appeared to be dissertation as some of the members set of distinction of ss and the increased exports in particular. in the messages about the commitment to this region and backing up the message with adequate defensive diplomatic intelligence resources by taking the steps to counter the support for their purpose and in the provision of the rockets and things like that to counter that impression that they get a free pass as long as the talks are going on in we can try to strengthen to the point. so to end this i worry that we have become captive to this
choice in this prospect of the military conflict. i reject that and i think the choice is between the deal that will set back the interest and a firm the approach that holds out the hope of advancing the interest. >> thank you for your testimony. you bring up important points. you wrote in an article recently that the negotiations have shown that the principle guiding the positions are markedly different than those in iran. can you explain the two sets of principles that you are referring to and at the positions in the body those different sets of positions make it more difficult to reach an agreement? >> i think if you look at the history they have been going enough in years. this is a story about 4,000 night and not 1,000.
and you look at what has been the driving force in iran and they want to maintain and save their nuclear program which will include uranium enrichment and it will include also the capability to produce plutonium in a heavy reactor and this has been all along there through the hardships. you read the statements made in 2005 when he left the office and how he explained he was able under difficult circumstances to preserve the program by suspending it for a while and how he was able to rescue the uranium conversion program. then we looked at the talks of today when the supreme leader says that we want to have 190,000 centrifuges and produce
uranium fuel for the reactor it's clear that the bottom line in the program has to survive and then you look at the challenges they are facing if they want to produce the nuclear fuel. the first thing is the fact they don't have enough in their soil to support such programs. what good is it for you if you cannot find your own uranium soil. when you look at this one, the reason is they want to preserve the program from that declaration. then the other side is actually we don't want to add the enrichment program because of a number of reasons. this is what i meant it's a very
different starting point and unfortunately now the situation is the spiritual leader said its 190,000. so it is a great number. i mentioned this idea iranian ambassador questioning all of the authorities in this regard. >> is this extending the period, what do you think is the intent? >> this tells me when the agreement will be there whatever will be negotiated in the next few months when it comes to the implementation they have the talk with iran and since these are the same people that are productive negotiation committee are still posturin, they arestie
that is their periods of the negotiations start with every action they try to take to be challenged. >> you are saying even presuming that the negotiators can reach an agreement in four months then there will be a whole other set of negotiations with the iaea as to how in fact those agreements would be enforced? >> what lesson should we draw from the framework agreement of north korea as we deal with this one? >> i think that there are similar lessons at the first ant thing that we learn is exactly the same.
north korea was about to leave and therefore they said that they are not found with the safeguards agreement and therefore they didn't do certain things and they tell us every step in the process but they did and i can give you an example. we were not even able to produce the inspection because it is in the agreement and therefore you cannot. i don't think that iran would take that line but it would be the uphill battle as we've already seen between iran and very recently they've challenged some of these actions taken.
>> when i hear the secretary sherman say that they would have to satisfy, that can be based upon the actions dedicated for some time in terms of what baby leave is appropriate for the verification and enforcement on both of the dimensions including the possible weaponization elements while the sanctions relief was suspended. >> this is a good remark and the only thing i would say that they need to pay for this agreement in such a way that it becomes legally binding and that when one is not in compliance and noncompliance has consequences. is that what we ask you your
final is a good model the south african model which ultimately admitted in 1993 to possess a nuclear program of nuclear tensions. the dimensions and then showed a allowing anywhere at anytime inspections that took 17 years to get it clean bill of health. that is elicited program tha the are talking about in iran but what is your perception of that tax >> it is less and more of a program because they have much more nuclear material before and there was a history of operation for 20 years. and one of the stumbling blocks is actually the verification of the race. there were 70,000 borrowers and it took a long time just to go through those. but why it was successful was the government had given up the
nuclear weapons program. they wanted to close that chapter in the history of south africa. and in order to do that, they needed someone to certify that and that organization was the iaea said the operation was there. once they did the disclosure in 1993 it was easy to go because the whole government was set up to help to complete its mission. but if that change doesn't take place in iran that they come clean code they want to come clean it is good to be difficult as it was in north korea. >> so even though in this case south africa determined as a government that it wanted to end that chapter in its history wanted to end its nuclear program it took 17 years to get a clean bill of health with the government willing and wanting to end its nuclear program i think tha that is pretty instrue
when we say long-term verification and an important ot agreement it is very difficult to the code different the two paradigms where south africa was at. senator corker? >> thank you mr. chairman and member for being here. i listened to some of the complications related to having this negotiation after the fact, and i know the way it has to occur. but i wondered we keep pressing about the full transparency of what the program is about in the past. as to how important is that to understand fully what the program was in the past. >> you don't need to know everyone from the program. but you need to know how far.
one part is the risk assessment. how much of the unknowns you tolerate when you agree with the number of centrifuges if you allow them to have a short break out into centrifuges. that is one reason. the second reason with your unknown is you certainly don't want to know how far and you want to see that they are not reconstituting the program. so therefore, you need to know what was done, where it was done and how it was done into this took place in south africa, still in 2010 they visited some of the military sites to confirm that those actions are not reconstituted so that is very important in setting the baseline so that the proper
scheme can be established. >> and when you do that, how do you know that when people are sharing with you what they were doing in the past, how do you know that that has been in reality what they were doing in the past? >> it's actually a number of things. you look at what peopl people tu yotell youyou look at the expery have been doing. do they make sense and debated the nuclear program at that point in time when they do those experiments? you can indirectly confirm by seeing the equipment they brought forth for that and others that have taken place. so it is where you have bits and pieces all over and have some of the gaps that you can establish what has taken place and there
have been no outliers or inconsistencies. >> one more question along those lines especially in a country like iran that has multiple silos and arrangements with the entities at some times are a part of the government and sometimes are not coming how do you know that there isn't some clandestine program clinics how do you know they have assurances especially in the country like iran that there isn't some other activities that are taking place in thand whatplace, and what kie deputies does the organization have to actually figured out how to? >> they have their own authorities and practices and skills but it also calls from the support of the member states and actually, this is the reason that i wrote to my testimony that the report is in a very transparent way what they have seen and what they have been told and what is where so that
the member states can have their own beans to find those details were formed their own picture thaabout the program and can ses this consistent with what iran tells them and the important thing is that why this means quite a lot when the ambassador in his letter said he doesn't like the way they did is they put because this is one of the keys to the success. and only then they can serve the member states if you ask that information. >> thank you for your testimony. the answer is a goalposts continue to move as we talk about where the deal is going but i just want to give a hypothetical.
let's say they ended up in a situation with a 3,000 centrifuges and very expensive and intrusive extensions. how does that affect the behavior in the region and the ability in the future how it would affect the neighborhood? >> it's important to note that sort of deal doesn't seem to be in the prospect because on some of those issues that you mentioned before, we have already -- >> i appreciate the testimony candidly and i feel very aligned with much of what you have to say. but let just go back to again unfortunately we have seen the goalposts move if let's say that hypothetically that is where things ended up. talk with me about the response. >> a lot of it would depend on not just the particulars in the
field of the context as well. look at some of our allies are not happy with the concessions that we've made. they would like us to not have made those concessions. but i think that if we had a -- >> is a big part of the p5? >> that is hard to answer because some of our allies may not be happy with those that they are unlikely t to say that publicly. some of the allies in the region and the gulf states have been more outspoken in the way they feel about that. and so, the risks they are i think is that position in the region how do they perceive the nature of the agreement and therefore the context of the policy in the region is important to healthy allies and others with judge judy view this as an expression of american resolve or do they view this as an expression of american weakness? so i think that if we have the right sort of policy context what are we doing in syria and in iraq, or we repairing the system in the region?
we can influence the folks see that agreement and then we can influence how they view our willingness to actually uphold in agreement. an agreement. in my view, i think that concessions we made about conceding in richmond and any number of centrifuges to iran that is not a good deal to conceive and we shouldn't have done that. and that i is the view that is widely shared in the region. but again i think the context is important and to improve the situation and how it is perceived that he can take certain steps. >> you included to the fact we started off in a not great place and people on both sides of the aisle are concerned about where we began. the use of the testimony you thought we could get to a good ending still. so, with where we began and where we are, how would you go about doing that?
>> the reality is we are where we are in the associations with the question before was how do we take the situation and make a good deal out of it and make the best situation. first i think the congress has a role to play in that and there has to be broad body in a politically for the agreement to succeed in the long term because of course it is important i think that the congress will have a role lifting the sanctions and the next administration will have a role in this agreement, so i think you need to have that broad political line so that's important. i do think from where we are now, we should be focused on those principles which the doctor articulated in making sure whatever agreement comes out is as strong as possible but i do think we should consider that any final sanctions relief again would be depended not just on these particular steps that on the evidence of the broader strategic shift by iran and the evidence that in fact they are going in a different direction and therefore that they are perhaps more trust and
confidence that they would actually uphold the other side of the bargain. and again i think that we can take steps on the other side. because remember for the states to agree to the deal isn't just about within the deal but it's about what is the alternative and we need to take steps from iran's perspective an's p5 perst means strengthening the credibility of the military threat and i think we do those things then perhaps we can influence the perception of what is a good feel? >> thank you both. i know this trouble to prepare testimontestimony and be here. we all benefit greatly and i want to thank you both for being here. bickley about noon at these hearings. things kind of clear after the other meetings but i know people are paying attention. and they break your written testimony. thank you. >> thank you senator. once the second panel with all due respect to the first panel is as important if not more insightful.
i want to revisit the doctor something that you responded to such is not insignificant. basically, you said when the iranian ambassador among their complaints to the iea ea was complaining about the way in which they were issuing the reports to its member states that the reason it is important to issue its report to its member states in the manne a man which they are doing it is because then the member states can use their own intelligence and information to judge whether what the iea ea has been told is along the lines of what they know from their intelligence.
>> it's not insignificant when the ambassador says i don't agree. i think that you are not reporting correctly. it may look like an insignificant element but it can be very significant if the states will make a judgment in this respect. >> and the complaint has been there the last five years. it started to arrive somewhere around 2007, 2006. so it's been quite some time and it is repeated and i personally thought with this new team that this kind of language disappears but apparently that is not the case.